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General Abstract 
In the contemporary world, the fight against impunity has become a fundamental political 
claim, a social goal and a main concern for human rights movements. However, it is unclear how 
we can delimit this fight, what are its aims and, ultimately, the remedies it proposes to overcome 
impunity. The academic studies and human rights mechanisms referring to this issue are not 
sufficiently clarifying. They often lack clear theoretical distinctions and stable empirical 
observations. Moreover, in social discourses impunity is employed with extremely vague 
connotations. This research addresses this lacuna, offering a conceptualization and characterization 
of impunity from a socio-legal perspective. With this purpose in mind, this work develops an 
analysis of impunity through the study of a particular kind of criminality.  
 
The study of state crime provides a prolific perspective for the analysis of the phenomenon 
of impunity, allowing to visualize the constitution of different blockages against the autonomous 
operation of the criminal justice. Particularly, this research studies an event of enforced 
disappearance initiated at the siege of the Colombian Palace of Justice in 1985, through a 
reconstruction focused on the perspective of the victims using a combination of qualitative 
methods. This field work, alongside different explorations of the sociological, human rights and 
criminological state of art of impunity, provides a sociological reflection on the concept of 
impunity. In the end, taking into account the problematization of the concept and its uses in social 
discourses, this work proposes a conceptualization apt for overcoming the vagueness of the 
definition of impunity as well as allowing a delimitation of the fight against it, leaving space for 
possible innovations on the penal rationality and possibly reinforcing a human rights agenda, 
concerned with the escalation of repression through punishment and committed with the 
restoration of social links and the victims’ rights.  
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1. Introduction 
 
  ‘There is nothing to be done, it is a state crime’ 
Impunity is an undeniably evocative and pervasive term. It has become so ubiquitous that 
its meaning is deemed obvious (Penrose 2000: 273). We all refer to impunity as an evident term 
and do so with a connotation of social regret. In social discourses, impunity is often used for broad 
and varied purposes: denouncing injustice, supporting law and order politics, expressing regret for 
social wrongdoing or mobilizing civil society, among others.  
The early nineteenth century understanding of impunity as a possibly valid mechanism for 
dealing with social unease, juvenile delinquency, political transitions or situations of widespread 
criminality, is currently demoted. Contemporary western societies refer to impunity as a problem: 
“[i]n the twenty- first century, fighting impunity has become both the rallying cry and a metric of 
progress for human rights” (Engle, Miller and Davis 2016: 1).  
The patent consensus against impunity, however, has not contributed to a sociological 
clarification of its notion and extent. Even though it is rare to come across academic studies 
problematizing and conceptualizing what impunity is, our work will refer to this issue as a social 
phenomenon in the sense that it is an observable fact of social life. Indeed, our starting point for 
developing a characterization and conceptualization of impunity is that this phenomenon exists in 
society. Although it is not difficult to find misleading notions of what impunity is and even though 
it may be difficult to delimit and describe it - some literature in the field recognizes that probably 
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no definition is exempted from major conceptual problems (Bonet & Fernández 2009; Penrose 
2000; Alvarez 2012), this phenomenon will not be understood in this work as a mere social 
illusion: it is because impunity exists that we need to assess how we can observe it.  
The present research will address these problems and lacunae through a problematization 
and elucidation around how we can observe, conceptualize and characterize impunity from a socio-
legal perspective. Bearing this purpose in mind, considering the wide-ranging universe of 
wrongdoing from which impunity may arise, a preliminary step was the selection of a particular 
form of misconduct enabling a significant perspective for deconstructing and reconstructing a 
conceptualization of impunity. With this respect, our initial explorations suggested that crimes 
committed with the acquiescence, support or direct involvement of the State had a particular 
interrelation with the phenomenon of impunity. Thus, we decided to study state crime considering 
the possible analytical advantage that this kind of criminality may offer for exploring our research 
question: how can we observe, conceptualize and characterize impunity from a socio-legal 
perspective through the study of state crime?  
States assume their authority from the proclaimed aim of protecting and guaranteeing the 
life and rights of the people. When States appear as instigators, collaborators or active actors of 
criminal activity, there is a documented tendency to block any public scrutiny. In literature and 
through social experience, we can find evidence that this kind of wrongdoing often lacks social 
restraint and proper redress. For these observations, impunity may emerge as a key notion.  
In state crimes studies, impunity is often addressed as a violation of a human right that 
generally takes place when states shield from legal reaction those who commit human rights 
abuses on their behalf (Aldana-Pindell 2004: 606-608). Sometimes impunity is understood as a 
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transitional justice problem, when evaluating the reaction of the criminal law towards state crimes 
committed during regimes overruled in the context of political transformation (Eser, Arnold & 
Kreicker 2002). At times, impunity is viewed as a problem of the criminal justice with differing 
possible solutions ranging from a retributivist perspective (center of gravity of the current 
construction of the fight against impunity) to with a (extremely marginal) restorative orientation. 
However ambiguous in the literature, we considered that an analysis of this form of criminality 
might enable an analytical advantage to further our understanding of the phenomenon of impunity.  
A socio-legal problematization and conceptualization of impunity through the study of state 
criminality could not be properly conducted without an empirical reference. Our socio-legal 
construction will be guided by both a theoretical study and a fieldwork. These two axes of research 
will be integrated into a shared field of analysis. Borrowing Bateson’s (1972) terms, we aim at 
achieving a sort of ‘pincers maneuver’ (operation en pince), by which the observations of social 
life and the fundamentals of science or philosophy form one single field for the scientific 
exploration of a problem (the concept of impunity). Within this interconnected field of reflection, 
empirics and theory, each of which with “its own kind of authority” (Bateson 1972: 6), should 
operate under a cooperative interaction, avoiding any preeminence, hierarchy or subordination. In 
this line, we attempt to achieve a form of exchange by which every development of our axes of 
research involves the movement of the whole corpus of reflection.  
The empirical analysis of this work is based on an event of enforced disappearance 
occurred in 1985 at the Palace of Justice in Colombia (hereinafter, the PJ case). This case consists 
of a series of crimes materialized during the taking of the National Palace of Justice by the ‘M19’ 
guerrilla and the subsequent retaking of the building by the military, in November 1985. At the PJ, 
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around one hundred people perished, including eleven justices of the Supreme Court and thirty-
five guerrillas; a conflagration consumed a significant part of the structure of the Palace and a 
number of hostages were released. The military labelled some as accomplices of the guerrilla and 
held them for interrogation. During their detention, some people were tortured, some were killed 
and some were forcibly disappeared (IA Court 2014).  
The present research will focus the analysis on the crime of enforced disappearance as well 
as its subsequent criminalization. Thirty years after the events there have been numerous legal 
inquiries: some judgments have been passed, but procedures have shed little light on those 
responsible for the wrongdoing as well as on finding the people disappeared. Indeed, not all the 
bodies have been recovered and there has been no final conviction of any of those involved in the 
disappearances. Over thirty-one years have elapsed and the victims are still wondering: where are 
the people that disappeared from the Palace of Justice and what happened to them?  
The case study is relevant, exemplary and important for exploring our research question, 
especially with regard to the legal system reaction vis-à-vis the criminal events. With this respect, 
among a great amount of legal procedures in national and international courts, we will focus on the 
study of the criminal dossier against retired Colonel Alfonso Plazas Vega (hereinafter, Plazas or 
retired Col. Plazas), who was in charge of the field operation to retake the Palace of Justice. He 
was found guilty of enforced disappearance by the tribunals but afterwards acquitted by the 
Supreme Court of Justice.  
We decided to focus on this dossier because it resulted in the first conviction of a high 
ranked military officer by ordinary tribunals for the PJ events and for the crime of enforced 
disappearance –although he was later acquitted. The indictment against retired Col. Plazas initiated 
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a lengthy procedure that undertook all possible instances within the domestic criminal justice 
system. This trajectory will allow us to review different instances of the criminal procedures, 
covering more than thirty years of history of the case. The dossier against retired Col. Plazas is also 
paradigmatic because of his status. Plazas is a prominent figure of the Colombian military, 
enjoying a widespread support amongst the Colombian traditional political class – especially of the 
political Right. For these reasons, the independent and most prestigious national magazine, Semana 
(2009), qualified this process as “the trial of the decade”: “[t]his is the first time that a senior 
military is on the bench for the crime of enforced disappearance. In the past, this seemed restricted 
to Southern Cone dictatorships.” (Semana 2009). 
The PJ case presents a paramount historical relevance in Colombia; however, this event 
will not be dealt with through a phenomenological account. Our study of the case will focus on 
enabling a field of reflection around the system of ideas, notions, discourses and practices that it 
brings about. This intends to habilitate further observations, intercommunications and analysis 
when dealing with the concept of impunity in reference to the problem at hand of state criminality.  
Concerning the mentioned elements and considering our analytical and conceptual aims, 
this case study is intended to furnish a point of reflection for our research question. As asserted 
before, this construction will be drawn in constant dialogue with the different parts of this research 
that will be divided into five main parts: the methodology (Chapter 2), the case of study (Chapter 3), 
the study and characterization of state crime (Chapter 4), the conceptualization and elucidation of 
impunity (Chapter 5) and, finally, the conclusions (Chapter 6).  
In the methodology (chapter 2), we intend to offer a general characterization of the methods 
used for the research, as well as the structure and criteria for the selection, observation and analysis of 
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the information gathered in this work from literature and our own fieldwork. From a methodological 
perspective, this work can be characterized as a qualitative study based on a case study. With the 
purpose of exploring the research questions proposed in this project, this research will depict and 
analyze relevant experiences, ideas and discourses of four main groups of people involved in the 
case study: the victims, their lawyers, the defendant and the judicial operators related to the case. 
By depicting how victims, lawyers and justice operators construct their views, our objective will be 
to observe how they understand the notion of impunity and which elements could be significant for 
the observation of state criminality. The experiences, ideas and discourses of these actors will be 
depicted, developed and analyzed based on different sources of information. This exploration will 
include the analysis of legal records, a media and documentary review, observation in situ of 
different public commemorations related to the case, and thirty-one face-to-face semi-structured in-
depth interviews. These sources of information are varied and complementary, providing a rich 
combination of primary and secondary information.  
Following our general methodological considerations, in Chapter 3 we will describe the 
case selected for the present research. In this part, we will offer a structured account of the Palace 
of Justice case reconstructing its antecedents and context (Section 3.1), the events of the taking and 
the operation to retake the Palace and the disappearances (Section 3.2), as well as a summary of the 
legal proceedings dealing with these actions, covering a period from 1985 to 2016 (Section 3.3). 
Working with our case study attempts at contributing to understand, enrich and characterize the 
link between the lack of legal intervention and state criminal actions suggested by the literature. 
The great amount of information that the PJ case provides and the prolific field of reflection that 
the crime of enforced disappearance enables may be important for furthering our understanding 
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around the operation of the criminal law system and, therefore, for addressing the problem of 
impunity.    
Considering this study, in Chapter 4 we will analyze and characterize the phenomenon of 
state crime. During the twentieth century, conservative estimations calculate between 100 million 
and 135 million deaths caused by the deliberate actions of the State (Friedrichs 1992: 54). Despite 
this fact, certain authors assert that there is a lack of research, curiosity and awareness on this topic 
(Rothe 2009: xvii). Others assert that the subject of state crime has often been raised by 
criminology but its implications have been “conveniently repressed” (Cohen 1993: 98). Among a 
variety of views, there seems to be a consensus on state crime literature about the need of more 
detailed, empirical and conceptual research: some commentators affirm that state crime research is 
still in its infancy (Grewcock, 2012).  
Indeed, our preliminary approximations to this subject allow us to find different opacities: 
in Latin America, some commentators disagree with the notion of state crime claiming it to be a 
merely dramatic term leading nowhere. Others, especially coming from social and human rights 
movements, have embraced it as a significant form of naming and blaming state criminal 
wrongdoing –often through vague characterizations that ultimately refer to every possible injustice 
where state agents play a part. Indeed, a constant problem for the research is the notion state crime 
is employed with great ambiguity. The pervasive elusiveness around the characterization of state 
criminality involves a need to offer a socio-legal characterization of this phenomenon. With this 
purpose, we will explore and problematize the literature on the field, taking into account the 
developments from the international law (Section 4.1), sociology and criminology (Section 4.2), 
together with empirical considerations based on our case study. 
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This characterization aims at clarifying the empirical and theoretical delimitation of this kind 
of criminality but, fundamentally, our exploration on the subject of state crime intends to give a 
particular analytical advantage for our study of impunity.  
Considering these developments, the first objective of Chapter 5 will be to offer an account 
of the notions that social discourses have built around impunity (Section 5.1). This exploration will 
be based on a national poll conducted in Colombia about the perceptions of impunity, 
representative of the opinions of the adult urban population. The study of social discourses around 
impunity has the aim of enabling a problematization of the concept. In addition to this study, we 
will conduct a state of art of specialized sources about impunity, focusing on the human rights 
doctrine, jurisprudence and normativity (Section 5.2).  
With respect to informal and specialized discourses around impunity, Section 5.3 will 
provide a critical analysis of existing social discourses, exploring their different connotations in 
contemporary western societies. By exploring the characteristics that the term impunity presents 
from the perspective of these discourses, we will attempt at detecting different problems, blind 
spots and paradoxes that they bring to the socio-legal understanding of the phenomenon.  
In the search for a conceptualization concerned with dealing with the problems that the 
notion of impunity raises within informal and specialized social discourses, the final part of this 
chapter will attempt at conceptualizing and characterizing impunity from a sociological 
perspective. As stated before, in the literature the word impunity is recurrently enunciated and its 
concept is often identified with the automatic notion of the lack of punishment. This perception 
often lacks further theoretical and empirical delimitations, and especially has the connotation of 
disregarding the potential of the fight against impunity for reproducing a criminal accountability 
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constructed around measures of intended infliction of pain (the traditional program of action of the 
criminal system).  
In our view, this suggests a lack of sufficient sociological reflection on the phenomenon of 
impunity, making relevant the question: how can we observe impunity from a sociological 
perspective? With the purpose of answering this question, in Section 5.5 we will propose a 
conceptualization using a strategy of both exclusion and inclusion. Through a strategy of exclusion, 
we will attempt to depict, characterize and discount the conceptual elements that, according to our 
study of the social discourses, hinder an appropriate construction around the conceptualization of 
impunity. This operation will attempt at diluting different conceptual obstacles, enabling the 
visualization, adoption and inclusion of different conceptual elements apt and valuable for a socio-
legal construction of the notion. The subsequent inclusion will therefore attempt at identifying, 
selecting and developing different sociological elements for a general conceptualization of impunity.  
Finally, based on the former developments, chapter 6 will offer a series of concluding 
remarks on the conceptual and analytical reflections of impunity through the study of state 
criminality and the case that this research explores. When dealing with these phenomena, we do 
not only intend to problematize their conceptualization but also their practices, underlying ideas, 
and consequent discourses.  
On the one hand, we intend to critically observe, analyze and understand criminal actions 
committed with the acquiescence, support or direct involvement of the State. On the other hand, 
we find important to contribute to a problematization and innovative understanding of the fight 
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against impunity and, ultimately, of the program of action of the criminal justice system1. Thus, 
this research intends to offer a critical perspective of the traditional way of thinking about 
punishment. Thus, through the topic of impunity this work will suggest a reflection on the 
practices, discourses, ideas, values of use and content of the criminal law system. A serious debate 
about impunity should address the possibilities of controlling criminal actions preserving a critical 
and innovative regard on what can and should be the social response to these actions.  
Last, not least, I would like to conclude this introduction by mentioning that an important 
part of this research originates from different personal reflections based on my own experience of 
victimization2. On April 18, 1998, my father was assassinated. He was a prestigious human rights 
defender in Colombia. Among other cases, he was the lawyer of the families of those who were 
disappeared in the Palace of Justice - the case that we study in the present research. At the time, it 
was vox populi that the military were involved in his killing. On several occasions, my 
grandparents visited the Prosecutor General’s office demanding a serious investigation. In one of 
their visits, the Prosecutor General told my grandmother: “There is nothing to be done, it is a state 
crime”. Years have passed and, to date, the enquiries have not offered any results. Like the case of 
my father, several crimes in my home country have been perpetrated without legal reaction, control 
or even a minimal social attention. 
Concerning the problems and themes of the present research, my personal stance proposes a 
positioned perspective for the academic study. In classical terms, this issue may be formulated as a 
                                       
1 The expression program of action refers to an arrangement of ideas forming a philosophical framework 
guiding its actors in their discourses, practices and notions. The program of action is not an action but a form 
of orienting the action, ideas that can frame choices (Durkheim 1922: 69; García 2013: 46; Pires 2008: 5).  
2 “It is often useful within social sciences to rely on personal experiences, or at least take this as our point of 
departure.” (Christie 1986: 17) 
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problem of possible objectivity. Is my experience of the problem under study from a position of 
victimization an obstacle for my academic reflections? Or, perhaps, does this constitute a privileged 
perspective nourished by different inner elements for the evaluation of the problems studied in this 
research? In our view, none of these alternatives should be taken for granted.  
Social sciences’ field of observation is fundamentally formed by the comprehension, 
interpretation and experience of human beings who participate in social life. The activity of 
researching in this field involves different forms of relation with the object of research. The researcher 
has a social experience that is part of his or her approach to the problems under study –“toute science 
(sociale) participe, qu’elle le veuille ou non, puisque sans participation […] il n’y a pas de recherche 
tout court.” (Pires 1997a: 44). There are various degrees of identification, distance and involvement 
with the social issues under study.  
In my case, due to my personal experience, I might be placed in an insider perspective vis-à-
vis the social problems that this work explores. This position does not automatically enable or 
impede a scientific approximation to the investigation. Rather than an advantage or a handicap, the 
connection with the subject of research can be portrayed as a condition for the observations. Using 
a classical term, the ‘objectivity’ that this work seeks is what Weber (1949: 98) calls the 
elementary duty of scientific self-control. Understanding that there is no free-value observation, 
such duty involves avoiding conducting scientific observations and constructing conclusions 
through mere judgments of value. In line with this, the researcher must seek scientific rigor for 
developing the arguments and a rich account of information and sources enabling external and 
internal awareness around the constraints and richness proposed by the researcher.  
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Using again a classical expression, the subjectivity that this work intends to avoid is the 
arbitrariness of the observations, the lack of analysis, reflection, auto-critique and self-control of 
mere judgments of value. “Bref, l’objectivation n’est pas incompatible avec la participation, mais 
seulement avec la participation apologétique.” (Pires 1997a: 44). The meticulousness in regard to 
the data gathered and the thoroughness of the analyses are fundamental to this purpose. Preserving 
the relation with the subject under research demands at the same time being aware of that condition 
and allowing a critical approach to our own positions and to the problem under study. This may be 
understood as a general duty for any academic work; however, the degree of engagement with the 
object of study can require specific efforts and special care in order to honor such serious aim.  
In the case of the present research, our ideas will be drawn with an experience of 
victimization. This process of reflection entails particular challenges. Having experienced the 
phenomenon under study from a perspective of victimhood involves a duty of consistency and 
special attention regarding the development of the process, the sources of information and their 
interpretation. During the research, I was constantly confronted. My own experiences, emotions 
and ideas on criminality, criminal accountability and impunity were continuously in motion. 
Throughout the process of research and while drafting this thesis, I have endeavored to carry out a 
rigorous reflection with academic care, honesty and scientific consistency, capable of offering deep 
considerations on the importance of preserving life, social bonds and constructing a more humane 
society. With this purpose, a serious program of action could be nourished by a critical assessment 
of the current philosophy of intervention of the criminal law system with the purpose of creating a 
space for innovation before criminal wrongdoing and its accountability. 
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2. Methodology 
 
This work employs a qualitative methodology based on a case study. This methodology 
intended to allow the observation, analysis and elucidation of the notions, characteristics, problems 
and paradoxes emerging from the social practices, ideas and discourses constructed around the 
phenomena of impunity and state crime. The observation and description of the information 
gathered in this research was conducted through the exploration of different events (empirics), 
alongside a study and discussion of the academic literature (theory) referring to our subject of 
research.  The present work employed a model of observation integrating theory and empirics for 
developing our inquiries.  
This research attempted at drawing a constant contrast and exchange between the 
observations coming from the empirics and the ideas elaborated on the basis of the theory. For the 
present research this form of interaction was characterized as a model; consequently, it was not 
only meant to describe the information gathered and the process of research but constituted a 
guiding parameter for our observations. This model was theoretical-empirical because it took into 
consideration both theoretical elaborations and empirical observations with the purpose of forming 
a common field of observation – “two bodies of knowledge, neither of which can be ignored” 
(Bateson 1972: 6). The constitution of this shared space of study suggests a constant interplay of 
empirics and theory.  
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The form of constructing the observations for this research should not be understood 
neither as inductive nor deductive, but rather as integrated: the empirics of the case study are not 
aimed at constructing theoretical generalizations, nor will we provide theoretical generalizations 
tested through the specific case study. In this line, we intend to abandon the classical instrumental 
use either of empirics or theory, drawing a progressive integration of these fields of research. In 
line with this model, the interrelation between theory and empirics is non-hierarchical. Such 
interaction intends to connect theory and empirics with no particular preeminence of any of these 
aspects. In a way, empirical observations permeate the conceptual work while the theory sheds 
light upon the observations around the fieldwork.  
In this manner, we intend to take a step beyond the traditional inductive/deductive approach 
conducting a sort of ‘pincers maneuver’ (opération en pince) (Bateson 1972). This term involves the 
constant interplay of both the empirical observations and the fundamentals of science or philosophy 
as the basis for the research. Using this methodological approach, the exploration intended to draw a 
continuing dialogue of our axes of research. A constant integrative exchange involves that every 
movement on any of the axes of research involves and attempts to achieve a movement of the whole 
body of reflection. As Bateson (1972) argues, in this process the empirics are conducted in mutual 
interrelation with the ‘fundamentals’ or, what we could call, the approved knowledge3.  
                                       
3 Bateson (1972) calls "fundamentals" two kinds of propositions and systems of propositions which are 
either truistical or generally true. For the truistical propositions, Bateson understands those tautological 
truths as the “‘Eternal Verities’ of mathematics where truth is tautologically limited to the domains within 
which man made sets of axioms and definitions obtain: numbers are appropriately defined and if the 
operation of addition is appropriately defined; then 5 + 7 = 12’” (Bateson 1972: 4). Whereas those 
propositions that Bateson describes as ‘scientifically or generally and empirically true’, are those "laws" that 
allow an empirical generalization. 
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In this part we will present the methodology employed in the present work describing the 
empirical data gathered in the research in Section 2.1; and, the epistemological approach employed 
for developing our observations in Section 2.2.  
2.1. The empirical data: a case study  
The fieldwork of this research was conducted using a case study. A case is a unity of 
analysis formed by a set of factors, actors and events interconnected through a pertinent analytical 
correlation delimited by the researcher. For the purpose of the analysis, the elements forming the 
case are brought together on the basis of a common property, a mutual influence, a specific 
relevance or simply due to a scientific intuition.  
The case selected for the present research is the Palace of Justice case (hereinafter, the PJ 
case). The events of this case refer to the enforced disappearance of a group of people materialized 
in the context of the taking of the National Palace of Justice by a guerrilla group called Movimiento 
19 de Abril (hereinafter, M19) and the subsequent operation to retake the building by the military, 
in November 1985. This event was selected for this research due to several reasons. Firstly, as 
exposed in the introduction, there is an experiential reason. When the PJ events took place, my 
father became the lawyer of the next of kin of a group of the disappeared. Because my father’s 
office was located at the same place where my family used to live, I was able to meet the victims 
and to be in contact with some of the actors of the case.  
Secondly, there is a generational reason to study this case. The events of the Palace of 
Justice constitute a landmark for my generation in Colombia. The commotion of the events at the 
Palace derived in a tough experience of the armed conflict for those who were born in Bogota 
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during the eighties. The great impact of the case in the media and the social life of the country 
involve a vibrant contact of my generation with the events.  
Another important reason to study this case is the magnitude of destruction that took place 
at the moment of the events. Around one hundred people perished, including eleven justices of the 
High Courts and thirty-five guerrillas; a conflagration consumed a significant part of the structure 
of the palace and a number of hostages were released. The military labeled some people as 
accomplices of the guerrilla and held them for interrogation. During their detention, some people 
were tortured, some were killed and some were forcibly disappeared (IA Court 2014).  
The present research focused the analysis of the case around the crime of enforced 
disappearance as well as the subsequent legal redress for these conducts. This particular form of 
violence constitutes a scientific reason justifying the selection of the PJ case for this research. 
According to the National Register of Disappeared People, up to 2017 there is record of 110,833 
disappearances in Colombia. Out of these cases, 23,441 cases (21.15%) have been classified as 
presumably forced disappearances, while 87,392 cases (78.85%) present no further information 
(Segura and Ramirez 2015). We selected enforced disappearance as a rich field of reflection, not 
only because of its quantitative magnitude in the Colombian context, but also because its 
qualitative value for developing an understanding of state criminality and, importantly to our 
research, for evaluating the particular constraints and problems around the operation of the 
criminal law system a propos these conducts.  
In the case, the fact that the military and different state officials were involved in these 
crimes calls for special criminological attention. Can we refer to these actions as a specific form of 
criminality? If so, how can we define it? What characteristics would it show? In addition, this case 
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also presents as a feature the particular difficulty for the legal system to acknowledge, process and 
address the wrongdoing: thirty years after the events no final conviction has been reached and the 
victims are still asking where are the people that disappeared from the Palace of Justice and what 
happened to them?   
The phenomenological complexity and social significance of the case is another reason for its 
selection. “It is rare that a single event can illuminate an entire epoch. Yet the tragedy at the Palace of 
Justice provided a microcosm in which the three mythic figures of every Latin conflict of the last fifty 
years – the Rebel, the General, and the President- acted out their appointed roles without benefit of the 
usual, self-protective, camouflage” (Carrigan 1993: 13) . In this vein, this event has been qualified by 
different commentators as one of the most important and dramatic events in the history of Colombia 
(IACHR 1993: Introduction; Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010: 276; Deutsche Welle 2015).  
Among the emblematic factors of this case we can refer to its magnitude (more than one 
hundred people perished and disappeared on less than three days and a conflagration consumed a 
significant part of the PJ), the site wherein it took place (the main square of the country’s capital), 
the multiplicity of harms produced in the events (killings, disappearances, tortures, injuries, 
traumas, pillage4 and the destruction of the Palace of Justice), the clash between different public 
powers within the state (the highest courts of the ordinary and the contentious administrative 
jurisdictions, the humanitarian organizations, the President and the military), the war confrontation 
between the guerrillas and the statu quo in the middle of alleged peace talks and, because of the 
                                       
4 “Pillage (or plunder) is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “the forcible taking of private property by an 
invading or conquering army from the enemy’s subjects”. The Elements of Crimes of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court specifies that the appropriation must be done “for private or personal use”.  As 
such, the prohibition of pillage is a specific application of the general principle of law prohibiting theft”. 
(ICRC, n.d.a)  
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social status of those implicated in the crimes (government officials and military members of high 
rank), and the media exposure of the judicial proceedings.  
Considering the former reasons, this case may be understood as both exemplary and 
emblematic, enabling a pertinent, relevant and strategic approach to the knowledge of the 
phenomena that we study. This case is emblematic, relatively rare, infrequent and extraordinary, 
comprising a particular combination of events, actors and factors forming a relevant and strategic 
field of observation of the phenomena explored. Thus, the case is not to be qualified or 
characterized from the point of view of its frequency – in social science case studies can refer to 
rare phenomena which can be unique as a whole (Pires 1997).  Rather, this case may be qualified 
as exemplar referring to the aptitude of the event for enabling the action of learning about a 
particular phenomenon (Pires 1997: 46). In this sense, the PJ case presents an exemplary character 
exhibiting several characteristics for studying state criminality and impunity, therefore enabling a 
proper conceptual and analytical consideration of the social phenomena under study. 
A case study is not meant to generalize what is particular or strictly proper to the case (Yin 
2009), but intends to offer analytical grounds in order to draw general observations on the 
phenomena under study. Thus, social events as those examined in the present research, encompass 
cultural and institutional references that allow an observation of society in action (Pires 1997).This 
analysis involves both, a phenomenological reflection based on the events and historic context, and 
an analytical reflection on their underlying ideas and concepts. 
Given the amount of information, events and judicial proceedings that thirty years of 
history of the case implies, we selected one particular dossier as the point d’ancrage for the 
observation of the empirics. Choosing this point d’ancrage was meant to allow us to preserve an 
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overall perspective of the case, at the same time enhancing our capacity of observation, conceptual 
attention and analytical precision avoiding to dissipate the study into an excessive amount of 
details. With that in mind, we decided to select the first conviction of a military member in regard 
to the case, issued by ordinary tribunals, as our special event of attention: the criminal dossier 
against retired Col. Plazas, field commander of the operation to retake the Palace, who was 
prosecuted as co-author of the crime of enforced disappearance.  
In 2008, retired Col. Plazas was indicted for the enforced disappearance of eleven people 
and in 2010 he was convicted and sentenced to thirty years of imprisonment (Juzgado Tercero 
2010). The Court of Appeal upheld the first instance ruling only in respect of two of the 
disappearances. Later, the Supreme Court of Justice (2015) acquitted him in cassation and ordered 
to start the process all over with respect to the disappeared.  
This event was selected because it allowed us to consider at the same time the criminal 
actions perpetrated at the PJ - particularly the enforced disappearances, the attempt of the criminal 
law system to process those actions, its limitations, obstacles and difficulties of operation and 
because it was the scenario where different actors of the case met. Furthermore, Plazas case was 
also selected as paradigmatic for at least four reasons. First, because of his presence and active role 
in the operation to retake the Palace of Justice as operational commander. Second, because he is a 
prominent figure of the Colombian military, who enjoys a widespread support of Colombian 
traditional political class - especially of the Right. Third, because the judicial case went through all 
possible instances within the domestic criminal justice system. This analysis covers a history of 
more than thirty years of the PJ case, from November 1985 to the beginning of 2017, after the 
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Supreme Court judgment in the Plazas case. And, finally, this case was selected because of the 
symbolic representation of the case in the country. 
The PJ case was a leading dossier because it was the first time that a high ranked military was 
on the bench for the crime of enforced disappearance. Retired Col. Plazas’s influence, rank and 
relevance within the military institution created a representation of this trial as a breaking point on the 
general responsibility of the military before ordinary tribunals. The case was permanently alluded as 
an argument around special regimes of responsibility favouring the military in the context of peace 
negotiations with the guerrillas5. Regarding this case, different commentators assessed that this 
prosecution was a milestone in the history of the accountability of the military before civil courts, and 
ultimately in the history of human rights in Colombia (Semana 2009).  
Our model of study of the PJ case will take into consideration different factors of analysis. 
Our case study is then divided into the description of the context, the concrete events of the taking 
and the operation to retake the Palace of Justice in 1985, the judicial procedures and, finally, a 
general overview of the criminal dossier against retired Col. Plazas. The data of observation 
gathered on the case relied on five main types of sources of information: a) legal records, b) media 
review, c) documentary review, d) observation in situ of public commemorations related to the 
case, and e) thirty-one face-to-face semi-structured in-depth interviews. The language of most of 
these sources of information was Spanish. However, we translated the information used for this 
work with the objective of standardizing the language.  Let us refer to these sources in detail:  
a) The legal records gathered for this research are limited to documents of public access, 
related to the case and issued by the legal system in the context of the intervention of a formal 
                                       
5 At the time of the events with the M19 and after the second instance judgment with the FARC. 
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proceeding. The main component of these records is the proceedings of the domestic and 
international judicial bodies. This includes documents of the criminal law domestic jurisdiction, the 
contentious-administrative courts, the Truth Commission on the events as well as the disciplinary 
proceedings, legislative investigations and the dossier conducted by the Inter-American system on 
Human Rights, alongside reports from the Procuraduría, the Defensoría Pública and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. 
The PJ criminal rulings are principal sources of the present research. This documentary 
review was conducted with public documents to be found in the judiciary archives concerning the 
case. These rulings are public and contain an account of the events, the legal basis of the decisions 
and the Court provisions for the case. Because of the large amount of information that these 
documents contain, they are relevant for detecting and analyzing the subjects of inquiry proposed 
in the present research.  
b) A media review was also conducted with the purpose of documenting the events, tracing 
circumstantial happenings to the judicial case, as well as obtaining the opinions of the actors that 
were not interviewed, mainly of the military6 and the political class. The media review involved 
gathering, selecting and analyzing different journal articles, documentaries, TV and radio 
recordings related to the case. The archive that we gathered was enormous. Until 2016, only in the 
two national journals in Colombia (El Tiempo and El Espectador) we found more than one 
thousand news. We estimate that our final selection covered around a 30% of this universe. 
                                       
6 Since Plazas, convicted in the two first instances, was detained it was not possible to reach him for an 
academic research –he was only released by the end of 2015. Nonetheless, he gave a considerable amount of 
interviews to the media. The media echoed several of his declarations as well as published a number of 
interviews showing his perspectives to the public. For this reason, a media analysis was useful in order to 
depict and study some of Plazas’s views. 
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An important criterion of exclusion was limitation of time.  The criteria of selection were 
the quality of the notes (we discarded the study of news that were merely propagandistic), the 
accessibility (privileging those sources accessible through internet) and the diversity of sources, 
scopes and positions regarding the events. Since 2012, I started collecting the media information. 
Every week I reviewed the media collecting the relevant news of the last seven days. I recorded the 
news in a single file under different categories. Soon, I had to reformulate my classification 
because of the amount of information and started using different files under different categories. I 
divided the information into three files: one for interviews, and the other two for reports and 
editorials. What I recorded was the title and reference, as well as one or two lines summarizing the 
content. By the end of 2013, I started doing a more selective collection because of the amount of 
information I already had. Instead of focusing on actual news, I decided to use more time 
collecting news from before 2012, until I arrived to the year 1985 –time of start of the events.  
c) During this research, we also depicted, categorized and analyzed different documentary 
sources. In total we used forty-seven documents, including books, reports and videos. The relevant 
parts of these documents were either recorded or scanned and then coded according to different 
relevant categories with the purpose of enabling a cross-examination of the subjects of interest. 
These sources were further classified according to their emphasis as: artistic, scientific or academic 
and legal or political documents referring to the case. Some of these documents were published 
during the research process.  
Artistic documents were a source of inspiration for the reflections. Reviewing these 
sources, we were able to have access to a recording of the theater play called “La Siempre Viva” 
(1994) that referred to the history of the victims of enforced disappearance at the PJ. We also had 
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the opportunity to share extensive and substantive talks with the playwright and writer Miguel 
Torres, who wrote the play. At that time two films were being produced on the events: one was 
inspired on the play and called “La Siempre Viva” (2016) and another called “Antes del fuego” 
(2015), a political thriller that described through a fiction history the nineteen days before the 
taking. Also, “Los Once” (2014) was published, a graphic novel of historical fiction inspired on the 
PJ disappeared. These artistic documents were interesting for reflecting on the interpretation of the 
events and how they can be shown and described.  
Also we found twenty-one research works on the events, including thesis, academic papers 
and journalistic works, including three documentaries; as well as sixteen books of legal or political 
analysis of the case. Within these sources, it was particularly relevant to our observations the 
publications of the actors of the case. As a result of the reflection from the part of the victims it was 
important to review the master’s thesis of Alejandra Romero (2005). This thesis alongside different 
conversations with Alejandra, allowed me to reflect on her reality as niece of one of the auxiliary 
Justices that perished at the PJ.  
Another important source was a publication by one father of the disappeared, Hector 
Beltrán (2015). In his book “El Suplicio de la Larga Espera”, Mr. Beltrán expressed his views on 
the disappearance and the legal procedures. On this subject as well, but from an opposed vision, 
one of the prosecuted for the crime and actor of our dossier of reference, the retired Col. Plazas and 
his wife, wrote three books. These books were extremely relevant for drawing our considerations. 
In the books “El Itinerario de una Injusticia” (2008) and “¿Desaparecidos? El negocio del dolor” 
(2011), retired Col. Plazas exposed his views on the injustice of the procedures, the inconsistencies 
of the investigations and the inexistence of the disappeared and the crime itself. In line with his 
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perspective, Thania Vega (2011), his wife, published the book “¡Qué injusticia!”, in which she 
expresses her emotions and thoughts on the prosecution against retired Col. Plazas.  
d) The observation in situ of public commemorations related to the case was important for 
detecting and understanding different particularities of the case. These observations in situ 
comprised at least three main moments:  
1. The public event for the launch of the book “El Suplicio de la Larga Espera”, wrote by 
Hector Beltrán (2015). I was invited by the next of kin of the disappeared. On August 19, 2015, at 
5:30 pm the event started at the Bogota’s Memory Center. The program consisted of the launch of 
the book, a commemoration of the disappeared and, finally, recognitions awarded to the parents of 
the victims who were still alive and continued with the search of their family members disappeared 
at the PJ cafeteria. In this event we were able to listen to the testimonies of different family 
members and especially Mr. Beltrán’s. Their discourses but also the way they interacted between 
each other, the symbols used in the place for the remembrance of those disappeared and the 
different nonverbal communications of the participants were relevant for our observation.  
2. The public event of acknowledgement of responsibility by the State: as will be explained 
in the Chapter of the PJ case, on November 6, 2015, the President of the Republic conducted a 
public ceremony in the presence of senior State officials and the victims, acknowledging State 
responsibility in relation to the human rights violations during the taking and operation to retake 
the Palace of Justice, as declared in the Inter-American judgment regarding the PJ case. I was 
invited to this event. During the act I had the occasion to take notes and to record the discourses of 
the different speakers for a posterior analysis. After the event, I was able to talk to some of the 
family members and to exchange perceptions regarding the acknowledgement of responsibility and 
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how it unfolded. This event was relevant to understand different conceptions about the 
responsibility for the violations committed in the case and to have more elements of analysis of the 
perceptions gathered during the interviews of the case. 
3. The 30th anniversary memorial: on Friday, November 6, 2015, the next of kin of the PJ 
disappeared victims conducted a memorial at the Plaza de Bolivar in Bogotá. Between 2 pm and 9 
pm there was an event with different artistic interventions, a video screening on the façade of the 
Palace and a private mass for the victims. During the event I was able to capture different symbols, 
ideas and discourses by the victims. In the memorial I took some pictures and recorded some 
impressions of the participants. The notes and recordings gathered in this event were a useful 
source of reflection and analysis for this research, especially for a better understanding of the 
victims’ discourses. 
e) Thirty-one face-to-face semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted in order to 
depict and elucidate the constructions on the matter of impunity as well as the characterizations 
regarding state criminality. The participants were informed about the objectives of the present research 
so they could give their free and informed consent for participating. Once they expressed their 
consent, they were instructed about the possibility of taking breaks, abstaining to answer, asking for 
anonymity and asking for reformulations of the questions at any time. The questionnaire elaborated 
for the interviews was semi-structured and varied according to the different groups that we selected as 
will be detailed in the following paragraphs. These interviews were divided into three different 
groups: victims of enforced disappearance, lawyers representing the victims, and judicial officials – 
including the prosecutor of the case, the first instance judge and one of her judicial assistants. 
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a) The first group of interviews focused on the victims of enforced disappearance. 
According to the Truth Commission, there is “no doubt” that the cafeteria workers and some 
occasional visitors were victims of enforced disappearance (Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010). The 
Commission concluded that the cafeteria’s employees, three occasional visitors and one M19 
guerrilla were forcibly disappeared. Further findings from different courts have concluded that 
other workers, visitors and guerrilla members were also forcibly disappeared. However, the main 
focus of analysis of the present research is the group of people that were at the cafeteria at the 
moment of the events and were disappeared.  
This group is formed by the families of twelve people: eight employees of the cafeteria 
(Carlos Rodríguez, Ana Castiblanco, Hector Beltrán, Cristina Guarín, Bernardo Beltrán, Gloria 
Lizarazo, David Suspes and Luz Portela), three visitors (Gloria Anzola, Luz Oviedo and Norma 
Esguerra), and one guerrilla (Irma Franco). These twelve people can be grouped not only 
according to the place of abduction (the PJ cafeteria) but also in line with their social position: 
these people were working class living in rather low-income contexts.  
Until 2016, there has only been news on the whereabouts of four of them.  The remains of 
Ana Rosa Castiblanco were identified in 2000 from rests found in a mass grave. The remains of 
Lucy Amparo Oviedo were found in the same mass grave and identified fifteen years later. Those 
of Cristina Guarín and Luz Portela were found in 2015 in graves that belonged to other people who 
perished during the PJ events – this information will be detailed in the impunity chapter. 
On February 11, 2008, retired Col. Plazas was indicted as co-author of the crimes of 
aggravated enforced disappearance and aggravated kidnapping against eleven people (see table 1) 
– the case of Ana Rosa Castilblanco was supposedly solved in 2000 with the finding of her remains 
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in a mass grave. I conducted twenty-two interviews with family members who suffered the 
disappearance of their next of kin in the Palace of Justice (see table No. 1).  
These were in-depth interviews aimed at depicting and understanding different problems, 
challenges and expectations that victims perceive in the case at a profound level. The questionnaire 
was semi-structured, aiming at allowing some degree of openness and variability according to the 
needs or specific interests and experiences of each person, but with a certain structure and focus in 
respect to the subjects of the research. After a general presentation of the research and the indication 
of the possibilities of clarifying the questions, taking breaks, reserving their identity or stopping the 
recording, there was a question on the informed consent and the authorization to record the dialogue.  
The exchange was conducted with the support of an open questionnaire composed by five 
main questions. The first question was focused on a general presentation of the interviewees and of 
their connection with the case. After that, four questions were directed to depict their views on a) 
how they perceived the events and particularly the disappearances, b) what were their views on the 
enquiries and the prosecution against retired Colonel Plazas, and c) their thoughts on impunity 
regarding the case and d) what actions should be in place to address it7. These questions were 
designed as pertinent for identifying and analyzing elements on ideas around state criminality and 
impunity. They were not asked on the same order and with the same formulation but were intended 
to refer to these themes following a coherent thread in favor of the conversation to be fluent. 
                                       
7 Asking victims about impunity may be perceived as a biased source: ‘victims will always perceive 
impunity in their cases’. However, our explorations on this matter were intended to understand their 
representations and usages of the medium impunity rather than on judging the existence of impunity in this 
particular case. These data allowed us to obtain relevant information for exploring a conceptual construction 
of the subject of impunity from a sociological perspective. In this sense, who better to ask than a group of 
people that have worked and mobilized for thirty years under the motto of a fight against impunity? 
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 Concerning the identification of the interviewees, none of the respondents asked for their 
identity to be withheld. Only in very few cases, they asked not to record certain parts of the 
conversation. Those parts were not taken into consideration when writing this text. While the 
present text includes references to the victims’ names, some parts were anonymized in order to 
protect the wellbeing, security, intimacy and emotions of the participants.  
The fact that all of them wanted their name in the research was perceived as an act of trust 
in regard to the interviewer but particularly as an act of telling, a desire to let their version be 
acknowledged, “proclaiming aloud” (Herman, 2001) their story and being heard. Throughout their 
researches, Winkler and Hanke (1995), Hollway and Jefferson (2000) and Lisa White (2010) 
observe that people that have faced violence can feel a sense of relief when pronouncing their 
experience. Taking into account the family link, in the present research we will identify the 
interviewees using their names (or other anonymous identifications in particular cases) and their 
family kinship with the person submitted to disappearance. Thus, next to the name of the 
interviewee the reader will find as elements of identification words as e.g. brother, sister, daughter 
or son. This, we believe, can clarify the reading due to the great amount of names and persons 
interviewed. 
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 Table No. 1.  Victims, biographical sketch and next of kin interviewed  
Identification Situation at the time of the events and following search Interviewees 
Gloria Isabel 
ANZOLA MORA 
- Visitor at the 
Cafeteria 
“Gloria […] was 33 years of age in 1985; she was a lawyer and was married to Francisco José 
Lanao Ayarza, with whom she had a son. Her office was near the Palace of Justice and, as her 
aunt was a justice of the Council of State, she used to park her car in the Palace of Justice. […] 
Following the events, her family went to the Palace of Justice and looked for her among the 
rubble and the corpses that were in the Palace of Justice and in the Institute of Forensic 
Medicine, unsuccessfully. They also looked for her in the 13th Brigade and the Cavalry School, 
but obtained no information on her fate” (IA Court 130-131). 
Juan Francisco Lanao 
(son)  
Héctor Jaime 
BELTRÁN FUENTES 
- Waiter 
“Héctor […] was 28 years old in 1985; he was married to María del Pilar Navarrete Urrea, with 
whom he had four daughters […]. Mr. Beltrán Fuentes’ brother, who worked in the DAS, went 
to the Casa del Florero to look for his brother […]. On the evening of November 6, his father 
approached the Palace of Justice and asked those who were outside the Casa del Florero about 
the cafeteria employees and he was allegedly told that “they were taken out alive and [were 
being held] in the Casa del Florero.” Following the events, the family of Héctor Jaime Beltrán 
Fuentes looked for him in the Institute of Forensic Medicine, hospitals, clinics and military 
facilities, including the Cavalry School and other places where it was rumored that the survivors 
of the Palace of Justice had been taken” (IA Court 120-121). 
Héctor Beltrán 
(father) and María del 
Pilar Navarrete (wife)  
Bernardo BELTRÁN 
HERNÁNDEZ 
- Waiter 
“Bernardo […] was 24 years old in 1985 […] Following the events, his family went to the Palace 
of Justice to identify the body of Mr. Beltrán Hernández among the corpses. They then looked 
for him in hospitals, the Institute of Forensic Medicine, and the 13th Brigade, without obtaining 
information on his fate” (IA Court 118-119). 
Bernardo Beltrán 
(father) and Sandra 
Beltrán (sister)  
Norma Constanza 
ESGUERRA FORERO 
-food supplier 
“Norma […] was 29 years of age in 1985 and, at the time of the events, she worked selling 
pastries in different places, including the Palace of Justice. […] On November 9, her family 
entered the cafeteria of the Palace of Justice and found several of her belongings on the counter, 
including “her wallet […], but the contents had been taken.” The family also looked for her in 
hospitals and her mother went to the North Cantón to look for her, without obtaining information 
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on her fate” (IA Court 126-127). 
Irma 
FRANCO PINEDA 
-guerrilla at the 
cafeteria 
“Irma […] was 28 years of age in 1985 and was a law student. On November 6, 1985, she was in 
the Palace of Justice, as part of the M19. […] In the Casa del Florero she was identified by 
several survivors as a member of the M19, and was therefore considered a suspect by the State 
authorities. Accordingly, she was taken to the second floor of the Casa del Florero and, 
according to the caretaker of the Casa del Florero, “between 7 and 8 p.m. on the evening of 
[November] 7, under strict security measures,” “she was placed in a four-wheel drive vehicle,” 
and to date her whereabouts are unknown. […] After the operation to retake the Palace of Justice 
had concluded, her next of kin went to the police, the DAS, and the Cavalry School where she 
was being held according to the information they had received, but without success” (IA Court 
111-112).  
Jorge Franco 
(brother), María del 
Socorro Franco 
(sister) 
Cristina del Pilar 
GUARÍN CORTÉS 
-Cafeteria cashier 
“Cristina […] was 26 years of age in 1985 and had a degree in social science. At the time of the 
events she was working on a temporary basis as a cashier in the Palace of Justice cafeteria, 
replacing Carlos Rodríguez’s wife, who had been on maternity leave since October 1985 […]. 
On the evening of November 7, the father of Cristina del Pilar Guarín Cortés entered the Palace 
of Justice to look for his daughter. Her family also looked for her in the Institute of Forensic 
Medicine, the Military Hospital, police stations, and the 13th Brigade, and they also approached 
the Presidency of the Republic, without obtaining information on her whereabouts” (IA Court 
114-115). 
Rene Guarín (brother)  
Gloria Estella 
LIZARAZO 
FIGUEROA 
-Cafeteria     
employee 
“Gloria […] was 31 years of age in 1985; she lived with Luis Carlos Ospina and had three 
daughters and one son [...] Following the events, her family members approached the Palace of 
Justice and looked for her in hospitals, clinics, the Cavalry School, the 13th Brigade, the DAS, 
the Sacromonte caves and the Ministry of Justice, but obtained no information about her 
whereabouts. According to a statement made by Luis Carlos Ospina, […] “three or four days 
after the events,” a soldier at the Cavalry School told him that people had been brought there 
from the Palace of Justice. However, the soldier could not tell him whether his wife was among 
those taken to the School” (IA Court 122-123). 
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Lucy Amparo 
OVIEDO BONILLA 
 
- Visitor at the 
Cafeteria 
“Lucy […] was 25 years of age in 1985; she was married to Jairo Arias Mendez, she had two 
children, she worked in a handicraft shop and she was going to study law. On November 6, 1985, 
Ms. Oviedo […] had a work interview with Justice Raúl Trujillo near the Palace of Justice. The 
family supposes that “[…] as she was so near the Palace of Justice, [she went] to talk to Justice 
[Reyes Echandía] or to his secretary [Herminda Narváez] to seek their help in obtaining the job 
for which she was applying.” […] Following the events, her family looked for her in the Institute 
of Forensic Medicine, hospitals, cemeteries, and the Charry Solano Battalion, and in the Bogota 
network of hospitals, and requested the help of the media and of senators of the Republic, 
without obtaining information on her fate” (IA Court 128-129). 
 
Luz Mary 
PORTELA LEÓN 
-General Service 
staff 
“Luz […] was 24 years of age in 1985; she worked as a dishwasher in the Palace of Justice 
cafeteria replacing her mother, Rosalbina León, who had been on sick leave since October 29, 
1985. […] Following the events, her family looked for her in the Casa del Florero, the Cavalry 
School, the Institute of Forensic Medicine and the DAS offices, among other places, without 
obtaining any information about her fate” (IA Court 124-124). 
Rosa Milena 
Cárdenas (sister)  
Carlos Augusto 
RODRÍGUEZ VERA 
-Cafeteria Manager 
“Carlos […] was 29 years of age in 1985 and was married to Cecilia Cabrera Guerra, with whom 
he had a daughter. He was the manager of the cafeteria of the Palace of Justice and studied law at 
the Universidad Libre. […] At least one person saw him that morning in the cafeteria before the 
taking over began. […] According to the evidence in the case file, the State authorities suspected 
him of collaborating with the M19 because he was the cafeteria manager” (IA Court 2014: 108-
109) 
César Rodríguez 
(brother), Cecilia 
Cabrera (wife), 
Adriana Rodríguez 
(niece) and Alejandra 
Rodríguez (daughter) 
David 
SUSPES CELIS 
-Cafeteria Chef 
“David […] was 26 years old in 1985; he lived with his companion, Luz Dary Samper Bedoya, 
with whom he had a daughter[…] Following the events, his family looked for him in hospitals, 
the Institute of Forensic Medicine, the 13th Brigade, the Military Institutes Brigade, and the DAS 
offices, among other places, without obtaining any results”(IA Court 2014: 116-117). 
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Different emotions such as sadness, rage, indignation, vulnerability, pride, courage, were 
present in these interviews. The conversations were conducted with calm, thoughtfulness and 
consideration for the emotions that the interviewees raised. The conversations were, with no 
exception, constructive and courteous. This research was conducted with special concern for the 
wellbeing of the interviewees, ensuring that participants remained comfortable, with respect for 
their emotions. Attempting to ensure these conditions, the dialogues took place in the location that 
the participants chose as comfortable for the talk, including participants’ homes. The interviews 
were preceded by a dialogue meant to create a space of confidence, transparency and informed 
consent for the interview. After the questions we had the opportunity to conduct informal dialogues 
with the purpose of giving feedback and comfort to the interviewees. 
The next of kin of the disappeared are considered in the present research as victims. There 
are very varied definitions of who is and what a victim is (Maier 2007). To us, a victim is a social 
role that works as a form of social attribution of a status aimed at recognizing a regretful 
experience. When that situation is caused by the intervention of someone, according to the 
particularities of the case, they can be called ‘victims of a crime’. Victims of crimes are not only 
those who are directly injured by the action, but also the next of kin8 of those people who, because 
of their relationship with the person harmed, suffer a particular affection recognized as an 
experience of victimization. The status of victim is awarded with a particular degree of variability 
as a label that depends not only of legal considerations -in the case of criminal activities, but on 
political and social categorizations giving interpretation to what is a regretful action, what can be 
called a harm, who are the actors of these situations and to what extent they can be called victims.  
                                       
8 In this respect, for instance, the IA Court (2014: 532) has assessed that the next of kin of the victims of 
human rights violations may, in turn, be victims. 
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In an interview with Pilar Navarrete (wife) she asserted that while at the start no one would 
recognize them as victims, after different legal advances and according to their persistence for 
years society finally did so. However, she believes that from a certain perspective the only victim 
of her case was her husband, because what happened to her was not comparable to what probably 
happened to him. Nonetheless, the people on this group will be identified as victims not because of 
the amount of suffering but based on the existence of a direct or indirect harm due to a wrongful 
action performed by someone else. According to this approach, we will specifically refer to the 
victims of the case as those people that suffered different harms originated from the criminal 
actions that took place at the PJ events, especially focusing on the enforced disappearance.  
In the eighties, when the families were asked to join ASFADDES (Colombian Association of 
families of the Disappeared) or to constitute their own organization, Enrique Rodríguez (father) said 
to their legal representative, lawyer Eduardo Umaña: ¨We don’t want to make part of any 
organization, we are nothing but a group of families¨ (history recalled in an interview with Alejandra 
Rodríguez –daughter). The representation as a group was further found in different interviews with 
the actors of the case. Following this self-representation, in the present research family members are 
considered as a group. Despite the fact that they have never constituted an organization, 
understanding them as a group allows visualizing and analyzing the common factuality of the 
violations perpetrated against them and their rather synchronic efforts for finding their loved ones.  
During the interviews it was visible that this group of victims shares a struggle and a 
history of suffering. In this sense, sometimes a shared discourse emerged in some of the interviews, 
especially in reference to the dynamics of the criminal case. However, this identification does not 
entail any sort of homogeneity or monolithic quality of the group. They are rather extremely 
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heterogenic, have different views on the case (even within each family) and hold different 
expectations. In the words of Hector Beltrán (father): “Every family is a world apart, each family 
suffered the pain in different forms, each family has a different opinion. But there is one thing I 
acknowledge: we have been united for 29 years” (El Espectador 2014a). Their experiences are 
different and they have different conceptions on what has happened to them: they lived the same 
events but experienced them differently. Nonetheless, they have learned to act together, sometimes 
as a collective that overcomes their diversity of opinions, sometimes as individuals with common 
goals. Sometimes divergences have prevailed and they have acted in contradictory ways. There 
have been a number of interpersonal disagreements bringing tensions to the group despite the 
different relations of familiarity and close friendship.  
Besides this group of victims, we conducted a set of semi-structured interviews with the 
next of kin of some of the Justices that perished in the PJ. Using the same methods, questionnaire 
and criteria, we interviewed family members of Auxiliary Justices Carlos Urán, Emiro Sandoval 
and Rosalba Romero (see table 2).  
Table No. 2. Auxiliary Justices. Victims, biographical sketch and next of kin interviewed  
Name Situation at the time of the events and following events Interviewees 
Carlos  
URÁN  
-  Auxiliary 
Justice of the 
Council of 
State 
Carlos Urán worked as an auxiliary Justice of the Council of State 
in the PJ. He was at his office in the PJ the day of the taking. Urán 
had four daughters and was married. He was particularly critical of 
the Armed Forces9. According to the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (2014) and the Truth Commission (Gómez, Herrera 
and Pinilla 2010), Urán left the PJ alive in the custody of soldiers, 
with non-lethal injuries in his left leg inflicted inside the Palace of 
Ana María 
Bidegain 
(wife), 
Mairee 
Clarisa 
Urán, 
Anahí 
                                       
9 In one of his writings, Urán states: “We think, at last, that from a popular dimension, there can only be one 
alternative in relation to the [Colombian] Armed Forces: their structural reformulation and their ideological 
redefinition or their dismantling following the model of President Manuel María Mallarino in 1856, that was 
then adopted in the Constitution of our neighbor Costa Rica” (Urán 1984: 21). 
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Justice. His exit was not recorded on any list of survivors drawn by 
the State. Subsequently, he was executed while he was in the 
custody of State agents with a shot at a distance of less than a 
meter. Later, his body appeared in the Palace of Justice patio, on 
the first floor of the building. His corpse was undressed, washed, 
and taken to the Institute of Forensic Medicine. It was not until the 
evening of November 8, 1985, when a friend of Carlos Urán found 
the body in the Institute of Forensic Medicine and when his family 
had news about the whereabouts of Urán. Alongside these facts, 
the Inter-American Court concluded that Urán had been submitted 
to enforced disappearance. “For years my daughters and I were 
living a lie from the Colombian State, which made us believe that 
my husband had died in the crossfire” (CEJIL 2014) said Ana 
María Bidegain (wife). 
Urán, 
Helena 
Urán and 
Xiomara 
Urán 
(daughters) 
 
Emiro 
SANDOVAL 
-  Auxiliary 
Justice of the 
Supreme 
Court of 
Justice 
Mr. Sandoval was auxiliary Justice of the President of the Supreme 
Court and was at his office in the PJ the day of the events.  Mr. 
Sandoval had one daughter and was married. He did not survive 
the PJ events. His body was given to his family right after the 
events and buried in a grave that bears his name. However, in 2015 
his remains were exhumed due to doubts on the identification of 
his remains. In fact, the autopsy of Mr. Sandoval, which was 
carried out in 1985, warned that the remains actually corresponded 
to “at least two adult corpses”. In spite of this, the remains were 
buried as if belonged to one single person. When Amelia Mantilla, 
Sandoval’s widow, buried her husband, she was warned by state 
officials that the coffin should not be opened. In a hearing of the PJ 
case, in June 2016, Sandoval’s family was informed by the 
National Institute of Forensic Medicine and Science and the 
Prosecutor General’s office that the identification of the remains 
was negative: in the grave under Mr. Sanvoval’s name there were 
three individuals and none of them was Emiro Sandoval.  
Alexandra 
Sandoval 
(daughter) 
Rosalba 
ROMERO  
-  Auxiliary 
Justice of the 
Supreme 
Court of 
Justice 
Rosalba was justice Alfonso Patiño’s auxiliary Justice at the 
Supreme Court. She was married and had one son. Her remains 
were given to her family after the events and buried in a grave with 
her name. However, in 2016 her remains were exhumed due to 
doubts on the identification of the mortal remains. Until January 
2017, Romero’s family was still waiting for a result on the 
identification of the remains: it is most likely that she is 
disappeared. 
Alejandra 
Romero 
(niece) 
The interviewees, next of kin of auxiliary Justices Urán, Sandoval and Romero were also 
regarded as victims because these officers did not survive the taking and the operation to retake the 
 36 
 
 
Palace of Justice due to different criminal actions. While we are not able to determine the exact 
circumstances under which they became victims – as it neither is our research objective, we can 
understand that different crimes were committed. Mr. Urán was subjected to enforced 
disappearance and extrajudicial execution; Emiro Sandoval was killed and it is likely that he is 
disappeared; and, Rosalba Romero also perished and is possibly disappeared.  
These people are not part of the group of the people of the PJ cafeteria; neither were they 
part of the victims of the prosecution against retired Col. Plazas. They could not be considered as a 
group because they do not act with any degree of coordination and in some cases not even 
dialogue. However, at the same time, they have had different (and sometimes common) 
experiences in regard to the subject of enforced disappearance and with respect to the difficulties of 
operation of the criminal law justice system. They do not appertain to a low-income class. Most of 
them have qualified jobs, a good number of them are middle class and some appertain to higher 
social classes. Understanding their differences with the group of the cafeteria, the perceptions of 
this group of people was relevant for enriching the comments on the group disappeared. 
b) The second group of interviews was conducted with lawyers representing the victims. 
This group is composed by experienced law professionals who work on the case as legal 
representatives of the victims. After the assassination of their first lawyer, Eduardo Umaña, the 
families have had different legal representatives. In this project, we selected two lawyers of the 
criminal dossier. Jorge Molano and German Romero were selected, based on the fact that they 
were the only professionals present, one or the other, during all of the criminal hearings.  
These interviews were conducted in Bogota. The exchange was conducted with the support 
of a questionnaire composed by semi-structured open questions. We used a set of five guiding 
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questions with the aim of emphasizing on the perceptions of these actors regarding the functioning 
of the criminal law system in the case. The first question was focused on establishing their history 
and actual situation as legal representatives of the case; the second question referred to the actual 
legal state of the case and their perceptions on the proceedings; the third question was about the 
particular case against retired Col. Plazas and the particular difficulties or advantages that they 
experienced during this process; the fourth question was about their views on the existence of 
impunity in the case and what actions should be in place to address it. These questions were meant 
to reflect from a legal perspective different elements on ideas around state criminality and 
impunity, focusing on the particularities, difficulties and challenges of the case as well as trying to 
bring about a reflexive exchange on the functioning of the legal system. 
We conducted two interviews with lawyer Molano. The first one took place after the first 
instance judgment and the second one after the last instance decision by the Supreme Court of 
Justice in favor of retired Col. Plazas. With lawyer German Romero we conducted one interview 
that took place in his office, after the second instance judgment. As they are public to the case and 
have appeared before the media as legal representatives of the victims, they agreed with being 
identified in the present research with their names.  
c) The third group of interviews was conducted with judicial officers who had worked in 
the judicial dossier against retired Col. Plazas. Within this group of people we conducted four 
semi-structured in-depth interviews with three people: the prosecutor of the case, the first instance 
judge and one of her judicial assistants. As asserted, for exploring their views we used a semi-
structured questionnaire focused on the procedures.  The objective of these interviews was that 
actors of the legal procedures could openly express their legal expertise. All of the interviews we 
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conducted with this group took place after their direct involvement in the process: in the case of the 
first instance judge and her assistant, the interview was conducted after her judgment against 
retired Col. Plazas; while in the case of the prosecutor, we interviewed her after her dismissal from 
the Prosecutor General’s Office.  
These exchanges were conducted in Bogota, with the support of a questionnaire composed 
by five main questions. The presentation of these questions varied according to the particular role 
of the judicial officers vis-à-vis the dossier. The first question was focused on a general 
presentation of the person and their position in the judicial system. The second question referred to 
their specific role in the case. The third question referred to their perceptions on the proceedings 
against retired Col. Plazas and the professional and personal conditions and obstacles that they 
experienced processing this case; the fourth question was about their perceptions on the results of 
the case; and, the fourth question was about their views on the existence of impunity in the case 
and what actions should be in place to address it. 
The views of this group on the criminal process were important for understanding the 
problems and challenges that this case presents. This group of people provided us with different 
insights from the perspective of the operators of the judicial system. Within this group it was 
especially relevant to focus on the elaboration of ideas about the functioning of the criminal law 
system. For processing the interviews we transcribed each recording, coding the texts using the 
software Atlas.ti. Using 249 different codes we conducted a cross-examination of the findings with 
the aim of grouping the assertions of the actors in different themes.  
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2.2. The epistemological approach 
The described set of data was intended to offer a series of specificities of the events 
around the taking and the operation to retake the Palace of Justice; further, this was not only 
aimed at understanding the particular case of study but also at providing insight into the general 
ideas, discourses and practices related to the phenomenon of impunity and the criminal activities 
of the State: the interest of this research is to visualize and understand “the complexity of the 
behavior patterns of the bounded system” of ideas (Cohen and Crabtree, 2006) taking place in 
this case. Thus, the analytical objective of the present work entails not only a description of the 
concrete events under study but an analysis of the problems, challenges and larger ideas 
regarding the social constructions around impunity and state crime.  
With this aim, this research required an analytical tool allowing us studying and integrating 
the wide variety of sources employed, the multiplicity of information gathered as well as 
simultaneously forming a shared space of reflection with the theoretical framework that we 
explored. Such framework was meant to have the aptitude for depicting the perceptions of the 
actors gathered in this research but also gradually and simultaneously for drawing their underlying 
system of ideas analyzing the general theoretical developments on the field of inquiry.  
In the search and construction of this tool, it was particularly relevant the discussions of 
the Canada Research Chair in Legal Traditions and Penal Rationality of the University of 
Ottawa where we conducted part of the present research. In different seminars we focused on a 
particular trans-disciplinary theory that served for drawing in-depth descriptions concurrently 
with unveiling the system of ideas underlying the observations. The first appearances of this 
theory of observation can be traced in the twentieth century through different researches coming 
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from a variety of disciplines, especially from natural and social sciences and from the 
mathematical work of Spencer Brown in The Laws of Form (1969). Although these sources were 
used and adapted for social studies mainly Luhmann systems theory (2000), this framework is 
not limited to a particular social theory. Presenting a trans-disciplinary vocation, beyond a bond 
with a specific discipline, this framework can be employed using different theoretical approaches 
to address social problems. However the different sources where we can find developments 
around this theory this framework is recent. The fact that the theory was somehow under 
construction provided us with the space for building our own variations, adaptations and 
reflections with a degree of openness in regard to the methodological approach during the 
process of research.  
This theory is descriptive in nature, aiming at depicting how observers do observe: the 
focus of this approach is not the object of the observation (X) but the process itself. In other 
words, a sociological theory of observation is a framework for observing social phenomena, 
without reproducing the question of what is reality. Rather than asking: ‘what is Y observing?’, 
this theory asks: ‘How does Y observe X?’ and, through this question, ‘What are the distinctions 
and selections that Y employs when observing X as it does?’  
“Spencer Brown’s concept of observation does not focus on the object of observation itself 
as a selection of what to observe. In this sense, the underlying question is not: what does an 
observer observe, but how does an observer observe; how is it that an observer is observing 
what he is observing, and not observing something else” (Seidl 2005:47). 
This theory of observation suited with the methodological aims of the present work The 
problem of the present research is not whether people do observe impunity in the case or whether 
they judge a state crime was committed or not. The purpose of our work is to depict those ideas 
enabling an observation or not of these phenomena and what is the content of those elements 
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allowing them to observe in conformity with this - how does a person or a system observe the 
phenomena under study? On the basis of what elements do they distinguish, characterize and 
select those phenomena?  
Our conceptual work could only be developed on the basis of those distinctions and 
selections drawn when observing the phenomena. In this line, the theory of observation teaches us 
that observing involves a process of drawing a distinction and operating a selection. “Drawing a 
distinction is the elementary act of observation which is the elementary act of human cognition” 
(Maturana & Varela 1980). Distinction are drawn between a marked and an unmarked space or 
between a term and a contra-term10. For example, when asking about impunity the actors could 
draw a distinction by contrast alter/ego – this can take the form of a term/contra-term as when 
observers draw a distinction impunity/no-impunity; or an unidirectional distinction by which one 
side is indicated and the other is left blank –as when an observer distinguishes impunity/the rest.  
“Once a distinction is drawn, the spaces, states or contents on each side of the boundary, 
being distinct, can be indicated” (Brown 1969); in other words, once a distinction is drawn, 
selection is enabled. Selections are indicating processes through which the observer opts for a 
direction in which the observation will be conducted (in our example I select ‘impunity’): 
observer systems draw distinctions and select a direction for their observation. 
Referring to the action of observing does not confine the activity of the theory to a sensorial 
experience; it rather involves a cognitive process that operates through distinction, selection and, 
more importantly, exclusion. Observing is, somehow, an exercise of exclusion. Observer systems 
need to delimit their field of attention through the exclusion of different elements from their 
                                       
10 The former is a distinction by contrast to the environment (e.g. the victim and the rest of society) and the 
latter is a distinction by contraposition of ego versus alter (e.g. the victim and the perpetrator). 
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observations; otherwise, they would be incapable of distinguishing. “No one can see everything” 
(Luhmann 2002: 74). There are no total observations. Observations are always partial. “[O]pacities 
remain, no matter how large the telescopes” (Rasch 2002: 4). Hence, the theory of observation allows 
us to depict not only those aspects that are being included for the observation but also those elements 
that are excluded from the observation drawing different descriptions on how and what we observe.  
With the purpose of better understanding the construction of the observations drawn in 
this research let us describe two basic kinds of observation that the theory formulates as basic 
forms of operation of the observations: first-order and second-order observations. “First-order 
observation focuses on what others observe; second-order on how others observe” 
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2009:18) 
A first-order observation consists on asking: ‘what does the observer observe?’ This 
question does not focus on what is actually observed but on how that is observed. In other words, 
using the theory of observation this question should not answered by referring to the object of 
observation but by depicting the distinction made by the observer system and detecting its 
selection: the focus is the operation used for observing and, by this means, depicting the underlying 
system of ideas governing a particular observation. For example, when observing state criminality 
the issue is not if observers do depict in a particular situation a criminal event coming from the 
State, but what are the distinctions and selections that the observer employs with that end. Thus, 
the observation changes if, for example, the distinction drawn by the observer is state 
crime/ordinary crime or if it is state crime/ unnecessary crime (the same happens when for 
observing impunity, the distinction drawn is impunity/punishment or impunity/justice).  
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A second-order observation involves asking: ‘how does an observer observe?’. This form 
of observing can be characterized as epistemologically relevant since they are not focused on the 
ontological constitution of the world -”the social is this or that” (Borch 2011: 58); rather, they 
are concerned with the epistemological perspective of observing - “how do observers observe: 
how do they believe the world is constituted?” (Borch 2011: 58). This level of observation 
allows further to “comprehend more extended realms of selectivity and identify contingencies 
where the first-order observer believes he is following a necessary path or is acting entirely 
naturally” (Luhmann 2000: 62 in Raupp 2013: 148).  
A second-order observation entails an observation of observers11. As mentioned above, 
this form of observation asks ‘how does the observer observe?’, consequently asking ‘What is 
not being taken into consideration by the observer when observing as he or she is doing?’, ‘is it 
possible to observe differently (better) what is being observed?’ “Indeed, if a first-order observer 
distinguishes between observed and non-observed, a second-order observer can also observe 
what a first-order observer and cannot observe” (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2009:18). This is 
related to the so called blind spots of the observation. 
As asserted before, observation entails exclusion. For excluding we need reasons. 
Elaborating those reasons involves taking into consideration what we exclude. Thus, when 
excluding although the observer does not select what is excluded, at the same time, he or she 
takes the excluded into account. This form of distinction and selection (or inclusion and 
exclusion) is different from a situation of not taking into consideration a particular element of 
                                       
11 “On this level [of observation] one has to observe not simple objects but observing systems - that is, to 
distinguish them in the first place. One has to know which distinctions guide the observations of the 
observed observer and to find out if any stable objects emerge when these observations are recursively 
applied to their own results” (Luhmann 1993: 763) 
 44 
 
 
observation: a situation of blindness. To be blind is not to not see but to not see that one is not 
seeing. A blind spot of observation is formed when something is being excluded without taking it 
into consideration when drawing an observation. In these occasions, what is being left out of our 
field of observation is not what is not selected but what the observer does not perceive that he or 
she is not taking it into consideration. This theory of observation enables perceiving what is 
being observed, excluded and unnoticed by the observer systems to operate in the social world. 
In a way, the theory of observation allows us to see blindness. 
In this context, the observation theory is auto-reflective in the sense that the researcher is 
acknowledged as an observer him/herself. A theory of observation therefore allows the researcher to 
be aware that his or her observations are also limited to the distinctions and selections drawn in the 
process, involving that the research is therefore bounded to its own limits and blind spots. Thus, the 
theory is useful as a mechanism of scientific control for the observations.  
The theory of observation allows to put forward the limitations of the process of 
observing, avoiding the (re)presentation of the social science developments as complete, absolute 
or ‘good’. This form of drawing the observations involves a scientific control of the inquiries 
while simultaneously allowing a structured and rigorous development of the process of research. 
Indeed, scientific consistency should involve awareness and restraint from mere-value 
judgments. This means that the process of research is intended to allow constant confrontation 
and contrast between differing ideas, especially controlling those ideas accepted as unquestioned. 
Even if engaged with a particular (political, ideological, religious) position, this process allows 
the researcher to adopt a cognitive openness.  
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This process therefore should be capable of guiding the research and the researcher 
influencing his or her cognitive processes. This form of reshaping and adjusting the process of 
knowing and perceiving involves focusing on how we observe the social life rather than what we 
observe: the theory of observation allows moving our attention to the operations of observation 
that particular social systems or actors employ in order to draw their distinctions. This could, for 
example, yield helpful insights into the convergence of ideas and practices between actors 
holding apparently opposed discourses (e.g. liberal human rights and conservative law and order 
acting both in favor of more criminal law repression) and vice versa.  Moreover, it offers a richer 
perspective allowing to characterize the significance of social actors’ ideas by understanding 
how they observe the social world. For instance, although two people may agree that a case 
involves a scenario of impunity they can do so for very different reasons, ultimately pointing 
toward very different phenomena. 
In sum, for this research we used a theory of observation in order to depict, describe, 
understand and analyze the case selected as well as the ideas, practices and social discourses around 
the themes of state crime and impunity. This framework of analysis provided us with in-depth 
insights on the information gathered through the media, the documentary sources, the observations in 
situ and the personal interviews of the actors. It also gave us elements for reflecting on and 
questioning the way that we were processing the information enabling scientific awareness of the 
limitations and selections that we used when drawing the observations of this research. This enabled 
a more thoughtful form of conducting our investigation as well as reinforced our openness when 
trying to explore, categorize and analyze the meanings and content of the ideas, discourses and 
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practices of the actors of the PJ case and their underlying ideas on the subjects of impunity and state 
crime.  
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3. The PJ case 
 
Different commentators have asserted that the PJ events are “one of the climactic moments 
in Colombia's problem with violence” (IACHR 1993: Introduction), “one of the most serious and 
disturbing events of the institutions in the long history of violence experienced by Colombia” (PJ 
Truth Commission in Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010: 276), and ultimately “one of the most 
emblematic human rights violations of the country’s armed conflict” (Deutsche Welle 2015)  
The present chapter aims at giving an account of the case giving a contextualized account 
of the taking of the Palace of Justice and the subsequent operation to retake it by the State security 
Forces in 1985, as well as the following legal investigations. A combination of various sources of 
information were taken into consideration with this purpose, including legal records, media reports, 
documents, in situ observation and factual aspects gathered in the interviews from our fieldwork. 
The great volume of available data, the variety of versions, the multiplicity of relevant events and 
the great controversy around them were a particularly complex feature for our analysis. 
In this part, we will attempt at drawing a reconstruction of the case in order to visualize, 
understand and analyze some of its specificities with respect to the system of ideas that it reveals. 
The objective of this exploration will not be to present a ‘new version’ of the case or ‘discovering’ 
new information on the fate of the disappeared, nor determining responsibilities for the violations 
or clarifying the motivations or concrete circumstances of the crimes. We will neither determine 
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the scientific or judicial truth of what happened at the PJ. In line part, we will rather give a rich 
account of the events with the purpose of enabling an analysis of the phenomena under study.  
Any reconstruction should take into account the intervention of the researcher and the 
limitations that condensing a singular version from a complex event entails. Researchers select for 
observing. A pretension of totality is both unfeasible – there is not a single point of observation 
allowing to assess the totality of an event (Bateson 1972: 5), and undesirable –it would only lead to 
the accumulation of desultory assessments (Popper 1952; Dahrendorf 1966). As Bateson (1972) puts 
forward, there is always a recoding, a sort of transformation between the brute event and the person 
who observes, between the researcher and the object of study.  
Considering these constraints, in the following section we will offer an account of the PJ 
case. These events could not be understood without an historical background. For this reason, the 
first step will be to succinctly expose an historical context of the events, with the aim of subsequently 
describing the happenings and the legal enquiries that have taken place with regard to them. Thus, 
the objective of this chapter will be to draw a proper description of the case for assessing the system 
of ideas that it embeds with respect to the phenomena under study in this research. 
3.1. The Historical Context and Background of the Events 
Colombia is the northernmost country of South America. The waters of both the Atlantic 
and the Pacific oceans bathe its coastlines and provide an important geostrategic location to its 
land. The estimate current population of the country is over 48 million inhabitants. The formation 
of the modern Colombian State started with the independence movement from the Spanish Crown 
in the nineteenth century. In the period between 1810 and 1850, after different fights against the 
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Spanish rule, Colombia gained certain independence and entered a phase of institutional 
adjustments.  
In the late nineteenth century, nine civil wars and more than a hundred regional civil 
conflicts burst out in the country. “Colombian history is often seen as a long series of civil wars 
and violence […] Historians (e.g. Alape 1985; Fischer 1991; Jaramillo 2001) have counted 54 civil 
wars [only] in the 20 years between 1851 and 1871” (Sánchez, Solimano & Formisano 2005: 120). 
Violence were also pervasive during the twentieth century12. However, since the independence and 
parallel to the violence, the country installed an electoral system sustaining public elections along 
most of its republican history13. In this context, during the nineteenth century and much of the 
twentieth century, two main political parties ruled the electoral life of the country: the liberals and 
the conservatives.  
According to Bushnell (1986: 32), while during the independence almost every citizen of 
the Republic self-identified as liberal14, the bifurcation with the conservatives took place during the 
War of the Supremes (1839–1842)15. From that point of history onward, the conservatives were 
traditionally thought of as supporters of a Catholic-based government and strong centralization. In 
                                       
12 These battles derived into and from a variety of conflicts, i.a. the independence of Panama (1903), the 
Bananeras massacre (1928) and two territorial wars against Peru (1911; 1932). None of these episodes 
lasted as much as La Violencia (Deas 1986: 43), which is the common denomination for Colombia’s 
modern conflict that will be explained later on. 
13 In contrast to the majority of Latin-American countries that at the time were ruled by long-lasting 
dictatorships: between 1970 and 1990 more than 75% of Latin-American population was ruled by military 
dictatorships (Torres-Vivas 1999: 285) 
14 This expression congregated at the same time patriots and republicans. 
15 “Colombian history is often seen as a long series of civil wars and violence dating to 1839.The first civil 
war—the war of the Supremes (Guerra de los Supremos)—began only a few years after Colombia was 
liberated from Spain in 1819. It was fought between supporters of Simon Bolivar (El Libertador), who 
attempted a coup d’état against the santanderistas (supporters of Francisco de Paula Santander, one of the 
leaders of Colombian independence).The war ended in 1841 and led to the founding of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties that have dominated Colombian politics” (Sánchez, Solimano & Formisano 2005: 120) 
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contrast, the liberals were represented as supporters of a secular government, agrarian reform and 
administrative and financial decentralization. 
The key factors of distinction between liberals and conservatives were, on the one hand, 
their position towards the degree of centralization of the public administration – however, Bushnell 
(1986: 36) asserts with this respect that there could always be found liberals who were centralists 
and conservatives supporting federalism; on the other hand, the second difference was their 
position around the role of the ecclesiastic power vis-à-vis the State16. In this context, the 
conservatives took certain preeminence mostly due to the influence of the Catholic Church, an 
institution that was eager to preserve its power within the structures of the State.  
 During the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth century, the two political parties 
resorted to violence to settle their disputes over the control of the State apparatus (CNMH 2013:112). 
The political pugnacity between the traditional parties reached its most critical stage in the period 
known as ‘La Violencia’ (CNMH 2013:112). According to some commentators, La Violencia was a 
phase of escalation of a conflict that was presented in terms of partisan antagonism, but that was 
rooted in a number of different social conflicts, particularly in the confrontation between the 
oligarchy and the people. This was particularly manifest when the Gaitanist movement emerged 
claiming its opposition against the ruling class, asking for social reforms and leading the working 
class and the peasants into a political group that could represent their demands.  
                                       
16 With respect to all the other political issues, it was difficult to find programmatic distinctions. Commentators 
as Gonzalo Sánchez (1986: 18) have asserted that these political parties were formed as subcultures or 
sometimes as labels rooted in oral tradition, rather than in tangible and concrete political discrepancies. With 
this respect, Bushnell (1986: 35) argues that the urban and rural masses were ascribed to one or another party for 
gaining access to the State bureaucracy. 
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In 1946 a period known as the Liberal Hegemony (1930-1946) reached its end with the 
election of the conservative Mariano Ospina Perez as President. President Ospina’s government 
unfolded in a context of heightened social unease noticeable in a growing wave of strikes17, as well 
as a growing situation of insecurity (Guzmán, Fals & Umaña 1962: 28). Such challenging social 
situation was exacerbated by a number of crimes committed against political dissenters, especially 
against the Gaitanist movement. Between 1944 and 1947, Gaitán proposed a vision of the Colombian 
situation as a radical social division between those who had everything (the oligarchy) and those who 
had nothing (the people) (Pécaut 1969: 191). While gaitanismo (Gaitán’s movement) was 
traditionally understood as part of the Liberal party, there is a current understanding of it as an 
alternative to the bipartisanism and therefore as against both the liberal and conservative oligarchies 
(Sánchez and Peñaranda 1986: 19). 
In a context of rising violence, on February 7, 1948 Gaitán led a silent march in which he 
pronounced his renowned Prayer for the Peace, asking the government to stop its violent acts 
against the population and his party fellows. On April 9, 1948, the Presidency candidate of the 
liberal party Jorge Eliecer Gaitán was murdered while giving a public speech to his followers. In 
his funeral, Amparo de Gaitán (his widow) repudiated the continuation of the conservative regime 
but also refused its replacement by the Liberal leaders, accusing them of complicity with the 
crime18. Nationwide, this assassination provoked violent disorders and the distinction between 
liberals and conservatives became an open sign of war, hatred and hostility.  
                                       
17 Since September 1946 there were more than 500 labor conflicts arising in collective bargaining and strikes 
(Guzmán, Fals & Umaña 1962) 
18 Just a few hours after Gaitán was murdered, the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties gathered 
together on that same night to discuss on the political situation (Braun 1986: 205). 
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On November 9, 1949, Liberal congressmen visited President Ospina to announce that they 
were going to file a process against him in the Congress. In that same afternoon, the Congress 
building was occupied by the military (Ayala 2003). Based on the remarkable disturbance of the 
public order, President Ospina Perez issued the Decree 3513, by which he declared the state of 
siege. Hence, President Ospina was free to rule because of the extraordinary powers conferred by 
the state of exception until the end of his mandate (Ocampo n.d.).  
La Violencia is the mainstream label for the violent socio-political conflict that emerged in 
the events mentioned above during the 1940s. Such rise in violence created a social environment of 
confrontation represented as a struggle between liberals and conservatives, present at least until the 
1960s19. This conflict created a general climate of destruction and radical enmity among the civil 
society: according to Oquist, between 1948 and 1966, 193.017 people perished as a result of the 
political violence (Oquist 1978: 322 in CNMH 2013:115). Also, in this context the country was 
progressively militarized: while in 1946 the country’s Armed Forces were as large as 8.000 men 
with a budget of 10,2% of the GDP, in 1965 the Armed Forces grew to 37.000 men with a budget 
that oscillated between the 17% and the 20% of the National Budget (Gilhodés 1986: 305).   
  In this context, under the excuse of protecting the public order, the government led an 
official campaign of repression that implied a crusade against liberals and communists. Numerous 
people were murdered and others were forcibly displaced. Some fled to neighboring countries and 
others, mostly liberals in the rural areas, either organized or joined self-proclaimed self-defense 
                                       
19 Some commentators assert that La Violencia is a period of around twenty years –some commentators 
frame it within 1945 and 1965 (e.g. HRW 1996), others frame it between 1946 and 1958 (e.g. CNMH 
2013:112) and some others that it was from 1946 to 1964 (e.g. Pécaut 1999:160). According to Pécaut 
(1999) this difference is due to different memories of La Violencia, some of them emphasizing on the 
continuity of social struggles since La Conquista (a permanent phenomenon with particular landmarks) 
and others laying emphasis on particular events as the War of a Thousand Days. 
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resistance groups since 1949 (Medina 1986: 249). These armed groups rapidly shifted their strategy 
from stationary defense to a more offensive and itinerant strategy. In short, these movement grew 
into guerrilla movements20.  
Around mid-twentieth century, the growth of these groups backed by a broad popular 
support made of this movements highly successful in their control of the territory and of the 
population. In this context, the statu quo that had disregarded these movements, perceived as trivial 
and weak by the political class and the military commanders at the time (Jaramillo 1986: 47), 
progressively considered them as a genuine threat to the national security. In this context, the 
conservative police targeted the guerrillas as their main goal. The abuse of the authority and the use 
of force by law enforcement officials became customary. The use of different methods of 
repression by the military and the police involved recurrent mistreatments, cruelties and crimes 
executed against the civil population, largely justified as part of the ‘fight against the rebels’21.  
This campaign was complemented by the emergence of different pseudo-paramilitary 
groups such as the Chulavitas22. In different international litigations against Colombia, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (hereafter, IA Court) (2004; 2005a; 2006a; 2006f; 2007) has 
concluded that the State has been actively involved in the creation of paramilitary groups, as well 
as in their legal, logistic and doctrinaire support. In 1962, members of the US Army Special 
                                       
20 Guerrilla warfare is a method of waging war that was present along the different conflicts and 
independence struggles in Colombia. The term ‘guerrilla’ indicates the military tactic of attacking the 
adversary through disperse mobile groupings. In early modern times, guerrilla warfare was considered in 
Colombia as minor groups resourcing to a desperate form of making war. 
21 Such fight aimed at ‘draining the sea to kill the fish’ - following the Maoist model claiming that ‘the fish 
is to water what the people is to the guerrilla’. Under this premise, the military framed their campaign with 
the objective of exterminating the guerrillas while isolating them from the popular support (Villar & Cottle 
2011: 123). Later on, this kind of abuses became the regular configuration of the war in Colombia, and the 
term guerrilla became the current identification of those armed groups acting against the statu quo. 
22 The Chulavitas were a group of armed men trained by the government and recruited in a rural area 
named Chulavita 
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Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg presented in Colombia a plan for the formation of 
paramilitary groups (Giraldo 2004). After the formation of the first communist guerrillas, in 
December 1965, the Legislative Decree No. 3398 authorized the creation of “self-defence groups” 
for supporting anti-subversive operations. The military supplied arms to the paramilitaries under 
the excuse of combating the guerrilla (UN 1990). At the time, the emergence of paramilitary 
groups, the normalization of states of exception and the unrestrained enlargement of military power 
were expressions of an institutionalization of terror.  
In an atmosphere of repression and in the middle of a fierce campaign of repression 
coordinated by the government and conducted by the conservative police and the military, the 
Liberal Party decided not to participate in the presidential elections, alleging a risk to their life and 
the absence of political rights. In the Presidency elections of November 27, 1949, the Conservative 
Party was the only running political force and the conservative candidate, Laureano Gómez, was 
elected for the period between 1950 and 1954. According to some commentators, Gómez led an 
authoritarian project that assimilated liberalism and communism and sought the return of the State 
to the Catholic Church as an element of social cohesion (Pécaut 2015)23.  
The armed conflict rapidly spread throughout the country. Civilians were largely victimized 
not only by war and violence but also by precarious living conditions, little public investment on 
                                       
23 “Although the liberal-conservative violence was promoted by the leadership of both parties, political 
confrontation was particularly fueled by the manifest sectarianism of the conservative leader Laureano Gómez, 
President of the Republic between 1950 and 1953. Since then, the political conflict resulted in open armed 
confrontation […] as a hallmark of the 1950s, violence was present amongst the citizens from both tendencies 
through the attack by the opposite party or their territories. Political parties formed armed groups with different 
levels of organization: on the one side, the Chulavita police and the Birds (professional group of hit-men), at 
the service of the conservative government; on the other side, liberal guerrillas and communist self-defense 
groups” (CNMH 2013: 112).  
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basic sanitation services, and defective social policies. In this context of social unease, other 
guerrillas were formed – there have been around ten guerrilla groups in the modern Colombian 
history. The biggest have been the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)24, the 
National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Popular Liberation Army, which were formed in the 
1960s claiming to have a communist orientation.  
On June 13, 1953, General Rojas Pinilla seized power in a coup installing a military 
government that lasted until 1958. General Rojas, acting with the support of the Catholic Church, the 
economic interest groups and both political parties, overthrew the conservative government. 
According to the U.S Department of State, the coup counted with the conservative support and the 
benevolent gaze of the liberals (U.S Department of State in Atehortúa 2010) due to the striking 
deterioration of the public order in the country.  
After declaring the state of siege, in 1953 one of the first measures that General Rojas 
undertook was to declare a unilateral ceasefire offering amnesty to the liberal guerrillas that would 
surrender (Decree 1823/1954 of the state of siege). On June 13, 1956, at Bogotá’s football stadium 
“El Campín”, Rojas Pinilla presented his own political party: “the Third Force”. Rojas suggested the 
need to overcome bipartisanship and proposed a socialist political program. This event was 
understood by the political elites as challenging the long-established political ruling class.  
On July 24, 1956, Alberto Lleras (liberal) and Laureano Gómez (conservative) signed the 
Pact of Benidorm: in the name of their parties they agreed on a system of government called the 
National Front. Following this pact, Rojas stepped down and a military junta was established as 
                                       
24 According to Pizarro (1986: 397) the majority of the commanders of the FARC had participated in the 
liberal guerrillas. 
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the transitional government25. The Frente Nacional was advertised to the public as a form of 
pacifying the civil conflict between liberals and conservatives. Under this agreement, during the 
following sixteen years, both parties alternated the Presidency every four years and shared their 
participation in the governmental bureaucracy. However, in the long run, this pact involved the 
discrimination and relegation of other political groups: “[i]nstead of working to exclude one another 
from power, the traditional parties now worked together to exclude all others from the political 
arena” (Rochlin 2003 in Isbester 2011: 212). 
After a short asylum in the Dominican Republic, General Rojas returned to Colombia and 
founded a political movement called ANAPO (National Popular Alliance). In 1970 Rojas was 
presented as ANAPO’s candidate to run for President, competing against the National Front 
candidate Misael Pastrana. On April 19, 1970, the presidential elections took place26. Rojas and his 
supporters alleged that the elections had been rigged. Nevertheless, the Electoral Council proclaimed 
Misael Pastrana President for the period 1970-1974. 
The suspicion of fraud around the elections raised great social unease. In this context, 
former FARC Jaime Bateman led the creation of the 19th of April guerrilla (hereinafter, M19), as a 
remembrance of the day when the Presidential elections were held. This was mainly an urban 
movement with a socialist political program27.  
                                       
25 The junta, presided over by General Gabriel Paris, governed the country from May 10, 1957 to August 7, 
1958. 
26 The official results of the elections were 1,561,468 votes in favor of ANAPO’s candidate and 1,625,025 
votes for the National Front candidate. 
27 In January 1974, this group issued its first public statement asserting: “Every worker, every anapista 
[partisan of Anapo’s party], and all the oppressed must understand: victory is not begged, it is taken. The 
people know that without struggle and armed organization, Anapo will not achieve victory; however, great is 
the number of votes that it can obtain in the polls. Such was the learning on April 19th, 1970, when they stole 
from us the victory. This history will never happen to us again” (Revista Alternativa 1974: 24). 
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The M19 conducted different armed actions that aimed at causing public impact. Hernando 
Gómez (1969) asserts that the target of this guerrilla was not the traditional rural guerrillas’ crusade 
against the military but rather a propagandistic campaign directed to the public opinion. The M19 
promoted an expectation campaign to announce its imminent appearance.  
Besides its advertising activities, the M19 conducted several armed actions of high impact 
on the public opinion.  On January 17, 1974, their first armed action was the theft of Simon 
Bolivar's sword. On this occasion, the M19 sent to the media a public statement.  
The only journal that published it was Revista 
Alternativa (1974: 24). On the statement that can be seen 
in the image next to the text, there was a photograph of 
the sword with the M19 flag and the declaration:  
“The liberating sword is now in the hands of the people. 
[…] Bolivar comes back to disturb the oppressor. He 
comes back to awake the oppressed. His sword renews 
his fighting. Now it faces the Yankees. The exploiters. 
Those who give away our country to the dollar. Those 
who drown our people in misery. [...] Land for the 
peasants, justice for the workers, fair work for the 
unemployed, school for the children, a clear and clean 
life for all” (Revista Alternativa 1974: 24). 
Later, on New Year's Eve of 1979, the M19 
Table No. 3. Images of some advertisements published in journals and found on the streets 
    
Coming soon: M19 
 
Lack of energy… 
Inactivity? Wait for M19 
(El Espectador 1974a: 
13A)  
Parasites… Worms? 
Wait for M19 (El 
Espectador1974b:1C) 
Decay... forgetfulness? 
Wait for M19 (El 
Espectador 1974b 14A)  
Picture No. 1. M19 Declaration. Retrieved 
from Revista Alternativa (1974: 24) 
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stole 4,076 weapons from a military base through a tunnel dug into one of the main Colombian 
Army weapons depot, at a military storage facility in Cantón Norte (Bogota). Due to festivities, 
activities in the depot were suspended for three days; the guerrillas took advantage of it and dug a 
tunnel from a nearby house. The excavation lasted about ten weeks. On the evening of December 
30, 1978, they reached their goal, stole the weapons and kept them until January 1, 1979. On 
January 2, the army conducted an operation and recovered most of them (El Tiempo 1992). 
Besides these spectacular operations, during the seventies, the M19 adopted a systematic practice 
of kidnapping, some of them for political negotiation and others concluding with the payment of a 
ransom or with the killing of the people deprived of liberty 28.  
                                       
28 Five representative cases of kidnapping by the M19 were: 
• In August, 1975, the M19 kidnapped the American citizen Donald Cooper, general manager of Sears stores 
in Colombia. Cooper was captive until a ransom of one million dollars was paid on November 5, 1975 
(Revista Semana 1988).  
• In February 15, 1976, Jose Raquel Mercado, president of the Confederation of Workers of Colombia (a 
working class union), was kidnapped and accused by the guerrilla of betrayal. They claimed he had received 
bribes from American interest groups. On April 19, 1976, Mercado was killed after a ‘trial’ and the M19 left 
his body exposed in the streets of the west side of Bogota (Revista Semana 1988).  
• In August 19th, 1976, Hugo Ferreira, former Minister of Agriculture and Indupalma28 manager was 
kidnapped. The condition for his release was for the Corporation to reach an agreement with the workers, who 
were in a process of collective bargaining. On September 14, 1976, the corporation accepted all of the requests 
of the workers and Ferreira was released in Bogota (Revista Semana 1988). 
• On May 10, 1978, the ambassador of Nicaragua in Colombia, William Baquero, was kidnapped. The 
purpose was to denounce Somoza’s regime and to call for solidarity with the Sandinista movement. Baquero 
was released after a few hours (Revista Semana 1988). 
• On February 27, 1980, at about midday, the M19 took control of the Dominican Republic embassy when 
they were celebrating a national holiday with other diplomatic delegates in Bogota. The M19 demanded the 
release of about 320 political prisoners. “On April 27, in the early hours of the morning, the captors of the 
Dominican Republic Embassy and the hostages, accompanied by the members of the IACHR, Colombian 
Government officials, members of the Asociación Colombiana Pro-Derechos Humanos, and representatives of 
the Red Cross went to the El Dorado international Airport of Bogotá to board an airplane flying the Cuban flag 
and to depart for Havana. […] Several hostages were released moments before the flight took off.  Others were 
set free in the Cuban capital, following a period of captivity that has lasted 61 days” (IACHR 1981: 
Introduction). 
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In the early 1980s, the military started to implement a more integral plan to fight the 
guerrilla. In the 1970s, throughout Latin-America29, the National Security Doctrine was 
implemented by the military against communism: the new internal enemy30. The statu quo led a 
civil and military campaign against its ‘new’ antagonist force - represented by the imageries of the 
bandoleros, the anarchists and the communists. This consequently reframed the social conflict 
from a bipartisan cyclic struggle for the political power (between the conservatives and the 
liberals) into a conflict to be fought under the slogan of the fight against communism31 (Gilhodés 
1986: 317, 320, 321).  
The first official record of the National Security Doctrine in Colombia may be detected at 
the beginning of 1972, under the rubric of General Hernando Castro (Gilhodés 1986). This date 
coincides with the time in which the phenomenon of enforced disappearances started to be noticed 
                                       
29 “During the second half of the twentieth century, large sections of the population were exterminated in 
various parts of Latin America. Most of these events followed a similar pattern and were the result of what 
became known as the National Security Doctrine. Developed primarily by the United States, this policy 
widened the sphere of international conflict to Latin America in the belief that the region could play a 
strategic role in the fight against communism, an ideological struggle that had no territorial boundaries. The 
National Security Doctrine was inspired by the Cold War but also by the methods developed by Western 
powers in various counter‐insurgency struggles. In particular, the methods  applied by the ‘French school’ 
in Indochina and Algeria and adopted by the Americans during the Vietnam War were later taught at 
numerous military and ideological training centres in Latin America. The most important of these was the 
School of the Americas, first established in the Panama Canal Zone in 1946 to train Central American 
forces. Following the success of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, another branch of the School was opened at 
Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1963 to teach ‘French’ counter‐insurgency tactics. Thus, the practice of 
systematic annihilation of political enemies in Latin America, which began as early as 1954 with the 
military coup in Guatemala, continued almost until the beginning of the twenty‐first century, spreading 
throughout practically all of Latin America” (Feierstein 2012: 489-490). 
30 The notion of internal enemy was imported from Europe and especially from North America. This 
notion described a change in the military and law enforcement focus, from the mission of defending the 
territorial integrity of the State against foreign threats, to the goal of defending an ‘inner frontier’ against 
communism. This strategy was characterized as an anti-subversive war that became the key issue of 
concern to the military (Barak 2015: 309). 
31 As Gilhodés (1986) as assessed, between 1925 and 1930, the Armed Force Commanders displaced their 
view of the Colombian conflict from a struggle between Liberals and Conservatives for the political power, 
to a fight against communism. 
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in the country according to the Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances (UN 1989) about Colombia  
In the transition between the 1970s and the 1980s, different human rights sources indicate 
that enforced disappearances became particularly widespread (ASFADDES 2003). As reported by 
the Colombian Forensic Institute, enforced disappearances gradually increased since 1975, 
becoming persistent mainly since 1981 (between 1972 and 1975 there was one case per year while 
in 1979 there were 23 cases and between 1980 and 1988, the UN Group registered a media of more 
than 78 cases per year32).  
It was in 1977 when the first formal allegation of enforced disappearance was registered: 
the case of the leftist activist Omaira Montoya perpetrated by members of the Police and the 
military33 (ASFADDES, 2003). Although enforced disappearances had been committed in the 
country in prior periods34, the disappearance of Montoya is a central point for the denunciation of 
this phenomenon in the country, even though the crime was not recognized at the time as a 
domestic criminal offense.  
One of the most relevant antecedents of the National Security Doctrine in Colombia is 
President Turbay’s (1978-1982) Security Statute. Justified under the grave disturbance of the public 
                                       
32 From 1972 to 1974 the Group registered one case per year; in 1975 and 1976, there were three cases each 
year; in 1977, there were nine cases; in 1978 there were six cases, in 1979, 23 cases, in 1980, 4 cases, in 
1981, 80, in 1982, 74, in 1983, 73; in 1984, 89; in 1985, 76; in 1986, 94; in 1987, 65; and in 1988, 70. 
33 Omaira Montoya was a bacteriologist and leftist militant. At the time of the events, she was three months 
pregnant. She was with her partner, Mauricio Trujillo, at the Barranquilla’s airport when she was 
approached by members of the Police Intelligence (F2). Mauricio Trujillo was illegaly detained, tortured, 
eventually tried in a court and sentenced to 8 years in prison. Omaira was forcibly disappeared. 
34 Information around the genealogy of the practice of enforced disappearances in Colombia is obscure. 
The oldest case registered in the National Register of Disappeared people in Colombia dates back to 1938 
(Segura and Ramirez 2015). However, there is little documentation on this violation before the mid-
twentieth century . With this respect, according to Federico Andreu (international expert on the subject of 
enforced disappearance), in the country this violation has been part of the history of socio-political 
repression at least since the 1950s. 
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order35, the Statute hardened punishment for certain crimes36, imposed prison penalties for those who 
participated in public demonstrations37, awarded competence to the military authorities to prosecute 
crimes38 and conduct administrative detentions39, as well as to the administrative authorities to enact 
curfews40 and censure the media when informing about ‘illegal’ strikes41.  
These provisions affected the human rights situation of the population. The criminalization 
of social movements facilitated arbitrary detentions42, some of which were used as means for 
disappearing people who were irregularly apprehended. With this respect, Amnesty International 
(1980: 52) claimed that many of these people were accused of subversion, were subjected to 
solitary confinement without proper legal aid, and were subjected to various forms of physical and 
psychological torture.  
                                       
35 “[…] [P]eriódicamente se han venido reiterando y agudizando las causas de perturbación del orden público, 
que crean un estado de inseguridad general y degeneran en homicidios, secuestros, sedición, motín o asonada, 
o en prácticas terroristas dirigidas a producir efectos políticos encaminados a desvirtuar el régimen republicano 
vigente o en la apología del delito, actos éstos que atentan contra los derechos ciudadanos reconocidos por la 
Constitución y por las leyes y que son esenciales para el funcionamiento y preservación del orden público” 
(Decreto Legislativo 1923 de 1978). 
36 The Decreto Legislativo 1923/1978 toughened penalties for kidnapping (Art. 1), rebellion (Art. 2), offenses 
against the public order (Art. 3), among others.  
37 The Decreto Legislativo 1923/1978 introduced the punishment of imprisonment against those affecting 
peaceful social activities (Art. 4). Also against those occupying, even momentarily, public spaces or other 
private entities with the purpose of pressuring public authorities, distributing subversive propaganda or fixating 
insulting writings or drawings exhorting citizens to rebel. Also, against those who incite to disobey the law or 
the authorities, as well as those who use without legal justification masks or any device hiding their identity 
(Art. 7).  
38 The Decree 1923/1978, gave military justice competence to try crimes committed against the life or integrity 
of members of the armed forces, security public bodies and against civilians at their service. 
39In accordance with the 1886 Constitution, the government was competent to order detentions in the context 
of disturbances of public order and security. 
40 The Decree 1923/1978, authorized the Mayors to limit and prohibit gatherings, demonstrations and open-air 
meetings (Art. 8). 
41 The Decree 1923/1978 granted the Ministry of Communications the power to veto radio stations and TV 
channels when informing about public order and illegal strikes or other labor-related work stoppages (Art. 13). 
42 Only from August 1978 to August 1979, the Minister of Justice notified 68,000 arrests. 
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These actions were part of a strategy issued by the General Command of the Armed Forces 
under the denomination Plan Tricolor, which consisted on a series of offensive actions against the 
guerrilla (Tribunal Superior 2012). According to General Jesús Arias, the Plan established that in 
case of a hostage situation, the military were to act promptly and decisively with no previsions of 
negotiation or dialogue (Verdad Abierta 2015). The existence of this Plan was proved to have an 
important role in the way the military dealt with the taking of the Palace of Justice (Tribunal 
Superior 2012; Juzgado Tercero 2010). 
The military were not the only to react against the guerrilla. On November 12, 1981, the 
M19 kidnapped 26-year-old Martha Ochoa, sister of three members of the Medellin Drug Cartel. 
The subversive group asked for a ransom of 12 million dollars. The drug dealers decided not to pay 
and offered a public reward for information on the whereabouts of Ms. Ochoa. In December, 1981, 
223 people formed a group called Death to Kidnappers (in Spanish, MAS), as a retaliation for the 
kidnapping of Ms. Ochoa. This organization became an armed force capable of conducting all 
types of violent activities to protect drug traffickers from the guerrillas.  
The group grew rapidly. In different regions such as the Magdalena Medio and Santander, 
landowners, merchants, military and local authorities adopted the MAS model for ‘cleansing’ their 
regions of rebels. Their original goal was expanded to an offensive against anyone opposed to the 
organization: politicians, peasants, activists and different people were killed, tortured and subjected 
to different kinds of violence. The authorities recorded 240 murders attributed to MAS, in which 
59 military and police officers in active service were implicated according to a report issued by the 
Procurador General (Procuraduría General 1983).  
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In this context, the Council of State conducted certain investigations addressing different 
human rights violations in which the military were involved and the Supreme Court censured the 
existence of martial trials conducted by the military against civilians, as well as the constant resort 
to states of exception for governing. These actions caused unease among the Armed Forces and, 
suddenly, the councilors of State began to receive threats saying that it was time for them to pay 
“for the infamy they had committed against the Army” (IA Court 2014: 523; Gómez, Herrera and 
Pinilla 2010: 32).  
Although the Procurador tried to initiate a broader disciplinary investigation, the tribunals sent 
the case to the military jurisdiction where all charges were dropped. At that time, the Minister of 
Defense, General Landazábal, ordered military officers to contribute part of their wages for the legal 
defense of their fellows accused of wrongdoing (Jiménez 1986: 121). He also championed the 
paramilitary groups, describing them as civilians who simply protected themselves from the guerrillas.  
The U.S. was a relevant actor in the escalation of violence43. The US and the Colombian 
governments coined the term narco-guerrillas, as the new enemy characterized by a double identity 
of both drug dealers and communist guerrillas44. The political and military pressure from the 
                                       
43 “[e]ven when the peace process between the guerrilla movements and the government began in 1982, the 
US continued to back the Colombian military and paramilitary groups which increased their counterinsurgency 
offensives against the guerrilla groups and Colombian civilians throughout the 1980s (Stokes 2005: 75). 
Disappearances and torture were ongoing, as were murders. A number of […] paramilitary groups, involved 
with drug cartels, were also formed during this period, and were responsible for kidnappings, murders and 
mass killings, all with the assistance of the Colombian military, which provided intelligence on the identities 
and locations of some of the targets (Stokes 2005: 75–6). Yet the US did not condemn the activities of the 
Colombian military and, in 1984, sent $50 million of arms to Colombia’s military and police forces (Stokes 
2005: 77). Such aid would continue and, by the end of the Cold War, would be granted in the name of 
counterdrug as well as counterinsurgency operations” (Blakeley 2009: 99). 
44 “There followed significant investment in a war on drugs to be waged both within the US and in Latin 
America in the early 1990s. $47 million of Foreign Military Financing was designated for Colombia in 
1992, and $58 million was requested for 1993, as well as $2.5 million in International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) provision each year (HRW 1992). This intensified with the initiation of ‘Plan 
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guerrilla as well as the social unease and the public allegations for human rights violations committed 
by the government and the paramilitary, pushed the government to accept a peace process. In 1982, 
President Betancur agreed a ceasefire with the M1945 and in August 1984, the M19 agreed to a truce 
with the government in Hobo (Huila) and Corinto (Cauca), under the promise of a “national 
dialogue” in order to carry out different institutional reforms. “President Belisario Betancur (1982-
1986) applied a generous political amnesty and introduced an ambitious peace plan, which included 
cease-fire agreements with the main guerrilla groups” (UN Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances 1988).  
This agreement created tensions within the establishment. Consequently, the truce did not 
last much time: in September, the M19 and the military engaged in combat and in December 1984, 
the truce was totally contravened in an attack against the guerrilla headquarter at Yarumales - the 
military alleged that they were attempting at rescuing people that had been kidnapped (Maya and 
Petro 2006: 105). After 22 days of combats, the army withdrew and the guerilla decided to 
maintain the Corinto agreement.  
However, On June 20, 1985, after further confrontations, the M19 declared the end of the 
truce, considering that the government and the military had systematically violated the agreement. 
                                                                                                                           
Colombia’ in July 2000, with a $1.3 billion package of what was claimed to be emergency anti-drug aid to 
Colombia and its neighbors (CIP 2002). Since 1996, the International Narcotics Program covered most of 
the training, rather than the IMET program. Funding increased for the International Narcotics Program in 
Colombia, from $16 million in 1996 to $439 million in 2003, of which $284.2 million was for police and 
military programs (CIP 2002). HRW reports that the UK also provided ongoing military assistance to 
Colombia, although the full amount or nature of that assistance is not publically known (HRW 2007a)” 
(Blakeley 2009: 128). 
45 “At last, the M-19 settled down in the countryside. First, they did so as a strategy that combined diverse 
scenarios, rural and urban, between 1978 and 1984. Afterwards, as a reduction of their own expectations, 
which they centered in the creation of a Bolivarian army in the countryside. This shift cannot be attributed to 
the ideological departure from the foquista strategy (fighting through little localized groups), but to a greater 
confidence in the idea that opposition and political resistance were more favorable in the rural areas” (Luna 
2011: 165)   
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On September 30, 1985, their first public action was to steal a delivery van, distributing the milk it 
transported to the residents of the southern part of Bogota (an underprivileged area of the city). The 
Police killed eleven members of the M19 who participated in the events.  
In 1985, in the context of the PJ events, it was evident that enforced disappearances had 
become not only selective -targeting popular leaders and social movements who represented 
political dissent, but massive. This violation grew into a mechanism of social control directed 
against the less advantaged members of society46 (ASFADDES 2003).  
In a climate of repression and control over the life of the citizens, and intensified 
intimidation against the opposition and the social movements, in the decade of the 1980s 
denunciations of disappearance became more and more eloquent. A turning point took place in 
1982: between March 4 and September 15, 1982, twelve students of the National University, one 
independent worker and one peasant leader went missing. Two of them were subsequently 
presented as “executed” by the Police and the others never appeared. In response to these incidents, 
the families of the disappeared joined together in their search, thus forming the Association of 
Relatives of the Disappeared-Detainees (ASFADDES)47. 
In October 1985, the military received an anonymous letter disclosing the M19 plans to take 
the building where the High Courts sat (IACHR 1993: Chapter VII). Simultaneously, the Supreme 
Court began to receive threats coercing the justices to turn against the enforceability of the 
                                       
46 In the PJ case, the military suspected the victims of being guerrilla because of their socioeconomic 
conditions or simply because they were at the cafeteria (Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010, p. 114). 
47 With the aim of organizing around their demands against enforced disappearance as well as in favor of the 
fight against impunity (ASFADDES 2003). This organization was born with the participation of the family 
members, under the lead of the example of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo of Argentina and with the 
support of two prominent human rights defenders: lawyer Eduardo Umaña Mendoza (assassinated in 1998) 
and father Javier Giraldo (continually threatened and harassed) (ASFADDES 2003: 28-29). 
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extradition treaty between Colombia and the United States (IA Court 2014: par. 523). Shortly after, 
security was removed from the Palace of Justice in spite of the death threats against the Justices 
originated in the constitutional examination of the extradition treaty between Colombia and the U.S. 
as well as in the High Courts decisions concerning human rights violations by the Army.  
In August 1985, the Army, the 
National Police and the DAS had 
information about the guerrilla’s 
intentions, as the Minister of Defense 
stated before the Congress of the Republic 
on October 16, 1985 (IA Court 2014: par. 
523). In October 18, 1985 the journals El 
Tiempo, El Siglo and El Bogotano published different news regarding the plans that the military 
had discovered around the possible taking of the PJ by the M1948.  
From October 16, 1985, until the beginning of November 1985, the Minister of Defense 
ordered special reinforcements for the security of the Palace of Justice: 22 armed agents to be on duty 
during work days (IA Court 2014: par. 523). On October 21, 1985, the reinforcement order was 
withdrawn but Bogota’s Police Department decided to maintain the security until November as a 
precautionary measure (IACHR 1993). However, on November 4, 1985, the reinforcement guard 
service was withdrawn and only six people were providing surveillance to the building.  
                                       
48 “Plan by the M-19 to occupy the Palace of Justice was discovered”, El Siglo, October 18, 1985. “Due to 
anonymous messages, security measures were increased at the Palace of Justice”, El Tiempo, October 18, 
1985. “Plan for taking and kidnapping in the Court was dismantled”, El Bogotano, Octuber 18, 1985. “The 
M-19 in the Palace of Justice, they were after 2 justices”, Diario 5 pm, October 18, 1985.   
Picture No. 3 Telegram from the DINTE (military 
intelligence) informing the plan of the M19 to take over 
the PJ in October 1985. Retrieved from BBC (2015). 
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Regarding the withdrawal of the surveillance, the military at the time affirmed that the 
President of the Supreme Court, Justice Alfonso Reyes Echandía, had requested so due to possible 
inconveniences for the Courts’ functioning. This information was disproved by the Plenary 
Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, the President of the Council of State at the time, the 
Special Investigative Court (1986) and the Truth Commission (IA Court 2014: par. 524) assessing 
that, on the contrary, the Justices had been emphatic about their request for adequate protection 
before the security risk they were confronting. Based on these circumstances, the IA Court 
concluded that while the State was aware of the imminent peril faced by the justices and the other 
employees and visitors of the Palace of Justice, it did not take the appropriate measures to counter 
the danger (IA Court 2014: par. 528).  
3.2. The taking and the operation to retake the Palace of Justice  
On November 6, 1985, at 11:40 a.m., an armed group of thirty-five armed M19 guerrillas 
seized49 the National Palace of Justice, headquarter of the Supreme Court of Justice and of the 
Council of State - the highest courts of the ordinary and contentious-administrative jurisdictions. 
This building is located at the Plaza de Bolivar, central point of the center of Bogota, in front of the 
National Congress and only a few blocks from the Presidential Palace. As mentioned before, prior 
to the siege the military and different security forces had access to information on the possible 
takeover of the Palace of Justice and its approximate date (IA Court 2014).  
                                       
49 While this act has been referred to by judicial procedures and other social discourses as the taking of the 
Palace of Justice, the military (Plazas 2011: 280) have sustained that it can be referred to as an assault 
because the taking is a term reserved for military operations. Nonetheless, in this research we will refer to 
the ‘take’ as the act of seizing a place giving privilege to the judicial denomination. In the same sense and 
for the same reasons, the military operation will be referred to as the retake,  although military (Plazas 2011: 
280) have sustained that it should be called a recovery of the building, because if not it would mean to place 
on the same level the establishment and the guerrilla, “a perverse denomination created by the enemies of 
the State” according to Plazas (2011: 281). 
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After they gained control over the building, the M19 commando demanded the presence of 
President Betancur. They aimed for him to stand trial over having, allegedly, violated the peace 
agreements (Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010: 52, 72). President Betancur decided not to 
negotiate. After the events, he declared on national TV: “The government could not negotiate what 
is nonnegotiable: the respectability of the institutions”. However, he did order the ceasefire. 
The President’s orders were not followed and the operation to retake the courthouse 
continued under heavy weapon fire (Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010: 225). Nonetheless, after the 
operation, the President affirmed in national TV that he had consented to the military operation and 
had personally taken all the decisions, keeping an absolute control over the situation. 
 
Table No. 4 Pictures of the military 
operation to retake the PJ 
 
Picture No. 4. The operation during 
the first night. Retrieved from BBC 
(2015) 
 
 
Picture No. 5 The military entrance to the building. 
Retrieved from El Nuevo Siglo (2015) 
 
 
Picture 
No. 6 
Helicopter
and tanks. 
Retrieved 
from 
CIVICO 
(2015) 
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The 13th Brigade, commanded by General Jesus Arias, led the operation. Colonel Plazas 
(actor of the main dossier considered for this research) was in charge of the field operation and was 
assisted by the Army Secret Service, led by General Ramirez, as well as by the Police that was 
commanded by General Delgado. In the military communications of the operations, known after 
the judicial inquiries, a voice under the alias of Paladin 6 -who is presumably the General 
Commander of the Armed Forces Rafael Samudio50, issued the following order: “I understand that 
the Red Cross has not arrived yet. Therefore, we enjoy total freedom of action and we are against 
time. Please hurry up, let’s consolidate and finish with everything” (Patiño y Chaparro 2008: 
5’06”- 5’24”). Not only the International Committee of the Red Cross was prevented from 
operating but the Ministry of Communications censured the media that instead of informing about 
the events, broadcasted a football match.  
This military operation has been qualified by domestic courts, the Truth Commission on the 
facts of the Palace of Justice (Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010) and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (2014), as disproportionate and excessive. According to the Procurador General51 at 
the time, Carlos Jiménez, the operation violated the basic principles of the ius cogens because the 
military attack never had the purpose of protecting the hostages but, on the contrary, constituted an 
attack of the Armed Forces against its adversary while civil population was being held hostage 
(Procuraduría General 1986).  
According to the Council of State, the State incurred in a “service-related failure” because of 
the “hasty, unconsidered and irresponsible way in which the Armed Forces quashed the taking 
of the Palace of Justice, leaving the judge with the depressing sensation of the insignificance of 
                                       
50 On November 13, 1985, the General Commander of the Army, Rafael Samudio, declared to the media 
he was proud of the operation because it had not only saved the institutions but because they had set an 
example on how to act in the fight against terrorism (El Espectador 1985 in Vega 2015: 3). 
51 On the use of the word Procuraduría, see note 20 
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the life of the victims in the skirmish, whose petitions, supplications, and lamentation were 
futile. Their captors, whose unjustifiable recklessness, supported by the State’s negligence, led 
to the tragedy, were annihilated. But, at the same time, almost a hundred people were 
annihilated, including eleven justices of the Supreme Court and eight officials and employees 
of this body and of the Council of State” (Council of State 1997 in IA Court 2014:105). 
“Everywhere you looked […] in every direction, it was a war zone. The entire fourth floor had 
been demolished. There was nothing left. Not a single dividing wall was still standing, the floor 
was deep in ashes, rubble, broken glass, and in places, the still glowing embers of the 
conflagration.” (Amelia Mantilla, Emiro Sandoval’s widow, in Carrigan 1993: 262)  
Table No. 5 The interior of the PJ after the events  
Picture No. 7 Retrieved from El Espectador (2013) 
Picture No. 8 Conflagration. Retrieved from Semana 
(1985) 
With respect to the numbers of the operation, the Council of State studying different 
contentious-administrative dossiers has established that in the operation over one hundred people 
were killed, including eleven judges of the Supreme Court. However. About this tragic numbers the 
IA Court (2014: 104) sustained that “[t]here is no certainty about the number of people who died 
during the events. The Institute of Forensic Medicine received 94 corpses from the Palace of Justice. 
The Report of the Truth Commission indicated that ‘the problems that arose during the identification 
process give rise to serious doubts about the identity of some of them, and the irregularities, 
particularly in the case of the charred remains, could suggest the existence of a greater number of 
deceased.’ In addition, according to the evidence in the case file, lists prepared by State personnel 
recorded between 159 and 325 survivors”.  
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According to the Special Investigative Court (1986), 244 people survived the taking and the 
operation to retake the building. Officials from different law enforcement institutions evacuated 
some survivors to the Casa del Florero, a historical house and museum neighbouring the PJ that 
was used as center of operations of the intelligence services for the purposes of the operation to 
retake the Palace of Justice. Some of the survivors were labelled as suspects of being guerrillas or 
supporters of the taking and were classified as ‘special’ (Superior Court of Bogota 2014: 589).  
According to the two first-instance Courts in the prosecutions against General Arias and 
Colonel Plazas (Juzgado 51 Penal del Circuito de Bogota 2011; Juzgado Tercero 2010), the workers 
of the PJ cafeteria were labelled as suspicious. In particular, in the criminal proceedings against the 
former Commander of the Cavalry School (colonel Plazas), the Third Criminal Court was 
“convinced that the special situation of some of the survivors, such as being university student, being 
born in a specific area of the country, working in the Palace cafeteria, etc., constituted grounds for 
presuming that they had collaborated with or were part of the insurgent group.” (IA Court 2014: 
237). In this same line, in the second-instance judgment against the Commander of the 13th Brigade, 
the Superior Court of Bogota considered that, “from the outset, some soldiers considered that the 
cafeteria employees could be suspected of having supported the guerrilla.” (IA Court 2014: 237). 
Table No. 6 The release and detention of hostages 
Picture No. 9 The release and detention of 
hostages. Retrieved from BBC (2015a). 
Picture No. 10 Hostages who survived conducted to 
the Casa del Florero. Retrieved from VOZ (2014). 
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Once in the Casa del Florero, most survivors were set free or were taken to hospitals. 
People classified as ‘special’ were held for interrogation by the military. These people were not 
registered as detained nor were they included in the lists of survivors (IA Court 2014). During and 
after the events, several next of kin of the victims received information that the some of the 
disappeared had survived and were being held in detention in military garrisons. Some people 
survived the detention and described that they had been subjected to interrogations, that they were 
ill-treated and some of them were transferred to military facilities, including the Cavalry School of 
the Colombian National Army and the “General Ricardo Charry Solano” Intelligence and Counter-
intelligence Battalion (IA Court 2014).   
According to the PJ Truth Commission (Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010) these people 
were tortured and at least twelve of them were forcibly disappeared. Eight of them were cafeteria 
employees (Carlos Rodríguez, Ana Castiblanco, Hector Beltrán, Cristina Guarín, Bernardo Beltrán, 
Gloria Lizarazo, David Suspes and Luz Portela), three were visitors (Gloria Anzola, Luz Oviedo 
and Norma Esguerra), and one belonged to the guerrilla group (Irma Franco). According to the 
Appeal Court in the Plazas case, the armed forces were instructed not to allow guerrillas to survive 
and to forcibly disappear all those guerrillas that could have exited the building (Superior Court of 
Bogota 2012: 586).  
Between November 6 and 7, three fires broke out inside the Palace of Justice (IA Court 2014: 
36). In this regard, the Truth Commission asserted:  
“[I]t was not possible to know with any certainty how the hostages and guerrillas who were on 
the fourth floor died, or even the real number of persons there. […] However, the fact is that 
most of the bodies were found dismembered, mutilated, apparently by the effects of the 
explosions, and almost all of them were carbonized, and according to forensics, in at least three 
of the Justices remains […] were found projectiles form firearms that the guerrilla was not 
using” (Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010: 152).  
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After the conflagration that consumed most of the PJ, the military cleaned the area using 
water and brushes, as well as dropped burned bodies in the main hall. The corpses that remained 
inside the building were removed, others were washed and some were burned by state agents. The 
military took their clothing and belongings. Identifying the bodies became virtually impossible. In 
the aftermath, the Minister of Justice organized a group of judges to start the research at the crime 
scene, but the military prevented them from entering the PJ. Before the IA Court, the Colombian 
government declared that the military personnel actions or instructions after the events did not appear 
“completely unreasonable”, given the conditions of the Palace of Justice after the operation and the 
absence of standards for the inspection and preservation of the crime scene. Thus, during the trial, the 
State argued that “even when the evidence reveals errors in the handling of the corpses and the 
evidence at the scene of the events, this is not sufficient to assert that this corresponded to deliberate 
actions that can be attributed to State agents” (IA Court 2014: 432). 
However, according to the Truth Commission “they wanted to hide or erase evidence 
related to the cause of death of the victims” (Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010: 128). In this same 
line, according to different domestic courts, they removed the corpses in order to obstruct any 
subsequent investigation (Tribunal Superior 2012; Juzgado Tercero 2010). With this respect, the 
IA Court (2014: 270) established that these irregularities were of such significance that they cannot 
be considered a mere error, rather they constituted “egregious impropriety that has prevented the 
elucidation of the facts. Consequently, these irregularities are an indication that the soldiers 
concealed what happened during the retaking of the Palace of Justice, including what happened to 
the presumed victims”.  
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After the operation to retake the Palace of Justice, different family members were able to 
access the building, most of them resorting to excuses or distractions. On November 8, 1985, 
Amelia Mantilla, Emiro Sandoval’s widow, entered the building using her credentials as public 
prosecutor. After thirty years, before the Prosecutor General’s Office, she declared that when she 
reached the fourth floor she was able to see military criminal justice officials and a man with a 
bucket on his hands. The bucket had a flammable liquid and the man ignited the fire with the 
“purpose (of) disappearing the remains of Dr. Reyes Echandía [President of the Supreme Court of 
Justice]”. “I started screaming: murderers! What you did doesn’t make you happy enough, so now 
you want to disappear the remains of Dr. Reyes!” (El Espectador 2015). 
 Cecilia Cabrera also managed to enter the 
building stating she was the cafeteria’s manager’s wife. In 
a personal interview, she drew a map of the cafeteria. 
Reminding what she witnessed (Picture No. 11), she 
described the place not only as a cafeteria but also as a 
restaurant: “the space was divided in two, a cafeteria and 
a dining room”. She explained that this was the reason 
why they had a provision of food, in contrast to the 
argument that the food supply was an evidence of their 
participation on the taking, as some media at the time implied. In the cafeteria, she said, there was 
neither sign of shots, not even a mess. Nonetheless, she noticed that all the valuables of the 
cafeteria had been removed and that the cashier was empty: it had been forcibly opened. Then she 
suggested: “if there was no combat [in the cafeteria], the fire did not affect the place and no 
Picture No. 11 Map of the cafeteria 
after the fire, by Cecilia Cabrera (wife) 
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guerrilla survived: how come that after one day [of the taking] there were no paintings, the money 
was stolen and the silverware was taken?” 
The PJ events involved a great amount of misbehaviours, performed by different actors 
against several victims. The magnitude of the chaos and destruction was insidious and widespread 
but, at the same, time localized and targeted. From that fact, it is difficult to label what happened as a 
simple misfortune of war or as a fatality. In a sense, the degree to which chaos took place at the 
events is a manifestation that what happened was not necessarily chaotic in the sense of completely 
lacking organization or order.  
The use of violence at the PJ was public, explicit and visible, while simultaneously private, 
secret and censured. The attack by the guerrillas and the operation to retake the building by the 
military were forceful, a part of the battle was performed outdoors, in the heart of the country’s 
capital and some events were broadcasted. At the same time, the events were private and kept in 
secrecy because, after a few hours of coverage by the media, they were censured by the 
government as well as because some events occurred at the inside of the PJ, the Casa del Florero 
and the military facilities. In these places, not only the military confrontation, but the 
interrogations, tortures and disappearances took place.  
The brutality of what was visible and the uncertainty of what was not created an imagery of 
the events as a cruel confrontation between the guerrillas and the military. With this perception, it 
was less disturbing for the public in general to accept the violence that took place under their eyes, 
rather than the violence performed in secrecy. This violence, however, took place during and after 
the events. Uncertain, obfuscated and private, the particular events of the disappearances were 
characterized by the lack of information, the obfuscation or vanishing of evidence, the involvement 
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of state agents, the media censorship and the secrecy. The PJ events have been processed by the legal 
system through different mechanisms that will be described and analyzed in the following section.  
3.3. After the fire: enquiries and criminal law in(-)action 
In this part we will give a summarized account of the legal proceedings around the PJ case. 
This case has been submitted to numerous judicial instances. The multiplicity of actors, the 
diversity of factors and events surrounding the action of the legal system is not only pertinent but 
valuable for evaluating the functioning of the legal system vis-à-vis criminal problematic situations 
similar to the present case. This part offers an overview of the procedures describing the main legal 
advances of the case presented in eight sections: 
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Domestically, different proceedings have been taken in the Administrative, Disciplinary, 
Criminal and Military Jurisdictions. Also, a non-judicial Truth Commission on the events was 
established by the Supreme Court of Justice, with the objective of shedding light on what happened 
at the PJ. Internationally, the case has been dealt by the Inter-American System on Human Rights. 
In order to understand such wide variety and complexity of instances, we will draw a summarized 
judicial history of the case according to the various jurisdictions in action.   
Since 1985 some families of the disappeared filed several complaints before the authorities 
asking for the whereabouts of their loved ones52. Some of them accessed the PJ after the military 
operation. Others went to the Institute of Forensic Medicine, the Colombian Army’s 13th Brigade, 
the Cavalry School, the National Police headquarter, the Administrative Department of Security 
(hereinafter, DAS), and the F-2 (military intelligence), searching their family members without 
success (IA Court 2014: 110). According to the Truth Commission, “from the moment of the events, 
the families of the disappeared knocked on the doors of justice […] and called for the solidarity of 
the society that, indifferent, took distance from the tragedy of their fellow citizens. The answer for 
years was the stigmatization and distrust of their claims” (Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010: 40).  
a. Special investigations and military criminal jurisdiction 
The first legal action on the PJ case was performed by a special investigation commission 
appointed by the national government. On November 13, 1985, the national government installed a 
Special Investigative Court to investigate the events in question (Decree 3300/1985). This Court 
                                       
52 Cecilia Cabrera (wife) and others next of kin of the disappeared wrote a letter to the Minister of Justice 
(November 12, 1985), then wrote a letter to the Supreme Court of Justice (November 19, 1985), then 
Enrique Rodríguez (father) wrote to the Minister of Defense (November 18, 1985), to the Special 
Procurador assigned to the Military Forces (November 19, 1985) and to the Special Investigative Court on 
the events (November 20, 1985). 
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was assigned to elaborate a report for the government and the corresponding judges for the 
pertinent effects. On May 8, 1986, the Supreme Court of Justice analyzed the enforceability of 
Decree 3300 and assessed that the Special Court was not legally empowered to make decisions on 
the crimes under investigation nor could rule to establish criminal responsibilities (IA Court 2014: 
156). Therefore, the Court was in practice a political resource. 
On May 31, 1986, the report was issued: it determined the exclusive responsibility of the 
M19. It also asserted that the disappeared who were at the PJ cafeteria died on the fourth floor 
where they were conducted as hostages during the taking. Finally, the Special Court mentioned 
more clarity was needed regarding “irregular actions” of the military, such as “the exit alive from 
the Palace of Justice and subsequent disappearance of Irma Franco, the detention of Orlando 
Quijano, Eduardo Matson and Yolanda Santodomingo, and also the ‘ill-treatment [to which they 
were subjected] by their interrogators’” (IA Court 2014: 158). These actions were characterized by 
the Special Court as “individual actions executed in default of superior orders, unrelated to the 
military institution” (IA Court 2014: 158). In line with these findings, the Special Court ordered 
the Sixth Military Criminal Investigation Court to continue with the investigation on these events, 
which had started on November 21, 1985.  
In November 1985, while General Arias was promoted, the Prosecutor General’s office 
undertook an inquiry into those who “presumably disappeared from the Palace of Justice”. The 
investigation ended on September 15, 1988, when the Prosecutor General’s office concluded that 
only two guerrillas (Irma Franco and another unidentified woman) could be considered as 
disappeared. The entity stated that, based on the evidence on the case, there was no sufficient 
evidence on the evacuation of the employees of the Palace of Justice cafeteria “whose families 
 79 
 
 
consider them disappeared” and, therefore, it was not pertinent to bring charges against any 
member of the Colombian Armed Forces.  
Afterwards, on January 31, 1989, the ordinary criminal jurisdiction through the 30th 
Itinerant Criminal Investigation Court of Bogota issued an indictment against nine members of the 
M19 Central Command. The Judge also sent copies of the process to the competent body of the 
ordinary criminal jurisdiction with the purpose of initiating an investigation on members of the 
Armed Forces allegedly responsible for the detention, torture and disappearance of some hostages 
and two guerrillas.  
Despite the provision of the ordinary tribunals claiming jurisdiction over the case, the military 
criminal jurisdiction conducted a criminal investigation. Proceedings were instituted against two 
members of the Army in relation to the forced disappearance of Irma Franco and the torture and ill-
treatment of Yolanda Santodomingo and Eduardo Matson. “These proceedings culminated in the 
discontinuance of the proceeding for forced disappearance, and the declaration of the prescription of 
the criminal action for torture” (IA Court 2014: 441). On October 23, 1986, the Commander of the 
Army’s 13th Brigade, whose members had presumably participated in the tortures and 
disappearances, initiated the investigations. “The next of kin of Irma Franco filed a request to bring a 
civil suit in May 1987, which was not admitted because, under “military criminal law […] civil suits 
can only be brought in proceedings for ordinary offenses and not in those related to activities 
conducted in compliance with mandates inherent to the Armed Forces.” (IA Court 2014:164).  
On May 12, 1992 and October 22, 1993, a military court of first instance and a military appeal 
court ended the proceedings against the Commander of the 13th Brigade in relation to the operation to 
retake the PJ as well as resorted to the statute of limitations with regard to the tortures. Also, they 
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acknowledged that Irma Franco was still missing and therefore ordered for the investigation to be 
reopened against the Commander of the 13th Brigade (IA Court 2014: par. 166-167). Nonetheless, on 
June 27, 1994 and October 3, 1994, the Special First Instance Court of the General Command of the 
Military Forces and the Military Superior Court decided there were no grounds for convening a 
martial court to try these actions, ordering the closure of the proceedings against the Commander of 
the 13th Brigade and the Colonel Head of the B-2 (IA Court 2014: par. 168). 
b. Disciplinary investigations: a tale of executive’s interference 
Different disciplinary investigations were conducted by the Office of the Procurador53 
assigned to the Military Forces and by the Procurador assigned to the National Police. In 1989, 
General Arias, who was the commanding officer of the operation to retake the PJ, was promoted as 
Commander of the armed forces (Decree 1592/1989) and President Virgilio Barco conferred him the 
highest rank in the military (general de tres soles). In June 1990, General Arias retired from service 
and in September and October of that year, the Procuraduría imposed a disciplinary sanction of 
dismissal on general (r) Arias and Colonel Edilberto Sánchez, former Chief of Military Intelligence 
(B-2), considering they had adopted inadequate measures of protection in favor of the life of the 
hostages at the PJ (Resolution 404 of 28 September and 24 October 438).   
                                       
53 The Procuraduría in Colombia is a supervisory agency of the public function directed by the Procurador 
General. The Procuraduría, as one of the main institutions part of the Public Ministry, is responsible of 
defending and promoting human rights, protecting the public interest, and overseeing the official conduct of 
those who perform public functions. Among its functions, the Procuraduría supervises the official conduct 
of those who hold public office, exercises on a preferential basis the disciplinary authority conducting the 
investigations and imposing the sanctions in accordance with the law.  The word Procurador and 
Procuraduría will be preserved in Spanish in the present document because its translations remain 
ambiguous: some documents translate these terms as Attorney General and Attorney General’s Office, 
others could refer to it as a kind of Ombudsman; however, to us these translations are insufficient for 
explaining the different functions that the Procuraduría presents in the Colombian context.   
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In response to this decision, on November 6, 1990, the Senate ratified his promotion (75 
votes in favor and 5 against), as a demonstration of support. The decision was meant ‘not to leave 
him sub judice’, according to the congressmen (El Tiempo 1990a). On the other hand, they 
summoned the Defense Minister, General Oscar Botero, and the Procurador General defying them 
to determine who would bear the historic responsibility of the slaughter of the Justices, either the 
military or the guerrilla (El Tiempo 1990a). During the debate held on November 14, 1990, the 
Minister of Defense assessed that the sanction created the impression that the Army was a ‘horde 
of savages’. The speaker senator read a letter from the Procurador that had issued the disciplinary 
indictment, in which the official ensured he had being pressured by the Procurador General to 
sanction General Arias. According to these elements, the Procurador General was asked to resign 
being also accused of being an enemy of the military (El Tiempo 1990b).  
Different Military Generals made public statements asserting that it “was difficult to defend 
a democracy that treats its most faithful servers like this” (General Alvaro Valencia Tovar in El 
Tiempo 1989a), that the sanction questioned the enforceability of the orders of the military (then 
Minister of Defense, General Botero in El Tiempo 1990e), that it fractured the spine of military 
discipline (General Valencia Tovar in El Tiempo 1994a), that it was absurd and clumsy (the 
Colombian Association of retired Officials of the Armed Forces in El Tiempo 1994b), and that it 
was against the interests of the Nation and the defenders of democracy (General Fernando 
Landazábal Tovar in El Tiempo 1990c). Finally, President César Gaviria stated the order of 
dismissal was ‘unfair’ and on November 16, 1990, the Procurador General, Alfonso Gómez 
Mendez, agreed with President Gaviria: “Yes, the sanction is unfair [...] from the point of view of 
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society the sanction is unfair and contrasts with the fate of those who attacked the Palace, who now 
benefit from an amnesty” (El Tiempo 1990d).   
The dismissal of General Arias was only effective in 1994 when the government, through 
the Minister of Defense, Rafael Pardo, fulfilled the sanction through the Decree 731, asserting that 
the order was being implemented despite the disagreement from the government and the armed 
forces with that decision (Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010: 288). 
During that year, General Arias filed a lawsuit in which he asked the annulment of the 
sanction against him. Finally, that sanction was annulled by the Administrative Superior Court of 
Cundinamarca in 2001 on a ruling confirmed in 2005 by the Council of State (Gómez, Herrera and 
Pinilla 2010: 288).   
c. The Impeachment and the Contentious-administrative jurisdiction judgments 
Since 1985, at least three complaints have been filed before the Impeachment Committee of 
the Chamber of Representatives against President Belisario Betancur and the Minister of Defense 
at the time of the events. The first investigation was formally opened on November 27, 1985, and 
formally closed on October 17, 1986. The decision of the Chamber assessed that there were no 
grounds for the impeachment with no further argumentation.  
The second complaint was filed in December 3, 1986, and was shelved in July 18, 1989, 
alleging that the responsible were the military and not the President. The third complaint was 
registered on November 6, 2004, by the next of kin of the disappeared, although there is no official 
record of that complaint (IA Court 2014: 215). Hence, in line with the different requests for 
investigation into the PJ events that were submitted to the Impeachment Commission of the House 
of Representatives, the President was never prosecuted.  
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The Council of State has issued more than 25 sentences declaring the State administratively 
responsible for the wrongdoing during the PJ events and ordering compensations for over 60 
families, including the next of kin of the disappeared54. When ordering the administrative redress 
for some of the victims, the Contentious-administrative jurisdiction recognized the lack of 
planning, prevention and proportionality in the operation to retake the PJ which was materialized 
through an exaggerated and irresponsible use of official weapons. In these cases, until 2014, thirty-
seven next of kin of eleven victims of forced disappearance have received compensation for 
material and “moral harm” in this jurisdiction (IA Court 2014: 601). 
d. Truth Commission  
In 2005, during the twentieth anniversary of the PJ taking, the Supreme Court established a 
Truth Commission to address ‘the partial truth, the impunity and the existing pact of silence about 
what happened’ in the PJ. The Commission, composed of three former Justices of the Court, 
attorneys Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla, conducted a non-jurisdictional investigation of the events, 
issuing their final report in 2009. The Commission described the “tragic events” materialized by the 
M19 guerrilla and the Armed Forces involving the abduction of hundreds of people, the destruction 
and incineration of the “temple of justice”, the slaughter of the Supreme Court, the killing of almost a 
                                       
54 Until 2014, the Council of State issued decisions in eleven cases in favor of the victims of enforced 
disappearance with regard to: (1) the wife and daughter of Carlos Rodríguez (Judgment of July 24, 1997); 
(2) the father of Pilar Guarín (Judgment of October 13, 1994); (3) the sister and children of Gloria Lizarazo 
(Judgment of August 14, 1997); (4) the wife and daughter of David Suspes (Judgment of September 25, 
1997); (5) the wife and daughters of Héctor Beltrán (Judgment of January 28, 1999); (6) the parents of 
Bernardo Beltrán (Judgment of October 13, 1994); (7) the mother and daughter of Norma Esguerra 
(Judgment of July 31, 1997); (8) the siblings of Irma Franco (Judgment of September 11, 1997); (9) family 
members of Ana Rosa Castiblanco (Judgment of December 2, 1996); (10) the mother of Luz Mary Portela 
(Judgment of September 6, 1995), and (11) the wife and daughters of Carlos Urán (Judgment of January 26, 
1995) (IA-Court 2014: 592).  
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hundred people, thus leaving countless victims and constituting “one of the two most serious 
catastrophes in the history of the country in the last century” (Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010: 23).  
The study of this report can be divided into two main parts: a factual part and a part 
analyzing the responsibility of the actors who intervened in the taking and the operation to retake 
the PJ. With regard to the first part, the Commission documented the context of the taking, the 
threats against the High Courts’ Justices and the lack of proper response by the government. After 
a description of the events, the Commission referred to the subsequent facts, finding evidence of 
tortures and inhuman and degrading treatments committed against survivors who were transferred 
to military facilities, the irregularities committed while handling the crime scene, the wrongful 
identification of the deceased, the “inexplicable order” to bury some bodies, evidence of 
extrajudicial executions and the practice of enforced disappearance, at least against the people who 
were at the cafeteria at the moment of the events (Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 2010). 
In the second part, on the one hand, the Commission stated the responsibility of the 
guerrillas for the planning and execution the violent attack, as well as the disrespect for the life and 
integrity of the hostages. On the other hand, the Commission found the State responsible for the 
disproportionate reaction, the disregard of the duty of prevention, the media censorship, and the 
disproportionate use of force by the military. With respect to these responsibilities, the 
Commission concluded that despite countless enquiries many questions remain unsettled regarding 
the basic history of the PJ events. Only since 2005, the criminal justice system started a serious 
investigation, and only with respect to the enforced disappearance, presenting no progress on the 
investigations for torture and summary executions described in the report. 
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During the proceedings at the Inter-American Court, the government acknowledged “the 
important effort made by the Truth Commission” (IA Court 2014: 33). However, it asserted that “its 
composition did not represent the different sectors and components of the Colombian nation or, at 
least, those involved in the events” (IA Court 2014: 33) and that it was created by the Supreme Court 
of Justice as “an institutional victim” (IA Court 2014: 33) that does not have competence to create a 
public truth commission. Therefore, the government discredited its legal grounds, qualifying it as an 
‘unofficial commission’ that was neither a public nor a judicial body. With this argumentation, the 
government asserted it had not provided any support to the commission. Consequently, it argued that 
“the Final Report of the Truth Commission […] is an important source, but not the truth, especially if 
it also suffers from substantive problems” (IA Court 2014: 33).  
Nonetheless, in a public event of the 25th anniversary of the taking of the Palace of Justice 
in 2010, President Santos stated that the Report of the Commission presents “a complete diagnosis 
and a report on the background, the events themselves, and what happened after the violent taking 
of the Palace of Justice by the M19 commandos. This document must be considered seriously and 
it is essential that all the proceedings undertaken to clarify the events are duly concluded” 
(Presidency of the Republic of Colombia 2010, in IA Court 2014: 33). Other commentators (Maya 
2010; Vega 2015) and some of the victims in the interviews asserted that the Truth Commission 
failed on clarifying the specific responsibilities of the actors of the taking and the operation to 
retake the PJ, refraining from giving any particular recommendation to the Prosecutor Office to 
supposedly avoid interferences with the investigations.  
e. Criminal Proceedings 
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In this section, we will refer to the criminal justice investigations on the PJ events. In the 
next section we will focus on the criminal law proceedings against high-ranked military including 
our point d’ancrage: the prosecution against the retired Colonel Plazas.  
On September 15, 1988, the Prosecutor General’s office issued a report evaluating the 
progress made into the investigations for the different complaints of disappearance presented in the 
PJ case, concluding that “only the guerrilla, Irma Franco, and an unidentified guerrilla can be 
considered disappeared.” The Prosecutor General’s office also put forward that regarding the 
“employees of the Palace of Justice cafeteria whose families consider them disappeared, there is 
insufficient evidence to establish that they were evacuated from the Palace of Justice and taken to 
the Casa del Florero”, and that there was “insufficient evidence, to date, to bring charges against 
any member of the Colombian Armed Forces, […] for those presumed disappeared from the 
Palace of Justice.” (IA Court 2014: 169) 
On February 7, 1991, the criminal procedure against General Delgado (Police Director) for 
ignoring the order of ceasefire, prescribed. In 1989, an amnesty was granted to the M19 members 
that were indicted for the PJ facts (Act 77/1989). Some days later, a judge closed the proceedings 
against 38 guerrillas that were under investigation for the events. Nonetheless, in 1992, another 
judge concluded that the acts of terrorism committed by the M19 could not be pardoned, ordering 
an investigation of the ex-guerrilla.  
The political class reacted in defense of the peace agreements and the judge ended up under 
investigation on a disciplinary procedure (El Espectador 2014a). In November 2009, the Second 
Criminal Court of Bogota decreed statutes of limitations in favor of the M19 members for the PJ 
events. However, on September 8, 2010, the Superior Court of Bogota declared the PJ offenses as 
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crimes against humanity and decided to reopen the investigations. In line with this decision, on 
April 2, 2013, the Second Criminal Court delivered a guilty verdict against eight members of the 
M19, including Irma Franco for the PJ events (IA Court 2014: 205-207).  
According to the Inter-American Commission, at the start of the events “the ordinary 
justice system failed to open investigations, ex officio, even though it was aware of the reports of 
forced disappearance and of torture […] rather than an omission, in this case the lack of 
investigation constituted an additional concealment mechanism” (IA Court 2014: 430). With 
reference to the criminal proceedings, in 1985 there were little procedural advances in the criminal 
jurisdiction, but some evidence was collected by the victims who acted collectively under the legal 
counselling of lawyer Eduardo Umaña.  
The legal representative of the victims, Eduardo Umaña, received death threats from the 
beginning of the inquiries. In August 1987, for instance, he received a threatening pamphlet in 
which he was labelled as critical of the PJ military operation. After lawyer Umaña was the target of 
different murder attempts, in April 1998 he obtained a court order for the exhumation of a mass 
grave at the Southern Cemetery of Bogota, wherein the bodies of the disappeared had been 
supposedly buried according to various military sources. The purpose of the order was to 
determine the  fate of the remains of the disappeared.  
Lawyer Umaña was murdered on April 18, 1998. His assassination impacted the PJ case. The 
PJ victims were deeply affected by lawyer Umaña’s murder. “The assassination of lawyer Umaña 
made us fall apart, it broke us. We saw him as our father, our brother, our friend, our everything”, 
Mrs. Navarrete claimed. The period between 1998 and 2000 became a state of limbo: nothing 
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happened in the case. It was not until 2001 when the Prosecutor General’s Office55 decided to open 
a criminal investigation for the PJ events for the crime of enforced disappearance. In 2005 the 
investigation was assigned to the National Human Rights Unit and Ángela Buitrago was appointed 
as the Prosecutor to conduct the criminal investigation.  
On September 28, 2007, Prosecutor Buitrago issued an indictment against five members of 
the B-2 of the Army’s 13th Brigade, for the crimes of aggravated abduction and forced 
disappearance. Also, between February 2008 and March 2009, indictments were brought against 
five other retired Army officers: Colonel Plazas as the Commander of the Cavalry School (11 
February 2008); General Ramírez, Colonel Blanco and Sergeant Arévalo (January 20, 2009), 
members of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Command (COICI); and General Arias 
(March 9, 2009), Commander of the 13th Brigade at the time, for the offenses of aggravated 
abduction and forced disappearance.  
In domestic courts, four trials were conducted under the ordinary Criminal Jurisdiction 
against some of the military that participated in the operation to retake the PJ. As a result, three 
low-ranked military were acquitted, there is an ongoing criminal proceeding against several state 
officials and three high-ranked retired military were sentenced due to chain of command. The 
determination of the appeal court is still pending with regard to all the sentences but one, against 
retired Colonel Plazas, that was annulled by the Supreme Court of Justice in 2015.  
f. High ranked military at trial: the point d’ancrage  
                                       
55 According to 1991 National Constitution “[i]t is the function of the Office of the Prosecutor General--
either ex officio or in response to a complaint filed--to investigate crimes and to bring charges against the 
suspected guilty parties with the competent courts and tribunals" (IACHR 1993: Chapter III) 
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The State Group of Memory, on their final report, stated that the prosecution of high-
ranked military like Plazas generated a state of turmoil among the most conservative sectors of 
society and within the military (CNMH 2013: 233). The criminal judicial process against retired 
Colonel Plazas started in 2005. In 2010, Plazas was sentenced to a 30-year term of imprisonment, 
convicted for the crime of enforced disappearance in the context of the operation to retake the PJ. 
This prosecution was led by prosecutor Ángela Buitrago and the procedures were conducted by 
Justice María Jara. The process entailed a specific burden for their security. The most serious 
intimidations were directed against the Judge of the case, the lawyer of the victims, the prosecutor, 
some of the victims and at least four witnesses  
On June 9, 2010, Judge Jara sentenced retired Col. Plazas to thirty years of imprisonment. He 
was found guilty of the enforced disappearance of eleven people56 when he was commander of the 
Cavalry School (Juzgado Tercero 2010). The defense and the Procuraduría appealed the sentence. 
On January 30, 2012, the Superior Court of Bogota (Tribunal Superior de Bogota 2012) partially 
annulled this ruling declaring Plazas’s responsibility for the disappearance of only two people in the 
PJ events: Irma Franco and Carlos Rodríguez. According to the Tribunal: 
 “the survivors of the Palace of Justice were, indeed, taken to military garrisons, including the 
facilities of the Cavalry School, where the details of all of them were taken, and some of them 
were subjected to torture, and subsequently disappeared, […] which allows the court to 
conclude that the [Commander of the Cavalry School] was part of an illegal organized power 
structure that designed and executed the disappearance of Irma Franco and Carlos Augusto 
Rodríguez Vera” (IA Court 2014: 177).  
                                       
56 Carlos Rodríguez, Cristina Guarín, Bernardo Beltrán, David Suspez, Gloria Lisarazo, Gloria Anzola, 
Norma Constanza, Luz Mary Portela, Irma Franco, Héctor Beltrán and Lucy Oviedo. 
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The defense and the Procuraduría filed cassation appeal that was accepted on February 5, 
2013. Finally, in 2015, the Supreme Court ruled the last instance cassation appeal in the case and 
acquitted Plazas of all charges.  
On April 28, 2011, the 51st Criminal Court of the Bogota Circuit found retired General Arias 
guilty of the crime of the enforced disappearance of eleven people and he was sentenced to thirty-
five years of imprisonment (Juzgado 51 Penal del Circuito de Bogota 2011). According to the judge 
of the case “on November 6, 1985 General ARIAS CABRALES acted in fulfillment of his duty,[…] 
however, sheltering in the constitutional obligations imposed on him [… he passed] orders with the 
purpose of deploying clearly unlawful actions against the ‘suspects’” (Juzgado 51 Penal del Circuito 
de Bogota 2011: 321-322). The defense and the Procuraduría appealed the decision and on October 
24, 2014, the Superior Court of Bogota partially annulled this ruling and claimed that Arias 
responsibility was related to the disappearance of five people57 in the PJ events. This sentence is in a 
process of last instance cassation appeal at the Supreme Court of Justice.  
On December 15, 2011, the 51st Criminal Court (the same judge that sentenced Arias in 
first instance) acquitted the former Commander of the Army Secret Service, retired General Ivan 
Ramírez, and the military officers Fernando Blanco and Gustavo Arevalo, who had been indicted 
on charges of enforced disappearance. According to the judge of the case “although plural 
evidence implicates the defendant […] the dossier does not offer conviction beyond all reasonable 
doubt about how, when and why the indicted were involved in the non-appearance neither alive 
nor dead of the cafeteria workers of the judicial building” (Juzgado 51 Penal del Circuito 2011: 
429). Nevertheless, the 51 Criminal Court made clear that the eleven disappeared persons had not 
                                       
57 Bernardo Beltrán, Luz Mary Portela, David Suspes, Irma Franco and Carlos Rodríguez. 
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died inside the Palace of Justice, they had rather been “subjected to forced disappearance, after the 
taking of the Palace by the guerrilla had ended” (IA Court 2014: 183). 
On October 18, 2013, Prosecutor General’s Office appointed a single prosecution unit to 
conduct all the investigations into the PJ events. According to the fieldwork, this was interpreted 
by the victims as a measure to avoid an Inter-American sentence against the State. 
On December 18, 2015, a Criminal Court of Bogota sentenced retired Col. Edilberto 
Sánchez Rubiano to forty years in prison as coauthor of the enforced disappearance committed 
against Carlos Rodríguez and Bernardo Beltrán. In the same decision, retired major Oscar William 
Vasquez was sentenced to a forty-year term of imprisonment as coauthor of the enforced 
disappearance committed against Irma Franco, Carlos Rodríguez and Bernardo Beltrán. Finally, 
the Court acquitted retired sergeants Rubay Jiménez, Luis Nieto and Ferney Causaya (Juzgado 52 
Penal del Circuito de Conocimiento de Bogotá 2015).  
g. Inter-American system on Human Rights: the international judgment against the State 
On December 3, 1990, Enrique Rodríguez (father) presented a petition to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter, IACHR). The Inter-American System on Human 
Rights opened the case 10,738 “The Holocaust at the Palace of Justice”, and started procedures on 
December 26, 1990 (IACHR 1993: Chapter VII). On July 25, 1991, the Colombian Government 
replied to the petition forwarded by the Commission that: “Colombia considers the terms and 
content of the petition presented to the Commission to be an insult to national dignity... the 
Government of the Republic of Colombia reiterates its rejection of said petition, believes any 
examination of its content to be unacceptable and respectfully requests that the petition be 
dismissed” (IACHR 1993: Chapter VII). On November 15, 1991, the Colombian Government again 
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requested that the case be dismissed “on the grounds that it’s content and language were 
unacceptable” (IACHR 1993: Chapter VII).  
   On February 9, 2012, the case came before the IA Court on the basis that Colombia had 
not complied with the recommendations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In 
2014, the IA Court delivered a judgment for the case Rodríguez Vera et al. (or The Disappeared 
from the Palace of Justice) v. Colombia. This dossier studied the possible enforced disappearance of 
twelve people who were at the PJ cafeteria during the operation to retake the building as well as the 
presumed disappearance and subsequent execution of Justice Carlos Urán, the detention and torture 
of Yolanda Santodomingo, Eduardo Matson, Orlando Quijano and José Rubiano, and the alleged 
failure of the courts to clarify all these events and to punish all those responsible (IA Court 2014: 5). 
On October 17 and November 10, 2013, in the context of the process before the IA Court 
(2014: 10-12), the State forwarded a partial acknowledgement of responsibility to the Court with 
regard to the violations claimed in the case. Particularly, the State acknowledged that Yolanda 
Santodomingo and Eduardo Matson were tortured while in the custody of State agents, that Carlos 
Rodríguez and Irma Franco were forcibly disappeared, and that there was an unjustified delay in 
identifying and returning Ana Rosa Castiblanco’s remains. In respect to the rest of the group, the 
State responded there were no disappeared and there was just an unjustified delay in identifying 
mortal remains, as well as in the investigations characterized as errors related to (i) the handling of 
the corpses; (ii) the lack of rigor in the protection and inspection of the scene of the events; (iii) the 
improper handling of the evidence collected, and (iv) the inappropriate methods to maintain the chain 
of custody. These mistakes, according to the State, occurred due to the omission and negligence 
rather than deliberate acts of state agents.  
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On November 12 and 13, 2013, the public hearings on the case took place during the forty-
third special session of the Court in Brasilia, Brazil. After the partial acknowledgement, the dispute 
partially ceased; however, it subsisted with regard to other claims, mainly those relating to the 
alleged forced disappearances and the presumed extrajudicial execution of Justice Carlos Urán (IA 
Court 2014: 14-15). 
On November 14, 2014, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued a judgment 
declaring the State of Colombia internationally responsible for human rights violations committed 
in the context of the events of the Palace of Justice in 1985. In particular, the Court found that the 
State was responsible for the enforced disappearance of ten people who were at the cafeteria58 and 
in respect to other two for violating its duty to guarantee their right to life, given the lack of 
determination on the whereabouts of Ana Rosa Castiblanco for sixteen years and Norma Esguerra 
thus far.  
Moreover, the IA Court declared the state internationally responsible for the enforced 
disappearance and extrajudicial execution of Justice Carlos Urán, the degrading treatments committed 
against Orlando Quijano, the arbitrary detention and tortures against Yolanda Santodomingo and 
Eduardo Matson; and, the lack of judicial clarification of the facts and the violation of the right to 
personal integrity, to the detriment of the relatives of the victims, as well as for the breach of its duty 
of prevention in favor of those who were in the courthouse the day of the taking. 
h. Public apologies and acknowledgement of responsibility 
In 2012, the Superior Court of Bogota acting as the appeal Court in the PJ case ordered the 
Ministry of Defense, the Commander of the Military Forces, the Commander of the National Army, 
                                       
58 Carlos Rodríguez, Irma Franco, Cristina Guarín, David Suspes, Bernardo Beltrán, Hector Beltrán, Gloria 
Lizarazo, Luz Mary Portela, Lucy Oviedo and Gloria Anzola 
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the Commander the 13th Brigade, and the Commander of the Cavalry School, to hold a public 
ceremony apologizing for the crimes committed on November 6 and 7, 1985, that resulted in the 
disappearance of Carlos Rodríguez and Irma Franco (Tribunal Superior de Bogota 2012). This order 
was never fulfilled. Instead, President Santos decided to offer a public apology “on behalf of all 
Colombians” to President Betancur and the Armed Forces for the Appeal Court decision (El 
Espectador 2012c). 
Nonetheless, during the public hearing held on November 12, 2013, the government 
decided to offer public apologies to the presumed victims and their families before the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. In this intervention, “the State partially acknowledged its 
responsibility with regard to the alleged detentions and torture, the presumed forced 
disappearances, its obligation to investigate, and some of the violations committed to the detriment 
of the next of kin of the presumed victims” (IA Court 2014: 21). Despite this, the IA-Court ordered 
the State to conduct a public act in Colombia to acknowledge international responsibility of the 
case, which ought to take place within one year as of notification of its judgment. The Court 
determined this measure was necessary “in order to redress the harm caused to the victims and to 
prevent the repetition of events such as those of this case. […] The State has one year to comply 
with this measure”. 
On November 6, 2015, the government conducted a public ceremony in the presence of 
senior State officials and the victims. Headed by the President of the Republic, the Vice-President, 
the Ministers, some Congressmen and the Presidents of the High Courts of Justice, among others, 
the President in representation of the State and its Armed Forces acknowledged their responsibility 
in relation to the human rights violations declared in the Inter-American judgment of the PJ case. 
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Conclusions on the enquiries and the criminal law in(-)action 
This case presents a wide variety of complex procedures. In over thirty years of history, the 
case has been treated by practically every competent jurisdiction in the domestic arena and, 
internationally, by the Inter-American System on Human Rights. Furthermore, an ad hoc 
investigation tribunal and a Truth Commission were created and, a public act of apologies and 
acknowledgement of responsibility was held and led by the President. However, no single actor 
has been convicted in a criminal justice final judgment for the PJ events, whereas the opposite has 
happened in other jurisdictions as can be seen in the following graphic: 
The variety of dossiers and interventions of different jurisdictions can be characterized as a 
legal web. The intervention of different jurisdictions acting through special investigations, the 
Congress and administrative dossiers, an Inter-American case, a truth commission and criminal 
and disciplinary prosecutions, weaves a legal web that is difficult to neatly distinguish. 
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In this context, it is clear that the criminal jurisdictions have failed to produce any definitive 
result, whilst the administrative and international jurisdictions have established a general responsibility 
of the State for the wrongdoing. In fact, on the one hand, the Special Procuradores assigned to the 
Military Forces and the National Police have undertaken disciplinary procedures with the purpose of 
sanctioning a handful of officers for their faults of prevention and control, but not for the crimes 
committed during and after the operation to retake the PJ. On the other hand, the criminal jurisdiction 
has not produced any definitive result: the military criminal jurisdiction acquitted all the officials 
under investigation, M19 guerrillas were sentenced for the PJ events and later granted an amnesty, and 
“the investigations under the ordinary system of justice into the possible enforced disappearance of the 
victims did not commence until 2001, at the insistence of the next of kin” (IA Court 2014: 471).  
The crimes committed at the PJ, which had gone largely unexamined for two decades, were 
seriously investigated for the first time at the beginning of 2005, when some military members were 
indicted. Out of those, three low-ranked military individuals were acquitted in first instance, a 
decision whose appeal is pending; there is an ongoing criminal proceeding against a number of 
officials involved in the crimes and two high-ranked retired military members have been convicted to 
high sentences due to chain of command. Out of these convictions, retired Col. Plazas was acquitted 
of all charges by the Supreme Court and other rulings are suspended because of a cassation appeal to 
be solved by the Supreme Court. No government official has been definitively convicted for the 
events. Additionally, the proceedings enacted in the PJ case have suffered interference of the political 
system, threats against its actors –especially against the victims and their legal representatives, 
political pressures and legal actions obstructing the functioning of the judiciary.  
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4. State Crime 
 
There is historical evidence of murders, massacres, genocides59, enforced disappearances, 
tortures, and other crimes committed around the globe with the acquiescence or support of States 
(IA Court 2006; Rothe 2009). Although controversies about the existence of these wrongdoing are 
negligible, the term state crime remains elusive and particularly contested in the academic literature 
and other specialized arena as the international public law. This part aims at offering an account of 
these debates in order to problematize this notion and elucidate the kind of criminality that we 
selected as a relevant standpoint for conceptualizing impunity.  
Through a state of art of state crime in sociological, criminological and legal studies, the 
present chapter will explore and analyze state criminality with the objective of enabling an 
advantaged perspective for elucidating and constructing a socio-legal concept of impunity. When 
conducting a preliminary review of the literature about state crime we were able to assess a certain 
opacity in regards to its conceptual boundaries. With this in mind, our first aim will be to offer 
pertinent parameters for a sociological distinction of the phenomenon. This task may enable 
different contributions for a socio-legal characterization of state criminality, in addition to the 
general purpose of offering a strategic perspective for a conceptualization of impunity. Ultimately, 
                                       
59 According to some commentators “[g]enocide is indeed a state crime: there is not a single instance of 
genocide in recorded history which was not committed either directly by a state, or by a state through one of 
its proxies” (Milanović 2006: 603).  
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in what sense does the phenomenon of state crime contribute to a better comprehension of the issue 
of impunity?  
4.1.  State crime according to International law 
In the international public law, the concept of state crime has been extensively debated. 
While for some international law commentators “[t]he concept of state responsibility for 
international crimes is juridically feasible and may be analyzed in terms of a criminal organization 
model or a corporate crime model” (Jørgensen 2000: 280); to others, “[t]he criminal state is 
juridically speaking a nonsense […]. The punishability of the state is both a legal and a practical 
impossibility” (Drost 1959: 304). Although currently, the common legal understanding represents 
this notion as alien to the legal tradition, this term has a relevant place on the historical debates and 
development of international law.  
“[T]he issue of state crime has of course a genealogy, with a provenance largely from the 
mid- to late-twentieth century. The domain in which this debate has mainly taken off is in the 
sphere of international law” (Vincent 2012: 67). Within the mentioned genealogy, the work of the 
International Law Commission of the United Nations (hereinafter, ILC) on the codification of the 
State responsibility is one of the first antecedents referring to this topic, constituting a landmark 
debate within international law60. For this reason, the first part of this chapter will study the ILC 
discussions around state crime. The second part of this chapter will focus on Latin-American 
developments, recognizing different contextual particularities with regard to the debates on the 
                                       
60 On the reasons to study the work of the ILC for a delimitation of international law, we agree with Allott 
(1988: 11): “In the case of the International Law Commission, the mere existence of its reports and draft 
articles has an effect on the development of international law. An aura surrounds the remarkable scholarly 
work of the Commission's special rapporteurs. Their reports on state responsibility, as on other topics, are 
among the most valuable material sources of international law”. 
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notion. With this purpose, we selected the discussions at the Inter-American Human Rights System 
as well as other domestic Latin-American case-law. 
Exploring the obstacles, limitations and advantages that legal tradition confers to the notion 
certainly awakens different criminological and socio-legal reflections. Although there is no lineal 
connection between criminological and international law studies (cross-references are rare between 
these disciplines), when conducting an analysis of these subjects we realize that they raise similar 
issues. Considering this, after studying international law deliberations a propos the notion of state 
crime we will draw a criminological characterization of this type of criminality. 
4.1.1 International law debate at the UN: introduction and dismissal of the concept of state 
crime 
The notion of state crime was discussed in the international law a propos the debates of an 
international regulation on the responsibility of States. In 1930, the League of Nations, original 
scenario of the debates, held a Conference at The Hague which resulted in a number of discussions 
around the topics of nationality, territorial waters, and State responsibility for damages caused in 
their territory to foreign people or goods (UN ILC 2015).  In spite of the fact that since 1927 these 
topics had been selected in consultations with the States as the most “desirable” matters for 
achieving a consensus, the Conference did not reach particular advances on these subjects - 
producing only four instruments regarding nationality and territorial waters (UN ILC 2015).  
The scarce agreement reached on the subject of State responsibility was attributed to the 
extreme complexity of the problems that the topic posed for the discussions. In fact, the League of 
Nations never reached an agreement to complete a codification on the matter (UN ILC 1949: 49; 
2015) and the attempt to regulate this topic was only resumed in 1949, when the United Nations 
 100 
 
 
(hereinafter, UN) was in place and the International Law Commission (hereinafter, ILC) was trusted 
with the task of the progressive development of international law and its codification (UN 1947: art. 1).  
In this new context and in spite of the 1930’s failure to produce a codification on this 
matter, the ILC decided to include the topic of State responsibility in the list of topics to be studied, 
adding as a subtheme the criminal responsibility of States and of the people acting on their behalf. 
With this respect, the first study of the Commission on the codification of the responsibility for 
internationally wrongful conduct was authored by Commissioner García Amador. In his report, 
Commissioner García concluded that even though the topic of State responsibility should be 
limited to the public responsibility, the developments around the criminal liability should be 
considered due to their effects on the principles of public responsibility. One of these effects was 
the differentiation between unlawful acts and (graver) punishable acts, the former subjected to 
compensations and the latter to sanctions (UN ILC 1954).  
Such presentation of this topic anticipated the trajectory of the discussions on the matter, 
which was drawn in constant reference to its legal consequences. Indeed, the success or defeat of 
the acceptability of the notion of state crime was strongly connected to the possibility of 
establishing legal consequences against its actors. In short, the debates around the draft articles 
indicated an analytical integration of the study of (state) crime and its consequences, as dependent 
and interrelated phenomena for their observation according to law.  
In 1955, Commissioner García Amador was appointed Special Rapporteur for the topic of 
State responsibility (UN ILC 1955: 190). Ever since his first report in 1956, Rapporteur García 
raised one of the most controversial themes of his mandate: the criminal responsibility of States. 
According to García, State unlawful conduct could give rise to reparations as well as to 
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‘punishment’ that could take place concurrently with compensations for damage (UN ILC 1956a: 
173-232). In 1956, the ILC discussed this report.  
Commissioners François and Zourek, took position rejecting criminal responsibility of 
States as a matter that international law did not recognize. According to François, this concept 
‘could not exist’ because the State is a mere legal fiction and, as such, it could not be held 
criminally accountable. Additionally, he argued that the Nuremberg Tribunal had reintroduced the 
criteria that ‘the king can do no wrong’, when establishing that unlawful acts coming from the 
State can only be attributed to its advisors or organs. In fact, the Nuremberg trial made clear that 
“crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced” (International Military Tribunal 1946: 447). Therefore, although since the aftermath of 
World War II crimes against humanity was a typology of wrongdoing characterized as a state 
crime (Rodenhäuser 2014), the international tribunal restricted its reaction to the conduct of 
individual agents61.  
With this regard, Commissioner Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, even though agreed that this issue 
should not be dealt with in greater depth by the ILC (UN ILC 1956: Volume I: 241), noticed that 
the idea of punishing a State was not absurd and that the possibility of establishing penalties 
beyond restitutio in integrum was not impracticable. At the end of that meeting, the ILC Chairman 
                                       
61 “The contemporary human rights movement is permeated with the logic of Nuremberg. Human rights 
groups focus on atrocities for which they seek individual criminal responsibility. Their method of work has 
a formalized name: Naming and Shaming. The methodology involves a succession of clearly defined steps: 
catalog atrocities, identify victims and perpetrators, name and shame the perpetrators, and demand that they 
be held criminally accountable. The underside of the focus on perpetrators is to downplay issues. This is 
problematic if one recognizes that political violence is often not a standalone incident but part of a  cycle of 
violence  –  a fact obscured by the absence of a historical context” (Mamdani 2016: 352).  
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concluded that the task of the ILC was to address the ‘public accountability’ of States which had to 
be restricted to the duty of reparation stricto sensu, implying that criminal liability could only be 
attributed to individuals (UN ILC 1956: Volume I: 246). Through this last debate we can 
preliminary observe from a sociological perspective how the understanding of the criminal liability 
is naturalized by the legal system as a process that can only implicate individuals and that has the 
goal of punishing them as its unequivocal and direct consequence. 
In 1957, the Special Rapporteur submitted his second report (UN ILC 1957a). In this 
document he did not mention the possibility of awarding criminal consequences for State 
wrongdoing, although he warned that this was nothing but a ‘pending issue’ that at some point the 
Commission would have to address (UN ILC 1957: 105). According to the rapporteur, crimes do 
not necessarily originate ‘punishment’, but they could bear measures for the protection of the 
victims and their assets. In this line, in his 1958 report, he affirmed that the duty of reparation 
stricto sensu involves the ‘satisfaction’ element that, as such, may entail a form of criminal liability 
(UN ILC 1958: 70). However, the Special Rapporteur did not examine the subject of ‘satisfaction’ 
measures in greater depth. From a sociological perspective, this assertion seems to contest 
punishment (understood as a temporal measure of pain infliction) as the only consequence of 
criminal accountability, recognizing a specific weight to the protection of the victims as an 
acceptable and legal form of criminal accountability. 
The ILC was unable to finish a draft of the codification as the decade of the 1950s ended. In 
1961, rapporteur García insisted on the discussion of the criminal liability of States distinguishing 
between two types of reparation: the reparation stricto sensu - understood as a civil institution with 
pecuniary implications, and satisfaction measures -understood as a type of moral and political 
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restitution with an “essential and unvaryingly criminal feature” (UN ILC 1961: 14). The latter was 
understood as bearing two purposes: restituting the dignity of the State affected by the wrong and 
punishing the State wrongdoer (UN ILC 1961: 19). In this sense, the rapporteur stated that reparation 
stricto sensu could turn into punishment depending on the direness of the infraction.  
Following the UN General Assembly Resolution 1686/1961, the ILC decided to prioritize 
the study of State responsibility62. With this task the ILC Secretariat prepared a document on the 
criminal accountability of States, analyzing the landmark discussion around the drafting of the 
project of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. In these discussions, it 
was proposed that criminal liability for genocides should also cover States (UN 1948) arguing that 
the complexity of the structure of modern States often meant that their acts should not always be 
individualized on a human being, but on the system as a whole. Nonetheless, in the debates, State 
responsibility for Genocide was rejected bearing that only individuals could be held responsible as 
authors of this crime (UN ILC 1964: 126).  
Concerning the antecedents, in further works the ILC Secretariat presented a compendium 
of international courts’ decisions regarding State responsibility and the new Special Rapporteur, 
Roberto Ago, submitted a report on the international codification of the topic (UN ILC 1963). In 
these works there was not much progress regarding the criminal liability of States. It was in the 
1970s when the topic gained momentum when the Special Rapporteur submitted a second report 
entitled “The Origins of the International Responsibility”, in which he analyzed the conditions that 
had to be met in order to determine the existence of an internationally unlawful event. In his report, 
Ago stated that International Law increasingly labeled as crime the grave breaches of international 
                                       
62 With this purpose, the ILC conformed a subcommittee on the matter. This organ submitted its 1963 and 
1964 reports on the issue of State responsibility (UN ILC 1964: 126). 
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law coming from States -especially those infractions of erga omnes duties63 as well as ius cogens 
obligations64.  
In 1971, Ago submitted his third report in which he studied the international law trend 
criminalizing State’s unlawful conduct (UN ILC 1971: 212). With this respect, the rapporteur 
referred to the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States approved in 1970, in which the war of aggression was defined as a 
crime against peace that, in accordance to international law, entails public responsibility. This 
precedent, in his view, allowed to shape the concept of international crime, as States are the only 
entities that can commit the crime of aggression. In this sense, the idea of criminal offenses 
perpetrated by the State did not only follow from the nature of the obligations breached by the 
conduct or the gravity of the wrong but also derived from the fact that there were a number of 
conducts that only the State as a whole may perform; in other words, there are illegal actions that 
could not be understood as committed by individuals without a substantial reference to the 
organization (the State).  
 
                                       
63 "For assessing what an erga omnes obligation is, he quoted the work of the International Court of Justice 
in the case Barcelona Traction that developed the idea of the erga omnes obligations.  This norms are 
understood as obligations opposable to the international community as a whole, meaning that by their legal 
status they are concern of al1 States: “[i]n view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be 
held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for 
example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as 
also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection 
from slavery and racial discrimination” (International Court of Justice 1962: 32). 
64 “Article 53. Treaties Conflicting with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law ("Jus Cogens") A 
treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international 
law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
deroga tion is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general in ternational law 
having the same carácter” (UN Vienna Convention 1969). 
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In 1972, the rapporteur submitted his fourth report on State responsibility, in which he 
assessed that wrongdoing performed by the State gives rise to international responsibility. 
Following this, in 1973 the rapporteur submitted a project regarding the general principles of State 
responsibility (UN ILC 1973). Despite the fact that these articles did not refer to forms of criminal 
responsibility, this topic was not abandoned in the further discussions. With this respect, in 1974 
the rapporteur declared before the ILC that even though the articles should be limited to the study 
of the secondary norms of responsibility (norms on the legal sanctions), it should not turn a blind 
eye on the content of primary obligations (norms on the obligations of States)65. The same 
observation was made by the Sixth Committee of the ILC, which affirmed that the study of State 
responsibility probably should take into account the existence of different types of obligations 
implying a distinction in their treatment according to their importance for the international 
community (UN ILC 1974: 6).  
In accordance with this, the rapporteur proposed the Committee to consider distinguishing 
between grave unlawful conduct (which could be labelled as international crimes), and other less 
serious wrongs (UN ILC 1974: 6). From this distinction the latter would involve an obligation to 
make reparations while the former would entail the implementation of sanctions. This remark was 
based on a historical analysis that the rapporteur divided in three periods of time:  
 
                                       
65 “The emphasis [of the articles] is on the secondary rules of State responsibility: that is to say, the general 
conditions under international law for the State to be considered responsible for wrongful actions or 
omissions, and the legal consequences which flow therefrom. The articles do not attempt to define the 
content of the international obligations, the breach of which gives rise to responsibility. This is the function 
of the primary rules, whose codification would involve restating most of substantive customary and 
conventional international law” (ILC 2001: 31)  
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From mid-nineteenth century until 
the outbreak of World War I Between 1915 and 1939 
From the end of the Second 
World War onwards 
In general terms there was no 
differentiation with regard to 
the content of the international 
obligations violated by the 
State. Thus, the possibility of 
sanctioning remained only valid 
if reparations were denied – 
with the exception of cases of 
aggression when it was not 
required to make reparations 
before taking sanction 
measures. 
The idea that there was not a 
single type of international 
wrongdoing was brought forth. 
In this vein, there could not be a 
single type of responsibility, 
enabling the possibility of 
penalizing States in line with 
the gravity of the infraction. 
This implied a step towards a 
criminal connotation of the 
international responsibility. 
It was accepted that 
international crimes exist 
and that, as such, they 
should bear a corresponding 
responsibility, entailing 
more severe penalties. In the 
1960s and 1970s, this idea 
was particularly relevant 
enabling a distinction 
between the types of 
international wrongful acts. 
In line with his study, the rapporteur established that the project on State responsibility 
should contain an article differentiating the most serious breaches from other infractions: grave 
breaches, he proposed, should be addressed as crimes, therefore implying more serious 
consequences (UN ILC 1976).  In this context, in 1976, the ILC decided to include the term ‘state 
crime’ in the draft articles on state responsibility (Weiler, Cassese and Spinedi 1989) in article 19 
of the draft codification: 
“[a]n internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an international 
obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international 
community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes 
an international crime” (UN ILC 1977: 11). 
The different governments reacted to this article66. Between 1980 and 1982, rapporteur 
Willem Riphagen, replacing Commissioner Ago, received the comments of the States. The 
different positions with regard to the matter of state crime could be classified in three groups:  
                                       
66 The impact positions of the States in the UN allows to observe the political difficulty of creating 
international law categories without their consent. Further from their particular position concerning state 
crime, the fact that States are behind the discussions on regulations for creating constraints to state power, 
involve a political difficulty. Some commentators have understood the methodology of the ILC submitting 
to the governmental approval the international law developments may entail a form of immobilizing further 
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In favor 
Belarus, Ukraine, the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria 
These States considered article 19 as an important provision for 
strengthening peace, international security and the principles of the UN 
Charter. 
Abstention 
Canada, Austria, Spain,  and The 
Netherlands  
These States abstained from making a definitive declaration, as the 
consequences to be awarded to the different categories of wrongdoing as 
well as an adjudicating forum with this purpose had not been clearly 
determined. 
Against 
Sweden, Federal Republic of 
Germany Australia, France, 
Greece, Portugal, and the U.S 
These States emphatically opposed article 19. The recurrent criticism within 
this group was that such provision would risk criminalizing the acts of 
States, without objective criteria: even if the definition of crimes enunciated 
a set of non-exhaustive examples, the debates cast doubt on the clarity of 
article when differentiating serious crimes.  
 The lack of consensus around article 19 was basically argued around the distinction 
between criminal and non-criminal conduct and the attributable consequences for state crime. 
Considering these objections, during the 1990s, there were different debates focusing on the 
consequences of state crime and the possible forum to decide on the criminal responsibility of 
states. With this respect, in 1993, the rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz submitted a report on State 
responsibility in which he analyzed the consequences of state crime establishing that the distinction 
between delicts and crimes was not merely descriptive, involving the instatement of a regime of 
responsibility capable of awarding particularly serious consequences for the crimes. This 
connotation of state crime raised worries in different States around the problem of creating 
measures that could endanger the territorial integrity or the political independence of a State (UN 
ILC 1992). In this matter, the ILC concluded that only armed aggressions justified unilateral armed 
reactions and that indirectly injured States could eventually be authorized to react by a decision of 
                                                                                                                           
advances in international law: “Instead of limiting the power of governments, the ILC's version of state 
responsibility establishes the limits of their powers. It affirms rather than constrains power. From the 
viewpoint of the people, the purpose of law is to realize their values and interests by directing the holders of 
delegated power to respect those values and to serve those interests. It is unlikely that anyone but a 
government official would regard the confirmation of government power as the purpose of law” (Allott 
1988:2). 
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the competent body according to the UN Charter. With this regard, the rapporteur explained that 
intervention should be limited to an imperative need and should be proportional in extent.  
In short, the rapporteur argued that the traditional distinction between States’ serious 
offences (with civil consequences) and wrongdoing of individuals (entailing penal consequences), 
should be transformed acknowledging that States are capable of criminal conduct involving legal 
consequences other than civil. With this regard, the rapporteur concluded that criminal 
responsibility is an adequate response to State’s criminal wrongdoing that should not limit legal 
redress to civil consequences, as well as should not involve collective responsibility which he 
qualified as a primitive and rudimentary institution67 (UN ILC 1993).  
In 1994, the ILC undertook a new debate on the characterization of certain illicit conduct of 
the State as criminal. A number of Commissioners defended the pertinence of this category, which 
legal consequences should be awarded by an independent international body - except for crimes of 
aggression for which the UN Charter already established an appropriate forum. On the other hand, 
other ILC members pointed out that the category of ‘crime of state’ should not be employed 
because article 19 aimed at establishing a distinction in reference to the degree of seriousness of 
the unlawful act, which was not clear and involved great discretion form the forum of attribution of 
responsibility.  
                                       
67 In this respect, Jørgensen (2000: 4) comments: “[t]raditionally, international law has been concerned 
with the activities of states, and it would seem that the concept of illegal war was at first discussed 
primarily in relation to the collective responsibility of the state. During the First and Second World Wars, 
crimes of a gravity never before equaled were committed and condoned by the state, and the intangibility 
of the state bureaucratic apparatus gave rise to the question of the criminal responsibility of the physical 
persons representing the state and acting in its name. […] The criminal responsibility of states, 
individuals, governments, and organizations were all notions that received considerable attention in the 
aftermath of each of the two world wars and three possible systems were advocated: first, that of the 
exclusive responsibility of states; second, that of the cumulative responsibility of states and individuals; 
and finally, that of the exclusive responsibility of individuals”. 
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In 1995, the rapporteur focused on the consequences of international wrong, particularly 
with the aim of determining the adjudicating forum for establishing the breaches, labeling them as 
crimes and awarding subsequent sanctions (UN ILC 1995). With this respect, the rapporteur 
established that the general consequence of states’ wrongdoing is the obligation to make 
reparations, including the termination of the conduct, the restitution in kind, compensation and 
satisfaction measures as well as the guarantee of non-repetition. In this context, criminal conduct 
implies broad reparations to be made since the breach of erga omnes obligations damages the 
international community as a whole. Thus, although restitutio should not compromise the existence 
of the State and the essential needs of its population, the obligation of restoring the victim to the 
original situation before the gross violations could not be evaded on the basis of arguments of 
sovereignty, independence or prevalence of the domestic jurisdiction. Finally, the rapporteur 
established that, in the context of reparations, countermeasures may be invoked by the affected 
States, with the exception of possible unilateral interim measures for addressing a situation of 
genocide. From the trajectory of the discussions, we can observe the progressive emphasis of the 
debate around state crime on the consequences attributable to the wrongdoing. 
The ILC examined this report, debating once again the concept of state crime. In this debate 
it was argued that the State was exempted from criminal responsibility because it was the only 
institution able and capable of punishing –the State punishing itself is viewed as impracticable (UN 
ILC 1995: 48). Additionally, it was argued that sanctioning a criminal State would unjustly extend 
its effects to the population and that the notion of state crime could stigmatize certain States as 
deviant, enabling eventual abusive counter-measures to be undertaken by powerful States. In spite 
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of these oppositions, the ILC provisionally approved the draft articles on State responsibility, 
maintaining the original version of article 19.  
In 1996, rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz was replaced by James Crawford who cast doubts on 
article 19, which he deemed defective regarding the definition of the criminal conduct (UN ILC 
1996). In 1998, different governments raised reservations on the notion of state crime, some of 
them opposing the notion of crime and others objecting the possible legal consequences when 
attributing a criminal conduct to the State. Considering these observations, the rapporteur 
concluded that the term ‘crime’ was unwelcomed by the states; even though there was a consensus 
on the relevance of the category of obligations erga omnes (UN ILC 1998: 77).  
In 1998, after numerous meetings and intense debate, article 19 was changed and the concept 
of state crime was excluded from the draft articles on state responsibility (UN 2002a). The ILC 
decided to exclude article 19 considering that there was no consensus regarding the notion of state 
crime. The dismissal of this term implied a relegation of the concept within international law. In 
2000, the rapporteur presented a new report clarifying that States were capable of committing illicit 
conduct but that criminal responsibility arising from this is only attributable to the individuals. 
Finally, he proposed alternative wordings to the original term ‘crime’, such as ‘serious unlawful 
international act’ or ‘exceptionally serious unlawful act’.  
In 2001, the ILC adopted the draft articles on the responsibility of States for internationally 
wrongful acts (UN ILC 2001) replacing the concept of state crime with the concept of serious 
breaches of obligations to the international community as a whole and essential for the protection 
of its fundamental interests. On December 12, 2001, the General Assembly took note of the articles 
and commended them to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their 
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adoption (Resolution 56/83). In 2004 (Resolution 59/35), 2007 (Resolution 62/61) and 2010 
(Resolution 65/19), the General Assembly insisted on commending to the attention of governments 
the articles requesting the Secretary-General to invite the States to submit written observations on 
the future measures to be adopted, as well as preparing an initial collection of the decisions of the 
international bodies related to the articles. 
4.1.2 Remarks on the International law debate about the concept of state crime 
The codification on the responsibility of States was the result of more than five decades of 
work. During this time the subject of state crime was largely debated. For a socio-legal 
characterization of state crime, this debate is not only relevant for a genealogical study of the 
notion, but also epitomizes three traditional issues when constructing a general definition of crime: 
what can we call a criminal action? Who can commit crime? And, what are (and should be) the 
legal consequences of crime?  
With regard to the question on the content and extent of wrongdoing that can be called crime 
-what can we call a criminal conduct?, the ILC considered that further from bilateral obligations, it 
was important to define State responsibility when ‘essential’ international rules were breached. In 
this line, the category of criminal conduct was developed by the ILC along with the international law 
categories of ius cogens (non-derogable norms) and obligations erga omnes (obligations opposable 
to all). In accordance to this, the notion of state crime emerged as an expression referring to 
wrongdoing resulting from the breach of essential international obligations that, as such, may be 
recognized as criminal by the international community as a whole (ILC 1977).  
In 1977, this notion was adopted in article 19 of the draft codification triggering an intense 
debate along two decades under the lead of different special rapporteurs on the subject (Umaña 
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2015). Article 19 of the draft articles was accepted by the States alongside the initial debates. 
However, as soon as the discussion focused on the legal consequences attributable to state criminal 
conduct, most governments expressed their dissatisfaction with the notion and paved the way to the 
exclusion of the term68.  
A similar situation emerged with regard to the question who can do crime? ILC discussions 
on the codification of State responsibility focused on establishing whether States were capable of 
wrongdoing and, if so, what type of wrongs they could commit. While to some of the discussants 
States could not be addressed as criminal actors because they are mere fictions that should not be 
submitted to criminal law -societas delinquere non potest; others sustained that states could be 
regarded as criminal actors when the State supported, acquiesced or participated in criminal 
conduct. This was confirmed by the fact that certain criminal conduct as the crime of aggression, 
apartheid or annexation could only be perpetrated by States. Furthermore, this category is relevant 
when criminal actions are performed through complex networks making it difficult to concentrate 
responsibilities on individuals.  
For some time, the ILC discussions were in favor of understanding the state as a criminal 
actor. However, this option was discarded and the State was finally famed as a non-criminal actor, 
particularly because of reluctance on assessing consequences of such categorization of wrongdoing 
and the appropriate forum for the attribution of responsibility. These debates revealed that the 
                                       
68 In the 1980s, various States made comments on the draft articles. These comments can be analyzed into 
three groups: the first group of countries (Canada, the Netherlands, Spain and Austria) did not offer a 
definitive statement because they understood that penalties were pending development projects. A second 
group of countries (Belarus, Ukraine, USSR, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) considered article 19 to be an 
important provision for strengthening peace and the purposes of the UN Charter. A third group (Sweden, 
Australia, France, Greece, Portugal, The Federal Republic of Germany and the U.S.) opposed to Article 19 
because it could result in turning acts of States into crimes and because it was not clear what the 
consequence of this should be. 
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acceptability of the notion of state crime was not only a matter of naming a wrong and blaming the 
State for it but concerned the question of what are (and should be) the legal consequences of 
crime? With this respect, ILC debates presented different theoretical problems concerning the 
possibility of awarding criminal law consequences to state wrongdoing under the traditional 
framework of punitive measures, as well as more practical issues in respect to the operational 
elements of such responsibility – e.g. the adjudicating forum for determining breaches and the 
procedures and rules of attribution and allocation of responsibility.  
While some governments and ILC Commissioners supported the idea of state crime as an 
adequate label for the most serious offenses under the general principle of the international 
responsibility for State wrongdoing, others argued that it had to be abandoned due to the 
impracticability of adequate legal consequences and pertinent adjudicatory institutions for state 
crime. Hence, the different issues around the category of state crime became progressively 
dependent on the possibility of finding an ‘adequate’ criminalization. Thus, in 1998 this concept 
was ‘put to one side’ due to the lack of consensus on its content and of the regime of responsibility 
that it should be granted with (UN ILC 1998). The replacement of state crime by the notion of 
‘serious breaches’ was mainly based on the objections referring to the legal consequences for 
criminal states wrongdoing (Wyler 2002; Bagchi 2009:10).  
The study of the possible legal consequences of state crime underlines the difficulty of the 
law for assessing the crime without a reference to its attributable penalties. Furthermore, this 
consequences should entail penal measures. This idea seems to be governed by the assumption of the 
necessity of punishment for attending criminal conduct. Indeed, the study of the genealogy of the 
ILC discussions allows to visualize a distinction drawn between civil law consequences and criminal 
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law consequences. In line with the traditional distinction between penal measures and compensatory 
measures, the former (sanctions) are attributable ‘by nature’ to criminal conducts and the latter 
(compensations) to civil wrongdoing. Do legal consequences attributable to wrongdoing have any 
essential or natural feature? The fact that reparations presented a penal element (e.g. punitive 
damages in tort cases) and other sanctions were found to have a compensatory element (e.g. 
compensation for criminal injuries), did not persuade the discussants of the lack of a natural bound 
between a particular measure and the sort of wrong materialized in the conduct.  
When dealing with the conceptualization of state crime, international law draws a necessary 
conceptual correlation between the phenomena of crime and its criminalization. As such, (state) 
crime could not be conceptualized without an attributable consequence entailing the 
criminalization of the conduct. The common legal understanding is that only the law can define a 
crime and the applicable punishment (nullum crimen [nulla peona] sine lege). In this line, the 
formula assessing that there shall be no punishment without a crime (nulla poena sine crimen), was 
inverted by the discussion to a logics of no crime without applicable punishment. In short, when 
limiting the concept of state crime to the possibility of finding practicable legal consequences, the 
international law situates criminality and criminalization as two fields of observation intrinsically 
concomitant. Hence, the absence of viable means or basis for the criminalization of an action was 
observed as an argument for making the criminal category (state crime) impertinent.  
The study of the concept of state crime in the international law illustrates the limitations of 
evaluating the phenomenon of criminality reduced to the notion of criminalization. This scope 
should be widened when constructing a socio-legal conceptualization of the phenomenon: for a 
sociological observation of (state) criminality, criminalization is a contingency. These are two 
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phenomena that need to be addressed as independent fields of observation and, as such, although 
related they are not necessarily conceptually nor practically interconnected. The conceptualization 
of state crime does not require a determination, or even the existence, of criminal law consequence 
(penalization) – notwithstanding valid attempts to create mechanisms of legal redress.  
With the aim of drawing a socio-legal conceptualization of impunity a characterization of 
the phenomenon of crime should allow to uncouple the observation of the criminal conduct and the 
extent, form and aim of its criminalization. In other words, the reconstruction and characterization 
of the (State) criminal conduct may be drawn independently from the (still relevant) task of 
debating the legal redress for these actions and the problem of impunity. With this regard, we have 
the task of identifying the cognitive, operational, procedural and ideological obstacles for 
visualizing legal consequences to the criminal phenomenon and their particular meaning and 
weight for the conceptualization of impunity. 
4.1.3 The regional law debates on the concept of state crime 
In spite of the rejection of the notion of state crime at the UN, when reviewing the work of 
different Latin-American jurisdictions we found relevant evidence on the use of the term (Umaña 
2015). This evidence was pertinent for evaluating the legal debates around state crime, from a 
genealogical, conceptual and contextual perspective.   
However, instead of drawing a genealogy on the notion of state crime from a legislative or 
political perspective, in this section we will review other aspects and problems with respect to the 
definition of state criminality exploring regional international law. In the Latin-American region, 
the legal discussions around the notion of state crime have mainly focused on jurisdictional 
developments. To our work it is important to take into consideration these developments and their 
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possible particularities around the understanding of state criminality, as the geographical, social 
and historical context of the case study of the present research. 
With this in mind, we will refer to the work of the Inter-American System on Human 
Rights (hereinafter, ISHR). The ISHR is a regional system of protection of human rights in the 
Americas, composed of normative, quasi-jurisdictional and jurisdictional mechanisms. The ISHR 
has competence on the violation of the obligations recognized in the American Convention on 
Human Rights principally and other instruments, in respect to States that have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, IA Court). In the exercise 
of that jurisdiction, the IA Court has extensively examined some of the most insidious actions of 
American States against people under their jurisdiction. Some of the Inter-American Court Justices 
have engaged in a debate around the notion of state crime. 
These discussions were not part of the ratio decidendi of the Court but were a source of 
inspiration of the debates on the human rights responsibility of the State in different cases. Through 
the study of this debate, we would like to explore three kinds of issues that can be distinguished as 
problems of definition, problems of application of the concept and problems concerning the 
possible consequences to be attributed to actions that falling into the category of state criminality. 
In regard to the definition, we can provisionally anticipate that the reader will find that the 
problems of conceptualization of state crime appear to be thematically consonant with the 
discussions underlined in the last section. With regard to the application of the concept, the Inter-
American Court debates allow us to explore possible difficulties that the usage and treatment of 
‘state crime’ can present for the judicial system. Finally, in reference to the possible consequences 
of state criminality, this section attempts at enabling differentiating the operation of categorizing a 
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certain conduct as criminal and the operation of determining the consequences to be assigned to the 
phenomenon as well as the legal system anxieties and limitations vis-à-vis such task.  
The Inter-American System on Human Rights presents recent developments regarding the 
category of state crime – different from the ILC discussions. The work of Justices García (IA 
Court, 2003a; 2006b) and Cançado (IA Court 2003a; 2006a; 2006c) brought the term into debate. 
When referring to gross human rights violations, Justice Cançado supported the category of state 
crime should be recognized by the ISHR69 while Justice García opposed to this form of labeling 
human rights violations.  
In different reasoned concurring opinions to the rulings, Justice Cançado has hold that the 
notion of state crime should be recognized by international law. The first time he did so was in the 
Myrna Mack v. Guatemala case (IA Court 2003a), in which the Court studied the extrajudicial 
execution of the anthropologist Myrna Mack Chang by the military on September 11, 1990. 
According to the IA Court her killing was politically motivated due to her denunciations and 
research concerning the displacement of rural indigenous communities that she concluded was 
caused by the Army’s counterinsurgency program (IA Court 2003a: 134.7 - 134.13). 
In this ruling, Cançado asserted that such cases are attributable to state agents who act as 
direct perpetrators and to the State on behalf of which crimes are committed. In this line, he 
sustained that with respect to this conduct, there is a sort of complementarity of the international 
criminal responsibility of the individual and the responsibility of the State. Thus, he concluded that 
                                       
69 “[w]hile the expression “crime of State” may seem objectionable to many international jurists […] 
because it suggests an inadequate analogy with juridical categories of domestic criminal law, this does not 
mean that crimes of State do not exist. […] Even if another name is sought for them the existence of crimes 
of State does not cease for that reason” (IA-Court 2003: 53) 
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in spite of the ILC draft articles on State responsibility setting aside, “rather lightly” (IA Court 
2003b: 8), the concept of State crime, state crime ‘does exist’ (IA Court 2003b: 53).  
“While the expression “crime of State” may seem objectionable to many international jurists 
(especially those petrified by the specter of State sovereignty) because it suggests an 
inadequate analogy with juridical categories of domestic criminal law, this does not mean 
that crimes of State do not exist. The facts in the instant case are eloquent evidence that they 
do exist. Even if another name is sought for them, the existence of crimes of State does not 
cease for that reason” (IA Court 2003b: 53). 
 
In this sense, Judge Cançado linked the concept of state criminality to the protection of the 
fundamental interests of the international community defining it as “grave violation[s] of 
peremptory international law (the jus cogens), which directly affects its principles and foundations, 
and which is a matter that concerns the international community as a whole, and should not be 
dealt with by analogy with categories of domestic criminal law” (IA Court 2003b: 27). When 
Cançado asserts that these crimes should not be dealt as a form of domestic criminal law, he 
implied that these actions are not a category of crime but a form of criminality: the problem is not 
to create an offense with the label of state crime but to recognize state criminality as actions from 
which “[…] millions of human beings have been made victims of grave human rights violations 
perpetrated by state policies” (IA Court 2006: 24). This observation is an important indication for a 
further development of a sociological concept of state crime. Indeed, it can allow us to visualize 
that state crime is not to be limited to a debate on the existence of a (new) criminal law offense, but 
rather a phenomenon of criminality that refers to different sorts of criminal prohibitions70. 
                                       
70 This idea was ignored by the Colombian Supreme Court in a case around unlawful interception of 
communications by the State Security Agency against the political opposition and human rights 
defenders. In the case, the plaintiff claimed for an exception to the application of the statute of limitations, 
arguing that the State should not benefit its own agents from the expiration of the statutory period when 
committing actions that use public power hidden from the public and the judiciary. In contradiction of this 
argument, the Colombian Supreme Court (2013) argued that domestic legislation did not establish the 
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Considering state crime as a type of violation, Cançado assessed the importance of 
determining the concomitant responsibility of the State and the individuals (acting as State agents) 
with regard to these conducts. Thus, Justice Cançado favored the concept of ‘crimes of States’ as 
an issue that involves the complementarity between individual and State responsibility. This, he 
assessed, was related to the international law trend towards the criminalization of grave human 
rights violations, in the context of the struggle against impunity. With this regard, according to 
Cançado, the legal consequences of state crimes would be the aggravated international 
responsibility in accordance with which the reparatio would involve a particular nature and a wide 
scope. This scope should comprise not only reparations but also punishment, the latter referring to 
punitive reparations taking the form of ‘obligations to do’ rather than merely pecuniary measures: 
these obligations “have exemplary or dissuasive purposes, in the sense of preserving remembrance 
of the violations occurred, of providing satisfaction (a feeling of realization of justice) to the next 
of kin of the victim, and of contributing to ensure non-recidivism of said violations (even through 
human rights training and education)” (IA Court 2003b: 50) 
In this ruling, Judge Sergio García expressed a reasoned concurring opinion in which he 
described state crime as a ‘withering’ expression that serves identifying these kinds of criminal events 
and frustrating their justifications. However, he criticized this notion as it could entail “the temptation 
to subordinate effective and specific individual criminal responsibility to a hypothetical and general 
State responsibility or, at least, to hide the former under cover of the latter”, as well as it could also 
unreasonably expand the consequences of wrongdoing to every agent part of the State at the time of 
                                                                                                                           
category of ‘state crime’ as it did not take into account the ‘criminal objective’ for fixing the statute of 
limitation, nor contemplated ‘the impact’ on victims, society in general and State institutions. Hence, the 
Court concluded that in this case the statute of limitation was objective and should be applied with no 
exceptions. 
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the crime (IA Court 2003C: 34). Hence, according to Justice García, in cases as the execution of 
Myrna Mack Chang, it is not pertinent to concentrate criminal responsibility in the State; rather, when 
the Court determined the existence of particularly serious wrongs, it would be appropriate to consider 
reparations consistent with the gravity of the violations. These reparations, he proposed, could surpass 
merely economic consequences enabling different non-pecuniary compensations, “such as publication 
of the judgment, [the] expression of guilt and requirement of apology in official declarations, and [the] 
commemoration of the memory of the victim” (IA Court 2003C: 47). 
In 2004, the subject of state crime was raised again on the occasion of the case concerning 
the massacre of 268 inhabitants of Plan de Sánchez by members of the armed forces of Guatemala 
on July 18, 1982 (IA Court 2004a). In his separate opinion, Judge Cançado insisted that state 
crimes are a reality and that it is essential in such cases to determine the concomitant responsibility 
of the State and the criminal liability of the perpetrators.  
“The facts of this Case of Plan de Sánchez Massacre speak for themselves, eloquently, 
revealing that State crime does exist, even though part of international juridical doctrine, 
clinging to the dogmas of the past, seeks to deny or elude this. State crime, entailing 
aggravated international responsibility directly affects the fundamental values of the 
international community as a whole” (IA Court 2004b: 34). 
In the Plan Sánchez massacre case, Justice Cançado asserted that state crime refers to 
wrongdoing perpetrated with the express intention from the State (in the form of a State policy) or 
through its tolerance, acquiescence, negligence or omission, in relation to grave violations of 
human rights perpetrated by its agents (IA Court 2004b: 35). According to this, the gravity of these 
crimes creates a particular regime of reparations covering various forms of reparation that may 
include symbolic measures – e.g. the rehabilitation of the surviving victims, the public 
acknowledgement of State responsibility and the preservation of the memory of the victims, or 
 121 
 
 
more concrete measures - such as the combat against impunity or the creation of health, education, 
housing, production and infrastructure programs.  
“Whether the reparations ordered in this judgment of the Court are called punitive damages – 
which should evidently cause those who deny the existence of State crime to shudder – or 
‘exemplary reparations’, or any other expression of this type, their basic purpose remains the 
same: they recognize the extreme gravity of the facts, punish the State responsible for the 
grave violations committed, acknowledge the extreme sacrifice of the victims who died and 
alleviate the sacrifice of the surviving victims, and establish a guarantee of non-repetition of 
the harmful acts” (IA Court 2004c: 25).  
In a former case (IA Court 2003b), Justice Cançado labeled these reparations as “punitive 
damages” which would take place beyond the boundaries of the classical civil law reparation, as 
non-pecuniary forms of reparation serving at “preserving remembrance of the violations occurred”, 
“providing satisfaction (a feeling of realization of justice) to the next of kin of the victim”, and 
“contributing to ensure non-recidivism of said violations (through human rights training and 
education)” (IA Court 2003b: 50). 
In the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia case, the IA Court (2005a) studied the detention, 
torture, and execution of approximately 49 people committed by members of the paramilitary in 
1997. This case, according to the Court, was an atrocity that counted with the acquiescence, 
tolerance, and collaboration of the State (IA Court 2005b: 32). According to Justice Cançado, cases 
as such involve a great convergence between international criminal responsibility of individuals 
and the State international responsibility; in accordance with which, “both must be addressed in a 
concomitant manner, as the atrocities are not merely acts (or omissions) committed by isolated 
individuals on their own” (IA Court 2005b: 32). In this case, it was the first time that the notion of 
state crime was discussed with respect to wrongdoing performed by paramilitary. 
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Cançado’s position broadening the possible actors of state crime to actors other than de iure 
agents (e.g. paramilitary groups), can also be depicted in his concurring opinion of the Ituango 
Massacre case (IA Court 2006a). In this case, the Court studied the international responsibility of 
Colombia for the acts of torture and murder of a group of civilians committed by a paramilitary 
command “acting in conjunction with the Colombian armed forces, or at least with their 
acquiescence or tolerance” (IA Court 2006b: 2). In this context, Justice Cançado sustained that 
besides discussion around the different sorts of agents that can be involved in state criminal 
conduct, the State does not constitute an “abstract entity” but involves a structure that can 
implement repression and violence through its own agents or third parties.  
With this view, according to Justice Cançado the State not only possesses a concrete 
manifestation but also, as such, States do perform crime (societas delinquere potest) and, 
accordingly, they can be held internationally responsible for criminal conduct. Such responsibility, 
he asserted, derives from the understanding of States as legal subjects of international law: state 
crime, planned and executed by the State and perpetrated in keeping with State policies, “can be 
attributed to the State as a juridical person of international public law, and entail unavoidable 
judicial consequences for the State (such as punitive damages, as a form of reparation)” (IA Court 
2006b: 42). According to Justice Cançado, these violations not only imply the infringement of the 
law but entail the breach of the fundamental and higher values of protection of the human person 
without which the legal order “is simply not realized” and “ceases to exist as such” (IA Court 
2003b :31), which is why such conduct may give rise to aggravated responsibility. 
In this regard, Justice García expressed his concern on the scope of the use of the term 
‘state crime’ in his concurring opinion to the case of Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay (IA Court 2006d). 
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According to him, this concept could improperly concentrate responsibilities in the State, 
overlooking the liability of the agents that committed the crime under the veil of a state policy (IA 
Court 2006d: 17). In this vein, to Justice García, state criminality, understood as collective in kind, 
involves a dilemma between attributing responsibility onto some actors (missing the responsibility 
of the organization, and attributing responsibility onto every member of the organization (must of 
who could be absolutely peripheral to the violations).   
With this understanding of the phenomenon, Justice García asserted that only individuals 
can perpetrate crimes (IA Court 2006d: 18), and for this reason he chose to employ the term 
“crimes from the State” or “terrorism from the State”. These expressions have the advantage of 
recognizing that State agents have used their public authority to inflict harm against individuals, 
contrary to other expressions (as state terrorism or state criminality) that may involve dissipating 
individual liability into the general responsibility of the State and possibly suggesting that 
‘everyone is guilty, except the criminal’ (IA Court 2006d: 27).  Likewise, Justice García argued 
against the possibility of eluding the involvement of individual agents in the crimes through the 
notion of state crime. 
In Cançado’s view the reaction to grave and systematic violations of human rights should 
generate a response from the international community as a whole against both the state and its 
agents for their wrongful actions and omissions (IA Court 2003b: 39). In this sense, as he stated in 
the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala case, there is no legal impediment in the coexistence 
of the international responsibility of the State and the criminal responsibility of the individual, 
being complementary in the struggle against impunity (IA Court 2004b: 10).  
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4.1.4 Notes from the Inter-American debate for a sociological construction of the concept of 
state crime 
Up to this point, Chapter 4 has dealt with the Inter-American debate on the concept of state 
crime. The contradiction between Justices Cançado and Sergio García shows two opposite views 
around state criminality: the former accepting and the latter rejecting the notion.  
The discussion around the notion of state crime is driven by the distinction criminal 
actor/non-criminal actor -as happens in the case of the universal debates. This distinction places 
on the non-criminal side the actors that are not capable of committing crime –in which Judge 
García includes the State. Within this distinction, the capability of committing crimes is drawn 
upon the legal status that the law confers to a certain actor. This status can be often verbalized as 
the ‘nature’ of the actor, according to which criminal actors are those that by reason of their (legal) 
nature can commit crimes. In fact, this verbalization veils the fact that the ‘capability’ of 
committing crimes is nothing but a legal decision. Indeed, with this understanding it is visible that 
there is no theoretical, conceptual or sociological obstacle to apply the idea of imputation of an act 
to the State. When reviewing the debates alongside ILC discussions around the notion of state 
crime, it is noticeable that the response to the question can states commit crimes? based on the 
‘nature’ of the actor is artificial and circular: states can commit crimes if the law decides so.  
Preliminarily, it could be presumed that the question about the possibility of States 
committing criminal conduct would be rather dissimilar between universal and Inter-American 
debates; after all, the universal debates were framed as a legislative function within international 
public law and the IA Court debates are part of a jurisdictional activity in the field of human rights, 
take into consideration the rights of the victims and the logics of human rights in order to elaborate 
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the debate. However, when reviewing the arguments of both forums, a main part of the arguments 
discussing State status as criminal actor were focused on the attributable consequences.  
Can institutions be held accountable for their wrongdoing? Can a state be punished for 
crimes? Who can hold states accountable for their criminal actions? What are adequate procedures 
for this purpose? Can we take states to prison? These questions represent part of the discussion 
within international law indicating that the debate on the positioning of states as criminal or non-
criminal actors is built upon a legal decision that is constructed through arguments of how and who 
can be hold accountable when dealing with state crime. In this sense, the notion of state crime is 
either rejected because of the difficulty for ascertaining adequate legal consequences, or it is 
accepted involving different forms of responsibility (punitive reparations, aggravated 
responsibility, measures of punishment, etcetera).  
International law’s attempts to use the concept bring to light the fact that despite the failure 
of the term at the UN, this notion can still trigger different legal debates as well as may be useful 
for characterizing particular violations. With this respect, the notion of state crime is not to be 
thought of as a new offense but as a form of criminality. As such, it can involve different 
infractions entailing various legal consequences. However, beyond the discussion around the 
attributable legal consequences, the notion of state crime has a descriptive potential, which is 
important from a criminological perspective: either as a blanket term that embeds a dramatic 
connotation or as a precise typology of violation with a sociological potential for the observation of 
criminality in society, the notion of state crime indicates a form of (ab)use of public authority 
implemented by concrete agents compromising the human rights of people.  
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Considering this panorama coming from the international law we would like to deepen our 
reflections from an interdisciplinary perspective. For this reason, in the following parts of this work 
we will draw a study using different socio-legal and criminological considerations with the 
objective of observing, describing, analyzing and conceptualizing state criminality as well as 
considering the forms of constraint and redress of those actions.  
4.2. A sociological delimitation of State crime  
It is difficult to trace the pioneer use of the term ‘state crime’ in social sciences71. Within 
criminology the term was introduced in the late sixties (Barak 1990). According to Cohen (1993) 
“[t]he first significant confrontation with the subject came in the early phase of radical criminology 
in the late sixties. That favorite debate of the times - ‘who are the real criminals?’- naturally turned 
attention from street crime to white collar/corporate crime and then to the wider notion of ‘crimes 
of the powerful’72. The particular context of the Vietnam War, pushed our slogans […] explicitly 
in the direction of ‘crimes of the state’” (Cohen 1993: 98).  
                                       
71 “Only recently have criminologist studied state crime. Yet, state crime has been approached in a number 
of ways by a number of disciplines (i.e., criminology, history, political science, sociology). For example, at 
the end of the nineteenth century, a French judge, Louis Proall (1898), in his book Political Crime, focused 
on the crimes of statesmen and politicians. Becker and Murray (1971) analyzed how state governments 
break the law, as did Lieberman in 1972. Sociologists, such as Giddens (1987a) and Tilly (1985), explored 
the use of organized violence used by states. Keelman and Hamilton (1989) analyzed crimes committed by 
individuals acting in obedience to government authorities” (Rothe 2009: 1) 
72 “Up until the early nineteen nineties criminological research on the crimes of the powerful tended to be 
separated into two distinct sub-disciplinary genres: corporate crime and state crime (Kramer 1992: 214). For 
Ronald Kramer and Ray Michalowski this was a matter of concern. They believed that by dividing the 
research on the crimes of the powerful into these two separate criminological strands, scholars were 
obscuring the fact that states and corporations are functionally interdependent, consequently it is rare for the 
deviant actions of one to occur without some assistance (whether by commission or omission) from the 
other (Kramer et al 2002: 270; see also Aulette and Michalowski 1993: 173; Green and Ward 2004: 28; 
Whyte 2003: 579-80). […] In order to remedy this problem, Kramer and Michalowski authored a series of 
papers in the early nineteen nineties which initiated a new criminological research agenda whose focus 
would be those illegal or socially injurious actions that resulted from one or more institutions of political 
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Apart from a North-American perspective, one of the first explicit references to this term is 
to be found in Hanna Arendt’s work. Arendt (1973) employed the term ‘state crime’ when 
referring to criminal actions perpetrated for the extraordinary ‘survival’ of the State - i.e. wars; or, 
as conducts part of the regular modus operandi of certain political regimes - e.g. ordinary 
(wrong)doing of totalitarian governments. The first case, Arendt attributed to exceptional actions 
perpetrated for assuring the survival of the State; while, in the second case, she framed a political 
program of action in accordance with which criminal conduct simply follows the typical course of 
action of certain regimes. In this last case, Arendt (1973) referred to totalitarian regimes which in 
her view implied the collapse of the traditional nation-state based on the rule of law, into States 
ruled by racism, anti-Semitism and imperialism.  
Arendt’s work is a landmark for the concept because of its precedence but also because it 
developed a correlation between state crime and the political configuration of the governments, 
particularly exposing Totalitarism and Nazism as regimes organized around the practice of state 
criminal conduct. The extent of such correlation was however contested in criminological studies. 
Indeed, for some criminology commentators, state criminality “is not indigenous or symptomatic 
of any particular socio-economic formation […] [C]rimes by and of the state can be found 
globally. In other words, historically it has been the case that both democratic and undemocratic 
regimes have engaged in state criminality” (Barak 1990: 16). According to this, the political 
organization of the State is relevant for properly contextualizing State’s actions, but it is not stricto 
sensu an element of the concept. After all, history has proved that different violations of rights 
                                                                                                                           
governance [pursuing] a goal in direct cooperation with one or more institutions of economic production and 
distribution (Kramer and Michalowski 1991: 4; see also Kramer 1990: 1; Kramer et al 2002: 269). This 
criminological sub-genre was labeled state-corporate crime” (State-crime initiative n.d.). 
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have been perpetrated on behalf or in the name of states in the most diverse contexts and supported 
by the most diverse forms of governments (Inter-American Court 2006; Rothe 2009), including 
democratic systems.  
Within criminology, state crime was conceptually pioneered by William Chambliss (1989) – 
his early studies in the subject focused on the issues of piracy, smuggling, plundering and other 
wrongdoing in which the State was a relevant actor. The use of this notion emerged to the discipline 
as a manifestation of the discussions around the role of the State with regard to the phenomenon of 
criminality as well as an expression of the concern for the crimes of the powerful and their social 
restraint. Thus, on the one hand, through this concept criminology challenged the double standard in 
accordance to which crimes against the government and the society have been understood as real 
crimes while the misconduct by the State has been understood as eventual mistakes that cannot be 
understood as criminal (Ross 2003: 84). On the other hand, when criminology referred to state crime 
it aimed at urging for a reinstatement of its field of observation moving beyond the orthodox 
emphasis on street crime and including other particularly harmful conduct.  
Additionally, the category of state crime was part of the response coming from criminology 
against the lack of legal restraint for the harm committed by powerful actors as well as by large 
economical corporations and States. In this context, the study of state crime was not only part of 
the concern for the lack of research and social awareness around the crimes of the powerful - 
compared to the widespread study and over-excited social perception of the crimes of the 
powerless. This subject of study was also part of a concern with regard to the accountability of 
powerful actors and the characteristic social bias of the operation of the criminal justice.  
“Historically, the crimes of the powerful have managed to avoid or escape criminalization 
and stigmatization. Time and again, these powerful criminal activities have been 
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conventionalized or neutralized by way of alliances, negotiations, and justifications that 
undermine the moralizations of these offenses (Carson 1979; Prins 2014; Ruggiero 2013). 
Concurrently, the legal reactions to as well as the ideological rationalizations of elite offenses 
by capitalist state actors and other defenders of the status quo contribute to this 
demoralization of the crimes of the powerful and to the denial of victimhood and liability for 
those harmed or injured. […] These social relations of criminal non-enforcement are 
reflective of a legal order where the capitalist state not only possesses the monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force and violence, but also the sovereignty over the currency and the law” 
(Barak 2015: 2). 
In this sense, the discipline referred to a problem of criminalization of theses conducts 
when criminal laws were available for imposing sanctions on the offenses of state criminal agents 
and other powerful actors, but the criminal justice was simply indifferent, unavailable or blocked 
from acting. This assessment allowed us to consider this form of criminality as possibly 
advantaged for conducting an in-depth study of impunity. We will come back to this later on.  
For the moment, we will draw a characterization of state criminality having in mind our 
study around the international law and developing from a criminological and socio-legal 
perspective a characterization of this form of criminality. Ultimately, this part will address the 
question: under what circumstances can we identify a certain conduct as a ‘crime of the State’? 
4.2.1 The ‘Crime’ 
A reflection on the concept of state crime could not be done without a discussion on the 
concept of crime. In this subject, state crime studies have divided into two main standpoints: while 
some authors considered that ‘state crime’ referred to those actions considered by the legislation as 
‘criminal’ (criminal law approach), others considered that the discipline should also be freed from 
the margins of the State legal framework and should broaden the general concept of crime (and 
particularly the notion of state crime), to the infliction of harm and to the infringement of other 
social rules or norms coming from the human rights (non-criminal law approach). In line with this, 
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the present section will problematize and clarify this debate with the purpose of elucidating what 
we mean by crime when pronouncing the term state crime.  
When referring to crime, the observer should be vigilant in preventing substantialization or 
anachronism. With this purpose, the researcher should avoid assessing a certain ‘essence’ and 
awarding ‘natural features’ to the phenomenon. Indeed, while the notion of crime is often deemed 
obvious in law schools, “[c]riminologists warn us that ‘crime’ is a misleading general term 
covering a wide range of very different kinds of conduct (see Walker 1987), so we should be 
careful of unexplicated assumptions about what crime is” (Duff and Garland 1994: 4).  
What can we observe as criminal? Can a crime be observed as an event of social life or is it 
an institutional construction? Does it involve a legal statement or the mere presence of a certain 
form of conduct or result? These questions are framed on a larger criminological debate on the 
characterization of crime.  In accordance with this debate, some commentators understand that 
crimes as events characterized by their ‘essence’, a series of substantial features detached from the 
determinations of criminal law that can be observed as a matter of fact (bare facts, faits bruts, 
hechos brutos). Other commentators sustain that crime should be defined and observed according 
to extralegal criteria as harm or the violation of non-criminal law regulations such as human rights 
provisions. Finally, others identify crime as a legal construction that can only be observable with 
reference to the criminal law legislation.  
Table. No. 7. Approaches to crime 
Substantial approach Crime is an essential concept, recognizable by a series of substantial features. 
Legal approach Crime is a legal concept and its framework of observation is the criminal law. 
Extra-legal approach 
Crime is a concept that refers to a certain type of harm recognizable by its 
seriousness (harms-based definition) or by the violation of particular normative 
parameters such as human rights (rights-based definition). 
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These three positions involve different problems. In line with the substantial approach, 
criminal conducts present a series of ‘natural properties’ holding an ‘intrinsic nature’. If crime is to 
be understood as a bare fact, the observer accepts that it has a substantial, material and objective 
existence which is independent from any criminal law provision. Those observers who understand 
crimes as bare facts are incapable of delimiting their distinctions without conferring to the 
phenomenon an ontological and, therefore, universal character. Indeed, bare fact views are based 
on the conviction that crimes can be observed as a natural category with considerable stability, 
without any reference to the criminal law system73. These criminologists understood that the 
discipline should  throw away the shackles forged by criminal law - paraphrasing Schwendinger & 
Schwendinger (2014), concluding that criminality is a phenomenon that should have an 
epistemological primacy over criminal law (Pires 2006: 204)74.  
This position involves the problem of presenting a substantialized conceptualization that 
does not offer stable parameters for understanding the content and extent of those social 
phenomena that may be framed as criminal according to their ‘intrinsic nature’. Indeed, if crime is 
defined by ‘essential features’, the observer could only observe a criminal conduct when the events 
meet the subjective criteria of selection of the observer. With this respect, authors as Sutherland 
understand that there is a sort of relativity around the concept of crime impeding a universal or 
substantial definition of the phenomenon: “Crime is relative from a legal and also a social point of 
view. This should not only be acknowledged but emphasized” (Sutherland 1934: 18).  
                                       
73 Converselt, the reference to the criminal law is useful when referring to a conduct as non-criminal. How 
can a society decriminalize a particular behavior without a legal reference? 
74 Thorsten Sellin, who is one of the first authors supporting this position, declared in 1937 that criminology 
"should not permit nonscientists (e.g., lawyers or legislators) to fix the terms and boundaries of the scientific 
study of crime” (Schwendinger & Schwendinger 2014: 88), since they do not address the ‘natural 
properties’ or the ‘intrinsic nature’ of criminal behavior. 
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The assertions that “there is no ‘ontological reality’ of crime” (Hulsman 1986: 66) and that 
“crimes do not exist as a given entity” (Christie 2004: 11), are especially explicit for visualizing that in 
order to avoid the substantialization of the concept of crime we should adopt an objective parameter 
allowing a referential observation of the phenomenon. Overcoming the problem of naturalizing the 
distinction between different kinds of wrongdoing, especially between criminal infractions and civil 
torts, is also relevant for their supposedly natural respective consequences (Pires 199875).  In contrast 
to the substantial approach, legal and extra-legal definitions of crime accept that the observer 
needs either a criminal law parameter or a certain type of harm or other normative framework as 
the human rights to be able to observe a criminal conduct.  
Extra-legal definitions present a problem for differentiating and stabilizing the observation of 
criminality. This position constructs the notion of crime employing references to harm or other 
norms of conduct (e.g. human rights). These references are ambiguous making it difficult to 
distinguish and select the events. For instance, if we use the notion of harm for defining what 
constitutes criminal would be problematic: the first problem would be to clearly assess what 
constitutes a harmful conduct -particularly in the context of a society of risk; also, it would be unclear 
to what point the harmful quality of a conduct automatically involves a criminal law issue; and, 
                                       
75 “Curieusement, même si l'échec des philosophes et des juristes à démontrer le statut onto-logique du 
crime a été annoncé avant le début du rêve des criminologues, et même si les critiques les plus percutantes 
sont venues de l'intérieur même du savoir juridique, il semble bien qu'on soit encore en train de veiller le 
corps du défunt et que l'on hésite à l'enterrer ; bref, la mort fut dûment communiquée, mais l'enterrement se 
fait attendre. Et aujourd'hui, peu sont ceux ou celles qui croient encore au criminel-né ou au statut on-
tologique du « crime », mais on a continué à penser et à agir comme s'il y avait une différence naturelle 
entre les deux ou trois sortes d'illégalismes” (Pires 1998: 14). 
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additionally, we would find several examples of harmful conducts that should not be addressed as 
crime – e.g. deaths in the workplace76.  
The reasons provided by this approach for avoiding a criminal law reference refer to the 
political bias of criminal law. Some state crime literature argues that for the distinction of the 
phenomenon a legal framework might be a biased source because of the political constrains 
involved in the production and implementation of the legislation (Friedrichs 2010: 72). In line with 
this, the influence on the determination of the criminal legal framework could involve an 
opportunity for the immunization of those political forces determining the law, therefore ‘limiting’ 
a status of criminality to those conducts alien to their range of activities (Schwendinger & 
Schwendinger 2014)77 - “[i]n the extreme, consider if a dictatorship arose in a society and we as 
criminologists simply accepted the legalistic definition of crime from which to construct our 
theories of criminal behavior?” (Milovanovic 2006: 82). 
In our view, it is important to take into account that the production of criminal legislation is 
indeed embedded in power relations. If the crime is regarded as something that the state creates, 
thinking about it should take into account who has the power to define it (Whyte 2009). 
Nonetheless, this consideration is a matter of variable correlations of power related to the 
                                       
76 “The notion of “harm” is often used as a basis for defining what constitutes a crime. On the surface, it 
seems straightforward to suggest that sufficiently “harmful” behavior should be defined as criminal. 
However, there are several examples that suggest this is not an easily defined concept. For example, most 
people agree that causing death is a serious harm. In fact murder carries the harshest penalties in criminal 
law. Consider, however, that every year the number of deaths in the workplace far outnumber homicides in 
Canada. Even in cases where negligence is present, we rarely treat deaths in the workplace as a crime. In 
this respect, the concept of harm might tell us that behavior is serious, but it tells us little in terms of how we 
should respond” (Law Commission of Canada 2003: 3). 
77 For instance, in 1970 Schwendinger & Schwendinger (2014) asserted that a legalistic view that defines 
crime according to the legal codes and the institutions of criminal justice implies that important wrongs, 
such as the imperialist war or racism, are unjustifiable as criminological and inadequate if referred to as 
crimes. 
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specificities of social relations, more than a conceptual factor useful for delimiting the concept of 
crime. In other words, if we remove the criminal law reference, the problem of the correlation of 
power does not disappear and, perhaps, becomes only disperse for the observation. More 
importantly, if we remove a program of reference for the observation, it becomes simply 
impossible to differentiate what is (not) a criminal event.  
The text of Michalowski, Kramer and Chambliss (2010: 5) is particularly useful for 
illustrating the problem of removing a clear reference for the observation of events as crimes. 
These authors assert that the study of state criminality should undertake inquiries on “crimes and 
social injuries of state power regardless of their status under law”. Following this view, Ross 
includes within the concept of state crime “those practices that, although they fall short of being 
officially declared illegal, are perceived by the majority of the population as illegal or socially 
harmful” (Ross 2000a:74; 2003: 87).  
In order to determine which conducts could be regarded as crimes, Green and Ward (2000) 
formulate a social audience test. In line with this test, state crime are those offenses that if noticed 
by a “significant social audience” (Ward 2013: 65) there would be at least a high likelihood of 
censure or sanction (Green and Ward 2000: 110). Rothe (2009: 6) qualified this definition as vague 
as far as it is unclear “what constitutes a social audience and which audiences may legitimately 
label behavior a crime”. In our view, the problem of this understanding is more serious: how would 
any audience (legitimate or not) be able to stabilize any observation of crimes without any previous 
established and generalized program of reference?  
Indeed, the audience deprived of a program of reference would not be able to stabilize any 
normative expectations; in other words, an ‘audience’ simply could not distinguish the 
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phenomenon without any point of reference. Moreover, if for the sake of discussion we attempt at 
undertaking a social audience test (therefore necessarily adopting a certain program of reference), 
we would find the results confined to the inscrutable decision of the public opinion. If the concept 
is clarified according to majority support, this could imply that grave crimes, if popular or 
perceived as legitimate, would not amount to (state) crime. Thus, if a certain wrongdoing is 
disputed by small or marginal social audiences, it could not be understood as criminal merely 
constituting a non-significant social audience. 
The idea that social audiences can detect crime without a reference to a criminal law 
regulation is related to a sort of moral substratum traditionally understood as implicit to the 
criminal law. According to this, “criminal law is always and inevitably expressive, or perhaps it 
would be better to say constitutive, of a prevailing social morality adopted and enforced by the 
state” (MacCormick 2007: 211). Following this idea, a part of the literature distinguishes between 
mala in se (wrongdoing in nature) and mala prohibita (regulatory offences). In line with this 
distinction, mala in se are wrongdoing for which the observer does not need a reference to a 
criminal offense in order to be able to recognize a situation as criminal. These crimes are 
wrongdoing because they collide with basic moral assumptions. On the contrary, the observer 
detects other wrongdoing as criminal only when the law prohibits them; nonetheless, “it is in some 
measure a public wrong, meriting public attention and concern—and, given appropriate proof, 
condemnation and punishment” (MacCormick 2007: 214). 
However relevant the interaction between moral and legal ideas, basing the observation of 
crime on the distinction mala in se/mala prohibita entails different problems of observation and, at 
the end, it says little about the relation between law and morality. The existence of mala in se relies 
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on a sort of synchrony between moral ideas and legal prohibitions. Although, while in a particular 
society there can be general (shared) moral ideas in favor or against a particular conduct, the 
criminal law system can validly contradict it - e.g. in Colombia homosexuality is not widely 
accepted, however criminal law rather ‘protects’ it from discriminatory practices. In other words, 
even when a particular society considers something to be morally binding it does not mean that as 
such it is legally prohibited by the criminal law and vice versa. How can we use this criterion and 
remain critical when the standard for observing crime is the erosion of a tradition, or an official 
way of life, or to prevent the harmless violation of a taboo?78  
Non-criminal law approaches to state crime have developed different references to observe 
the presence of state crime. Some have chosen a harms-based definition that emerges from the idea 
that crimes should be defined “in terms of needs-based social harms inflicted by the powerful on 
less powerful people, independent of formal legal institutions” (Friedrichs and Schwartz 2007: 4). 
In line with this trend, Matthews and Kauzlarich (2007:51) point out that the notion of state crime 
cover all state-prompted harms, even if they are not technically law breaking.  
While this view avoids legal arguments, it attempts to establish a sort of control for the 
observation of crime: the harm. The harm principle attempts to avoid criminal law prohibitions of 
those conducts causing no harm, as can be misconduct considered as such on the grounds of mere 
morality. However, this form of control remains elusive and ambiguous. Indeed, the categories of 
injury, wrongdoing or harm are vague standards for determining the occurrence of a crime. There 
can be cases where harm is explicit but where the presence of a criminal situation is not, e.g. when 
someone cheats on a bet by taking advantage of that situation or when someone bullies another 
                                       
78 Question inspired on Feinberg (1990:7) 
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person. There can also be cases where the existence or not of harm is doubtful and contested but 
there can be a criminal action, e.g. cases of abortion that are criminal in certain jurisdictions in 
spite of a case-by-case determination on the existence of harm. Moreover, there can be 
non‐grievance evils or harmless actions that can be considered as criminal and, as such, be 
enforced by the criminal law, e.g. the Canadian criminal code regards as a criminal offense 
polygamy79 or immoral theatrical performance80. 
Within the group of non-criminal law approaches to state crime different commentators 
have developed a rights-based definition with the reference of universally defined human rights 
(Doig 2011: 47). According to Schwendinger & Schwendinger (2014) redefining crime implies 
that criminologists redefine themselves not as the defenders of order (as when they adopt a concept 
of crime according to the law) but rather as the guardians of human rights. A rights-based 
definition asserts that state crime is an “organizational deviance involving the violation of human 
rights” (Green and Ward 2004: 2; also in Ward 2013). In line with this definition, human rights are 
not only legal norms the breach of which constitutes a violation; rather, they are principles that can 
be violated independently of particular legal rules (Ward 2013).  
This reference to the violation of human rights results in an open-ended definition of crime 
since every claim that an observer presents as a human rights violation becomes criminal - when 
                                       
79 “(1) Every one who (a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or enter 
into (i) any form of polygamy, or (ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same 
time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of marriage, or (b) celebrates, assists or is a 
party to a rite, ceremony, contract or consent that purports to sanction a relationship mentioned in 
subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii), is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding five years”. 
80 “(1) Every one commits an offence who, being the lessee, manager, agent or person in charge of a theatre, 
presents or gives or allows to be presented or given therein an immoral, indecent or obscene performance, 
entertainment or representation. (2) Every one commits an offence who takes part or appears as an actor, a 
performer or an assistant in any capacity, in an immoral, indecent or obscene performance, entertainment or 
representation in a theatre”. 
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human rights and criminal legislation are two faces of the same coin, either you fall in one or in the 
other. This poses serious conceptual and practical problems when determining the scope of the 
concept because the observer is not able to draw a clear indication for what is considered as (state) 
crime since all human right’s violations become a crime. Nevertheless, not every human rights 
violation amounts to a crime: there is a multiplicity of human rights that can be violated by acts 
that are not criminal and there are a number of rights that do not violate human rights. We will 
come back to this later, however, examples of this can be when a child does not have access to 
primary education or when workdays exceeds the maximum legal ordinary working hours, there is 
a human rights violation but not necessarily a crime.  
Considering the different problems that the lack of a clear reference involves to state crime 
studies when referring to the notion of crime, we agree with Stanley Cohen (1993: 98) who invites 
to use a “more restricted and literal use of the concept ‘state crime’” as both “more defensible and 
useful”. What concept could be useful for drawing up clearer boundaries for the concept of (state) 
crime? The criminal-law approach addresses this question affirming that the definition of state 
crime should be constructed around legal definitions of criminal conducts in order to avoid the 
indistinctiveness of the concept. In line with this, the literature working with a legal framework is 
focused on the legal definitions as the point of reference to indicate the presence of crime 
(Matthews and Kauzlarich 2007: 47).  
The pioneering criminology conceptualization developed by William Chambliss (1989: 
184) defines state crime as those “acts defined by law as criminal and committed by state officials 
in pursuit of their jobs as representatives of the state”. According to Kramer, Michalowski and 
Rothe this definition was problematic because it limited its scope to a “conventional definition of 
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law” (2005, p. 54), exclusively regarding legal prohibitions in a nation-state basis. In a sense, this 
critique can open the floor for the argument that the notion of state crime is a logical self-
contradiction “since the sovereign state is the only valid legal presupposition to the concept of 
crime. In this sense the concept of crime simply cannot logically transcend or indeed temporally 
precede the state” (Vincent 2012: 68).  
In 1995, Chambliss (1995: 9) integrated into his concept of state crime those behaviors 
violating “international agreements and principles established in the courts and treaties of international 
bodies”. With this incorporation, Chambliss original position restricting the concept to those violations 
recognized as crimes by international or domestic criminal legislation was unchanged in the basic 
assumption of the need of a legal reference for the observation of the phenomenon.  
The position of integrating domestic and international law as parameters of the distinction 
of a crime entailed the observation of a legal development: international law became a relevant 
source of criminal law81. In order to identify which acts qualify as international crimes, Heller 
(2016) establishes that “the vast majority” of International Criminal Law scholars differentiate 
between “core” international crimes and other international criminal conducts. The former are 
                                       
81 On the distinction between national and international law the ICTY established: “It is a settled principle of 
international law that the effect of domestic laws on the international plane is determined by international 
law. As noted by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Case of Certain German Interests in 
Polish Upper Silesia, “[f]rom the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its organ, 
municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States, in the same 
manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures”. In relation to the admissibility of a claim within 
the context of the exercise of diplomatic protection based on the nationality granted by a State, the ICJ held 
in Nottebohm: But the issue which the Court must decide is not one which pertains to the legal system of 
Liechtenstein. It does not depend on the law or on the decision of Liechtenstein whether that State is entitled 
to exercise its protection, in the case under consideration. To exercise protection, to apply to the Court, is to 
place oneself on the plane of international law. It is international law which determines whether a State is 
entitled to exercise protection and to seize the Court. The ICJ went on to state that “[i]nternational practice 
provides many examples of acts performed by States in the exercise of their domestic jurisdiction which do 
not necessarily or automatically have international effect” (ICTY 2001: 22). 
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those conducts universally criminal under international law and the latter somehow rely upon 
domestic frameworks82. Thus, with respect to core international crimes, the domestic rejection of a 
criminal offense in no way precludes the characterization of a conduct as internationally criminal 
as, conversely, what is unlawful in the municipal law does not necessarily mean that the act 
violates international law (ILC 2001: 36, 37)83.  
Chambliss’s adoption of an international law parameter for delimiting criminal conduct 
was, to some degree, a response to the position against the use of a conventional definition of 
crime restricted to domestic legal prohibitions for state crime. According to this criticism, the use 
of a legal parameters makes “the activity of criminologists subservient to the State” (Schwendinger 
& Schwendinger 2014: 109), and makes it “dependent on arcane legal arguments about the 
meaning of what are often highly ambiguous and unsatisfactory laws” (Green and Ward 2004: 7). 
In this sense, an international law definition can be understood as a form of independence from 
merely domestic parameters to enact or enforce a criminal law prohibition. 
Nonetheless, this answer may seem unsatisfactory to those who consider that international 
law is a framework that remains state-dependent. In this vein, Cox (1993: 62 -63) asserts that 
“[i]nternational institutions embody rules which facilitate the expansion of the dominant economic 
and social forces but which at the same time permit adjustments to be made by subordinated 
                                       
82 “[A]lthough some acts that qualify as domestic crimes are universally criminal – murder, for example– 
their universality derives not from international law, but from the fact that every state in the world has 
independently decided to criminalize them. The universality aspect of the requirement, in turn, distinguishes 
an international crime from a transnational crime: although a transnational crime such as drug trafficking 
involves an act that international law deems criminal through a suppression convention, international law 
does not deem the prohibited act universally criminal, because a suppression convention only binds states 
that choose to ratify it. If a state decides not ratify a suppression convention, it retains the sovereign right to 
refuse to criminalize the commission of the prohibited act on its territory.” (Heller 2016: 1-2) 
83 The general rule to international law for this provision is that a State cannot escape its responsibility under 
international law by appealing to the provisions of its municipal law. 
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interests with a minimum pain. […] International institutions and rules are generally initiated by 
the state which establishes the hegemony. At the very least they must have the state’s support”. In 
this vein, commentators as Schwendinger & Schwendinger (2014) propose that redefining crime 
should entail for criminologists the task of making human beings and not institutions the parameter 
for the distinction of crimes. At the end, “legal systems are highly normative, slow to enact 
legislation, and often reflect elite, upper-class, or nonpluralistic interests” (Ross 2000: 6). 
With regard to this problem, observing crimes as legal constructions involves different 
problems of power, legal creation, interpretation and application. However, in order to distinguish 
the phenomenon a reference of observation is necessary. For some commentators, this 
understanding may entail presenting criminality as a mere problem of legal definition, leading to a 
sort of moral indifference – if there is a problem of criminality we just adjust the definitions of 
what is criminal to make the problem vanish away without any groundbreaking aptitude of 
visualization and redress of the problem. Nonetheless, if crime is to be understood as an 
institutional construction this is meant to enable the distinction between crime and non-crime, but 
it does not turn invisible or even refer to the social problems that the phenomenon entails.  
While from a legal point of view the State has the authority to define what crime is and to 
enforce the law criminalizing those conducts, from a sociological perspective the problem of 
distinguishing between crime/non-crime is different from the matter of whether crime is punished. 
The central idea in a sociological definition of crime is to be able to distinguish with a stable 
criteria what can be observed as crime and not to observe the presence or absence of punishment. 
In this sense, the legal reference (and the crime) does not vanish away the problem of the political 
strategies employed for neutralizing the operation of the criminal law system. For instance, if the 
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criminal code was to be destroyed in the middle of a sanguinary war by the state agents in order to 
perpetrate murders on a certain population ‘without accountability’, would we still be in a society 
with no crime84? Would the binary code crime/non-crime, created by the destroyed code, be erased 
completely?  
The legislative program does not vanish before a political strategy of obfuscation. The 
penalization of crimes is a different problem than the definition of crime. Let us refer to two main 
problems of the legalistic approach to state crime. The first is the alleged dependence between the 
conviction by a court and the existence of the criminal action and the second is the understanding 
of the legal framework as the implementation of a simple syllogism. 
With respect to the problem of the identification between conviction and crime, this issue is 
extremely relevant to our reflections on the matter of impunity. From a juristic point of view it is 
traditionally conceived that crimes and criminals are only those qualified as such by the courts 
(Tappan 1947: 100; 2001: 31). Nonetheless, crimes and criminalization, as proposed in the present 
research, will be addressed as independent but interconnected phenomena. In this sense, 
criminality has an epistemological primacy over criminalization; in other words, the possibility for 
a sociological observation of the phenomenon of crime is not determined by the effectiveness (or 
even the presence) of its criminalization, i.e. its official qualification as “crime” by the criminal 
justice system. In fact, we can observe criminality from a sociological point of view independently 
from a statement of criminal law institutions.  
                                       
84  According to Rothe and Mullins (2010: 91) there is a “growing body of state crime research that shows 
how states actively use their sovereignty to shield their criminal actions from external bodies that could 
potentially intervene”. 
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When Sutherland defined ‘white-collar crime’ he asserted that it is a crime because the 
conduct is in violation of the criminal law. This selection expressly rejected the action of courts as 
the reference for the qualification of a conduct as criminal. “White-collar crime is […] called crime 
[…] because it is in violation of the criminal law. The crucial question in this analysis is the 
criterion of violation of the criminal law. Conviction in the criminal court, which is sometimes 
suggested as the criterion [to determine if there is a crime], is not adequate because a large 
proportion of those who commit crimes are not convicted in criminal courts” (Sutherland 1940: 5). 
In this regard, Sutherland assessed that courts faced a problem of class bias as well as of the 
influence of certain actors holding the power to impact the implementation and administration of 
the law (Sutherland 1940: 7)85. In this sense, he advanced on the criminological understanding that 
the implementation of the law was incidental to the problem of determining what is criminal – e.g. 
I can observe that the event of someone killing another person constitutes a “homicide” before any 
formal decision of a criminal court in a judicial process that a “homicide” has taken place.  
Criminalization and criminality are not always convergent: some people are criminalized 
without having committed any crime and there are crimes that are not criminalized —indeed, most 
of crimes are not (Hulsman 1986: 65, 70; Baratta 1991: 61, 1989: 340-341; Duff and Garland 
1994.: 9). While independence allows us to overcome possible inaccuracies of observation when 
                                       
85 This observation is still valid in many parts of the world. A paradigmatic example is the United States 
criminal justice system which is the largest in the world – in 2011 approximately 7 million individuals were 
under some form of correctional control in the United States, including 2.2 million incarcerated (Sentencing 
Project 2013: 1). According to the 2013 Report of The Sentencing Project to the UN Human Rights 
Committee, “racial minorities are more likely than white Americans to be arrested; once arrested, they are 
more likely to be convicted; and once convicted, they are more likely to face stiff sentences. African-
American males are six times more likely to be incarcerated than white males and 2.5 times more likely than 
Hispanic males. If current trends continue, one of every three black American males born today can expect 
to go to prison in his lifetime, as can one of every six Latino males—compared to one of every seventeen 
white males” (Sentencing Project 2013: 1). 
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limiting our understanding of crimes to criminalization; realizing their interconnectedness allows 
us to elucidate their interaction and to study the criminalization as a field of observation of the 
ideas, discourses, and practices of the criminal law system before the phenomenon of crime. 
With respect to the second problem, the legalistic framework could be used as a form of 
limited syllogism. In this regard, considering once more the notion of white collar crime, it needs 
to be argued that state crime is not intended to be a criminal law category in order to be observed 
as a crime. As in the case of white collar crime, state crime is a category of observation that 
comprises different legal offenses. In this respect, using a legalistic framework, a Colombian 
judicial case results paradigmatic to our study:  
In Colombia, the Supreme Court of Justice was questioned regarding the possibility to 
extend the time of the statute of limitations in a case of illegal interceptions of communications 
performed by the Security Department of the State against members of the political opposition, 
qualified as a state crime by the victims. In this case, the civil party argued that, as the State 
committed such criminal conduct through its main intelligence agency, preventing them from any 
legal intervention, the transgressors should not benefit from the passing of time that would 
eventually block the prosecutions (statute of limitations).  
This argument was rejected by the Supreme Court (2013) arguing that “our legislation does 
not establish the category of ‘state crime’. It does not take into account the ‘criminal intention’ for 
setting a prescriptive term; nor does it consider ‘the impact’ that criminal acts in general can have 
on the victims, society at large and the institutionalism of the State as a criterion to vary the statute 
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of limitations. This term is objective and does not leave any doubt with regard to its application; 
for this reason, the claim by the representative of the civil parties is devoid of any legal basis”86. 
This case shows the mobilization of a legalistic argument for rejecting the reception of the 
notion of state crime by the legal system. Moreover, this case reveals the problem of a legalistic 
perspective that does not regard the factuality for understanding the sociological phenomenon 
presented by the criminal problematic situations. This position may entail major problems of 
observation, becoming a simple logical operation of a syllogism and not, as we propose, a relevant 
criminological phenomenon subject to sociological observation.  
Table No. 7. Problems of the Approaches to Crime 
Substantial approach Legal approach Extra-legal approach 
Main problem: 
substantialization of the 
criminal conduct that is 
defined according to 
subjective essential features.  
Main problem: the criminal conduct 
becomes a mere legalistic 
reference, a matter of syllogism 
confused with the implementation 
of the code crime/non-crime by the 
criminal justice. 
Main problem: the criminal 
conduct is undifferentiated or 
ambiguous, depending on the 
type of harm or other violations 
of particular normative 
parameters oriented on rights. 
                                       
86 To date (2017) the Colombian judiciary has rejected the notion of state crime based on a legalistic 
argument. Still, different social movements resort to this notion for explaining violations perpetrated with 
the support of the State. An example of this is the National Movement of Victims of State Crime 
(MOVICE), created in 2005 in Colombia by over 300 organizations representing victims. The precedent of 
MOVICE is the Project Colombia Never Again created in 1995 by different social organizations that 
consolidated local work teams for the documentation of the humanitarian crisis of the country. This project, 
unlike the other Never Again groups of Latin America, would not be located under a context of transition to 
a constitutional regime, but it was developed within the context of a formal democracy with the presence of 
a plethora of human rights violations. The project faced huge difficulties, such as the elimination and exile 
of people and organizations that contributed to the project and also to the seizures of the archive centers. In 
2004, in the midst of the negotiations between the AUC (paramilitary groups) and the Colombian 
Government, the first National Summit of Victims was held in Bogota. In this meeting, more than 1000 
delegates, 230 organizations and 400 local Delegates from 28 Departments participated. They concluded 
that it was necessary to organize the MOVICE. In June 25, 2005 MOVICE was founded at the II National 
Summit. Movice is a collective movement working for the enforceability, organization and mobilization of 
victims of state crimes and organizations of surviving victims, families of victims, social, political and legal 
organizations that have been victimized struggling against impunity and in favor of historical truth, justice, 
and integral reparation. MOVICE comprises 300 organizations representing victims of various crimes 
committed within the context of the conflict, including victims of forced displacement, massacres, and 
political genocide. In addition to a central coordinating body, MOVICE has over 22 regional groups. 
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Considering the above-mentioned problems for a conceptualization of crime, this research 
should point toward a different perspective beyond substantial, merely legalistic or extra-legal 
observations of different moral frameworks. For the definition that we will propose, a first step for 
the observation of a crime can be drawn using the notions of constitutive norms and institutional 
facts proposed by John Searle and adapted by Pires (2001) with this purpose.  
When studying the notion of (state) crime and observing its occurrence in social life, the 
elements that enable its observation should address both, factuality and legal regulation. With this 
purpose in mind, the paradoxical theory of crime (Pires 2006) can be a satisfactory approach to the 
criminal element, unfolding a double problem in the understanding of criminality.  
The double problem is based on the recognition that crime has no natural qualities. Accepting 
that crime has no inherent constitutive features implies that in order to identify what is “criminal” the 
observer should question how the phenomenon of crime can be observed, rather than what is crime. 
In order to answer this question, the observer needs to detect a conduct and an institutional structure 
of expectation instituted through constitutive norms. This approach acknowledges that (criminal) 
conduct is recognizable as a ‘brute fact’ - for instance, one can always observe an act of killing 
without a criminal law framework. Subsequently, when an institutional framework is available 
drawing a distinction crime/non-crime, this normative expectation enables the observer to consider 
those conducts as criminal in line with the communications of the criminal law system. In other 
words, crime is not only a conduct (external to the criminal law system), neither is it a mere 
normative expectation; it is rather a double faceted phenomenon. 
According to this perspective, the conceptualization of crime depends on a series of 
constitutive norms coming from the criminal legislation, without which the observation of criminal 
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conducts becomes an ambiguous task. In other words, if crimes are understood as a social 
construction or as “institutional facts” (Searle 1969; 1995; 2005), an event can only be 
characterized as crime according to a social reference recognizing the acts as such. Francesco 
Carrara (1859: 41 in Pires 1995:17) asserted that crimes were not to be conceived as ‘actions’ but 
as ‘infractions’, that is, as a form of correlation between observed actions and criminal law 
provisions. In line with this view, human conduct can only be differentiated and observed as 
‘criminal’ if we take into account an institutional fact created by the criminal legislation (Jeffery, 
1959:464; Pires 2011:199). In this context, criminal conduct is historically and empirically 
constituted and observed in line with the existence of constitutive norms that can be materialized in 
the form of «institutional facts»87. In other words, the criminal legislation is the constitutive norm88 
                                       
87 Searle (1969; 1995) distinguishing between brute facts and institutional facts, assessing that the later can 
exist only within human institutions (such as money or sentences), while brute facts exist quite 
independently of any institution capable of formulating constitutive rules of the form X counts as Y in C 
(Searle 2005: 11).  
88 “Las reglas constitutivas o instituyentes son las que definen la institución y las condiciones dentro de las 
cuales podemos afirmar la existencia jurídica de la institución y su validez. Estas reglas nos permiten 
reconocer o identificar la institución tipo, institution-type, al fijar las condiciones definitorias de las mismas 
[(tipo ideal, categoría)], y nos permiten verificar la existencia de cada una de las concretas y específicas 
instituciones-token [(caso concreto, muestra, ejemplar)] […]Podría decirse que el cambio social puede 
llevar al desarrollo de instituciones-muestras (tokens) concretas que no coinciden exactamente con los tipos 
o categorías de instituciones a los que en teoría corresponden sino que añaden matices o excepciones, como 
nuevas reglas constitutivas, o nuevas condiciones o reglas consecutivas distintas, o reglas consecutivas 
específicas o incluso nuevas reglas terminativas. Estos ejemplos concretos de instituciones concretas pueden 
entonces llevar a modificar las reglas de las instituciones-tipo. Así se produce también el cambio jurídico, no 
sólo a través de la intervención de agencias legislativas con la capacidad formal de modificar las reglas de 
las instituciones sino a través de la práctica jurídica y de agencias judiciales que interpretan de forma 
innovadora las reglas de las instituciones según su propia finalidad social o en función de las adversas 
consecuencias inesperadas a las que puedan llevar” (Bengoetxea 2015, pp. 79-81). 
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allowing the observer to draw a line of distinction between criminal and non-criminal conduct (the 
institutional fact) – constitutive norms are the condition for the existence of institutional facts89.   
This paradigm overcomes the dilemma built around realism and constructivism which has 
excluded one of both, behavior or normative expectations, for observing ‘crime’. The double 
paradigm approach allows us to observe a factual situation as problematic and defining it in 
reference to the criminal law regulatory framework. This form of observation of the phenomenon 
of crime allows the observer to notice that certain ‘events’ are problematic further from the legal 
framework, as it gives legal grounds to the observation of crime according to the criminal law 
institutional qualification of the situation.  
For the moment, and in accordance to our general aim of characterizing and conceptualizing 
impunity, we can assess that the observation of the criminal conduct needs to be uncoupled from its 
criminalization through the legal system. In this sense, the action of the criminal justice with regard 
to a particular criminal wrongdoing does not affect the criminological observation of the criminal 
conduct. The criminalization is conceptually different but related to the concept of crime from a 
phenomenological perspective. This conclusion is a relevant reflection for constructing a social-legal 
definition of impunity. Indeed, in a sense, impunity takes place in reference to a criminal conduct 
precisely because the conduct can be observed as such, independently from the action of the criminal 
justice system (but not from its legislative program). In the PJ case this is particularly relevant for 
the observation of the criminal problematic situation. Let us review this in detail: 
                                       
89 Hart (2012: 27) holds that “the criminal law is something which we either obey or disobey and what its 
rules require is spoken of as ‘duty’. If we disobey we are said to ‘break’ the law and what we have done is 
legally ‘wrong’, a breach of duty’, or an ‘offence’”. 
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a. Realizing enforced disappearance: the double problem perspective at work 
Realizing the mere factuality of a disappearance poses a relevant problem of observation. 
Enforced disappearances, paraphrasing Gutman, are denied simultaneously as they happen90. In the 
PJ case, for a long time, the uncertainty about what had happened was an argument used for 
neutralizing the visualization of the events and, further, their characterization as a criminal 
conduct91.  
The uncertainty and unrest stemming from not knowing about the fate of a person may 
confront some victims to the tragedy of preferring (and perhaps wishing) any other offense against 
their loved ones - perhaps even death over disappearance92. This constraint creates a difficulty for 
the observation of the disappearance. In certain occasions, it is difficult to determine whether a 
person has simply been unreached or if he or she has actually disappeared.  
“When you’re looking for someone you love, and you carry their image with you, you’re 
looking for his face, for the color of his hair, for the way that it grew… In order to look for 
my husband, in the midst of complete chaos, I had to begin by reviewing the long lines of 
corpses… Only a very few were even recognizable as human beings.” (PJ events. Testimony 
of a women looking for her husband in Carrigan 1993: 262)  
When it can be established that a person has disappeared (her whereabouts are unknown), 
the following question to be made is: was the disappearance voluntary? The causes of the 
                                       
90 “The denial, the blurring of reality and the eradication of traces and vestiges of the stark truth were part and 
parcel of the act of murder [we would add, of disappearance] itself” (Gutman 1985: 14 in Cohen 2001: 79). 
91 In the PJ case, the appeal court recognized that rather than conducting an investigation on the fate of the 
disappeared, the response of the institutions denied this situation: “Las mismas fuerzas que entraron en un 
negacionismo de la ocurrencia de estas desapariciones, en vez de contribuir a la resolución del problema que 
subyace en la zozobra de las familias que después de 26 años, no pueden hacer el duelo al dolor del familiar 
ausente de quien se ignora todo” (Superior Court of Bogota 2012: 592-593). 
92 “It would have been better for me if Jimmy had passed away because: you don’t know what happened 
after they were captured… it would have been better for me if  he had passed away, instead of thinking so 
many things could have happened to him” (Pilar Navarrete -wife, in Romero 2015: 66). 
“Thinking of all the atrocities they did to my sister does not give us peace of mind… They must have 
done wicked things to a girl like Irma, as young as she was, 26 years old, as pretty as she was… You 
don’t even want to think of it” (Socorro Franco -sister, in Romero 2015: 68). 
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disappearance may be diverse in nature. The lack of information characteristic of the disappearance 
constitutes a significant constraint for distinguishing between non-violent disappearances and 
violent abductions (Aim for Human Rights 2009). In the PJ case, at the beginning, “no one 
expected anything serious could happen” (Cesar Rodríguez, brother).  
“The awareness of the disappearance came afterward. Rumors and news spread that the 
employees of the cafeteria might have been abettors, that they probably entered the guns through 
the basement and hid them in the cafeteria, that they had an amount of food that would have 
supported the taking for several months. I mean, there was a purpose of communicating the 
public opinion some sort of justification for the disappearance of the employees of the cafeteria. 
It was then when we became aware that they were disappeared” (Cesar Rodríguez, brother). 
The factual awareness around the abduction of the group of people of the cafeteria arose 
when their families started to be intimidated for their search. When the families of the disappeared 
met in the surroundings of the PJ right after the operation to retake the building, they joined 
together in the search of their family members. Even though the fire had consumed the building, 
they were hopeful. Some of them had received phone calls indicating that the military had detained 
their loved ones.  
“It was inconceivable for us that the State and the military forces would disappear people. 
Despite Mr. Enrique was familiarized with violence because he had been a judge and a 
prosecutor, I would say that during the first attempts to find the people he supposed that [his 
son] was being held prisoner, not disappeared” (Cecilia Cabrera, wife). 
 “My children, Hector’s siblings, were convinced that the authorities had mistaken him for 
someone else and unjustly detained him. They kept hoping that one day he would suddenly 
show up and explain it all” (Beltrán-father, 2014: 20) 
The confidence that the detention put them safe from the battle and would protect them from 
further misbehaviour turned into despair: at the request of the next of kin of the disappeared, military 
officials met with some of them at the 13th Brigade. At the meeting, the officials advised them to stop 
searching because their loved ones were ‘guerrillas’ who “most likely had escaped to the mountains” 
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(Juzgado Tercero 2010: 111). Enrique Rodríguez (father) declared before the criminal prosecutor of 
the case that the week after the events he received a call saying that the military were torturing his son 
(Juzgado Tercero 2010).  
The fact that the PJ had been scenario of a crude urban battle and that the flames consumed 
the building created a great confusion and chaos on the perception of the events. In this context, 
any observer would be more ready to accept that the people inside the Palace perished as a result of 
the calamity and not that an event of forced disappearance was taking place. However, the 
justificatory discourses and the tactic of stigmatization of the victims and denial of their fate, were 
relevant factors indicating that something different had happened. From this case we can learn that 
justificatory arguments and the stigmatization of the victims may be valuable for the factual 
observation of criminal conduct. State crime literature has not often explored criminal the potential 
of justificatory discourses around the wrongdoing and denial as empirical factors and analytical 
resources for the visualization of the crimes.  
When the observer is able to remark that a person is absent because of a crime committed 
against her, the observer needs to delimit enforced disappearance from other violent actions. For 
conducting this operation the observer needs to resort to an institutional definition of the 
phenomenon (the double problem). With respect to qualification of the events as enforced 
disappearances, the PJ case entailed a difficulty coming from the criminal legislation: at the time of 
the events (1985) there was no domestic legislation concerning enforced disappearances. 
According to the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, at 
the time of the events: 
“[t]he lack of a legal classification of disappearance sometimes renders it impossible to 
continue investigations on enforced disappearances unless the courts in question treat such acts 
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as abduction. […] This enables the offence to be classified and proceedings to continue. 
However, this interpretation does not enjoy a consensus among the judiciary, so that there have 
been cases in which the judge has ordered the closure of the investigation, on the grounds that 
there is no such category of crime as enforced disappearance. In those cases in which an 
investigation has been initiated because of abduction, some cases have been filed on the 
grounds of limitation, even where the individual concerned is still missing” (UN 1989: 17). 
Considering this difficulty, victims, human rights activists and organizations started pushing 
for the adoption of a criminal offense. In this context, six projects were presented to the Congress. 
The first time a project was presented was in 1988, when Ombudsman Horacio Serpa submitted a 
proposition of bill to the Congress. According to Amnesty International, in a public statement the 
Defense Ministry vetoed the initiative considering that it would undermine the power of the 
authorities, whose priority was to restore law and order (AI 1989: 126).  
However, in 1991 the Minister of Interior reintroduced the same text to the Congress 
arguing that disappearances were widespread and that they were not properly dealt with by the legal 
system (AI 1991:97). Although this project did not succeed, the new Constitution expressly 
established that “no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance, torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment” (Article 12). This proscription gave a new impulse to the possibility of a bill 
criminalizing enforced disappearance.  
In 1992, a Project introducing enforced disappearance as a crime was presented to the Senate. 
However, President Gaviria objected to the Project arguing that the military jurisdiction was the 
competent legal forum and due obedience as an exonerating clause were constitutional cornerstones 
that the proposed bill should not eliminate (Diario Oficial de Colombia 1994). In reference to these 
objections, the UN working group on Enforced Disappearances expressed its concern about the fact 
that the government regarded enforced disappearances as a service-related act (UN 1994), 
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emphasizing on the need of a prompt and effective judicial remedy and the country’s obligation to put 
alleged perpetrators on trial (UN 1996, 1997).  
In 1997, the succeeding government of President Samper presented a new bill to the Senate. 
Project 129/1997 aimed at criminalizing enforced disappearances and genocide, as well as enlarged 
the existing crime of torture. The project had a slow track in the Congress and the Government asked 
requested for an urgency procedure (a sort of fast track legislative proceeding). Nevertheless, in three 
different sessions the quorum was not met and the project was never voted. With this respect, the 
national newspaper El Tiempo (1998) highlighted that the possibility for the bill to be approved was 
rather “low” because congressmen were “occupied in the presidential campaign” and the voting 
session had coincided with the “opening session of the FIFA World Cup”.  
By July 15th 1998, the Minister for Justice reintroduced the project which was approved 
after more than one year of discussions. However, on December 1999, the succeeding President, 
Andrés Pastrana, objected to the Bill (Diario Oficial de Colombia 1999). The press regarded 
Pastrana’s objections as “confusing and incomprehensible” because the government had not been 
raised any issues during the debates (El Tiempo 2000). An editorial published by the national journal 
El Tiempo (2000a) affirmed that the objections derived from the pressures of the Armed Forces 
Command and the association of military veterans who did not support the criminalization of 
enforced disappearance and genocide.  
Finally, the House of Representatives voted in favor of the bill (El Tiempo 2000a) and on 
July 7, 2000, the Law 589/2000 was published. This text suffered considerable changes over time 
with the intervention of the Constitutional Court establishing that crimes such as genocide and 
enforced disappearance were excluded from military jurisdiction and that they could not exonerate 
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perpetrators when victims were member of illegal groups (Constitutional Court 2000) as well as 
established that perpetrators should not be limited to state agents (Constitutional Court 2002). 
According to this, the crime was introduced into the criminal legislation in the following terms:  
Article 165. Enforced disappearance: Anyone who deprives another person of their liberty in 
any way, followed by concealment and refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or 
to provide information on the person’s whereabouts, thereby placing the victim outside the 
protection of the law, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of twenty (20) to thirty (30) 
years93, a fine of one thousand (1,000) to three thousand (3,000) times the current minimum 
statutory monthly wage and disqualification from the exercise of rights and the holding of 
public office for ten (10) to twenty (20) years. The same penalty shall apply to any public 
servant, or anyone acting at the instigation or with the acquiescence of a public servant, who 
commits the act described in the preceding paragraph. 
According to this, enforced disappearance was composed by two acts: the deprivation of 
liberty (ab initio legal or illegal), followed by the concealment and the refusal to acknowledge 
what happened or to provide information regarding the whereabouts of the person94.  
The recognition of the crime in 2000 was extremely important for the PJ case. Based on this 
legal provision, the victims filed a new plea. In response to it, in 2001, the Prosecutor General’s 
office opened a preliminary investigation –formal investigations only started in 2006. However, 
before 2000 and despite the lack of a legal provision, the PJ families had denounced the enforced 
disappearance of their next of kin. Furthermore, the category of disappearance was also employed 
earlier from its introduction as a domestic criminal offense by the President of the Republic in an 
                                       
93 This penalty can be aggravated according to the code depending on a number of aggravating 
circumstances enumerated on article 166. According to this article the perpetrator can be liable to a term of 
imprisonment of thirty (30) to forty (30) years. It can also be attenuated when the perpetrator voluntarily 
releases information about the whereabouts of the person in a short-term after the abduction. 
94 This definition differs from International Human Rights law in the sense that it extends the active 
subject of the crime to anyone. This definition also differs from the Statute of Rome in three main 
aspects: in Colombia the crime is not limited to political organizations but to anyone as active subject, the 
domestic regulation does not establish a minimal prolongation of time for the disappearance and there is 
no requirement on the intention to remove the person from the protection of the law. 
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official Decree in 198595, the Special Investigative Court in its final report on the PJ events in 
198696, the Prosecutor General’s office in 1988 and the Special Procurador assigned to the Military 
Forces who sanctioned the military for the disappearance in 199097.   
The fact that the victims and some State institutions were able to observe a problematic 
situation called ‘disappearance’ exposes the possibility of drawing a factual observation that in this 
case supposed a form of wrongdoing. As such, when the justice and other institutions referred to the 
events they also recognized their possibility of scrutinizing these actions. However, procedures could 
only be initiated referring to offenses different from forced disappearance because there was no 
autonomous criminal offense in the domestic arena available. Indeed, the fact that discussions 
around the bills were not seriously addressed or were objected by different governments during a 
decade, created obstacles for framing the case as a crime of enforced disappearance to the formal 
institutions of the legal system. 
With this respect, from the start of the investigations, retired Col. Plazas’s lawyers requested 
the annulment of the prosecution arguing that the crime of enforced disappearance was not enacted at 
the time of the events (Juzgado Tercero 2010: 60). Lawyer Eduardo Umaña and the succeeding 
                                       
95 As soon as December 27, 1985, the President of the Republic issued decree 3822/1985 that the Law 
provides a special procedure for declaring the presumed death of those “disappeared” of the Palace of 
Justice through the municipal civil judges of Bogota using a special process set forth for that purpose. 
96 On June 17, 1986, the Special Investigative Court published its final report on the PJ events. In line with this 
document, the people that were ‘allegedly disappeared’ from the cafeteria had died in the middle of the 
confrontation at the PJ fourth floor. Additionally, the tribunal asserted that two of the guerrillas that 
participated in the siege (Clara Encizo and Irma Franco) had been taken alive by the military and 
“disappeared”. Despite the fact that there was no criminal offense, the tribunal recognized the existence of a 
wrongdoing that was labeled as ‘disappearance’.  
97 The assertion of the Special Investigative Court that the guerrillas had been forcibly disappeared is not the 
only evidence of the above-mentioned reception. Also in 1988, the Prosecutor General’s office also concluded 
that Irma Franco had been forcibly disappeared; and, in 1990, the Special Procurador assigned to the Military 
Forces issued a disciplinary sanction against the Head of military intelligence body B-2, for the 
disappearances. 
 156 
 
 
representatives of the victims sustained that the enforced disappearance could be prosecuted as such 
because at the time of the events this was already considered an international crime (criminal law 
reference): the negligence on the domestic adoption of the bill could not immunize the defendant.  
With regard to this debate, after more than twenty years, a judge of first instance, an appeal 
court (Tribunal Superior 2012) and the Supreme Court asserted that enforced disappearance was an 
international crime in force at the time of the events, and that due to its criminalization in the year 
2000 it could be currently prosecuted  considering the permanent nature of the crime –implying that it 
is present as long as the fate and whereabouts of the victims are not clarified (Tribunal Superior 2012). 
Considering the double problem approach for observing crime and the particularities of the 
case study we can conclude that the double reference emerges when a (mis)conduct is observable. 
Before the existence of a criminal law legislative program, the misconduct may be observable but 
is not available for qualification as a criminal offense to be processed by the criminal justice. In the 
case of enforced disappearance, when the criminal code does not contain a specific crime it can be 
processed through other offenses98. However, as shown in this part, the justice system may find 
obstacles prosecuting the conduct as other offenses because of the particularities of the 
wrongdoing, creating opportunities for the containment of the legal intervention.  
After having problematized and delimited the observation of criminal conduct, 
characterizing state crime could not be done without a proper reference to the actor of that kind of 
conduct. This will be conducted in the next section.  
                                       
98 “In jurisdictions where the criminal code contains no specific crime of enforced disappearance, 
prosecutors can pursue charges of kidnapping, abuse of power, torture (if there is relevant evidence 
available), and murder, particularly if the remains of the victim are found. There may be other associated 
crimes committed by authorities in relation to denials of detention or, even, the survival of the 
disappeared” (Dewhirstv & Kapurv 2015: 32). 
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4.2.2 The ‘State’  
Traditional positions, particularly deriving from the law and the social sciences, tend to 
observe the reference to the State as a criminal actor as improper or irrelevant. There is a tendency 
to dismiss the State conduct as part of the phenomenon of crime. Indeed, most theories of 
criminality reject the fact that States, or even those agents acting on their behalf, can be criminal 
actors. The idea of crimes committed by the State frustrates the biological theories of crime that 
explain criminal behavior according to the physical appearance, the personality, the social status or 
the life conditions of wrongdoers (e.g. dysfunctional families, poor neighborhoods, lack of formal 
education, inter alia). This is not only an obstacle for the social sciences. As studied before, the 
law debates the acceptability of the idea of States committing crimes based on the traditional 
conception of crime (only performed by individuals and established by the State) and the criminal 
responsibility (expressed through punishment as a mechanism of infliction of pain measured in 
terms of time to which organizations like the State could not be submitted).  
In this part, we will elucidate the problems that the concept of State poses when referring to 
its criminal activities. We will not adopt or develop a theory or a concept of State, rather we will 
delimit the form of authorship that the subject of state crime raises. With this purpose, we will refer 
to some socio-legal ideas suitable for drawing empirical and theoretical delimitations of what can 
be considered and observed as State for state crime.  
Boudon and Bourricaud’s Critical dictionary of sociology (1989) bears that “[t]o define the 
State is an almost impossible task” because of the ambiguity and multiplicity of definitions that the 
notion presents. When defining the State, they explain, researchers face two main types of 
difficulties: a descriptive problem and a normative problem. The former is present when 
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researchers attempt to elucidate the characteristics that make the State distinctive in respect to its 
composition and basic physical and symbolical features. The latter refers to the problem of 
delimiting and understanding what the State should be and how it can be organized, not only 
regarding its administrative arrangement but also at the level of its goals, means, rules and 
organizational principles.  
For the sociological delimitation of state crime both problems are pertinent. However, we 
will focus on the descriptive problem because it enables pertinent delimitations around the 
distinctive characteristics of the State when constructing the phenomenon of state criminality. 
Thus, we can start by affirming that the State is a form of organization consisting of interdependent 
or coordinated parts, established and designed to achieve different social objectives “by means of 
explicit rules, regulations and procedures” (Giddens 2009: 783). The State, like other private 
organizations, “is a particular type of social system that reproduces itself on the basis of decisions” 
(Seidl 2005: 408). These decisions are adopted, adapted, produced and reproduced in reference to 
determined social contexts and historical conditions presenting a public scope as they are capable 
of binding social communities. For the delimitation that we intend to draw in this part, it is 
important to give a historicized account of the State visualizing the characteristics upon which it is 
observable at a particular time and in a specific context. This form of referring to the notion may 
allow avoiding anachronism and obsolete uses.  
In this context, referring to this form of organization requires an additional caution around 
implicit assumptions or substantializations often automatized when referring to the ‘State’ (Rothe 
2009: 11). The State has no essence, the State has no heart, “not just in the sense that it has no 
feelings, either good or bad but it has no heart in the sense that it has no interior” (Foucault 2010: 
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77). Perhaps for this reason, when studying different definitions of State one can conclude that 
there is no consensus.  
However, as Bourdieu (1994) suggests, the State appears today as a self-evident category99 
embodying an institution that exists beyond any choice and resulting from different power 
struggles that are sometimes overlooked under uncritical intellectual natural adherence100 (in the 
same sense, Abrams 1977101). Such understanding may involve presenting the State as an 
unchanging (and always pertinent) structure in the history of humankind. Nonetheless, sociological 
attention should be awarded to the task of problematizing the conceptual construction of the State 
as an object of observation. With this regard, Skinner (2009: 326) asserts that “to investigate the 
genealogy of the state is to discover that there has never been any agreed concept to which the 
word state has answered […] As the genealogy of the state unfolds, what it reveals is the 
contingent and contestable character of the concept, the impossibility of showing that it has any 
essence or natural boundaries”.  
                                       
99 An example of this lack of reflection on the sSate is the UN Draft declaration on the rights and duties of 
States. By resolution 178 (II) of 21 November 1947, the General Assembly instructed the International Law 
Commission to elaborate a draft declaration on the rights and duties of States. During its first session, in 
1949, the Commission examined the subject and adopted a final draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of 
States which was postponed until a sufficient number of States have transmitted their comments. With 
respect to the definition of the State, the Commission concluded that “no useful purpose would be served by 
an effort to define the term ‘State’, though this course had been suggested by the Governments of the United 
Kingdom and of India. In the Commission's draft, the term ‘State’ is used in the sense commonly accepted 
in international practice. Nor did the Commission think that it was called upon to set forth in this draft 
Declaration the qualifications to be possessed by a community in order that it may become a State” (UN 
ILC 1949: 289). 
100 To Bourdieu this assertion expresses his concern on questioning and, perhaps, defying the beliefs on the 
State: “[t]he destruction of this power of symbolic imposition based on misrecognition depends on 
becoming aware of its arbitrary nature, i.e. the disclosure of the objective truth and the destruction of belief 
(Bourdieu 1994; 170)” (Gecienë 2002: 119). 
101 “We have come to take the state for granted as an object of political practice and political analysis while 
remaining quite spectacularly unclear as to what the state is. We are variously urged to respect the state, or 
smash the state or study the state; but for want of clarity about the nature of the state such projects remain 
beset with difficulties” (Abrams 1977: 112-113). 
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In respect to the boundaries of the notion, one of the main problematic factors when 
referring to state criminality is the extension that the notion of State covers: for a conceptualization 
of state crime, how broad should a concept of State be? What should it cover?  
With regard to these questions, a first problem that can be found when reviewing the 
literature is the construction of wide-ranging notions including an enormous quantity of 
phenomena and institutions into this form of organization. In this vein, some authors refer to the 
State as all the public structures and activities, either political or legal, commercial or symbolic; 
others refer to it as covering every social organization expressing any form of public authority; and 
some use the concept for private activities such as the commerce or other milieus that currently are 
not understood as intrinsically public as the family or the religion. In short, these understandings 
tend to frame within the State any form of social organized domination, control or authority 
exercised in society.   
In this vein, a part of the literature identifies the State with the doctrine of the public 
function, which affirms that any organization or individual in charge of a public function can be 
considered, at least in respect to her activity, as State in nature. In line with this view, public 
authorities are instruments of the State that perform a public function; in other words, States 
express a degree of organization based on a functional assessment.  
The notion of public function refers to activities reserved to the State according to their 
constitutional ends and the public interests at play (Corte Constitucional 1998). “Under the 
‘traditional state function’ doctrine, an entity is a ‘state actor’ and thus subject to liability for 
constitutional violations if it performs a function traditionally performed by the government” (Edgar 
2005:857). The legal doctrine refers to the ‘traditional functions’ of the State referring to them as 
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public services. These services are understood as activities that meet the needs of society and that are 
implemented through the general, permanent and continuous direction, regulation and control of the 
State. This doctrine has understood that prototypical activities reserved to the State are those services 
intended to preserve basic functions of law and order as well as tax collection or the management of 
public goods (Corte Constitucional 1998; Corte Suprema de Justicia 2012). This view has the 
purpose of ensuring that people have access to essential services that can be provided in accordance 
with constitutional rules and preventing market exploiting consumers (Edgar 2005:861).  
Functional criteria allow to detect the State according to different competences usually 
delimited and distinguished through branches of the public power. In the Politics, Aristotle referred 
to this structure through the idea of the separation of powers102 which has accompanied the modern 
political structure of the State (Hörnqvist & Hörnqvist 2010: 21). These branches create abstract 
compartments of competence that can be classified into three main traditional functions103: the 
legislative, through which the State dictates norms; the judiciary, dedicated to the resolution of 
individual disputes by means of the law; and the executive, usually defined as the branch 
responsible for enforcing the law. 
In general, the distinctiveness that the public function doctrine proposes in respect to the 
State is far from conclusive. Paraphrasing Boudon and Bourricaud (1989), distinguishing between 
                                       
102 “All constitutions have three elements, concerning which the good lawgiver has to regard what is 
expedient for each constitution. When they are well-ordered, the constitution is well-ordered, and as they 
differ from one another, constitutions differ. There is (1) one element which deliberates about public affairs; 
secondly (2) that concerned with the magistrates- the question being, what they should be, over what they 
should exercise authority, and what should be the mode of electing to them; and thirdly (3) that which has 
judicial power” (Aristotle 1999: 100). 
103 Currently, this classification can be reformulated adding more divisions and sections taking into account 
other social spaces where the public power has specialized and become differentiated such as the electoral 
administration and the military forces. 
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the activities that depend on the State and the activities that in no situation fall within its 
competence is very uneasy. In relation to state crime, in line with Doig (2011: 45), “most state 
crime authors focus on the state as, variously, governments, the executive and various public 
agencies”. Indeed, although ample definitions may be suggested by state crime literature, few 
authors would accept that the State can be any public agency (agent) capable of performing a 
public function. This is so because it is unlikely that any state official committing a crime could 
express the authority or political power that the State embodies, as the concept of state crime 
requires - we will come to this element in the section ‘on behalf of the State’.  
The extension of the concept of State (vis-à-vis state crime) is a recurrent problem in the 
literature referring to the State as a structure of domination. A vibrant example of this 
understanding is Marxism. Earlier Marxists bear that the State is a superstructure apparatus in the 
hands of a dominant class (Jessop 2000: 121) which has a fundamental capacity of repression and 
intervention in the class struggle favoring the bourgeoisie and affecting the proletariat (Althusser 
1971: 90)104. Later Marxists consider that the ruling class is not uniform as it embraces different 
struggles, competitions and calculations of power. In this line, rival political elites emerge within 
the State (Callinicos 2007: 542).  
                                       
104 According to Althusser (1971), this concept refers not only to a the specialized apparatus furnishing basic 
supplies for legal practice, e.g. the police, the courts or the prisons; but also the army, which “intervenes 
directly as a supplementary repressive force in the last instance, when the police and its specialized auxiliary 
corps are ‘outrun by events’; and above this ensemble, the head of State, the government and the 
administration” (Althusser 1971: 90). Althusser assesses that when Marxism understands the State as a 
repressive apparatus, it is nonetheless differentiating state apparatus from state power: the class struggle is 
centered in the State power and by consequence on the use of the state apparatus as a function of class 
interest, being the apparatus an instrument of repression that can survive even in the presence of 
modifications on the state power. Hence, Althusser concludes that the state is a form of repression by 
physical and non-physical forms that exercises functions by violence and functions by ideology through 
distinct and specialized institutions (Althusser 1971: 90). 
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Developing the idea of domination, Gramsci, as a later Marxist, focused on the concept of 
hegemony. According to this, the ethical State educates the population into a particular cultural and 
moral type of organization “which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for 
development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes” (Gramsci 1971: 79). This ethical 
State articulates the political and civil society constituting an “‘image’ of a State without a State” 
(Gramsci 1971: 80). This form of organization implies that the individual becomes a ‘normal 
continuation’ and ‘organic complement’ of the political society (Gramsci 1971). 
If the notion of State is constructed covering all possible actors of the public function and 
all possible forms of domination or power, the concept of state crime loses distinctiveness and 
pertinence, voiding its descriptive significance and specificity.  With the purpose of a conceptual 
delimitation a relevant tool is presented by governmentality authors inaugurated by Foucault 
(2013: 283). This literature represented a relocalization of the State, not as the ultimate seat of 
power (Sharma and Gupta 2009: 9), but as one structure of power among others. When this 
literature claims the necessity of moving away from the State105, it provided an important insight 
for delimiting the State itself.  
Drifting away from Marxists and discussing the problem of power in a multifaceted way 
(instead of the idea of top-down hegemony or class control), this literature does not deny the 
existence of power in the State but widens the scope of power beyond it and beyond relations of 
                                       
105 “What does doing without a theory of the state mean? If you say that in my analyses I cancel the presence 
and the effect of state mechanisms, then I would reply: Wrong, you are mistaken or want to deceive yourself, 
for to tell the truth I do exactly the opposite of this. […] However, if, on the other hand, “doing without a 
theory of the state” means not starting off with an analysis of the nature, structure and functions of the state in 
and for itself, if it means not starting from the state considered as a sort of political universal and then, through 
successive extension, deducing the status of the mad, the sick, children, delinquents, and so on, in our kind of 
society then I reply: Yes, of course, I am determined to refrain from that kind of analysis. There is no question 
of deducing this set of practices from a supposed essence of the state in and for itself” (Foucault 2010: 77) 
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domination106. In this line, the problem of power would not rely on the law but on normalization, 
not on punishment but on control. In this respect, Foucault (1991) draws a double historical 
movement according to the transformation of power characterized by: i) the replacement of a 
society of sovereignty focused on the State, by a disciplinary society which takes shape of different 
micro-powers inoculated into the population and the bodies (Foucault 1978) and ii) the 
replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government that deploys a technology of 
power based on different techniques of governmentality polymorphous, contingent and mobile. 
These techniques aim at achieving the control of populations and the bodies through different 
disciplines as the pedagogy, the medicine, the human sciences and the economics, marking the 
beginning of the era of ‘bio power’ (Foucault 1978: 140). 
Considering the recognition that power can be found in all types of social relations as “a 
consequence of relationships between different social actors” (Whyte 2009: 3), and if we accept 
the idea that state crime is not merely about criminal conduct but is heavily related to power 
(Whyte 2009:3), this literature allows to localize the problem of state criminality within the idea of 
institutional power. In this vein, the State is not every social manifestation of relations of 
domination (as some Feminists may assert107) or structures of power (as Marxism may affirm). 
                                       
106 In relation to the distinction between power and domination Foucault asserted “we must distinguish the 
relationships of power as strategic games between liberties – strategic games that result in the fact that some 
people try to determine the conduct of others – and the states of domination, which are what we ordinarily 
call power. And, between the two, between the games of power and the states of domination, you have 
governmental technologies” (Foucault 1988: 19). 
107 The problem of State power beyond class structures was explored by different feminist perspectives that 
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. While some feminists understood the State as a neutral arbiter that tends to 
be dominated by men promoting masculine interests (Kantola 2006: 119); others understood it as “a 
gendered set of apparatuses, serving the aims of a patriarchal order. It is not only that state institutions are 
overwhelmingly staffed by men but that masculinist ideologies inform the policy and decision-making 
process” (McLaughlin & Muncie 2012: 415-416). However dissimilar (neutral or patriarchal), most of 
initial feminist kept discussing power enlarging the power of the State to different structures of domination. 
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The idea of state crime should focus on a form of institutional power expressed through state 
institutions and its agents that display different typologies of power (power of the capital, cultural 
power, colonial power, gender-based power, class power)108.  
For the description of state crime, this assertion requires complementary ingredients of 
observation. In the search of empirical elements to observe the institutional and organizational 
arrangement that the State presents, we may characterize States as modern forms of organization of 
the political power that interact in the social world through physical and non-physical structures, 
ideas, practices and discourses.  
“A State is not a fact in the sense that a chair is a fact; it is a fact in the sense in which it 
may be said a treaty is a fact: that is, a legal status attaching to a certain state of affairs by virtue of 
certain rules or practices” (Crawford 2007: 5). States are politico-legal entities (Currie 2008: 21) 
acting with a legal status. “[I]nternational law plays an important role for the determination of when 
an entity constitutes a State, since it is for the international legal order to provide a legal qualification 
and establish the legal consequences of a subject of international law, in particular its rights and 
obligations. The role of international law in this regard is twofold: it has a positive role of 
determining, in certain cases, whether an entity constitutes a State even in the absence of effective 
government, as well as a negative role of denying Statehood to entities which claim it but which were 
established in violation of a peremptory norm of international law” (de la Cuba 2012:172-173).  
In this context, international public law has developed a notion of the State in accordance to 
the matter of statehood. In line with this concept, the State should possess a permanent population, 
                                       
108 According to Bourdieu (1994) the different models of the emergence of the State have privileged the 
concentration of the capital of physical force as the invariant offering a systematic account of what we call 
the State. 
 166 
 
 
a defined territory, a government and a capacity to enter into relations with other states (American 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States: article 1)109. The political factor is an important 
ingredient when referring to state criminality. Despite population, territory and government are 
physical elements, for their observability they require in principle further elaborations than a 
physical verification in order to determine their content: we need to draw different legal and socio-
political considerations in order to be able to determine that a group of people is a state’s 
population, or to delimit a given territory within certain boundaries or to establish the existence of 
a government. After all, “there will be exceptional instances where one or more of the foregoing 
requirements of statehood may be absent or in abeyance, at least for a period of time, and yet 
where an entity is nevertheless treated as a state. Similarly […], there may be situations where all 
of the foregoing criteria are met but where the entity in question is nevertheless not generally 
recognized as a state […]” (Currie 2008: 24). In other words, for an entity to be characterized as a 
State, the mentioned elements require a sociological characterization without which they would 
simply be a group of loose objects detached from any collective realm.  
These international law elements offer a number of empirical elements furnishing different 
features valuable for the sociological observation of the State. What is the relevance of these 
                                       
109 International public law has particularly debated this issue referring to the distinction of declarative and 
constitutive ideas on statehood. According to the former, States are identifiable by the mere presence of a 
group of material or symbolic elements, whithout the need of any further political recognition from other 
states. In contrast, constitutive ideas assert that statehood is achieved in accordance to the political 
recognition of other existing states. “Proponents of the declarative theory have argued that the constitutive 
theory is unsustainable in practice, as there is no international body with the authority to acknowledge the 
existence of States on behalf of the entire community of States. […]In turn, proponents of the constitutive 
theory have criticized the declarative theory for being unable to explain the legal status of the collectively 
non-recognized territorial entities that do fulfill the factual criteria for statehood” (Zounuzy n.d.: 52-53).  
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elements for delimiting the notion of State for the expression state crime? Let us review this more 
closely. 
(i) The permanent population refers to a stable human community present over time (Currie 
2008; Brownlie 2003). This element is relevant because it refers to the human ingredient of the 
social organization that we call ‘State’. The notion of state crime raises a particular form of 
authorship comprising an organizational or collective level (States are collective entities) as well as 
an individual level recognizable through its actors (States operate through people). Even if the State 
has a relevant symbolic character, it has a concrete existence materialized through different 
organizations, facilities, and, ultimately, through people: state crimes are executed by people acting 
on behalf of the organization. People as agents of the State may be involved in criminal conduct not 
only as active perpetrators, but also as instigators, bystanders110 or collaborators111.  
Because the State can only act through individuals, “[a]n ‘act of the State’ must involve 
some action or omission by a human being or group: ‘States can act only by and through their 
agents and representatives’. The question is which persons should be considered as acting on 
                                       
110 Bystanders are those spectators, onlookers, people who come to know but are not directly involved in the 
crimes. According to Cohen (2001: 15), there are three types of audience: “(i) immediate, literal, physical or 
internal (those who are actual witnesses to atrocities and suffering or hear about them at the time from first-
hand sources); (ii) external or metaphorical (those who receive information from secondary sources, 
primarily the mass media or humanitarian organizations); and (iii) bystander states” (“whole governments 
and ‘the international community’ are also external bystanders. The term ‘bystander nations’ was originally 
used to describe the lack of response by Allied governments to early knowledge about the unfolding 
destruction of European Jews” (Cohen 2001: 17))  
111 When reviewing the ILC conceptualization on state crime we detected the criticism that this notion could 
‘demonize’ a certain population as deviant. However, as a sociological definition, state criminality does not 
necessarily refer to the blame of a certain society as a whole, but implies the recognition that people 
(population) are present on the equation when evaluating a state crime, and that this element becomes more 
relevant when those crimes are systematic or sustained in time. State crime studies allow visualizing a rather 
structural and collective configuration of criminality that is perpetrated in the name of a State. Such 
definition does not victimize a society as a whole but recognizes that the crime committed through the state 
has an impact on people, even perhaps a specific one.  
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behalf of the State” (ILC 2001: 35). Acts are attributable to the State when they express somehow 
State’s authority. In principle, to the concept of state crime, agencies or agents incapable of 
expressing political authority cannot claim to have acted on behalf or in the name of the State. An 
example of this can be a public-school professor, or a public transportation driver or the 
technicians of a public journal who could not ordinarily and validly assert or claim that their 
actions do represent the State as a political organization.  
The general rule of international law is the attribution to the State of the conducts of its 
organs of government as well as of others who have acted under its direction, instigation or control 
(UN ILC 2001: 38). This can be developed through the distinction between de iure and de facto state 
agency. De iure agents are persons or agencies designated by the law as state functionaries or 
institutions exercising some form of governmental authority. De iure agents are legally bound as 
members of the public authority while de facto agents are those persons or groups that, without 
express legal authority, act under the instructions, direction, instigation or control of a State. Ranging 
from total subordination to acknowledgement or tolerance, there can be various degrees of 
connection for establishing if a person can be called a (de facto) state agent. For a sociological 
observation of these agents, the question remains to what degree a level of involvement of an 
individual actor with the State must be established so that he or she can be considered a de facto 
agent.  
“Establishing a link can be hard given a state’s incentive to hide its intentions. The link that 
establishes attribution may rely upon approval authorization, awareness, complicity, control, 
support, or tolerance, or manifest itself in the public nature of the act” (Townsend 1997: 678).  
Under international law, this question remains unsettled because there is no treaty in force 
on the subject and case law is contradictory on this matter (Townsend 1997: 635). Nonetheless we 
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have traced some parameters under international law that can be useful for a sociological 
construction of state agency within the conceptualization of state crime. These parameters can be 
classified under three different criteria: high, medium and low standards. 
A high standard refers to an intense relationship between the State and the agent. The ICTY 
Tadic case and the ICJ Nicaragua case are examples of the use of this standard, referring to state 
agents as those under the effective control of the State creating a form of dependency or 
subordination on the agent. In the Nicaragua case, the question was if the contras –a paramilitary 
group that acted against the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979, was to be equated to an organ of the US. 
Despite the fact that the US had financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized those groups, the 
ICJ found that the contras could not be considered agents of that country because there was no 
sufficient and effective control over them112 since they had conducted different actions by their own 
initiative113. Following the Nicaragua case standard, in the Tadic case the ICTY found that the 
defendant was not to an agent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when he committed different 
killings, beatings and forced transfers of Muslims in the context of ethnic extermination committed 
by Bosnian Serb forces against the non-Serb population of Prijedor.  In this case, the Court employed 
a high standard “requiring a prosecutor to prove that the de facto agent greatly depends on the State, 
and that the State effectively controls the de facto agent” (Townsend 1997: 641).  
                                       
112 The question the ICJ posed was “whether or not the relationship of the contras to the United States 
Government was so much one of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it would be right 
to equate the contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the Untied States Government, or as acting on 
behalf of that Government” (International Court of Justice 1986: 109). 
113 Despite the large quantity of documentary evidence and testimony that has examined, the Court has not 
been able to satisfy itself that the respondent State "created" the contra force in Nicaragua. […] Nor does the 
evidence warrant a finding that the United States gave "direct and critical combat support", at least if that 
form of words is taken to mean that this support was tantamount to direct intervention by the United States 
combat forces, or that all contra operations reflected strategy and tactics wholly devised by the United 
States. On the other hand, the Court established that the United States authorities largely financed, trained, 
equipped, armed and organized the FDN” (International Court of Justice 1986: 108). 
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An intermediate standard refers to a moderate degree of involvement of the agent and the 
State. This can be referred to as a general test of dependency and control. As proposed by Judge 
McDonald (1997) in her separate opinion to the Tadic case, according to this position, absolute 
effective control is not a necessary element for finding an agency relationship. Instead some sort of 
dependency suffices for establishing the link – e.g. when the person is being paid a salary by the 
State and that subject is submitted to its operational command. 
A low standard can be found in certain degrees of tolerance before the wrongful actions. 
This involvement can be analyzed under Grotius’ distinction between patientia -meaning a lack of 
prevention, and receptus -meaning a level of complicity. This standard requires a level of patientia 
referring to the lack of duty of due diligence and failure to prevent. Private deviance can indicate 
States’ acquiescence when it operates with enough tolerance from the State, materialized through its 
omission to countervail such actions114.  
“The ‘due diligence’ standard has a long history in the law of state responsibility for injury to 
aliens and is a central doctrine of a number of areas of international law, including 
international environmental law. It entered international human rights law through a 
landmark decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1988. In the Velasquez 
Rodríguez case, the Court found that the disappearance of the complainant had been carried 
out by state officials. However, more importantly for the present discussion, the Court 
further held that ‘even had that fact not been proven’, the State would have been liable for its 
lack of due diligence in preventing or punishing the violative conduct of putatively private 
actors” (Gallagher 2010: 242).  
An example of this kind of attribution of responsibility can be found in the provisions of 
due diligence for violence against women exposed in the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women (1993), according to which States are urged to “exercise due diligence to 
                                       
114 A study of this class of omissions and their relation to the subject of state crime can be found on Martin’s 
(2012) study on South African endemic vigilantism, as a practice use of force by autonomous citizens to 
protect themselves or as a reaction against certain illegality or injustice arguing that the South African 
police, stimulated through their omission a vigilante culture that creates different levels of criminality. 
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prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against 
women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons”. Following this 
provision, the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW: 1992) noted in its General Comment No. 19 that “States may also be responsible for 
private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and 
punish acts of violence.”  
These standards are valuable for the sociological observation especially in modern times, 
when there is an accelerated privatization of military operations. Governments that cannot or do not 
want to be directly involved in warfare operations have extensively used the market of private 
security contractors. In a context in which different State activities are increasingly outsourced or 
performed by private corporations or individuals, there is a main problem for the sociological 
observation of state criminality.  
With this respect, part of the legal literature has assessed that the conduct of private 
individuals may constitute state conduct when the agent performs functions that are traditionally 
reserved to the State. Besides the doctrine adopted, from a sociological and a legal perspective we are 
able to recognize that people do not necessarily have to be uniformed or become official members of 
a public entity in order to conduct state actions. With this respect, the ICTY (2001) has adopted a test 
composed of three different standards of control differentiating between: (1) acts by a single private 
individual or a group that is not militarily organized, to which the applicable standard is that of 
“specific instructions”, public endorsement or ex post facto approval by the State; (2) acts of armed 
forces, militias or paramilitary units, to which the applicable standard is the “overall control” test, 
provided not only the equipping and financing the group, but also by the coordination and assistance 
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in the general planning of its activities; and (3) acts of individuals assimilated to state organs on 
account of their role within the structure of a State, regardless of the existence of state instructions. 
For a sociological inquiry, these standards are not to be regarded as disjunctive but may be 
applicable in different circumstances. It is important to assess different scenarios where these 
standards may apply when evaluating to what degree armed groups or private individuals can be 
regarded as a de facto organ of that State. With this purpose, the legal doctrine gives specific 
grounds for the sociological observation. In this context, for a sociological observation of state 
criminality performed through private agents, cases of de facto agency may be present when “private 
contractors [are] employed by the state to fulfill security or military functions without being 
incorporated into the police or armed forces, but also organized resistance groups and other military 
organizations with sufficient connection to the State in question. De facto agency also arises where a 
State ‘acknowledges and adopts’ the conduct of private persons as its own. The required 
acknowledgement and adoption does not have to occur verbally, but can also be inferred from the 
State’s own conduct as long as it is clear and unequivocal” (Melzer 2008:72-73).  
 (ii) States are the expression of a territorial power (Sáchica 1994: 152). We refer to the 
territory as the place where a public authority is exercised (paraphrasing authors as Burdeau and 
Hauriou). However, some commentators assess that the territorial boundaries of the States no 
longer coincide with those of the political authority (Strange 1996: ix) – ‘‘in a world of increasing 
globalization and transnational crimes […] sovereign claims become problematic or irrelevant […] 
sovereignty claims are now an illusion in terms of traditional meaning’’ (Friedrichs 2007: 13).  
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The territory is the physical context under the control of the alleged State, “even if its precise 
extent is uncertain or varies over time” 115 (Currie 2008: 24) – e.g. when there is a loss of control of a 
certain territory or when there is a sort of hybridity of control where private and public actors share 
the control over the territory and the population (Jaffe 2013). In this sense, we can find multiple 
places where foreign authorities exercise political control over the territory or where non-state 
authorities are the recognized political authority of the place. This is what the literature has referred 
to as state-like entities. These forms of organization have de facto territorial authority over a place. 
Such intervention in the territories could not be asserted to be State criminal actions per se. Even 
though analytical criteria of state crime literature may be applied to state-like wrongdoing, this form 
of criminality requires to trace the source of the authorship within the structures of the State. 
The territory is the space where crimes are committed and remain a basic reference to it, 
despite an increasing incidence of the cyber warfare116. However, the element of the territory does 
not necessarily allow us to distinguish the State that we are observing from a sociological 
perspective. The participation in criminal behavior of population from different origins in various 
territories is pervasive in a context of expanding globalization. From the sociological perspective, 
the connection required for an action to be considered as states’ behavior should not be based on the 
territory, but rather on the material connection of the actions to the State as a political organization.  
                                       
115 Nonetheless, Higgins (1963) suggests that serious doubts as to boundaries can undermine claims of 
statehood. 
116 “Cyber warfare has been defined as any hostile measures against an enemy designed "to discover, alter, 
destroy, disrupt or transfer data stored in a computer, manipulated by a computer or transmitted through a 
computer." Examples of hostile use include computer attacks on air traffic control systems, on oil pipeline 
flow systems and nuclear plants.[…] The fact that a computer network attack during an armed conflict is not 
kinetic, physical or violent in itself, does not put it beyond the remit of IHL. As with other means and 
methods of warfare, computer network attacks against combatants and military objectives are legal as long 
as they are consistent with humanitarian law. However, computer network attacks open up new questions 
since they can be used, for example, against the enemy's production, distribution and banking systems, 
making the impact more difficult to judge”. (ICRC 2010)  
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This is particularly visible when combatants of different origins participate in wars that are 
not their own, when a conflict becomes internationalized117, when combatants or victims are not 
limited to one State, or when a State promotes and delivers war in absolute absence of its 
population into a foreign territory (e.g. the Plan Condor in the Americas) – “[t]here is some 
appreciation that not only can states be domestic contributors to crime but they can also be 
transnational criminals” (Chambliss 1989 in Ross 1998: 338). Before these situations, it would be 
inadequate to refer to territorial boundaries according to international law as the element par 
excellence to delimit the State.  
While the territory and the population are important factors for delimiting physical 
boundaries of a certain State, the exclusive reference to these elements is insufficient for the 
concept of state criminality. The observation of a wrongdoing with a sociological interest, that is 
located in a particular territory and in contact with a specific population, still needs to employ other 
elements in order to delimit the presence of the State exercising political authority over that place 
and intervening in the social relations of that specific population.  
                                       
117 “The expression “internationalized armed conflicts” is not a legal expression as such and does not imply 
a third category of armed conflicts. The expression rather describes situations of non-international armed 
conflicts with a dimension that is said to be “international”. This dimension can take several forms: 
1) One or more third States or an international/regional organization (the States or the organization acting 
through a multinational force) intervene in support of a state involved in an armed conflict against an 
organized armed group. 2) One or more third States or an international/regional organization (the States or 
the organization acting through a multinational force) intervene in support of an organized armed group 
involved in an armed conflict against a State. 3) Other possible combinations between situations 1), 2) and 
3). From a legal point of view, these situations can be translated into three specific cases: 
- Some remain a non-international armed conflict; - Others become an international armed conflict; - Others 
become “mixed” conflicts. In such conflicts, depending on the nature of parties to the conflict, IHL of non-
international armed conflicts applies to the relations between some parties (e.g. between an armed group and 
an intervening outside State), while IHL of international armed conflicts applies to other relations, e.g. 
between to States intervening militarily in support of two adverse parties of a NIAC)” (ICRC n.d.) 
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(iii) The third element, the government, indicates an institutional arrangement giving a 
form, a program of action and a configuration to the political system in place in a certain society 
which main aim is to govern and to exercise control over the territory and the population. Skinner 
(2009: 326) asserts that handbooks on political theory have regularly pointed out that the State is 
an established apparatus of government, which is why the words State and government have come 
to be virtually synonymous terms. For instance, Rothe (2009: 27) uses the term governmental 
crime interchanged with the term state crime as “we commonly call the government and its 
agencies [in] the state”.  
Although both governmental crime and state crime imply a violation of the public trust due 
to the involvement of public authorities in illegal activities, paraphrasing Friedrichs (1992: 54) 
governmental crime refers to crime committed in the context of the government and not 
necessarily on behalf or in the name of the State -as it is the case of state criminality. Thus, we 
agree with Friedrichs (1992: 53) who observes this synonymy as misleading because while “[t]he 
term state crime suggests crime committed on behalf of a state […] the term governmental crime ... 
can more naturally be applied to crimes committed within a governmental context on any level, 
and not necessarily on behalf of the state” (Friedrichs 1995: 53-54 in Ross 2003: 85-86).  
Moreover, in general terms, there is a conceptual difference between the government and 
the State, the former being an administrative structure that governs and the latter being a social 
arrangement of institutional power. While they may appear as interconnected, there is no natural 
link between them. Thus, for instance, certain States have been qualified as such by the 
international law in the absence of verification of a government in effective control of the 
population and territory (de la Cuba 2012:129).  
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“While it is generally accepted that a state requires some administrative structure capable of 
governing its population, effectively controlling its territory, and representing it 
internationally, there are instances where this requirement appears not to be essential, at least 
for a period of time. In other words, the existence of an effective government can provide 
good evidence of the stable human community and sovereign control of territory referred to 
above, and thus of the existence of a state. However, its temporary absence appears not 
necessarily to be fatal to statehood” (Currie 2008: 26).  
However different, the interrelation between the government and State should not be 
ignored when observing state criminality. Given that state crime involves the presence of a public 
organization with the capacity of acting in the name of the State, this element emerges as an 
important factor for observing state criminality. In other words, the government is an institutional 
configuration of the political power118 that, as such, can exercise political authority in the name of 
a State and to which can be attributed the behavior of its agents. 
The authority of the State somehow resides in a politico-juridical element, a legal 
personality that the law confers to the State indicating that as legal subjects it has legal rights and 
can also enter into obligations: “the State is a real organized entity, a legal person with full 
authority to act under international law” (ILC 2001: 35). This legal personality can be understood 
as a mere fiction that is present only by the virtue of the existing personality of those people who 
compose it (theory of fiction), or as a legal category that corresponds to the existence of the State as 
a moral person, independent from its components (theory of reality).  
Either a fiction or reality, through the idea of the legal status the legal system recognizes the 
possibility of the State to be responsible: “[i]n brief, the legal personality of a collective entity 
(such as the State) is a construction of the Law, and it constitutes a unit of imputation for its 
                                       
118 Governments are the institutions that represent the state’s legal personality while acting before the 
people: “All government is a conspiracy. Good government is a conspiracy in favor of the people. Bad 
government is a conspiracy against the people” (Allott 1988:25). 
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conduct, carried out by the individuals who compose [the] said collective entity and who act [on] 
its behalf; thus, both the legal person and [the] said individuals must answer for the consequences 
of their acts or omissions” (IA Court 2003b: 20). In sum, the State’s legal status implies, among 
other things, that it is submitted to the law: “the state is no longer an absolute power which bears 
within itself its limits and its end” (Parvikko 2000: 228).  
The legal personality of a State is important to the subject of state crime because it implies 
that the State has some legal duties and, as such, it is submitted to the rule of law - ultimately, this is 
the essence of the idea of the law-state or Rechtsstaat. Although in the legal doctrine only few would 
question that criminal conducts may entail State responsibility (Jorgensen 2000: 139), most of the 
literature rejects the fact that States could or should be held criminally liable. In this context, the 
traditional legal understanding of the State rejects its possible characterization as a perpetrator of 
criminal conduct. Rather, before the criminal phenomenon the State is characterized as the legislator 
–establishing the distinction crime/non-crime, the organization of control119 - determining what 
behavior can be considered as criminal and reacting against it, and the victim120 - the State has been 
constructed as the injured party before the criminality, taking the place of the victim of problematic 
criminal situations.  
With respect to the actors who commit criminal wrongdoing, the classic legal thought 
considers that criminal conduct is only performed by human beings. In this context, States are 
                                       
119 In line with this view, authors like Durkheim sustain that the State operates restituting moral unity before 
the normlessness experimented by crime. In this view “plus l'État devient fort, actif, plus l'individu devient 
libre. C'est l'État qui le libère” (Lenoir & Durkheim 1958: 437). 
120 With this view, all crimes involve a victimization of the State simply because they erode State’s order. 
This is present not only when a criminal conduct victimizes concrete people, or the community as a 
whole, but also when there is a victimless conduct that is qualified as criminal even though there is no 
concrete injury. These interventions are not intended to protect any particular individual but the public 
order and the public interests that the State embodies, acting as victim and prosecutor of these cases. 
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fictional entities that are not capable of performing crimes. Despite different developments around 
the criminal responsibility of corporations, legal discussions have not been able to advance on the 
States for two main reasons:  
The first reason is that the legal doctrine, taking as a basis a wide-ranging notion of the 
State, comprises a diversity of actors to which a general category of state criminality may create an 
inappropriate stigma involving unjust attribution of responsibilities. Moreover, even under a 
restricted concept, the international law would reject the notion of state crime as it could lead to 
stigmatize certain States as deviant, opening the door to eventual abusive counter-measures by 
powerful States.  
The second reason is that the legal thought operates a criminal law program of action that 
presents a focus on measures of redress directed to the infliction of pain through temporal 
measures as imprisonment. With such understanding it remains unclear for the legal system what 
could be adequate measures of redress for state criminal conduct. According to this, the 
observation of an action as a crime of the State depends on the attributable legal consequences. In 
this sense, if no criminal law consequences apply or no sanction is available against states, the 
underlying criminal phenomenon is not recognizable.  
Sociological and criminological studies challenge these reasons coming from the traditional 
legal view explaining that the State as any other organization may also be involved in criminal 
behavior (Rothe and Friedrichs 2006: 150). Sociological organizational theorists have put forward 
that organizations can be understood as criminal actors. This has allowed criminologists and 
sociologists to recognize that States may perform a form of organized crime (Ross 1998; 
Chambliss 1988) or organizational deviance (Green and Ward 2004). Doing so, these disciplines 
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take into account an empirical and theoretical distinction between the crime and its possibility of 
criminalization: States may commit criminal conduct regardless of the question of the adequate 
criminal responsibility. To a criminological debate on state criminality, observations are not 
limited to the pragmatic adjudication of responsibility.  
Agreeing that States can be criminal agents does not imply demonizing the State but 
necessarily implies a sort of de-sacralization. The study of state criminality does not necessarily 
and generally support Nietzsche’s assertion that the “State is the name of the coldest of all cold 
monsters” (2001: 62) nor, as some anarchists do, that the State is simply and at all times a criminal 
enterprise (Friedrichs 2010: 130). Rather, the category of state crime allows observing the State as 
a form of organization that may be involved in different criminal wrongdoing. Thus, the State, 
rather than the counter-phase of violence, the victim of all crime or the savior against terror, should 
be conceptually developed as an organization that can implement, support or contribute to different 
forms of criminal conduct121. According to Luhmann, the notion of “public force” is paradoxical. 
“Public power” understood as the exercise of violence is often presented as a necessary medium 
that it is preferable not to use. “Violence”, writes Luhmann (2004: 213), “must be used to abort 
violence”. This means that “we include in the concept of public force the exclusion of violence” 
(Luhmann 2004: 213).  
                                       
121 Bourdieu (1994) asserted that the state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different 
species of capital expressed through a physical and a symbolic violence. These forms of violence are 
exercised “in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms”, and “in the form of mental 
structures and categories of perception and thought” (Bourdieu 1994: 4). This form of organization locates 
their holders as legitimate agents of public power, composed by physical force and coercion, economic 
capital, cultural or informational capital and symbolic capital , and granting power over other species of 
power with a collective recognition that rests upon an organized bureaucracy. 
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Weber’s concept of the State might be useful in order to advance on this discussion. 
According to Weber, the State is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber 1946). Weber does not imply that 
all violence on behalf of the State is legitimate but that it is the political reference in order to 
legitimately authorize the use of violence. This conceptualization neither involves that “[…] the 
state is the only actor actually using violence but rather that it is the only actor that can legitimately 
authorize its use” because “[t]he state can grant another actor the right to use violence without 
losing its monopoly, as long as it remains the only source of the right to use violence and that it 
maintains the capacity to enforce this monopoly” (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s. v.).  
This conceptualization allows focusing on the claim of the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical force within a given territory, overcoming the conception of the State as a social 
organization opposed to a ‘state of nature’ where violence reigned122. Weber’s definition does not 
imply that all state violence is legitimate, remaining possible to assert that the State can resort to an 
illegitimate use of force: using Weber’s definition we can agree that States can do wrong. These 
wrongful actions are the genus of a species called state crime.  
For a conceptualization of state crime, Weber’s concept offers clarifications but also raises 
some elements that may be reframed in the context present societies. Contemporary society is not 
predominantly characterized as a central political authority. Indeed powers other than the State, as 
                                       
122 This contrasts with the famous view of Hobbes' Leviathan: “[I]t is manifest that during the time men live 
without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a 
war as is of every man against every man. For war consistent not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in 
a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known.  […] All other time is peace” 
(Hobbes 1651:77-78). 
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the international community123, diversified local organizations124, transnational economic 
corporations and political entities are capable of a degree of incidence in the political social life 
attributed in other times solely to the State. A current trend in political theory affirms that there is a 
decline of the State’s capacity to influence social life. For some authors, amidst the continuing 
growth of multi-national corporations and international organizations States seem to be fading 
(Creveld 1999: 420 in Skinner 2009: 360), they are “on the way out” (Ankersmit 2007: 36 in 
Skinner 2009: 360) or are simply “losing their autonomy and authority” (Ubi 2008: 7) because 
their actors rationally pursue their self-interest rather than general public goals (Colin and Lister 
2006:16), or because their capacities and obligations are being “evidently superseded” (Falk n.d. in 
Skinner 2009: 360). This is happening in a context of globalization of the economy (Ohmae 1995) 
and “a growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations, and to local and 
regional bodies, and in a growing asymmetry between the larger states with structural power and 
weaker ones without it” (Strange 1996: 4).  
In this line, authors such as Strange, Ohmae, Greider, Sassen, Albrow, Hardt and Negri 
argue that globalization redefines nation-states, which have become less relevant. Hardt and Negri 
(2000: xii) refer to a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of regulation called Empire, born 
in the midst of the “declining sovereignty of nation-states and their increasing inability to regulate 
economic and cultural exchanges”. To other authors, the intensification of globalization has not 
                                       
123 The international community that can adjudicate the right to violence in a certain territory with a 
legitimate claim - this claim can reinforce state claims as it can openly compete against them.  
124 “ad hoc governance might be practiced by (traditional) political authorities at the local or sub-national 
level […]. [L]ocal leadership and public institutions are generally ascribed greater legitimacy than a distant 
central state” (Wulf 2007: 9) 
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eroded State power but is restructuring State power between local demands and transnational 
networks (McGrew 1998)125. 
Contemporary phenomena as the privatization, globalization and localization of public 
powers involves different dealings, collaborations and competitions vis-à-vis the political power of 
the State. These phenomena are important for enriching our comprehension of States when 
thinking on state criminal conduct; nonetheless, this does not obliterate the fact that, even if there is 
an overlap or a competition between the State and the international community or private 
multinational corporations, we can still distinguish the State as a pertinent and relevant source of 
criminal violence - “[l]ooking at transformations of state authority and control over the use of 
force, is not the same as pointing to the end of the state” (Leander 2004: 8).  
With the purpose of distinguishing state actors, another problem that stems from developing a 
socio-legal concept of state criminality based on Weber’s definition is that it does not provide much 
information on the sociological characterization of the State. Indeed, the limits of what may 
constitute a human community126 that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
                                       
125 In Colombia, Orquist exposed the thesis of the ‘partial falling of the State’ characterized by the 
disintegration of the institutional apparatus of the State as a result of the confrontation between the 
traditional political parties. In his turn, Daniel Pecaut has assessed that in Colombia, there is a progressive 
dissolution of the State characterized by the weakening of its intervention in the benefit of industry owners 
because of the progressive adoption of a liberal model of development that has made of the State a non-
autonomous entity where power is fragmented in favor of economic corporations (Sánchez and Meertens 
1982). This is analyzed in a less univocal direction by García and Espinosa (2013) in the assessment that the 
Colombian presence of the State constitutes an institutional apartheid characterized by a strong disparity 
between territories with especially robust institutional control and territories with weak or no institutional 
framework, a situation of abandonment that comes to be regulated by illegal actors or by the social 
communities within themselves. 
126 A conceptualization of the state using the notion of community can also be found in the Politics where 
Aristotle asserts: “Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view 
to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities 
aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the 
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can be dubious as regards proto-states or organizations that have a certain control over a territory and 
a population – e.g. rebel organizations, mafias, terrorist groups. In this respect, Green and Ward 
(2004: 3) describe the State “in the traditional Marxist sense” using Engels notion (1968:577) of “a 
‘public power’ comprising personnel organized and equipped for the use of force, ‘material adjuncts 
prisons and institutions of coercion of all kinds’ and agencies which levy taxes’”. Then, they assert 
that public powers shall include “those ‘political entities (for example, the FARC –Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia) which deploy organized force, control substantial territories and levy 
formal and informal taxes but are not accepted members of the international society of states. We 
shall refer to such entities as ‘proto-states’” (Green and Ward 2004: 3).  
With this regard, we agree with Doig (2011) who observed that although the definition of 
the State may be elastic, the inclusion of revolutionary groups, terrorist organizations and self-
proclaimed independent movements, implies that “the definition may be too diffuse” (Doig 2011: 
44). To call the crimes of those organizations “state crime” is imprecise because it could divert the 
focus of the concept to the territorial control exercised by an organization rather than on the 
existence of an organized public structure involving state political authority. Indeed, if state crime 
entails actions that are performed not as personal goals but on behalf of the state (as will be studied 
in the next section), we are referring to those actors that hold some sort of inclusion or relation with 
the political system and with those agencies in charge of enforcing the law. 
Some of these boundaries can be further established using the reflections of Niklas 
Luhmann when he denotes that the State refers to a centralization of the political functions 
(Luhmann 2014: 212). As Luhmann points out, in ordinary discourses the State mobilizes two 
                                                                                                                           
rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good” (Aristotle 1999, Book One, 
Part I: 3). 
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contextual characteristics: firstly, like people, States are identified by names that allow others to 
refer to them; also, States are located in a specific territory, they have a population and they have a 
“public force”. Besides these elements, States present a self-designation of a political function - 
namely, “the social function of taking collectively engaging decisions” (Luhmann 2014: 212).  The 
State involves the institutionalization of the political power configured through a public 
organization representing the public political power, paraphrasing Bourdieu (1994).  
In this line, state crime can be characterized as conducts in which the State engages as an 
organization. In this sense, a concept of state criminality should include agents and agencies 
capable of expressing the political function of taking collective engaging decisions specially 
comprising the exercise of violence through the public power127. In this vein, we may argue that 
States comprehend political actions and decisions that are objectified through public organizations 
acting in the name of the State.  
States can act physically only through actions or omissions of their agents (agencies). In 
particular, state crime can be attributed to persons who through their actions or omissions128 act “in 
                                       
127 The legal thought sustains a distinction between (real) crime committed in the streets by private agents, 
and the legitimate use of force necessary for public control, rejecting the category of state crime. This 
distinction may be understood from a sociological perspective as pertinent although certainly as governed 
by a moral bias distinguishing certain harmful actions as criminal while other (similar or graver) conduct is 
reduced to legitimate State practice. 
128 “‘[P]olicy’ does not require active orchestration; it is also satisfied by implicit support or 
encouragement, including deliberate inaction to encourage crimes” (Robinson 2014: 115). A similar 
provision may also be found in Ambos and Wirth (2002: 34), asserting that “[a] widespread attack which is 
not at the same time systematic must be one that lacks any guidance or organisation. The policy behind such 
an attack may be one of mere deliberate inaction (toleration). Such a policy, however, can only exist if the 
entity in question is able and, moreover, legally obligated to intervene”). Here, it is relevant to differentiate 
two levels of deliberate inaction which are willful blindness and negligence. The former means that an agent 
deliberately decides to remain ignorant while knowing the risk of failing on a certain duty (Supreme Court 
of Canada, 1989). The latter means that the agent does not exercise control over a risk and simply does not 
have any knowledge of the situation. Hence, while acting with willful blindness there is some degree of 
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official or covert capacity as agents of the state” (Kramer, Michalowski and Rothe 2005: 56). For 
this reason, it is relevant to study when a conduct may be performed on behalf of the State. In this 
research, the State is not observed as a mere fiction nor as a mere analytical concept; on the 
contrary, we do argue that States have a material configuration and concrete manifestations.  
This perspective takes into account the State as an organization that has a precise and 
observable entity: when committing crimes, States can be differentiated on a number of elements 
that can be found in structural and functional features, referring to the specific configurations and 
institutions of the State or to the role and function of the State in society. When developing these 
two approaches in this work, we observed that there are not abundant indicators on the sufficiency 
of any of these elements taken separately and independently.  
In this sense, we may argue that the State is a collective entity with a legal personality that 
operates through highly complex networks. Although embracing a multiplicity of legal entities and 
operating through a variety of persons, the observability of the organization that we call State 
remains possible from the sociological perspective. For state criminality, although the State may 
adopt ‘mobile shapes’ as Foucault would name it, its basic feature is the centralization of the 
expressions of the society’s political system, acting with the legal status allowing to enter into 
obligations and acquiring rights of the State. Luhmann (2004: 213) understands that this function is 
related to the “law enforcement”. The idea of “law enforcement” is at the ‘heart’ of state 
criminality. To the subject of state crime, institutions in charge of enforcing the law express the 
political function of taking collectively engaging decisions endorsed by the exercise of violence 
through institutional power.  
                                                                                                                           
awareness or advertence to the prohibited risk, acting with negligence means that there is inadvertence of 
information that should have been known. 
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4.2.3 On behalf of the State  
State crime is an organizational conduct (Ross 1998; Chambliss 1988; Green and Ward 
2004). As such, these crimes are not committed due to individual spontaneous initiative (Tilly 1985 
in Ross 1998) or in the mere pursuit of personal gain but in accordance with the operative goals of 
the formal organization that we call the State (Schrager and Short 1977: 412; Green and Ward 
2004; Kauzlarich, Matthews & Miller 2001129). In this line, according to Chambliss (1989), “State-
organized crime does not include criminal acts that benefit only individual officeholders, such as 
the acceptance of bribes or the illegal use of violence by the police against individuals, unless such 
acts violate existing criminal law and are official policy”.  
This characterization recalls the distinction between private misconduct and organizational 
wrongdoing. The former refers to any kind of conduct committed for personal gain, beyond the 
goals of any organization; while the latter is a form of wrong that follows the objectives of an 
institution or some form of organic structure. When applying this distinction to our subject it 
follows that crime pursuing an organizational goal could be categorized as crime of the State, while 
criminality based on a private aim can be understood as conduct against the State. Although 
actions for individual gain and actions following organizational ends are theoretically 
distinguishable from a sociological perspective, in cases of state crime the phenomenological, 
functional and structural frontiers between these two are not always clear (Friedrichs 1995: 72).  
With this regard, part of the literature has explored different forms of overlapping (e.g. 
state-corporate crime) capturing the existence of criminal joint-ventures benefiting not only private 
                                       
129 Reducing state criminality to the study of the individuals “is to ignore the social, political, and 
historical contexts which shape the nature, form, and goals of state agencies” (Kauzlarich, Matthews & 
Miller 2001: 189). 
 187 
 
 
interests but also State goals130. A phenomenon that paradigmatically captures this overlapping is 
corruption, e.g. when the latter is the mean for an organizational criminal goal, or when there is a 
waiver or tacit encouragement of corruption when contributing to organizational goals, or when the 
pursuit of profit through corruption becomes itself an organizational goal (Green and Ward 2004).  
The concept of corruption is not clearly delimited in criminological studies. Acosta (1985) 
evaluating a number of conceptual developments with this respect131 concluded that criminological 
studies share as conceptual basics the identification of two parties: the corrupt who gets material, 
political or social benefits in exchange of an advantage for the briber who as the second party 
could not otherwise obtain certain resources. In this context, the only element that Acosta (1985) 
deems to be unanimous among different authors is the misuse of the public function. However, 
current sociology and international law have dealt with the subject of corruption as a problem 
affecting the private sphere as much as the public administration132. Indeed, there is a growing 
                                       
130 As an example of this, the notion of state-corporate crime emerged in criminological studies as the 
intersection of the State and institutions of economic production that act with a shared goal in direct 
cooperation through actions that can be actively initiated by the State or simply facilitated by a lack of 
restraint of deviant business activities (Kramer, Michalowski & Kauzlarich 2002). 
131 “i. Rogow et Lasswell (1966 : 132/133) : un acte de corruption trahit la responsabilité envers un système 
d'ordre public ou civique est incompatible avec un tel système et risque de le détruire. 
ii. Nye (1967 : 416) : la corruption est un comportement contraire aux devoirs statutaires liés à une fonction 
publique (de nature élective ou autre) en vue d'obtenir... un gain personnel ou améliorer une position sociale 
; ou qui viole les règles qui interdisent l'exercice de certaines formes d'influence qui visent l'obtention 
d'avantages personnels. 
iii. Rose-Ackerman (1978 : 1/2) : la corruption est l'utilisation de mécanismes illégaux du marché, dans des 
décisions concernant l'affectation des fonds publics, rejetée par le système politique démocratique. 
iv. Sherman (1978 : 130) : la corruption est l'utilisation du pouvoir organisationnel pour l'obtention 
d'avantages personnels. 
v. Benson (1978 : xiii) : corruption est toute utilisation illégale ou non éthique de l'autorité gouvernementale 
en vue d'obtenir des gains personnels ou politiques.” (Acosta 1985: 334) 
132 The UN Convention against Corruption adopted by the General Assembly by resolution 58/4 of 31 
October 2003, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, adopted by the Organization of American 
States on 29 March 1996, the Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving Officials of the 
European Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, adopted by the Council of the 
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literature on private corruption understanding that acts contrary to the duties and responsibilities of 
a private position may allow to exercise a certain power or influence over a function, task or 
responsibility with the purpose of taking advantage to obtain a benefit for oneself or for another 
person (Argandoña 2003: 255). Thus, from the perspective of international law, despite the fact 
that there is no unanimity around its definition133, there is a general understanding that this 
phenomenon amounts to the misuse of entrusted power for private gain (e.g. Gray and Kaufmann 
1998: 22; Gray-Molina et al. 1999: 8; Klitgaard 1998: 45; La Palombara 1994: 77; Owen 1997: 40; 
Everett, Neu & Rahaman 2006: 3), either simply economical or for political advantage (i.e. 
political white collar crime134). 
Crimes committed with the purpose of personal gain can also be rooted in political goals 
involving public or state corruption but not necessarily acts on behalf of the State. While these 
phenomena may involve structural and phenomenological couplages, they remain different for a 
sociological delimitation.  This form of criminality cannot be reduced to an event of corruption in 
                                                                                                                           
European Union on 26 May 1997, the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development on 21 November 1997; the Criminal Law 1 See E/1996/99. 2 Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C 195, 25 June 1997; the Convention on Corruption, adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe on 27 January 1999; the Civil Law Convention on Corruption, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 4 November 1999; and, the African Union Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Corruption, adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the African 
Union on 12 July 2003. 
133 International law has generally opted for offering an enumeration of different forms of corruption. 
Within these forms we can find the offering, granting, solicitation or acceptance by a government official or 
a person who performs public functions, of any benefit, in exchange for any act or omission in the 
performance of his public functions; or any act or omission in the discharge of his duties by a government 
official or a person who performs public functions for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself 
or for a third party; or the fraudulent use or concealment of property derived from any of these acts. 
134 Friedrichs (2010) highlighted that political white collar crime can be committed for a political 
advantage. Friedrichs (2010), Geis and Meier (1977:207) use the term political white collar crime to refer 
to illegal and improper activity perpetrated by governmental or political party officials for direct personal 
gain. 
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the pursuit of individual goals. Rather it is an intentional and strategic use of violence (Cohen, 
2003), by which state agents and agencies participate in the planning, execution or covering of 
criminal activities, following a collective criminal setting expressing ideological, political or 
economic state goals and involving complex networks of organizational deviance and 
compromising the individual responsibility of the agents135. In short, state crime is essentially 
crime by, for the benefit (Doig 2011: 44) and on behalf of the State (Friedrichs 1992: 53).  
Organizational goals are official communications expressing a collective character that 
allows to characterize the actions that they mandate, endorse or authorize, as performed on behalf 
of the organization that we call State. As Bourdieu (1994) would assess, official acts or discourses 
are expressions of a situation of authority performed or authorized by officials holding a position 
assigned by the State. In this sense, the observation of organizational goals does not involve 
understanding the State as a homogenous ‘decision-making’ institution. States uphold a variety of 
decisions, discourses and practices often characterized by a lack of unanimity and even eventually 
competing with each other or struggling for power (Blakeley 2009: 37); after all, the State “is a 
complex web of connections between numerous entities that have varying degrees of autonomy” 
(Nicholson 1986: 29).  
Although the different components of the State work to achieve a range of objectives that 
may suppose heterogeneous goals, form a sociological perspective the State can be understood as an 
organization capable of affirming, supporting and implementing common goals or shared overall 
                                       
135 The collective and organizational nature of these actions, challenges the “one-sided personalization” of 
criminal law accountability (as pointed out by the German historian Martin Broszat). Focusing in one actor 
of the atrocities may obfuscate the contextual and structural content of the actions (Koskenniemi 2002). 
However, this does not mean overlooking the individual, which would be in detriment of a complex 
understanding of state criminal actions. 
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objectives enforced with enough authority to be observed and followed by the various organs of the 
State. With this view, organizational aims can be understood as programs of action aiming at 
establishing the “correct decision making by defining specific goals that are to be achieved, e.g. 
“profit maximization”, and in this way structur[ing] the given decision possibilities” (Seidl 2005: 
406). However defining, authoritative and influential, institutional programs of action are 
contingent to different ideological, doctrinaire, political, economic and religious factors (Rothe 2009: 
12). This is so, not only regarding their design but also their interpretation and materialization, which 
can meet, negotiate with or confront different internal and external constraints. As such, these 
programs are, at the same time, outcome of struggles between different oppositions and source of 
governmental practices.  
Accepting that organizational goals may involve a complex dealing of power structures (in 
some occasions less relevant in the context of totalitarian States), involves that their 
implementation may imply diverse forms of disciplinary control, repression or persuasive 
campaigns of indoctrination. In this context, States not only address their own institutions but often 
the organizational goals aim at the society in general. These goals are formulated as a matter of 
authority, expressing power and force. 
Identifying such goals in the context of complex networks may pose considerable 
challenges for the observation. Addressing this constraint, with the purpose of detecting the 
organizational character of these wrongs it is advantageous to depict the degree of organization and 
coordination of the criminal actions. Sociologically, two relevant factors for this observation are 
the capacity of operation, coordination and organization of the wrongdoing as well as the 
existence of a common plan of action.  
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Table No. 8. Organizational goal 
Two main factors of observation: 
Capacity of operation, coordination and 
organization of the actions 
Common plan of action 
Capacity-oriented assessment Goal-oriented assessment 
Ability to coordinate and capacity to 
organize the criminal actions. 
Organizational plan of action involving a collective 
planning and preparation of the crimes determined by 
the organization involving a criminal purpose. 
Evaluation focused on the preparation, coordination 
and common disposition of the actions. 
The capacity of operation, coordination and organization of the criminal conduct refers to 
the capability of coordinating, controlling and organizing the activity, resources and/or 
infrastructure of the State for the wrongdoing. The organizational character of the misconduct may 
derive from the level of organization and the extent of public resources employed for planning, 
executing or obfuscating state criminal activities. The capacity of acting in a coordinate manner 
usually involves an ingredient of hierarchy and direction. States organize their capacity for 
inflicting violence through a hierarchical configuration that sociology has studied employing the 
concept of bureaucracy.  
Bureaucracy is a form of constituting, organizing and developing institutional power which 
operates through delimited areas of competence. Weber, pioneer on studying this phenomenon in 
the context of modern organizations, asserted that “bureaucracy is the means of transforming social 
action into rationally organizing action” (Weber 1968: 62). This form of organizing supposes both, 
hierarchy and depersonalization of administrative management: functionaries make a career out of 
their jobs, this separates their private life from their official position and their properties from the 
material resources they employ in the pursuit of their posts (Weber 1968; Giddens 2009).  
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For some authors, bureaucracy creates more compliance to the rules, less arbitrariness, 
more equality and impartiality, treating all citizens regardless of their private moral life and 
divorcing the administration of public life from the private interests of officers (Du Gay 2000). 
According to others, as Arendt (1971), Bauman (1989) or Kelman & Hamilton (1989), on the 
contrary, bureaucracy produces an instrumental rationality upon which functionaries separate their 
jobs from any moral awareness136. This lack of consciousness about the content, extent and effect 
of what they do, they argue, creates opportunities for atrocities as the Holocaust137.  
“When subordinates receive orders from duly constituted authorities operating within an 
apparently legal framework, they may well assume that the orders themselves are legal. 
More often than not, the question of legality does not even enter their minds, especially when 
they are working in official settings-military or civilian-surrounded by the trappings of 
legitimacy” (Kelman & Hamilton 1989: 47).  
The role, force and scope of criminal organizational goals may be reinforced by the placing 
of the criminal behavior and its concrete actors within the structure of hierarchical organizations: 
functionaries employed under hierarchies are expected to follow instructions and orders. In these 
contexts, authorizations and commands to do wrong may be highly compelling and may somehow 
blur the criminal law proscriptions or the significance of their actions, especially with regard to 
officials acting under the representation of accomplishing a transcendent mission, namely an 
organizational goal138.  
                                       
136 Dealing with state crime, IA Justice Cançado assessed that these wrongdoings have been historically 
accompanied by the insensitivity of States to the consequences of their own criminal practices as well as 
by state policies of ‘dehumanization’ of the victims, creating an alleged “right of the State to persecute or 
massacre […] in other words, to perpetrate […] state crime” (IA Court 2006b: 27). 
137 While some “scholars contest the notion of an amoral, unthinking bureaucrat as an historical and 
psychological phenomenon, Arendt used her famous phrase to point to the fact that the danger of the 
totalitarian state lay in the fact that it need not rely on inherently “evil” individuals, but rather on the 
motivations of ordinary people” (Davidson 2016: 259).   
138 “The most obvious sources of crimes of obedience are military, paramilitary, and social-control 
hierarchies, in which soldiers, security agents, and police take on role obligations that explicitly include the 
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With this respect, the ‘sociology of denial’139 offers an important analytical insight for the 
study of state crime, referring to the conduct of people (state agents) who do not necessarily 
express a disagreement with the general social values or with the legal order but at the same time 
manage to neutralize140 their validity through different forms of denial with the aim of performing 
criminal conduct - e.g. denying what happened, its repercussions, its magnitude, among others. 
This idea is an important element for understanding how state crime is performed ‘on behalf of the 
State’ and its order, even though it may involve the violation of that same order. In sum, denial 
focuses on the statements of motives deployed when someone espouses the duality of knowing and 
not acknowledging as well as the ambiguity of violating the legal order although supporting it. We 
will come back to this later on. 
However relevant for the study of state crime, the bureaucratic involvement of state 
officials or agencies, does not definitively result in the univocal presence of a State goal in such 
actions. For instance, when a group of police members use their position and authority for 
                                                                                                                           
use of force. These hierarchies are the classic ones from which the term chain of command is borrowed; 
authority is bureaucratically stringent. The goals of these bureaucracies and the role definitions of actors 
within them in fact require harm to certain categories of others (such as an enemy or subversive). The sole 
question concerns the scope and definition of the target of harm rather than the existence of such a target. In 
this context authorization is explicit and backed by multiple binding forces: sanctions are potentially severe; 
surveillance by authority can be strict; and others' conformity is often observable. Routinization of actions 
that may contribute to harming targets is characteristic of the organization. And dehumanization of victims, 
especially in wartime, is systematic” (Kelman 1989:314) 
139 The sociology of denial, led by Stanley Cohen, studies how and why people overlook the suffering of 
others (Cohen 2001: x). Cohen developed the concept of denial as a form of knowledge that does not lead to 
a form of acknowledgement. “Denial is always partial; some information is always registered. This paradox 
or doubleness –knowing and not-knowing- is the heart of the concept” (Cohen 2001: 22). 
140 This theory is inspired in the work of Sykes and Matza (1957), authors that developed the concept of 
techniques of neutralization. These techniques are mechanisms by which a subject inhibits social controls on 
deviant motivational patterns while remaining committed to the dominant normative system. This idea was 
intended to shift the understanding of juvenile delinquency, not as originated by a learning experience in direct 
contradiction to the dominant society, but rather by techniques neutralizing the validity of norms in certain 
situations. “Thus the delinquent represents not a radical opposition to law-abiding society but something more 
like an apologetic failure, often more sinned against than sinning in his own eyes” (Sykes & Matza 1957: 667). 
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executing and organizing a personal vendetta, it could not be said that there is a state crime: in this 
case, there is no institutional or organizational goal governing the course of action, despite of the 
coordination and involvement of state bureaucracy in the wrongdoing; in other words, there is no 
action on behalf of the State.  
If we accept that a criminal action with wide-ranging involvement of State organs indicates 
but does not necessarily imply that the actions are committed in accordance with organizational 
goals, the existence of a common program of action may be a relevant element clarifying the 
organizational character of a criminal action, at least from a sociological perspective. State crime can 
be characterized as part of a program of action providing general directions for the criminal conduct. 
Likewise, this form of criminality can be characterized as a crime of obedience (denomination of 
Kelman and Hamilton 1989) meaning that these actions are implemented in coordination with or 
ordered by a certain authority, either through express instructions or as part of a context in which the 
wrongdoing is sponsored, expected, or at least tolerated by the authorities -as occurs when the 
perpetrators are furnished with good reasons to believe that the action “conforms with official policy 
and reflects what their superiors would want them to do” (Kelman 1989:27). 
Although state crime refers to the organization orienting its agents what to do, individual 
interests and strategies can play an effective role and can involve a phenomenological coupling 
with the organizational aim. From an individual perspective, organizational goals imply the 
involvement of people in order to materialize their program of action. The personality, the 
morality, the ideology, the capacities, the abilities, the awareness, perceptions and disposition of 
state agents, ultimately are determinant to set in motion, give content and extend to the 
organizational goals. Ideology, doctrine and training are relevant factors when evaluating criminal 
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state goals from an individual perspective. For instance, if a military trained under the doctrine of 
the enemy is assigned to deal with a situation of massive protests and general disorders, it is 
expectable that this official, if understanding political dissent as an enemy action, would probably 
respond to the situation with no consideration for the integrity of the protesters.  
The structure of beliefs that agents uphold is a relevant ingredient for understanding their 
involvement in criminal actions. Although implemented individually, in the context of actions 
performed on behalf of the State, these ideas remain part of a collective communication endorsing 
particular organizational values and goals. For instance, in the PJ case, retired Col. Plazas 
recurrently claimed that he was right in his actions and that he was simply a victim of a complot 
from the “enemies of Colombia” (Vega 2011: 43; Caracol TV 2011). The distinction enemy/non-
enemy141, evidences the socialization of an ideological framework. These type of manifestations 
are not expressions of mere auto-referential ideas but are part of collective communications.  These 
ideas “are not individual and idiosyncratic in nature, mere personal beliefs, or states of mind. 
Rather they draw on widely available, socially approved vocabularies, beliefs and rationalizations 
that resonate in the wider society. They are ‘cultural constructs’, not personal belief systems” 
                                       
141 Different studies show the impact that the distinction enemy/non-enemy has on stimulating and justifying 
all kind of atrocities against undesired social agents qualified as ‘enemies’. For instance, Herrera and 
Lehalle (2013) studied the memorandums of the U.S. Department of Justice that between 2001 and 2005, in 
the context of the war against terrorism, that ground to all necessary methods against the ‘enemy’, including 
the practice of torture as an interrogation method. In their analysis, the authors identified the memos as 
political communications transmitting direct messages to the understanding of the law system relativizing the 
absolute proscription of torture as justified using the distinction friend/enemy: “En se fondant sur la distinction 
ami/ennemi pour juger de la force d’une union ou d’une séparation, d’une association ou d’une dissociation, 
Schmitt nous amène à envisager les concepts d’ami et d’ennemi non pas comme des métaphores ou des 
symboles, mais dans un sens concret et existentiel : l’ennemi représente l’autre, l’étranger dont la différence est 
en soi une source potentielle de conflits (Lehalle, 2009). Il devient possible de déterminer comment, dans le 
cas de la torture, la séparation entre ennemis et amis-victimes permet à certains de justifier un usage limité de 
la torture. C’est sur cette opposition ami/ennemi que la position relativiste devant la torture s’appuie 
essentiellement¨ (Herrera  and Lehalle 2013 : 282). These authorizations can certainly operate as arguments of 
justification mobilized through a language of legality.  
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(Hogg 2012: 91). When embraced and adopted by a certain individual as valid parameter for 
perceiving reality, these ideas may constitute authentic ideologies of aggression142, contributing to 
the emergence of multiple forms of engagement with the values that it upholds143 as well as 
creating eventual justifications or excuses for the eventual impairment of legal intervention144.  
Ideological frameworks and, more extensively, organizational goals are frequently 
manifested, supported and organized around official policies. These are important for reflecting on 
the collective background of crimes performed on behalf of the State: state crime involve the 
commission of different crimes pursuant to or in furtherance of an institutionalized policy145. 
While different organizations can adopt policies these are not pertinent to the concept of state 
crime when they do not denote or derive from the authority of the State. Paraphrasing the ICTY 
(1997), not only a policy must be present but the policy must be that of a State. The existence of a 
policy presupposes a political capacity of its adoption and promulgation: “[t]he capacity required 
for adopting a policy that provides broader guidance for the crimes in question […] requires 
                                       
142 For instance, in his research about state crime by the police, Menzies (2000: 143) asserts that some South 
American police were willing to engage in death squads based on their beliefs of defending the country from 
‘godless opponents’. This phenomenon is particularly visible in the ‘war on terror’ and other law and order 
campaigns that create the dominance of security discourses inciting people’s fears and anxieties about security 
threats. Security thus takes the place of a technique of governance. 
143 With respect to the values, the writings of colonel Plazas (2011) in the PJ case reveal his view of the 
Colombian conflict as a history of fight against narcoterrorism and communism (Plazas 2011: 343). In his own 
words Colombia, as one of the biggest reserves of the Catholicism, has been under attack by communism and 
other ideas against Christianity, proved by ‘a proliferation of a faith crisis and atheism’, that he qualifies as ‘a 
perverse modernism’ that has created the “perversity of abortion, homosexuals, same-couple marriage, 
swinger couples and other customs that are far from the moral principles of Christianity” (Plazas 2011: 343). 
144 In the words of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2009) “[c]rimes such as the reckless 
or negligent killing or ill-treatment of detainees by rogue members of the security forces are often not properly 
investigated and prosecuted because of a culture of ill-conceived solidarity among colleagues”. 
145 Most of the criminal law doctrine understands that the category of political crimes is reserved to the 
actions against the statu quo (i.a. Bassiouni 1975; Ingraham, 1979; Roebuck and Weeber 1978; Schafer 
1974) while other in criminology refer to state political crime for referring to actions of the statu quo (i.a. 
Comfort 1950; Proal 1898; Tunnell 1993; Michalowski, 1985; Thomas & Hepburn, 1983). 
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leadership –although not at the highest level of a state or organization- that develops and 
promulgates some broader guidelines, or a framework, that actively promotes, encourages, and 
provides general directions for the attack” (Rodenhäuser 2014: 925).  
Deriving from these policies or parallel to them the production of frameworks of authority 
delimiting the decision making is usually governed by institutional norms. As Cohen (1992: 102) 
observed “state crimes are not just the unlicensed terror of totalitarian or fascist regimes, police 
states, dictatorships or military juntas. […] [E]ven in the most extreme of these regimes, such as 
Nazi Germany, the discourse of legality is used (Muller, 1991)”146. During the twentieth century, 
conservative estimations calculate that between 100 million and 135 million deaths were caused 
worldwide by the deliberate actions of the State (Friedrichs 1992: 54). In a context where the rule 
of law (and not mere arbitrariness147) has become a fundamental principle of democratic Western 
                                       
146 Similarly, Barak (1990) contented that US state criminality concerning acts of warfare have shared in 
common the adoption of a combination of legal, illegal and clandestine operations. In this respect, Pulantzas 
(2000) argues against the distinction Law/Terror that “even the most bloody state form has set itself up as a 
juridical organization, giving itself an expression in law and functioning in accordance with a juridical 
form”, concluding that “nothing could be more mistaken than to counterpose the rule of law to arbitrariness, 
abuse of power, and the prince’s act of will” (Poulantzas 2000: 76). Mattei and Nader (2008) study the role 
of the rule of law in practices of violent extraction that they call plunder, and they conclude that law has 
been used to justify, administer, and enact Western conquest and plunder as a mechanism of spoliation that  
is not always resisted or even resented. In this context, the law serves as an instrument enabling plunder, but 
also these authors acknowledge that this is not the only bound of law, being capable of creating 
opportunities for justice (Mattei and Nader 2008: 201). 
147 According to the UN, the modern conception of the rule of law allows human communities to be 
governed by non-arbitrary rules, in opposition to the rule of man, which implies to be governed by the whim 
of the ruler (UN n.d.). The IACHR has concluded in different thematic reports that the consolidation of the 
rule of law is a prerequisite of a democratic culture, state, and society. The IACHR bases its characterization 
of the rule of law on three main principles: limitation of power, legality and fundamental rights. The 
limitation of power refers to the constitutional limits, distribution, delimitation and balancing of public 
power refraining any form of totalitarianism. Legality implies that State organs function under subjection to 
the law, respecting the supremacy of the Constitution and following the parameters of the law. Finally, the 
declaration of fundamental rights involves an obligation of warranty, respect and protection of the 
individuals and communities who are the holders of different legal entitlements. “In a democratic society, 
the rights and freedoms inherent in the human person, the guarantees applicable to them and the rule of law 
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societies (European Court of Human Rights 1999), it is relevant to question the possible correlation 
between the discourse of legality and state crime.  
As Hannah Arendt (1994) stated, one of the problems that Nazism presents to political 
philosophy is that, in a certain way, the atrocities were consistent with the laws created by the 
regime148. In Arendt’s (1994) study of the Eichmann trial, she observed that the Nazi’s regime 
‘outstanding characteristic’ was that crimes “took place within a ‘legal’ order” (Arendt 1977:290): 
“[s]urely, no one will maintain that Eichmann was in business for himself or that he acknowledged 
obedience to no flag whatsoever. [O]ne of the fundamental problems posed by crimes of this kind, 
[is] that they were, and could only be, committed under a criminal law and by a criminal state” 
(Arendt 1977: 262).  
The legal nature of the regime may be discussed (Arendt herself wrote the word in italics). 
In fact, the existence of a regulatory framework enabling criminal conducts coexisted with the 
criminal law proscription of these same conducts: during the Nazi regime, the criminal code was 
not suspended although there were several legal mechanisms authorizing and ordering the act of 
killing and disappearing149. At least from a sociological point of view we can observe the crimes, 
                                                                                                                           
form a triad. Each component thereof defines itself, complements and depends on the others for its 
meaning” (IA Court 1987: par. 26). 
148 In this respect, Martin Luther King (1963) affirmed:“[w]e can never forget that everything Hitler did in 
Germany was “legal” and everything the Hungarian freedom fighters did in Hungary was “illegal.” It was 
“illegal” to aid and comfort a Jew in Hitler's Germany.” 
149 The Night and Fog Decree (Nacht und Nebel Erlass) was a directive stamped as ‘secret’ for “the 
prosecution of offences committed within the occupied territories against the German State or the occupying 
power, of December 7th, 1941” (preamble) issued by the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces. This directive states that ‘communist elements and other circles hostile to Germany’ having 
increased their activities against the German State ‘obliged’ them to take severe ‘deterrent’ measures 
(paragraph I). The directives to be applied were the ‘death penalty’ for offences committed against the 
German State - or for a simple state of readiness that could endanger its security. These offences “as a rule 
are to be dealt with in the occupied countries only if it is probable that sentence of death will be passed upon 
the offender […] and if the trial and the execution can be completed in a very short time. Otherwise the 
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despite the fact that the law-like authorization could furnish the perpetrator with a legal argument 
for restraining the criminalization of the conduct.  
With regard to the legal nature of these mechanisms, in a different context, the Peruvian 
Supreme Court of Justice (2009) characterized former President Alberto Fujimori’s conduct in the 
Cantuta case as a ‘state crime’ (Question 134, 156), affirming that these actions involved the 
creation of a regulatory framework enabling criminal conducts involving a disengagement from the 
legal order. By doing so, the Court drew a distinction between the rule of law (as a system of law) 
and regulatory dispositions, asserting that while the rule of law is substantially antagonist to state 
crime, a regulatory framework may be capable of distorting (but not annulling) the law. 
When a regulatory framework is engineered with the aim of providing foundations to do 
crime, rules may become mere formalisms that do not add to the substantial containment on the use 
of violence150. This form of collaboration is not directed to attack the validity of the law, or the 
proscription of the criminal conduct but to obstruct legal constraints to it151; in other words, these 
                                                                                                                           
offenders […] are to be taken to Germany” (paragraph II). Further, these prisoners taken to Germany were 
to be subjected to military procedure “only if particular military interests require this” and, “in case German 
or foreign authorities inquire about such prisoners, they are to be told that they were arrested, but that the 
proceedings do not allow any further information” (paragraph III). 
150 In this respect, Schwendinger & Schwendinger (2014) proposed a distinction between Defenders of 
Order and Guardians of Human Rights. These authors expressed the late sixties’ sentiment of visualizing 
and condemning state crime in the USA (Cohen 1993: 98), denouncing the legal order as having anti-human 
grounds against minorities or allowing external warfare. Using Negri’s and Hardt’s (2000: xv) words on 
Empire, although discourses on legality are continually bathed in blood, the concept of law and legality is 
always dedicated to a perpetual state of peace. 
151 An example of a legal enactment of these forms of containment is the Decree 070 of 1978 in Colombia. 
This decree provided that during the state of siege declared in 1976, alleged crimes were justified if, among 
other things, were committed by provision of law or mandatory order of a competent authority or if they 
were committed by members of the security forces when intervening to prevent and address crimes like 
extortion, kidnapping and drug trafficking. Within human rights movements in Colombia, this norm was 
known as the ‘Decree 007 License to Kill’ (like the cinematographic character of James Bond), because the 
crimes committed by the security forces were expressly excluded from legal scrutiny. Indeed, one of the 
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rules are not general permissions to do wrong but rather limits to the enforcement and law 
intervention vis-à-vis the wrongful actions (inspired on Herstein 2014: 23)152.  
Forms of legal-like authorizations of atrocity are not only manifest or literal, they can also be 
interpretative. Cohen (2003:107) asserted that “powerful forms of interpretive denial come from the 
language of legality itself”. As Cohen (2001; 2003) presents, legalism can entail a powerful 
mechanism of interpretive denial creating a discrepancy between the rhetoric and the reality and 
producing a legal façade substituting the material violations as something less pejorative through the 
use of language153: a “non-pictorial discourse which invariably yields opaque versions of reality” 
(Hogg 2012: 104). Conduct encouraged by legal-like mechanisms can be portrayed as complying 
with legal parameters, can be accredited as performed with proper legal endorsement, normalized 
as part of the ordinary development of the public function, and even desired or considered 
reasonable with the purpose of preserving the statu quo or for preventing greater harms. 
There are legal authorizations that do not seem to be contradictory with the criminal law 
prohibitions but that may become interpretative authorizations or implicit licenses for wrongdoing. 
These regulations do not exempt the application of the criminal law but create a reasonable 
expectation of impunity. An example of this form of containment can be depicted in the case of the 
                                                                                                                           
mechanisms deployed by the State in order to commit crimes is the disposition of a legal framework 
enabling wrongdoing. 
152 In this respect, Colonial Studies have called the attention on the use of law as a device that enables the 
destruction of the colonized, legitimizing colonial violence, criminalization and persecution of those who 
challenge the colonizing power (Atiles 2015: 84). Atiles (2015) does not limit the understanding of law to a 
collaborative regime of spoliation but frames a three-dimensional approach: law is not only destructive but 
derives from a colonial reality and subjectivity, additionally enabling possible resistance when anti-colonial 
movements make use of the law to resist colonialism. 
153 “[M]agical legalism is a method to ‘prove’ that an allegation could not possibly be correct because the 
action is illegal. The government lists domestic laws and precedent, ratifications of international 
conventions, appeals mechanisms and provisions for disciplining violators. Then comes the magical 
syllogism: torture is strictly forbidden in our country; we have ratified the Convention against Torture; 
therefore what we are doing cannot be torture” (Cohen 2003:108). 
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extrajudicial executions perpetrated in Colombia between 2002 and 2010. During this period, the 
country was under the rule of a hard-right government that promoted and supported a law and 
order campaign against the guerrillas aiming at their military elimination. With the purpose of 
encouraging military hits, the Ministry of Defense issued some directives rewarding the killing of 
subversives. For several years, the military executed defenseless peasants and underprivileged 
people presenting them as combat casualties. Under this strategy, the UN Human Rights 
Committee (2010) reported that from 2002 to 2010 over 1,200 Colombian civilians were submitted 
to extrajudicial execution. The military officials who participated in these killings were rewarded 
with money, days-off, special training and even promotions.  
The fact that the executions were rewarded without eliminating the criminal law 
proscription did not entail a legal waiver (after several years some prosecutions took place) but 
created a normative parameter and a political structure  for decision making that somehow repealed 
the operation of the criminal law. From the perspective of law, this can be understood as a matter 
of validity and effectiveness of the legal intervention; however, in the social life the structure of 
authorizations conflicting with criminal law prohibitions can be difficult to detect being at the same 
time sufficiently capable for enabling criminal actions. 
Legal-like authorizations of criminal actions can take the form of a metaphorical discourse 
that in certain contexts can seem banal, but that a contextualized and historicized assessment can 
allow to understand its sociological value and significance. For instance, in the PJ case intercepted 
military communications revealed that the military affirmed in the operation to retake the building: 
‘We hope that if the sleeve is there, the vest does not appear. Over”. Due to the context and 
considering the regular language used in these operations, during the criminal proceedings, Police 
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experts concluded that these communications were an order with coded language to commit illegal 
acts, specifically the order to execute enforced disappearances (Tribunal Superior 2012).  
The context refers to the historic background, the socio-political circumstances and the 
cultural and economic conditions of a given society. These are relevant factors when evaluating if 
an action is executed on behalf of the State. With this respect, for state terrorism, Blakeley (2009: 
41) asserts that while in some cases it is possible to confirm that the State intended to terrorize the 
population, when there is no such evidence “we have to look to the broader context. In the case of 
disappearances, it would be helpful to determine whether there were disappearances of other 
individuals critical of the state during the same period”. For instance, if in Sweden a person is 
missing this situation would probably not be labeled as enforced disappearance at the outset, 
meanwhile, if the same situation occurred in Buenos Aires during the Argentinian dictatorship, one 
would more readily suspect that the absence of the person is probably due to an enforced 
disappearance because that is a recurrent occurrence in that social context.  
The ends and goals that are disposed by the organization with the purpose of guiding the 
criminal actions are not always found in public policies or legal-like dispositions. While there are 
state criminal conducts that are public and even publicized as victorious commands undermining 
rival networks of power or simply as tactics of intimidation against an opponent force (Lasslett 
2012), there are others that are characteristically obfuscated or concealed. These aims may not only 
be observable through positive indicators but may suppose a negative inquiry for detecting the goals 
of the State in situations when there are no manifest or express statements of motivation. While for 
the public cases different evidences are materialized in official propaganda, advertisement, policies, 
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directives and norms; there are crimes that are keep out of the reach of any public scrutiny, before 
which another perspective may be pertinent for their sociological observation.  
In the absence of active and concrete motivational elements, the observer can detect the 
organizational aim through an inference concluding that the actions could only be adequately 
explained through the existence of a state goal. Thus, using a negative perspective the observer of 
state criminality detects the presence of the State motivations through the absence of a different 
probable explanation of the actions. With this respect, Robinson (2014) develops this form of 
observation for cases of crimes against humanity, developing a test based on disclosing the 
organized nature of the acts of violence through the improbability of their random occurrence. This 
test assesses that the policy ingredient is satisfied by showing the improbability that the crimes 
were coincidental individual acts154.  
In this context, the sociological observation of the organizational capacity and coordination 
for the wrongs as well as the common plan of action can be observed through the analysis of the 
opportunity structure155 available for committing the wrongs and the operational control and 
constraint in place for its prevention, restriction or redress. These elements have been raised by the 
state crime literature for the observation of the motivational element deriving from the State 
                                       
154 This seems an adequate criterion for constructing a negative form of observation of state crimes. “More 
recent Tribunal cases are settling on the test of ‘organized nature of the acts of violence and the 
improbability of their random occurrence’. See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Judgment and Sentence, 28 November 2008, ICTR-99-52-A, par. 920; 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Trial Chamber), Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., 
Judgment, 22 February 2001, IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, par. 429; Blaškić, par. 203, see supra note 13” 
(Robinson 2014: 115).  
155 The expression ‘opportunity structure’ was also found in a work of Bryant (1979) where through a 
military sociology he analyzed deviant behavior in the military context.  
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(Kramer, Michalowski and Kauzlarich 2002; Kramer and Michalowski 1990; Kauzlarich and 
Kramer 1998; Rothe and Mullins 2006, 2007, 2008; Green and Ward 2004; Mullins 2009).  
Table No. 9 Factors of observation of the Organizational goal 
Capacity and organization of operation Common plan of action 
Opportunity structure Operational control and constraint 
Means for attaining organizational aims and 
the resources that are made available vis-à-vis 
the intended ends. 
Mechanisms of control, prevention and 
redress, including legal sanctions and social 
overview towards the actions of the State. 
“Being a state (or being in control of one) strongly enhances the ability to create and 
capitalize upon criminal opportunity” (Mullins 2009: 21). When referring to the opportunity 
structure the literature refers to the means available for attaining organizational aims. In this sense, 
means may be offered by the lack of constraints for obtaining an intended goal as they may also be 
given by the personnel assigned to a particular function and their equipment. For instance, when 
security forces are called to react vigorously against social upraise and are given the task of 
neutralizing a group of protesters (a non-criminal instruction, in principle), and to that end they are 
only furnished with lethal weapons, it can be asserted that criminal actions are not discarded and that 
officials are furnished with an express opportunity for wrongdoing. Such disposition may enable a 
sociological observation of an organizational goal fostering a criminal conduct. 
The means are thus related to the organizational structure which indicates the form of 
organization, the degree of specialization, the corporate culture and the codes of conduct of an 
institution and its officers156. In other words, it indicates to what extent an organization is structured 
                                       
156 With this respect Bryant’s work on deviant behavior in the military, assess as factors of such conduct 
“the informal pressures and stains inherent in military culture” and “the structured subversion of 
organizational goals frequently component to military enterprise” (Bryant 1979: 7 in Ross 2000: 120). 
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and designed so that it can either perform criminal actions or refrain from them157. For instance, if a 
specialized military unit that has systematically performed torture in the past is instructed to cross-
examine dangerous suspects, it is expectable that the course of action of the organization will take a 
criminal connotation.  
The described situation supposes the combination of means available to an end and lack of 
control and constraint. This situation can be characterized as the creation of opportunity structures 
enabling criminal-like situations (Mullins & Rothe 2007:138). The operational control and 
constraint158 refers to mechanisms providing forms of excluding, addressing, disabling or 
sanctioning criminal behavior. These can be provided by the action of the legal system159 or can be 
raised by the mass media, by actors as the social movements or the international community, 
among others.  
                                       
157 With this respect, it is relevant to recall the debate on training in the British police between T. Jefferson 
and P. Waddington. The debate started in 1987 with a publication in the British Journal of Criminology by 
both writers. “Waddington (1987) argues that training the police in paramilitary techniques leads to less 
violence, as untrained police are more fearful of […] violence than those with confidence in their ability to 
handle violence. Jefferson attacks this position as ‘idealistically abstract’ (1990: 131) and advocates viewing 
the police from the perspective of those at the bottom […], those driven to protest” (Menzies 2000: 145). 
Hence, Jefferson asserted that paramilitary policing rather undermines the principle of the minimum force. 
Jefferson’s position seems more reasonable. 
158 A part of the state crime literature (Rothe and Mullins 2006) claims a phenomenological distinction 
between constraints and controls; according to which, a constraint is a barrier that operates at the onset of or 
during the action, while a control is the preparation of a blockage of the action operating as an ex post 
sanction. This distinction proposes a temporal-based differentiation involving distinct measures depending 
on their presence either ex ante, during or ex post factum; nonetheless, in the present work we chose to 
group them because of their similar identity as forms of restriction of criminal actions. 
159 In this direction, Gill (2000) studies the forms of control of security intelligence agencies before the 
phenomenon of state crime. Focusing on the Canadian case, he asserts that the rule of law according to 
which the officials are submitted to the same law as the citizens “should provide one of the main checks on 
the abuse of power by the state” (Gill 2000: 102). With this purpose, he assesses that the role of courts is 
fundamental; although, a number of different factors limit judicial control over national security in all 
countries, either because of unwillingness, reluctance or because of legal or political constraints. In the same 
vein, authors as Grabosky (1989 in Ross 2000) assert that state crime is a form of attack against the rule of 
law. 
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Internal controls created by the State to govern its own conduct may exist in the form of 
counterbalances. According to Ross and Rothe (2008), the effectiveness of internal controls to state 
crime is remote. They assert that this kind of controls are usually underfunded and/or understaffed and 
that their purpose is often restricted to alleviating public criticism. On the other hand, external controls 
are those placed out of the structure of States. Authors such as Ross and Rothe (2008) are more 
optimistic about the capacity of this kind of controls for promoting and supporting accountability. The 
role of victims160, human rights activists, social movements, NGOs161, international actors and the 
media162, among other actors, is viewed as relevant sources of external control.  
The absence of controls and the lack of counterweights coming from the State may constitute 
a sociological indicator of motivations for performing deviant actions. Using this perspective, 
Blakeley (2009) refers to the problem of state terrorism163 asserting that an isolated criminal conduct 
                                       
160 Victims of grave human rights breaches have a crucial role in visualizing the violations, giving account 
of the events, identifying the perpetrators and exposing their modus operandi. This role has led to the 
emergence of organizations seeking public awareness of violations, accountability and effective legislation 
against impunity (Buitrago, 2007). Victims who join organizations find such association important because 
it reduces their sense of vulnerability and gives more visibility to their struggle (ASFADDES, 2003). In this 
respect, commentators such as Sikkink (2011) frame the role of civil institutions and actors in building new 
standards, strategies and practices for achieving accountability. Visibility of violations is gained through 
demonstrations, documentation, public campaigning and other strategies raising awareness on this issues. 
161 Human rights defenders can exercise external control. As reported by the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (UN, 2004) a human rights defender is the person that protects or promotes the rights of 
people or groups. In Colombia, human rights defenders are vulnerable to attacks, intimidations and judicial 
prosecutions (Programa Somos Defensores, 2008). These attacks undermine the accountability they are 
seeking in the cases they are litigating. 
162 As major sources of public information, the media are relevant actors to disclose violations and prevent 
abuses of authority. Nonetheless, the media can also create or reproduce justifications and denial of the 
crimes, as well as stigmatize and intimidate victims, witnesses, and judicial officers. Still, journalists in 
Colombia suffer from different constraints preventing them to exercise their profession freely. The IACHR 
(2008) has highlighted that journalists are victims of death threats and other violations that make their work 
particularly vulnerable in the context of an armed conflict. The IACHR (2008) special study on murders of 
journalists showed that between 1995 and 2005 Colombia registered the highest number of journalists killed 
in a country of the Americas region, with seventy-five homicides. 
163 “The state terrorism narrative has […] been utilized by human rights activists and politicians to provide a 
different account of atrocities. In countering justifications based on the notions of war and excesses, this 
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can be differentiated from an act of state (terrorism) through the evaluation of the reaction of state 
institutions against wrongdoing: “[i]f measures are taken, swiftly, to try and punish the perpetrator(s) 
through proper legal and disciplinary channels, and if there is no evidence of a broader pattern of 
such incidents, nor of the state sanctioning such activities, we might conclude that this was a criminal 
act by an individual or group, and not an act deliberately enacted by the state to terrorize” (Blakeley 
2009: 38). On the contrary, we may add, if these restrictions are absent or inoperative, this gap of 
control raises an indicator for the observation of organizational aims.  
Indeed, if the measures of control or redress are deceitful or simply fraudulent (e.g. when 
measures are taken giving a mere appearance of control), or when they are impertinent, remarkably 
futile or irrelevant (e.g. when the control is clearly inapt for limiting the crimes or when measures are 
taken after long time or once the wrongdoing has been recurrently committed or completed), these 
can be relevant factors for the sociological observation of the state organizational aim. These ideas 
may enable an understanding of the link of lack this form of wrongdoing and the accountability 
around it. Let us review this in the next section. 
                                                                                                                           
countermemory narrative pointed instead to how the state was responsible for implementing a systematic yet 
clandestine plan of appalling crimes, from torture to disappearances.” (Lessa, Olsen, Payne, Pereira & Reiter 
2014: 99). In the present work we will not employ the term state terrorism. Different state crime scholars study 
this subject including Penny Green and Ward (2004, 2005), Kramer and Michalowski (2005) and Chambliss 
(1989), among others. In accordance with Blakeley (2009), this approach is used by a small number of 
academics mostly because scholars concerned with (state) crime, she claims, do not tend to study this subject 
as such because it has no existence as a legal category. We decided not to refer to this notion in the present 
work not because the absence of a legal categorization of terrorism but because of the different conceptual, 
ideological and political controversies that it embeds, which we believe we do not have the space to properly 
address in the present research. However, from the expression terrorism we would like to retain the idea that 
the actions of the State that cause terror are an issue related to the criminality of the State. The IA Court judge 
García Ramirez has claimed that “State terrorism means that the State becomes a terrorist, sowing fear and 
alarm among the population, and causing anguish that gravely disturbs the peace that should reign in society” 
(IA Court 2006d: 20). In this respect, for instance, Blakeley (2009) shows how state terrorism has been used in 
the South by Northern states in the service of securing and dominating the resources and markets in the South. 
This is related to the concept of the Colonial State Terror that colonial studies relate to the spoliation and 
exploitation of territories, resources and colonized subjects using state terrorism (Blakeley 2009). 
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4.2.4 Strategy of obstruction of the legal system  
In the literature related to state criminality, there is a recurrent concern for legal 
intervention under the general observation that this kind of wrongdoing often lacks social restraint 
and proper redress (Andreu-Guzmán 1996; Welch 2009; Correa 2009, 2012). In line with this 
general statement, in the case of my father’s assassination, the Prosecutor General affirmed there 
was an apparent impossibility to process the crime derived from the sort of criminality at hand: 
“There is nothing to be done, it is a state crime”. Worldwide, several crimes such as the one 
committed against my father are perpetrated without legal redress164: State-prompted crimes are 
often incited and performed in a way that nobody is held accountable165. Under this premise, in 
this section we will study the relation between this subject and impunity. Subsequently, this 
                                       
164 With this regard, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2009) established that 
investigations in that continent regarding “widespread abuses committed by the security forces in conflict 
situations” have been “plainly insufficient” causing “impunity in cases in which state agents are suspected of 
having ordered or otherwise instigated or covered up crimes committed by non-state agents”. An example of 
this situation is the secret detentions and tortures committed in the context of the counterterrorism campaign 
led by the United States and European countries. “[T]he European governments involved have done little or 
nothing to hold those responsible to account. Italy has gone furthest, convicting Italian and US agents, the 
latter in absentia, for kidnapping a man who was sent to Egypt and tortured, but some of those deemed 
criminally responsible have since received a presidential pardon. Every other criminal investigation in Europe 
into European complicity – in Poland, Lithuania and the UK – is stalled or has been shelved. The UK 
government has shelved the work of a judicial inquiry into allegations of complicity in rendition and torture, 
and instead handed over the task to a parliamentary committee that lacks necessary independence. Successive 
investigations into European complicity by the Council of Europe and European Parliament faced obstruction 
from most of the governments under investigation.” (Raj 2017) 
165 According to the Human Rights Watch 2016 world report, this is a worldwide situation. The organization 
observed inter alia that crimes perpetrated by law enforcement officials result in frequent impunity in 
Georgia (p. 275). In Guatemala, the use of lethal force by the national police is a chronic problem and 
impunity is the rule (p. 292). LGBT people in Kyrgyzstan experience ill-treatment, extortion, and 
discrimination from state actors with widespread impunity (p. 368). In Mexico, unlawful killings of civilians 
by security forces take place amid an atmosphere of systematic and endemic impunity (p. 401). In Nigeria, 
impunity for human rights crimes committed by security forces remains pervasive (p. 422). In the 
Philippines, there is a failure to address impunity for the government’s rights violations (p. 457). In Sri 
Lanka, the organization observed that the government took no significant measures to end impunity for 
security forces abuses, including police use of torture (p. 527). In Ukraine, it noted a widespread perception 
of impunity on part of law enforcement agencies (p. 598). In Venezuela, it referred to impunity for abuses 
by security forces as a serious problem (p. 631). 
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exploration will enable us to address the question: in what sense does the study of state crime 
contribute to a better comprehension of the issue of impunity?  
Considering the researches in the subject, we can assess that the subtraction of the state 
criminal conduct from the organized operations of the criminal justice system is a relevant element 
for a sociological characterization of this kind of criminality. The constitution of different forms of 
obstruction of legal redress may be described using the metaphor of a sanctuary. The idea of 
sanctuaries brings back to an ecclesiastical imagery of the space in temples destined to the high 
altar and the clergy166 to which different civilizations have attributed a sacred character. The 
metaphor of sancturium represents the constitution of social spaces or situations that remain 
inviolable, especially from any measure of force or civil law. Our use of the term in this work 
refers to shelter or protection by virtue of which state criminality take refuge from criminal law 
accountability and general legal intervention. Let us develop this idea. 
In premodern times, people were allowed to flee from justice or persecution within the 
limits of certain ‘sacred’ places (Alston 1912). “Sanctuaries in antiquity were multipurpose. As 
stated in Mosaic Law, they served as shelters to all those being prosecuted or persecuted. [… They] 
were often large places, sheltering persons of all shades and varieties: political dissidents, rebels, 
fugitive prisoners of war, persons deviating from the official creed and opinion, debtors, and of 
course criminals” (Bianchi 1994:139).  
This right survived antiquity and appeared in every major medieval legal tradition 
(Shoemaker 2011: ix). In the Western world, the confluence and tensions between the Christian 
                                       
166 Sanctuary is variously designated apsis or concha (from the shell-like, hemispherical dome), and since 
the Middle Ages especially it has been called “choir”, from the choir of singers who are there stationed. 
Other names are presbyterium, concessus chori, tribuna or tribunal, hagion, hasyton, sanctum, sanctuarium. 
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doctrines and civil powers gave an unprecedented attention to the enshrining of sanctuary as a right 
(Shoemaker 2011: 5). Some modern readings assert that this right emerged due to the imperfection 
of the legal system (d’Mazzinghi 1887) and the vulnerability of certain political regimes (Stanley 
1861) which had to cede part of their power for the preservation of their authority. Although in the 
early Middle Ages this was perceived as an expression of the power of the Catholic Church over 
society, according to Shoemaker (2011) by the later Middle Ages this was perceived as an 
appropriate form of civil government and pious kingship, “occasionally implemented with more 
enthusiasm […] than the papacy found commendable” (Shoemaker 2011: 5). Following this 
interpretation, we can understand that sanctuaries were not expressing a shortcoming of the civil 
political power: “[f]ar from being a concession to the Church by cowardly monarchs, grants of 
sanctuary actually enhanced their status as rulers” (Helmholz 2012: 589). The interpretation of 
Shoemaker (2011) of the right to sanctuary as an epitomized expression of the civil power is useful 
for the metaphor of sanctuary that we use for the conceptualization of state crime: the right to 
sanctuary and sanctuary as containment of the legal system are manifestations of (political) power 
blocking the possibility of legal redress.  
If we accept the assertion by Hart (2012: 27) that “[t]he social function which criminal 
statute performs is that of setting up and defining certain kinds of conduct as something to be 
avoided or done by those to whom it applies, irrespective of their wishes”, the strategy of 
obstruction of the legal system creates a form of exception or pseudo-exclusion of those to whom 
the laws are to be applied upon. This can be portrayed in the PJ case through the repeated refusal of 
retired Col. Plazas to be present at the courthouse because, in his words, “I do not recognize as 
legal or constitutional the trial that is being undertaken by the ordinary jurisdiction” (Juzgado 
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Tercero 2010)167. This contention was also put forward by his wife, Thania Vega (2011: 98), who 
wrote: “he decided not to go to the hearings because he felt that the military did not have minimum 
guarantees in criminal proceedings before civil courts”. The alleged right to special protection and 
to the enforcement of his social status, enunciated through the argument that a special jurisdiction 
was the competent forum for the case, entailed a demand of placing the defendant out of the reach 
of the ordinary criminal law system168.  
These imageries are not only constructed invoking the status of the actors, they are also 
allegedly immunized appealing to the supposed social worth of the actions, the protection of the 
way of life of a particular population or, ultimately, the survival of the State. The imagery of self-
exclusion in sum is drawn on the grounds of an open claim of protection from the ius commune 
regarding conducts which instead weigh against others (paraphrasing Libellus de verbis by Cortese 
in Steinberg 2013: 115).  
The premodern right to sanctuary however similar to the sanctuary created around state 
criminal actions as measures of exclusion from legal restraint, entail considerable differences. Let 
us review three substantial contrasts in order to better characterize sanctuary as containment of the 
legal system: 
i) The first substantial difference is that while the ‘right to sanctuary’ is a legal entitlement in 
                                       
167 The defendant combined this with a continuous substitution of representatives: at least three times 
Plazas’s lawyers resigned in crucial moments of the procedures and, according to Plazas (2011: 377), the 
judge of the first instance appointed sixteen ex-officio lawyers when the defendant did not appoint a legal 
representative. Every time a new lawyer  joined the case, the trial had to be suspended producing undue 
delays. These delays were used by the defense to raise motions of expiration of terms. 
168 The UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings observed that there is sometimes a “conscious 
attempt by military judges to frustrate the efforts of the civilian justice system” (UN 2010b: 16). The UN 
Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances has reported that cases regarding the 
participation of security forces in disappearances generally went unpunished especially when submitted to 
the military jurisdiction (UN 1989: 12). 
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favor of wrongdoers, who therefore enjoy protection from prosecution, for state criminality 
obstruction supposes a strategy and not a legal right. Thus, although an agent of state criminality may 
request, allege or demand the support and defense of the state political structure (to prevent the 
operation of the criminal justice system regarding the problematic criminal situation), such demand 
does not constitute a legal entitlement, since it does not meet a correlative duty, legally enforceable 
and justiciable - using Hohfeld’s categories of analysis of rights.   
Rather, sanctuary for state crime involves the design and implementation of a series of 
maneuvers or stratagems subtracting the wrongs from legal intervention. The efficacy of these 
mechanisms, however endorsed by different resources and machineries connected to the public 
power, is nothing but a probability and their applicability is a matter of force and power and not of 
legal enforceability. The effectiveness of this strategy is contingent, so it can be characterized as a 
constraint (in opposition to a jurisdictional limit recognized as such by the legal system – as in the 
case of the right to sanctuary). However, from a sociological perspective it is noticeable that the 
public authority deriving from the State and the considerable amount of resources that it supposes, 
entail a severe constraint for the legal intervention vis-à-vis state agents’ misconduct: “[S]tate 
officials are in the privileged position of being able to mobilize significant resources to conceal 
their activities” (Lasslett 2012: 126). Under the auspices of these resources, culprits may be 
reasonably admissible for evading legal intervention (inspired in Rodenhäuser 2014: 916).  
The forms of obstruction in opposition to a right to subtraction from the legal system 
operation, become noticeable in the PJ case with the regret that retired Col. Plazas, his family and 
political allies expressed about the supposed lack of support from the Government when the 
prosecution was in place. “They left him alone, in contrast to his attitude […] when he defended 
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the flag that he swore to honor” (Vega 2011: 101). The deception expressed by Plazas when he was 
prosecuted allows portraying a demand for obstructing the legal system that was supposedly not met 
by the political system. As such, this request does not constitute a justiciable right (to be raised before 
the Courts), but a political expectation (presented to the Government). Moreover, such expectation 
expresses the recognition of the ability or at least the pertinence of a (political) action of interference 
for countervailing the legal intervention.  
The PJ case, for example, presented several pressures 
against the autonomous implementation of the criminal law 
program of action, rejecting criminal accountability of the 
military and other high state agents. A paradigmatic graphic 
example of these constraints and their capacity of hampering 
the legal reaction can be found in Picture No. 12 of the 
Parliamentary dossier against President Betancur for the PJ 
events. Its cover states: “Do not touch. PJ Dossier”. 
In the criminal prosecution, the involvement of the political class and the military was 
portrayed among the actors of the case as a permanent and inexorable constraint affecting the ability 
of the criminal justice to produce an autonomous decision. These pressures were particularly visible 
in public statements from the Government (El Espectador 2012b)169 – especially from Presidents 
Uribe170 and his successor Santos171, the Military High Command (CM& 2011), the retired Generals 
                                       
169 When the Appeal Court asked the International Criminal Court Prosecutor to investigate former president 
Betancur (Tribunal Superior 2012), the government expressed ‘deep concern’ for this provision. 
170 When the ruling against Plazas was issued in 2010, then President Alvaro Uribe publicly expressed his 
regrets for the decision. In a publicized meeting President Uribe and the Military Commanders 
‘examined’ the ruling declaring to the media that Plazas’s conviction was a piece of “legal insecurity” 
Picture No. 12 Retrieved from 
Caracol Radio 2012. 
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and military veterans’ (Revista Cambio 2007), some Congressmen172, some of the heads of the 
largest business corporations and high-level politicians (Revista Semana 2012b)173. Regarding this 
situation, the UNHCHR asserted that political and media pressure against the verdict posed “a threat 
to judicial independence and can increase the vulnerability of judicial officials and victims’ families 
and their representatives” (UN 2012). 
The described interference from the political system reminds the metaphor of sanctuary as an 
act of kingship (in the sense of the right to sanctuary), demonstrating the intention and ability of the 
political power to obstruct the operation of justice. Sanctuary for state crime is a strategy of 
protection from prosecution supported by social systems capable of exercising some sort of intrusion. 
In these cases, the independence, authority, competence and impartiality of the judiciary are affected 
by influences alien to the administration of justice, intervening the circuit of operation of the criminal 
justice174. 
                                                                                                                           
against the military while the Armed Forces Commander remarked the expectation of the institutions that 
the decision would be reconsidered (Revista Cambio, 2010).  
171 When the Superior Court of Bogota acting as the appeal Court in the PJ case ordered in 2012, to different 
state authorities to hold a public ceremony apologizing for the crimes committed on PJ (Tribunal Superior de 
Bogota 2012), President Santos decided to offer a public apology “on behalf of all Colombians” to President 
Betancur and the Armed Forces for the Appeal Court decision (El Espectador, 2012c). 
172 The then Congress President expressed about the Appeal Court ruling:“the judiciary commits excesses 
when it comes to judge the security forces” (Revista Semana 2012a) 
173 In September 2011, the former vice-president, the heads of the largest business corporations and high-
politicians published a front-page article in the journal El Tiempo entitled “Why Colonel Plazas Vega is not 
free yet?”, pushing for Plazas liberty. The Congress also put pressure on the case during the debates of a 
Transitional Justice Bill. The author of the project declared that the Bill could correct the “historic mistake” 
of sentencing the military in the PJ case. 
174 The Inter-American jurisprudence has established that judicial independence is essential for the exercise 
of the judicial function (IA Court 2004h: 171; 2005e: 145; 2009b: 67). This principle gives rise to a series of 
guarantees and rights, as the protection of judges against external pressures, guaranteeing their working 
conditions, stability and due process of appointment and dismissal. The IA Court has understood that the 
tenure of judicial officers under these parameters ensures judicial protection against interference and 
political pressures. 
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These forms of obstruction do not constitute proper rights. Their operation remains dependent 
on different social factors and their implementation remain contestable as unlawful. Thus, we are 
able to characterize this issue as a struggle between the criminal law system and those institutions 
or systems acting as protectors, interested parties or collaborators of the crimes (e.g. the military or 
the political system). This tension may involve an asymmetry of power between the legal system 
and the intervening system, impeding the former to react autonomously; in other words, the 
organized criminal group might be powerful enough to co-opt any scrutiny. 
In the PJ case, for instance, lawyer German Romero (representative of some of the victims) 
asserted: “in this case one wonders how far the power of the military can go. Even today, the 
procedures depend on their acquiescence; the prosecutions are nothing but scratches on the wall”. The 
perception that the case was permanently submitted to interference and the feeling of impotence 
captured by the expression ‘scratches on the wall’ proposes a metaphor of a blockage affecting the 
judicial procedures (the wall) and a situation of asymmetry of power. The asymmetry of power 
concerns the possibility of action of the judicial system vis-à-vis the ability of the defendant 
interfering the judicial procedures (building a wall) and the vulnerability of the victims.  
Different studies frame the phenomenon of impunity as a problem of power. In 1898, Tarde 
observed that powerful actors often escape from accountability and public redress placing them above 
the law. Tarde (1898) referred to this problem as ‘impunity’ shielding the strong (in terms of political 
power) from punishment. Tarde’s work is useful for indicating a problem of certain social systems or 
actors who are able to obstruct the possibility for implementing the criminal law program of action 
(although in his work Tarde preserved the traditional construction of impunity as opposed to 
punishment). With this respect, the prosecutor of the PJ case, who was dismissed from her position 
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afterwards, concluded: “when those submitted to prosecution are powerful people and [you as] a 
prosecutor enter their domains, you might suffer the consequences” (El Espectador 2011).  
ii) The second substantial difference is that the medieval right to sanctuary enabled a 
composition system. According to this, the wrongdoer was protected from prosecution until a fine 
was paid, amends were made, goods were forfeit, or penance or exile took place, after which the 
person was exempted from corporal or capital punishment (Shoemaker 2011).  
 “Let no one dare drag forth a guilty one who has fled to a church, neither give him over to 
punishment or death, that the honor of churches may be preserved; but let rectors strive to 
obtain the fugitive’s peace, life and members. However, let [the fugitive] make lawful 
composition for that which he did iniquitously” (Gratian’s Decretum at C. 17. q. 4. c. 8 in 
Corpus Iuris Canonici, 1879–81 in Shoemaker 2011: 157). 
While sanctuary for state crime may also be understood as a mechanism of protection in favor 
of the wrongdoer, it does not refer the parties of a problematic situation to any other form of 
composition or compensation to victims or society. In this context, the form of containment that we 
are describing may not only involve the concealment of the misconduct - ranging from methodical 
obfuscation, to denial or different forms of justification and excuses175. Containment may also take the 
form of express endorsement, direct acknowledgement or indirect recognition of the actions without 
admitting their consequences, followed by the subsequent obstruction of the criminal justice reaction.  
In short, for state crime, the mechanisms of denial, obfuscation, protection and moralization 
may portray legal intervention as implausible, absurd176 and, even, unjust177. In this context, there 
                                       
175 A regular justification of state criminal conduct is the allusion to the raison d’état as a narrative of 
necessity and urgency according to which wrongdoing is performed for the sake of the State. The raison 
d’état does not necessarily deny the illegality of the conduct but intends to legitimate it as an ultimate 
measure, a savior resource and ultima ratio for protecting a superior interest: in the words of Foucault 
(1991: 138), the reason of state adopts the form of the infringement of the principles of law, equity and 
humanity in the sole interest of the State. 
176 In public statements, retired colonel Plazas stressed that he had saved many people in the PJ siege and 
that the suggestion of his participation in the crimes was ‘absurd’ (Gibson, Salazar, 2012). 
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is no alternative legal response to the problematic situation, there is simply no offer for a solution 
and, essentially, no acknowledgement of the problematic situation.  
iii) This is related to the third substantial difference, which is that the right to sanctuary 
entails a form of addressing wrongdoing rather than a way of obfuscating the misconduct. In its 
medieval form, the right to sanctuary was attributed to individualized wrongdoers recognizing their 
infractions against which the legal system refrained from reacting. On the contrary, sanctuary for 
state crime is meant to obfuscate the conduct, to hamper the application of the code crime/non-
crime and to preserve the anonymity of the criminal (or at least of her actions as performed on 
behalf of the State). 
With respect to state crime, the containment of the legal intervention may be implemented 
through strategies of silencing and denial. For instance, in the PJ case, the Truth Commission 
established that a political pact of silence was implemented concealing the misconducts committed 
during the PJ military operation: the complaints for the disappearances were not seriously addressed 
in the aftermath of the events, they were ignored and dealt with silence (Gómez, Herrera and Pinilla 
2010).  
Besides silence obfuscating the misconducts and hampering the recognition of the crimes, 
sanctuary may entail a “general acceptance of the relevant normative code whilst seeking to 
exempt the particular situation at hand” (Hogg 2012: 90). This entails a form of denial: a 
knowledge of the situation without the acknowledgment of what it involves. “Denial, then, 
includes cognition (not acknowledging the facts); emotion (not feeling, not being disturbed); 
                                                                                                                           
177 In 2007, twenty retired Generals presented a letter to the Prosecutor General expressing their 
‘indignation’ for the ‘unjust detention’ of the military in the case (Revista Cambio, 2007). 
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morality (not recognizing wrongness or responsibility) and action (not taking active steps in 
response to knowledge)” (Cohen 2001: 9).  
Denial may be expressed through verbal statements or other discourses. As Cohen (2001) 
has underscored, there are at least three main classes of denial statements (referring to the object 
denied): the raw facts (literal denial), their meaning (interpretative denial) or the implications that 
follow from them (implicatory denial). Literal denial is usually present as: ‘nothing happened’. In 
the PJ case, retired Col. Plazas has affirmed many times that there are no disappeared in the case, 
while several times he has also affirmed the opposite: 
‘People did not disappear’178 
“They are accusing me of disappearing 
people who have not disappeared” (Caracol 
TV 2011). 
“Such thing as the disappeared of the Palace 
of Justice simply does not exist” (El 
Heraldo 2012) 
“If we analyze what the legal procedures 
against military officials found […] you can 
notice that the cafeteria employees never 
came out alive” (Plazas 2011: 27). 
“There are no disappeared people” (RCN 
2012, min. 4’) 
‘People were disappeared’ 
In 2008, Plazas published a book where he 
affirmed that Irma Franco “[…] is the only person 
about whom there is evidence that survived and 
was brought to the Casa del Florero, where she 
was interrogated by intelligence officers. At eight 
o'clock in the evening, a group of men in civilian 
clothes took her in a jeep. Since then, she does not 
appear” (Plazas 2008: 5).  
“The M19 is the one responsible for what 
happened. I think the M19 is not responsible for 
forced disappearance but for murdering. I want to 
make clear that the only disappeared is the 
guerrilla Irma Franco”179 (Revista Semana 2015) 
 
Denial statements can be directed not only to the facts themselves but also to their 
conventional interpretation (interpretative denial). These are hermeneutic in nature and are 
expressed through a “phraseology […] needed if one wants to name things without calling up 
mental pictures of them” (Orwel, Politics and English Language; 362 in Cohen 2001: 107). The 
                                       
178 This affirmation is also sustained by a publication from the Corporación Defensoría Militar (2013) that 
concludes that in the case there are no people disappeared but corpses without proper identification.  
179 In 2013, Plazas’s defense had already affirmed that “[i]n the PJ one person disappeared” (El Colombiano 
2013). 
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usual interpretative denial statement is: ‘it is not what it looks like’. In the PJ case, retired Col. 
Plazas asserted that there were no disappearances but killings (performed by the guerrilla), wrong 
identifications of the bodies, or even good treatment and proper consideration toward the hostages: 
‘People did not disappear, they are dead 
or unidentified’ 
 
 “I insist: there are no disappeared” (Plazas 
in Diario El Espectador 2012).   
“They are not disappeared, they are dead 
because they were killed by the M19” (El 
Colombiano 2012; Plazas 2011: 27). 
 
‘I am the rescuer, not the perpetrator. Others 
are responsible for what happened’ 
 
“According to the prosecutor, retired Col. Plazas 
was coauthor of enforced disappearance just 
because he was cautious in dealing with the 
released hostages. What a conclusion! […] It turns 
out that an act of mere courtesy with the hostages 
[…] trying to give them preferential treatment, 
when they were going out of that nightmare 
produced by M19 terrorists, called by the 
prosecutor ‘a rebel group’ […] is the evidence of 
having committed such an atrocious crime as the 
one for which I have been wrongly accused? […] 
No, Madame Prosecutor, that is not an argument 
of Col. Plazas ordering mistreatments or 
disappearance of people. It rather indicates quite 
the contrary” (Plazas 2008: 60-62) 
Denial statements may also focus on the implication of the events (implicatory denial). In 
these cases, the denial relates to the psychological, political or moral implications that follow a 
wrongdoing. “Implicatory denial concedes the facts of the matter and even their conventional 
interpretations. But their expected implications […] are not recognized. The significance of the 
reality is denied. These are ‘denials’ in the loosest sense. They evade the demand to respond by 
playing down the act’s seriousness or by remaining indifferent” (Cohen 2001: 22). These 
mechanisms are numerous; some of them are the denial or minimization of the victims, the 
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condemnation of the condemners, the advantageous comparisons with alleged aims and the 
scapegoating180.  
The minimization of the victims takes place when the implications of the harmful actions 
are minimized or unrecognized. In the PJ case, this form of denial had many expressions. For 
instance, when the victims’ demands were portrayed as desperate expressions due to their social 
vulnerability181: 
‘All they want is money’ 
Plazas (2011) published a book entitled The Business of Pain, were he argued that the prosecution was 
part of a “business” created by unscrupulous individuals who profit from the suffering of others (Plazas 
2011: 327). According to him, investigations were prompted by a group of people that were focused on 
taking economic compensation out of the situation: “we have to remember that they are very humble 
people. The business of pain” (Plazas 2011: 135). In different opportunities, Plazas (2011) has assessed 
that the families of the disappeared are desperate to have money because they are poor. 
Other forms of implicatory denial are advantageous comparisons claiming the benefit of a 
collective goal through arguments of convenience of the wrongdoing. This can be noticed when the 
violations are portrayed as mechanisms preventing other harmful activities, when the victims are 
exposed as worthy of harm, or when violations are considered as defending higher interests (Cohen 
2011). An example of this logic can be found in the PJ case: Col. Plazas, who was in command of 
the field operation, improvised a press conference in the middle of the military operation. When 
asked what the military were doing, he asserted: “Here we are pal, saving the democracy!” This 
                                       
180 Scape goating aims at blaming some ‘bad apples’ for the misconduct of the group. This argument aims at 
maintaining the credibility of the system as well as making believable the rhetorical denial of the violations 
(IPC and Corporación Jurídica Libertad 2010). 
181 The portrait of the victims as individuals interested just in money is questioned in the interviews of the 
case as will be reviewed in chapter 5. Reparations do not seem to be the main argument why victims seek 
justice. In a general scenario, this was found on a research on the prosecution of crimes against unionized 
workers in Colombia where La Rota, Montoya and Uprimny (2010) concluded that only in 8.3% of the 
dossiers for violence against unionists victims requested the economic reparation of the damage. However, 
according to the study, in most cases the judge ordered ex officio financial compensation for the vict 
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phrase has remained as a stigma of the military operation to which the victims have replied: 
“murdering and disappearing people is no way for saving democracy!”182 
According to Aldana-Pindell (2004), the social acceptance of justifications can create a 
representation of empathy with the perpetrators. This could make prosecutions less likely because 
of the social consideration for the violations. Denial affects not only the information about the 
person disappeared, but also the denunciations or demonstrations that can be easily portrayed as 
conjectures or part of conspiracy plans. “The general uncertainty as to what is really happening 
makes it easier to cling to lunatic beliefs. Since nothing is ever quite proved or disproved, the most 
unmistakable fact can be imprudently denied” (Orwel 1984: 315, in Hogg 2012: 92).  
‘There are no evidences’ 
“There is no evidence to suggest that there 
are people disappeared. The evidences that 
the prosecutor Buitrago presents to the 
public opinion through the mass media, 
¡are false! […] If there is no evidence, 
there is no crime of forced disappearance. 
And, if there is no crime of forced 
disappearance, there is no way that civil 
courts have competence on this matter” 
(Plazas 2011: 29) 
‘I am too clever to do things as what they say that 
happened’ 
“How could it make sense that Col. Plazas, whose 
troops helped to rescue at least two hundred and sixty 
people, would have taken a group of workers who 
served coffee to torture and kill them afterwards? 
That is outrageous”. “Col. Plazas, who has always 
been in top places […] is not so clumsy as to have a 
group of people killed and buried in the same military 
unit he was commanding” (Plazas 2011: 257).   
The condemnation of the condemners is a form of implicatory denial relevant to strategies of 
obstruction, by which the person accused of wrongdoing reply to the legal control with an accusation. 
In some situations, a person blamed for a crime can argue tu quoque by turning accusations back on 
the accuser. In the PJ case, retired Col. Plazas (2011) asserted that the testimonies of the prosecution 
                                       
182 “At the time of the massacre in the Palace of Justice, and habitually, the military leadership depicted 
itself, and was described by the admiring media and politicians, as the defenders of democracy. And they 
are indeed the designated defenders of the particular version of democracy they defend with such ferocity. 
The Palace of Justice is a chilling but fascinating exploration of the realities that underlie the copious 
rhetoric of a pseudo-democracy.” (Cruise 1993: 9-10) 
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were frauds organized by ‘dangerous communists’ and her wife asserted that the people who gathered 
them were a ‘coalition of terrorists’ and a group of ‘monstrosities of evil’ (Vega 2011: 57). According 
to retired Col. Plazas, human rights NGOs, especially those involved in the procedures, are industries 
of conspiracy against the military and ‘apologists of terrorism’ that want to change democracy for a 
‘totalitarian Marxist system’ by manipulating the justice system (Plazas 2011: 259-260). Also, he 
affirmed the prosecution was accomplice with drug trafficking and criminal gangs: “the organized 
crime infiltrated the judicial system” (Plazas 2011: 327).  
In 2010 the judge of the case, María Jara, received death threats related to Plazas’s trial. In 
that same year, during an audience, Judge Jara denounced publicly that a false intelligence report was 
issued implicating her in drug trafficking (El Espectador 2010). Even though the IACHR (2010) 
granted precautionary measures to Judge Jara and her son, the threats continued and she had to flee 
the country right after she issued the conviction against retired Col. Plazas. Other judicial officers 
were also harassed at crucial moments of the PJ procedures: in 2009, Magistrate Claros was 
threatened when he was deciding whether the case should fall under military jurisdiction (El 
Espectador 2009a); and in 2011, prosecutor Buitrago denounced that during the procedures different 
journal editorials were issued implicating her in drug trafficking (El Espectador 2011) and qualifying 
her as a guerrilla collaborator. Additionally, in the official website of the Ministry of Defense a photo 
of her was published being targeted by a sniper.  
Stigmatization is linked with this form of implicatory denial, facilitating to accuse the 
accusers as the ‘real’ deviant. The prosecutor of the case and the judges were not the only target of 
different acts of violence and criminal and disciplinary complaints for malfeasance, forgery, fraud 
and conspiracy presented by Plazas’s defense; the victims were recurrently stigmatized as well. 
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Incriminating the victims in the siege and portraying them as the ‘real’ deviants was used as a 
justification for the atrocities. An event of stigmatization frequently raised by the interviewees is 
the case of René Guarín (brother):  
‘The case: a Greek tragedy set up by guerrillas’ 
In 2010, a radio station informed that René Guarín had been involved in the M19 guerrilla during the 
80s (W-Radio 2010). At the same time, Journalism without Borders released an article identifying 
him as a ‘guerrilla’ who had planned a plot against the military “setting up a Greek tragedy” to falsely 
implicate Plazas for a crime that he had never committed: the disappearance of his sister (Periodismo 
Sin Fronteras, 2010).  
Mr. Guarín admitted before the press his participation in the guerrilla, for which he had been granted 
an amnesty (El Espectador 2010c). In a personal interview, he asserted: “I decided to join the 
guerrilla and then I demobilized […]. When my sister disappeared, I decided to take the risk of war. I 
went to prison. I was tortured. […] Those are life choices that people make”. This information was 
revealed a month and a half after the first ruling for the PJ case and motivated death threats against 
Mr. Guarín, who fled the country in fear of death in 2011.  
In his book, Plazas (2011: 192) affirmed that the procedures had been promoted by people like Mr. 
Guarín who was a ‘guerrilla’, a ‘kidnapper’, a ‘bank assailant’ and a ‘robber’. The use of this sort of 
justifications was also present in the criminal hearings. Before this, in one of the hearings prosecutor 
Buitrago concluded that retired Col. Plazas aimed at making the victims look like the enemies (El 
Espectador 2012b). According to the UNHCHR, in Colombia there is a tendency to discredit and 
stigmatize the victims of human rights violations (UN 2012). 
The strategies of obstruction directed to the victims started when they received threats urging 
them to stop the search for their loved ones (IA Court 2014: 304). This implied a form of 
neutralization of the system, because the victims were the main actors pushing for the criminal law 
investigations. Additionally, their legal representative, Lawyer Umaña, was threatened from the 
beginning of the inquiries183 resulting in his assassination in April 1998184. With this regard, María 
Navarrete (wife) affirmed: “when Eduardo Umaña was killed I thought the case was lost”. According 
to Jorge Franco (brother), when this happened “I completely stopped everything [referring to the 
search of information about his sister], because I thought none of that legal activity was worth it” 
                                       
183 In August 1987, a pamphlet threatening Umaña signaled him as a lawyer critical of the PJ military 
operation. 
184 In that same month, Umaña had obtained a Court Order for the exhumation of the PJ remains. 
 224 
 
 
(Juzgado Tercero 2010: 116). With this regard, Rosa Cárdenas (sister) said: “they killed the person 
who was like our father, who was taking us down that little road of justice; those were very sad times 
and the case was paralyzed”.  
This form of blockage against the justice operators, the victims and their legal representative 
was also directed against the information that they had gathered. In this regard, Ángela Buitrago 
(Prosecutor) assessed that over seventy-five videos and several audio recordings of military 
communications that were part of the dossier had disappeared when she assumed the investigations 
on the case. Blockages against the justice system when assessing evidence may constitute a factor of 
impunity impeding the system to ascertain the facts, to establish the wrongdoing and to determine 
those responsible for them. This happens, for instance, when witnesses are affected. In the PJ case, 
out of the group of witnesses, a former military called Edgar Villamizar declared in 2007 that he had 
eye witnessed the torture of at least five people who, according to him, had been brought to the 
Cavalry School in 1985 (Revista Semana 2015). At a turning point of the trial, Villamizar vanished 
(El Espectador: 2009b; Tribunal Superior 2012: 403) and in 2011 retracted his confessions declaring 
before the Procuraduría that he had never served as a witness in the process185. Finally, in 2015, 
Thania Vega (Plazas’s wife) tweeted: “Villamizar, who had the courage to denounce that his 
supposed testimony against Plazas was false, has died. May he rest in peace” (El Tiempo 2015b). 
The attack against the forms of gathering evidences is particularly relevant in cases of 
enforced disappearance because this violation is based on the lack of information on the whereabouts 
of the person abducted. By erasing the traces of the person abducted, perpetrators delete traces of 
                                       
185 In this respect Villamizar asserted: “Mis apellidos son Villamizar Espinel y no Villarreal; soy de Cúcuta 
y no de Pamplona; la firma que aparece al final no es la mía (...) Tampoco es cierto que estuve en la Escuela 
de Caballería, la única vez que estuve allá fue en el año de 1982, cuando me enviaron del Batallón Vargas a 
adelantar un curso de contraguerrilla urbana" (El Tiempo 2015b) 
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their criminal actions and possible accountability. If there is no crime, there cannot be any 
responsibility, and of course, no legal redress.  
The former observations enable us to establish as a relevant element of state criminality the 
constitution of forms of strategies obstructing the legal system. Through the metaphor of the 
sanctuary we were able to characterize this strategy of obstruction as a series of maneuvers or 
stratagems aiming at making criminal actions and their actors unavailable for legal intervention, 
and particularly inaccessible or untouchable for the criminal law system186. In this context, the lack 
of control of crimes is not to be reduced to a failure of restraint but may be observed as an intended 
outcome fostered by social systems alien to the legal system. Indeed, the strategy of obstruction of 
the legal redress may be enforced by different social systems, creating a safe space for perpetrators 
beyond the reach of the criminal justice187. 
                                       
186 David (2006) proposes a classification of delinquents according to their interaction with the criminal law 
system referring to four categories: the sacrificeable (under-privileged people who are recurring clients of 
the criminal justice system), the undesirables (deviants that regardless of their danger are portrayed as 
threatening and, hence, repressed through a combination of social control mechanisms), the inaccessible 
(delinquents who are hardly reached by the legal system, because of their skills, status or power) and the 
untouchables (who enjoy legal immunity from prosecution). 
187 An additional difference between the rights to sanctuary and sanctuary for state crime is that the latter 
cannot be physically delimited. In this sense, there is also a difference with Gerald Neuman’s (1996) 
‘anomalous zones’. Through this expression the scholar refers to geographic areas or particular contexts 
wherein certain principles accepted as general to the wider society are suspended in regard to certain 
problematic situations. Within this idea, Neuman (1996) studies two examples: the red districts and 
Guantanamo refugee camps. In reference to the red districts, Neuman observes that the legal system 
tolerates activities that are normally considered as illegal (and even criminal in some cases), without need 
of a general assessment of breaking the validity of the legal order. In this same study, Neuman studies 
Guantanamo as a refugee camp, especially for Haitians. This is an example of the anomalous zones, 
because Guantánamo in this case (and so many more, we can add) emerges as a place where foreigners 
are deprived of their constitutional rights, including rules that are claimed to be essential to the legal 
system and that, although suspended, do not imply the formal deletion of the existing order. Within the 
study of ‘anomalous zones’ there is the authorization of certain activities, in favor or against certain 
people, without invalidating the legal order. This double condition shows a similarity with the metaphor 
of sanctuary to state crime, since on the one hand there is no general invalidation of the order and, on the 
other hand, it is presented as both a benefit to ‘all’ and an impairment to ‘certain people’. 
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From this section we can therefore conclude that the characterization of state criminality 
allows to draw a relation with the phenomenon of impunity as well as it enables the observation of 
different elements for a construction of the concept of impunity. With this respect, one of the main 
indications is the localization of the problem outside the internal operation of the justice system. 
When reviewing the subject of state criminality, we were able to observe an environmental 
intervention obstructing the possibility for implementing the criminal law program of action. In this 
sense, when observing the problem of impunity we should consider the interactions of the legal 
system with other social systems and actors capable of affecting the autonomous operation of the 
criminal justice.   
These considerations may be important for the reconstruction of the concept of impunity that 
will be developed in detail in the successive parts of the present work. For the moment, a word of 
caution is in order with respect to the extent of the phenomenon that we are designating as 
obstruction: any form of pressure, opposition or tension against the judicial system does not 
constitute the problem that we are referring. The problem of obstruction, as we are able to frame it 
through the study of state criminality, is quite singular and specific: this phenomenon emerges when 
the judicial system is unable to maintain, preserve and guarantee its possibility of autonomously 
implementing the criminal law program of action. This perspective, coming from the characterization 
of state criminality, raises important elements for a sociological reconstruction of the concept of 
impunity. Let us now concentrate in this possible reconstruction. With this purpose, we will draw a 
characterization of the literature and social discourses dealing with impunity, in order to subsequently 
offer a reconstruction of this issue from a sociological perspective. 
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5. Impunity 
 
This part of the research aims at problematizing, elucidating and reconceptualizing 
‘impunity’ from a socio-legal perspective. With this purpose, we will first determine: how has 
impunity been observed until now? And, furthermore, how to critically assess discourses about 
impunity in contemporary societies? This study will allow us to depict the forms that the term 
impunity adopts in social discourses as well as to problematize the blind spots and paradoxes that 
these conceptualizations produce. In this regard, we will focus on the constructions coming from the 
criminal law and the human rights188 . These are two relevant fields of observation which have 
produced profuse and leading representations on the subject of impunity. Through this analysis and 
problematization, we will attempt at establishing pertinent elements for delimiting a notion of 
impunity from a sociological perspective. Ultimately, this chapter of the research will attempt at 
addressing the following question: how can we observe, conceptualize and characterize impunity 
from a sociological perspective? 
With regard to this question, we aim at elucidating what should be excluded from the 
notion of impunity – what is not impunity as a general sociological phenomenon; and, what 
                                       
188 This work will not embark on a discussion about the content of human rights. It will not elaborate on its 
propensity to imperialism (Hardt and Negri, 2009), on its lack of neutrality and universality (Mutua, 1996; 
2001), on its ineffectiveness (Hathaway, 2002), or on its depoliticizing effect (Savage, 2008). This work will 
simply accept that the scope of human rights is wide-ranging, covering the basic conditions of respect and 
promotion for human life and dignity –which are themselves expanding concepts. However we consider 
human rights should consist on the protection and guarantee of life and dignity according to a social 
program of humanism and social justice. 
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conceptual elements should be relevant for constructing a socio-legal notion of impunity capable of 
avoiding the problems and paradoxes that we will refer to and analyze. For this construction, we 
will use as an empirical point of reflection the phenomenon of state criminality. However, we 
believe that the conceptualization proposed here will be useful for describing “impunity” in all 
criminal matters (and not only in reference to state crimes). Certainly, this is a theoretical statement 
that can be revised and evaluated by other empirical studies or theoretical reflections. 
5.1. Impunity in social discourses: a tale of ambiguous unanimity   
Impunity is more easily recognized or proclaimed than defined and there is not a consistent 
effort of reflection and clarification of this issue. Much like pornography or terrorism, this term 
presents a limited distinctiveness but a recurrent usage in social discourses189. Most of these 
discourses are charged with a political and emotional burden of social denunciation and unease. 
While an observer can find a frequent reference to the topic, it is extremely difficult to delimit the 
concept of impunity. How has impunity been observed until now? How can we observe, 
conceptualize and characterize impunity from a sociological perspective? 
Information on the subject of impunity is vast and diverse190. In internet an enormous 
amount of information, sources and themes are associated to this topic. Until April 2017, there 
                                       
189 Inspired on Ben-Naftali and Michaeli (2003: 270) when referring to terrorism. “Like pornography, too, 
this discursive illusiveness is essentially due to the political and emotional baggage attached to the activity” 
(Ben-Naftali and Michaeli 2003: 270) 
190 When searching for the word ‘impunity’ in google scholar, between 1990 and 2000, 23,900 documents 
were produced on this subject; between 2000 and 2010, there were 30,900; and, between 2010 and 2015, 
there were 20,300 documents. While there is a phenomenon of expansion of internet access and the 
academic production worldwide has increased in number, these numbers nonetheless indicate the magnitude 
of the increase on the production of documents related to the subject of impunity being as significant as 
10,000 documents more every decade. 
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were 13,3 million web pages (!) for the English word “impunity” in Google191 and 163.000 papers 
in Google scholar192. A random exploration of these sources can give the impression that impunity 
has been virtually related to every social life problem. In this context, conceptual delimitations on 
the term are obscure and vague. While the legal doctrine has produced different documents on this 
subject, it is rare to find sociological or criminological studies developing this notion. In 
sociological and criminological empirical research, impunity is often enunciated as a reference to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the justice system rather than through conceptual reflection (for 
example, referring to the number of cases unsolved by the police or lacking final judgment). In 
other words, the notion is “automatized” without having been object of theoretical attention. 
Indeed, reviewing different sociological and criminological handbooks and dictionaries in the 
search for a notion of impunity193, it is often hard to find a definition of the term at all.  
Etymologically, the word impunity comes from the Middle French word impunité which is 
derived from the Latin expression impunitatem. With regard to its semantics, this term is 
understood as a wrongdoing without (official) penalty, as an assimilated form of in and poena - 
opposite to punishment (Online Etymology Dictionary, n.d.; Skeat 1936; Craig, 1861: 1017). 
Indeed, at least since the seventeenth century, impunity as the exemption from punishment became 
                                       
191 In Spanish (impunidad), there are about 12,700,000 results; in potuguese (impunidade), there are 2,960,000 
results; in French (impunité) there are about 4,000,000 results; in Italian (impunità), there are 677,000 results. 
192 In Spanish (impunidad), there are about 71,100 results; in potuguese (impunidade), there are 32,400 
results; in French (impunité) there are about 28,800 results; in Italian (impunità), there are 11,500 results. 
193 No reference on this notion was found on: the critical dictionary of sociology by Boudon, R., & 
Bourricaud, F. (1989), on the Handbook of sociology by Smelser (1988), on the Sociology 6th edition of 
Giddens and Sutton (2009), on the The Oxford handbook of criminology by Morgan, Maguire and Reiner 
(2007), The Sage dictionary of criminology edited by McLaughlin and Muncie (2006).  
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identified as the dominant form of the term in Latin languages as French or Spanish194. Today, the 
starting point of different texts is the (etymological) characterization of impunity as the lack or 
absence of (due) punishment (i.a. Pensky 2008; Acosta 2011). However, this definition does not 
provide the observer with a clear notion from the sociological perspective because, among other 
things, this notion limits the phenomenon to a non-modifiable state of affairs that, as such, could 
not be overcome. Moreover, the horizon that it covers remains elusive also in respect to what can 
be referred to as ‘punishment’.  
Following another line of thought, according to Tarde (1898), impunity was originally 
understood as the legal protection of the paterfamilias’ authority over their descendants or the 
master’s over his slaves: the legal system could not challenge their authority over their family or 
their property, thus assuring impunity over their wrongdoing in these contexts. Impunity was thus 
understood as a legal subtraction from the attribution of responsibility. Submitted to historical 
transformations, the perception of impunity has experienced various modifications as it has been 
gradually and progressively understood as regretful. In this context, political and legal systems 
                                       
194 In the French language, the Dictionnaire de l'Académie française of the years of 1694, 1792, 1798, 1872, 
1932, 1835 and 1992, impunité is the lack of punition - manque de punition. The only variations in the 
Dictionnaire are the editions of the years 1694, 1792 and 1835. In the years 1694 and 1792 impunity was 
portrayed as a matter of power, being the lack of punition of those who have the authority and the exercise of 
power (pour ceux qui ont l'authorité & le pouvoir en main); while in 1835, the reference to power was not 
present but it was added to the lack of punition, the exemption from a deserved punishment (exemption d'une 
peine méritée). 
Revieweing the semantics of ‘impunity’ in Spanish we find a similar situation than in French: this term 
emerges as well as the exemption from punishment. The Academic dictionary of the Real Academia de la 
Lengua Española of the years 2001, 1992, 1925, 1884, 1817 and 1780, present an identical 
conceptualization of impunidad, which is the lack of castigation - falta de castigo. Further, the meaning of 
the word castigo (that we have translated here as castigation but could also be translated as punishment) in 
the same documents was conceptualized as the penalty imposed to someone who has committed a crime or a 
wrongdoing - pena que se impone a quien ha cometido un delito o falta. Thus, since the thirteenth century 
the word impunidad has had the unaltered significance of the absence of punishment to someone who has 
committed a crime or a wrongdoing. 
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have increasingly and largely abandoned the view of impunity as a valid or appropriate social 
mechanism. Still, in the early nineteenth century we can find a strong tendency embracing 
impunity as a valid and positive mechanism for dealing with social unease, political transition or 
situations of “widespread”195 criminality.   
With regard to impunity as a valid mechanism for dealing with social unease, the subjacent 
argument was that impunity could allow other social remedies to be implemented in situations of 
extraordinary social tension when criminal law repression could be unbearable for maintaining 
order. This idea also took place in peacetime, when impunity was viewed as a valid mechanism for 
dealing with certain segments of the population. An example of this form of validation of impunity 
can be found on the London Report of the committee of the Society for the Improvement of Prison 
Discipline and for the Reformation of Juvenile Offenders (1818). Produced in the early nineteenth 
century, this document recommended that “amongst children of a very early age, absolute impunity 
would have produced less vice than confinement […]. It is painful to reflect, that the remedy 
provided by the law should be one great cause of the evil; but the fact is indisputable”. Although 
nowadays there can be found different discourses of contention of the criminal law system before 
certain criminal actors such as the children, these are not framed as a matter of impunity but as part 
of a rehabilitative aim, as an argument of leniency or to support other democratic values. 
During the nineteenth century there was a constant use of impunity as a valid mechanism 
for dealing with political transitions. In such contexts, impunity was “the political price paid to 
secure an end to the violence of ongoing conflicts or as a means to ensure tyrannical regime 
                                       
195 Even if the word “widespread” remains unclarified in the sense that figures of criminality suggest a great 
universe of criminal conducts, which the criminal justice deals with thorugh an overall criterion of selection 
as the condition of operation of the system.  
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changes” (Bassiouni 1996: 10). Impunity was understood either as the warranty of the return of 
‘military to their barracks’, or as the first measure to be taken for ending internal armed conflict 
(Andreu-Guzmán 2014); in other words, it was a ‘necessary evil’ shielding the political regimes 
under the pragmatic objective of transition towards democracy and peace.  
The perception of impunity as a valid social mechanism has been radically contested and 
has been transformed. Currently, “those facing justice could not expect to trade impunity for laying 
down their weapons or giving up power” (Seils 2014). In our time, the political or legal system 
could not seriously employ the term impunity as a positive social action, although it remains valid 
to affirm that it is not appropriate to punish everyone for every action. However ambiguous this 
concept might be (Viñuales 2007), in the contemporary world no noble or respectable social 
objective can be called impunity: the fight against impunity has gained a remarkable unanimity 
embracing a consensus of social regret and dissatisfaction, even if its meaning remains vague. 
Nevertheless, or because of this, combating impunity has been installed as a fundamental human 
rights slogan (Engle 2015: 104). “The human rights movement in the 1990s has become 
increasingly preoccupied with the importance of punishing those responsible for gross violations of 
fundamental human rights. […] The phenomenon is described as impunity, and we are urged to 
combat it” (Schabas 1997: 215).  
What does the fight against impunity stand for? What are the means that this struggle does 
and should deploy? Is this a phenomenon of the criminal justice system or is it an issue of other 
social systems? Is impunity an expression of the moral conscience of a particular society or is it a 
phenomenon delimited by legal standards? To what extent is impunity related to issues of memory, 
reparations and truth when wrongdoing is committed? Is or should impunity be measured in line 
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with the quantity or quality of the legal consequences against wrongdoing? Does or should the 
fight against impunity aim at preventing the recurrence of wrongdoing?  
Ultimately, when trying to answer these questions it is not clear what the actual limits of the 
slogan against impunity are. The widespread acceptance of the fight against impunity is rather vague, 
but persuasive. In this context, the observer can remain engaged and persuaded by the slogan while 
being actually unaware or, perhaps, in disagreement with its substance, means or ends.  
The ambiguity of the notion of impunity is, however, a narrow observation if we are unable 
to identify, depict and characterize the different forms that the notion can adopt in social 
discourses. Considering this, we conducted an analysis on the use of ‘impunity’ in social 
discourses in order to depict the forms that the notion of impunity adopts in the context of the usual 
social communications.  
a. Usual uses of impunity: the Colombian case 
In order to construct a sociological concept of impunity, it is pertinent to explore the social 
constructions and perceptions that the notion of impunity raises. With this purpose, we conducted a 
poll exploring the perceptions of the Colombian urban population on the concept of impunity. 
Between 2014 and 2015, the University of Wisconsin Madison and the University Externado de 
Colombia conducted the second phase of a national survey on various social issues in the country. 
The second poll of “Communication and Politics” gathered information from 1,102 people living in 
ten Colombian cities. This sample was representative of the urban adult population of the country. 
At the present time, the majority of the Colombian population lives in urban contexts -76% of the 
47.6 million inhabitants of Colombia live in urban areas (DANE, 2014).  
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Respondents were asked 86 questions related to their social perceptions on different 
subjects. I was part of the team responsible for this survey and proposed three open-ended 
questions on the subject of impunity: “what is impunity for you?”, “who is responsible for it?” and 
“what percentage of crimes do you think goes unpunished in Colombia?” The objectives of these 
questions were to depict the notions that respondents use when referring to ‘impunity’, who they 
regard as responsible for it, and what is their perception on the extent of the phenomenon. In the 
present study, we will focus on the question “what is impunity for you?” which provides pertinent 
data to detect what Colombian population understands by ‘impunity’.  
The selection of an open question for the poll was intended to give respondents the 
opportunity of using the words they would spontaneously employ when unfolding their ideas on 
this subject. This selection implied a difficulty to process the information but was also convenient 
to consider different ingredients that were not anticipated before the poll. The data gathered in the 
poll provided a multiplicity of themes mobilized through the topic of impunity: the 1,102 
respondents used 993 different notions. There is a remarkable variety of uses of this medium in 
ordinary communications.  
In this context, we used a coding system that grouped the answers in accordance to the 
terms that respondents used as opposed to the notion of impunity. Taking into account a first 
reading of the results, we found pertinent to use the international law Crime Victims' Rights with 
this purpose: impunity was then coded as the opposite to justice (with the number 1)196, the 
opposite to truth (number 2), the opposite to reparation (number 3), and the opposite to non- 
recurrence of the wrongdoing (number 4).  
                                       
196 The ordinary definition “absence of punishment” was not an independent category, but only an eventual 
specification of the category “opposite to justice” (number 1). 
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When respondents characterized impunity as a form of injustice, their answer was marked 
with the label “absence or lack of justice”. When they focused on the concealment or denial of 
wrongdoing, the responses were classified under the category “absence or lack of truth”. Those 
responses that referred to the lack of compensation to the victims, were grouped as part of the 
responses of “absence or lack of reparations”. Finally, those responses identifying impunity with 
the recurrence of wrongdoing were classified as “repetition of the wrongdoing”. In addition to 
these labels, we used two additional categories: (i) the “everything” response identifying impunity 
as a wide-ranging problem that amounts to any wrongdoing; and, (ii) the “don't know/no response” 
answers. The results of the processing and coding of the answers gathered in the poll are explained 
in the following table:  
Table No. 10 Codification of respondents’ perception of impunity  
Category Frecuency Percentage 
Absence or lack of Justice 780 70.8 
Absence or lack of Truth 108 9.8 
Absence or lack of Reparation 2 0.2 
Repetition of the wrongdoing 4 0.4 
Everything 81 7.4 
Don't know/No response 127 11.5 
Total  1102 100% 
The most frequent response to the poll was the definition of impunity as the lack or absence 
of justice (70.8%). The second most common answer, given by 11.5 percent of respondents, was 
‘Don't know/No response’; the third was the construction of impunity in opposition to truth (9.8%); 
and, the fourth was the ‘everything’ answer identifying impunity as a wide-ranging notion with 
ambiguous limits (7.1%). Far from reaching those numbers, we found answers identifying 
impunity as the lack or absence of reparation (0.2%) or as the repetition of the wrongdoing (0.4%). 
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 Chart No. 1 Distribution of responses categorized by opposition on the issue of impunity 
 
In accordance with chart No. 1, in Colombia the majority of the urban population identifies 
impunity with the absence or lack of justice. In this category, we find responses referring to a wide 
variety of justice-related topics. However there is a blatant difficulty of delimiting what ‘justice’ is 
for our analysis, we can recognize a series of issues that respondents frame in reference to the 
justice system. While such delimitation remains elusive, this category of responses brings about 
perceptions of impunity as a straight forward opposition with justice (“when there is no justice” 
“no justice is served” “injustice on someone or something”), as the lack of operation of the justice 
system (“when justice does not investigate” “the judiciary are not interested in the pain of others” 
“when nobody is convicted for the crimes committed”), as a deficiency of design or 
implementation of justice mechanisms (“it is the consequence of the Colombian defective judicial 
system”, “the lack of authority of the judicial system”); or as a form of containment of the justice 
system (“an obstruction of justice”, “to hide something from justice”). In this category, justice 
issues were also portrayed with regard to a particular problem in the measures adopted by the 
judicial system. In this line, some respondents of the poll assessed that impunity is a problem of 
lack of equality (“justice is not equal for everyone”, “when politicians go unpunished for what they 
do” “benefits for the richer” “poor people are punished and the rich people are pardoned”); or a 
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matter of lack of severity (“justice is not severe against those who commit wrongdoing” “lack of 
severe and exemplary punishment”, or when wrongdoing is pardoned or amnestied (“to forgive 
those who have committed crimes” “to pardon, it means to leave crimes go unpunished”).  
In short, when referring to impunity as opposed to justice the poll provides information on 
a wide variety of topics.  The notion of impunity drawn on the basis of the absence of justice 
expresses a form of repudiation and denunciation of any kind of injustice perceived by the 
respondent. Impunity thus becomes a term employed for regretting what is perceived as unjust.  
When processing the results of the poll, we also found different responses referring to 
impunity as a ‘state of affairs’, as part of a general perception that everything is considered to be 
wrong. These responses were grouped into the “everything” category, including answers like: 
“impunity is everything in our beautiful country”, “Colombia means impunity”, “around here it is a 
commonplace, it is a characteristic of our society”, “everything in Colombia is impunity, those in 
charge of keeping law and order do not prosecute wrongdoing”, “impunity in Colombia is part of our 
history: crimes, abuses, etc., all unpunished”, “it is the lack of morals of a society ruled by crooks”.  
Here, the word impunity is employed to express all sorts of disquiet related to the social life. 
This could be expressed as a blasé attitude, adapting Simmel (2011) observations in his book The 
Philosophy of Money, according to which we could say that through the medium impunity injustices 
and social problems are regretted while there is an indifference to their specificities. Indeed, 
respondents identifying impunity as everything in social life base their answers on a strong blasé 
attitude (in the terms of Simmel). For this reason, these responses do not allow to distinguish what 
exactly can be called ‘impunity’. In other words, these discourses are an inadequate parameter for 
stable observations of the phenomenon.  
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Table No. 11 Responses without indication  
Category Frequency 
Relative percentage of 
responses without 
concept 
Total 
Percentage 
Don't know/No 
response  127 61.95% 11.5% 
Everything is impunity 78 38.04% 7.1% 
Total 205 100% 18.60% 
In Table No. 11 we cross-checked data, revising responses that do not allow exposing the 
notion of impunity that the respondents are using. This table allows us to conclude that 18.6% of 
the respondents did not provide a meaning to the topic of impunity. Considering this data, while 
the majority of Colombian urban discourses on impunity identify impunity as the lack or absence 
of justice (70.8%), the second most common use of ‘impunity’ actually lacks a notion (18, 6%).    
Considering the results of the poll, it is clear that the term ‘impunity’ in Colombia was 
selected by the majority of the respondents to denounce a situation experienced as a form of 
injustice, manifesting regret and a sense of grief or distress. In accordance to this finding, we will 
develop two possible connotations as principal for exploring the social constructions using the 
notion of impunity: denunciation and regret.  
In accordance with our enquiries, impunity raises rather connotative meaning, in the sense 
that it brings about associations to the term rather than a conceptual content indicating what it 
exactly denotes (denotative meaning). In this line, impunity may be considered as a medium 
embracing different significances. Mediums have no essence; there is no sole form capable of 
absorbing all the options of meaning of the medium197. Nonetheless, the medium (impunity) is 
                                       
197 “[L]es possibilités d’un medium ne peuvent jamais être saisies à partir d’une seule forme” (Luhmann, 
2013: 165 in Pires 2015) 
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always expressed through a selection of meaning, which enables the perception of the medium198. 
The selections of particular forms have the potential of suspending other selections. Such capacity 
does not imply an elimination of the other possible forms of the medium (Pires 2015: 6).   
Besides ordinary social discourses characterized by their ambiguity and polysemy, there is 
a considerable amount of specialized literature referring to impunity. How does this literature deal 
with the subject of impunity? Does this literature shed light upon the social discourses often 
obscured by their vagueness? Or perhaps, is this literature the source of further problems in the 
understanding of the phenomenon of impunity? In this field, human rights developments have 
become the leading source of specialized studies: a study of the fight against impunity should not 
be currently conducted without referring to the human rights developments on this issue.  
5.2. Human Rights discourses on impunity 
In this section we will study human rights characterizations of impunity as a central issue to 
its current discourses, ideas and practices. This analysis is framed into our objective of detecting, 
considering and analyzing the problems and elements of how impunity has been observed until 
now.  Dealt with by the doctrine, the jurisprudence, the treaties and other normative mechanisms, 
the notion of impunity has elicited a great interest for the human rights. Human rights have become 
the leading discourse expressing the need for a global “fight against impunity”.  
This expression has become a slogan employed with different connotations, developed 
without in-depth sociological reflection, and characteristically indifferent to the implications of a 
discourse based on the traditional penal rationality. We will elaborate on these problems later on. For 
                                       
198 “J’ai besoin du médium pour construire des formes et de formes (propositions) pour employer le 
medium” (Pires 2015: 5) 
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the moment, considering the importance of taking into account the human rights constructions 
around the concept of impunity, we will conduct a general overview of the human rights position in 
this regard. In the second part, we will focus in different normative sources, giving particular 
attention to the most authoritative human rights conceptualization of impunity: the UN Set of 
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity. 
Ultimately, the analytical remarks of the present section will be complemented by further critical 
considerations in part 5.3 of the work. 
5.2.1 Human Rights discourses on impunity: a general overview 
The fight against impunity has become a fundamental campaign to human rights 
movements to the extent that “[s]ince the beginning of the twenty-first century the human rights 
movement has been almost synonymous with the fight against impunity.” (Engle 2015). In this 
context, the subject of impunity is remarkably present in the work of different human rights 
organizations. Large organizations such as Amnesty International199, Human Rights Watch, the 
International Commission of Jurists, the International Federation of Human Rights, the World 
Organisation against Torture200, the Center for Justice and International Law, and other large 
international and local human rights institutions have devoted major efforts to fight against what 
they call impunity201.   
                                       
199 In 2004, the Amnesty online database had 3.000 documents with the word ‘impunity’ on their heading, 
while in 2006 there were 3.366 documents (Viñuales 2007). 
200 “Based in Geneva, OMCT’s International Secretariat provides personalised medical, legal and/or social 
assistance to hundreds of torture victims and ensures the daily dissemination of urgent interventions across 
the world, in order to protect individuals and to fight against impunity” (OMCT n.d.). 
201 Moreover, those human rights institutions without an express agenda on this issue would rarely deny the 
importance of such campaign –athough a good number of organizations could still advocate for less 
punitiveness. 
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These campaigns consider respect for human rights as one of the chief concerns and 
justifications of the fight against impunity. The human rights literature generally gives impunity a 
negative connotation as one of the most serious threats to human rights. Human rights campaigns 
employ the notion of impunity mostly as a problem that concerns human rights and that as such 
should be denounced as illegitimate, illegal and immoral (all at the same time). Indeed, when 
reviewing the great amount of literature produced by human rights experts and activists on this 
issue, the denunciatory use of this term is patent: “the time to end impunity has come”.  
In this discourse, impunity is portrayed as a social problem capable of compromising 
human relations, affecting the rights of the victims and distorting the rule of law, it is uncommon to 
find a conceptual delimitation of the subject or clear contours about what the fight against impunity 
is actually about. For the moment, we will focus on depicting, studying and analyzing the main 
meanings that impunity presents according to human rights.  
Revising the state of art in the field, we can find three major orientations of the use of this 
subject in human rights discourses: (i) impunity as a breach of human rights obligation of the 
States to protect their own citizens, (ii) impunity as a cause or consequence of other human rights 
violations, and (iii) impunity as a human rights violation in itself.  
(i) According to different human rights institutions, impunity arises from a failure by the 
State to meet its obligations for addressing violations. Indeed, various human rights discourses 
have established that human rights obligations include fighting impunity: “States are to combat 
impunity […] in order to uphold the rule of law and public trust in the justice system” (Council of 
Europe 2011).  With this respect, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (2009: 36) has 
assessed that “one of the main dimensions of state obligations is linked to the judicial clarification 
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of criminal conduct with the view to eliminating impunity and preventing the recurrence of 
violence”. In this line, the Inter-American System on Human Rights has established a correlation 
between the fight against impunity and the right to access to justice (IA Court 2001b: 123; 1999: 
65): “any person who considers himself or herself to be a victim of such violations has the right to 
resort to the system of justice to attain compliance with this duty by the State, for his or her benefit 
and that of society as a whole” (IA Court 2002: 115). 
Considering the view that States have a human rights obligation to fight against impunity, 
different human rights discourses have addressed impunity as a breach of States’ commitments to 
strengthen and to ensure the compliance with human rights (OHCHR 2011). In accordance with this 
perspective, the notion of impunity is constructed in contrast to the accountability of those individuals 
violating human rights and of the State on the occasion of wrongdoing (Groome 2011: 190).  
In respect to the responsibility for violations, human rights have developed a series of ideas, 
discourses and practices favoring accountability in cases of human rights violations as an 
obligation of the state: “[t]oday, to support human rights means to favor criminal accountability for 
those individuals who have violated international human rights or humanitarian law” (Engle 2015). 
Human rights accountability therefore became identified with criminal accountability. 
In different human rights sources, this obligation comprises the investigation, prosecution, 
trial and punishment of the direct perpetrators of violations, as well as their masterminds: impunity 
is “the overall lack of investigation, tracking down, capture, prosecution and conviction of those 
responsible for violating the rights protected by the American Convention” (IACHR 2003: 205; IA 
Court 1998: 176; 1998a: 173; 2005c: 203; 2005d: 170; 2004g: 148).  
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In line with this understanding, when human rights courts establish the violation of states’ 
international commitments, they have intended to remedy human rights violations ordering states 
to “[c]onduct full and meaningful investigations and prosecute or punish those responsible for 
crimes202“ (Groome 2011: 193). In this sense, the human rights view is that States have the 
obligation to use all the legal means at its disposal to combat that situation (IA Court 1998: 173; 
2001d: 69; 2001e: 63; 2001f: 100): “the State that leaves human rights violations unpunished is 
also failing to comply with its obligation to ensure the free and full exercise of those rights to all 
persons subject to its jurisdiction” (IA Court 2002a: 101). 
With this regard, the IA Court (1996: 61; 2000b: 75, 77; 2001d: 69, 70; 2001e: 62; 2001f: 
100; 2002: 115; 2002a: 99) has consistently established that States party to the American 
Convention have the duty to investigate, identify and punish the perpetrators or accessories to 
human rights violations and that this obligation must be complied seriously, not as a mere 
formality – the problems that this position involves to the reproduction of the traditional structures 
of the criminal justice system will be further discussed in section 5.3.  
                                       
202 See Castillo-Piez v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 34, 1 90 (Nov. 3, 1997); Blake v. Guatemala, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 36, 1 124.3 (Jan. 24, 1998); Paniagua-Morales v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 37, 1 181.6 (Mar. 8, 1998); Villagran-Morales, et al., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, 1 
253.8 (Nov. 19, 1999); Bamaca-Velisquez v. Guatemala, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
70, 1 230.8 (Nov. 25, 2000) (requiring public dissemination of investigations results); Barrios Altos v. Peru, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, 1 51.5 (Mar. 14, 2001); Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Columbia, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, M 296.7, 296.10 (Jan. 31, 2006) (requiring search for missing pursuant to international 
norms); Balde6n-García v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 147, 1218.8 (Apr. 6, 2006); Ximenes-Lopes 
v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 149, T 262.6 (July 4, 2006); Montero-Aranguren et al v. Venezuela 
(Detention Center of Catia), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, T 160.7 (July 5, 2006); Goiburl et al. v. 
Paraguay (Condor), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, 192.5 (Sept. 22, 2006) (The investigation is to include 
the "masterminds" of the crime. The court also required that the investigation's results be published and that 
Paraguay collaborate with neighboring countries in the prosecution of related Condor cases); La Cantuta v. 
Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 162, 1 254.9 (Nov. 29, 2006); Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, Inter-
Am Ct. H.R. 1 265.8 (May 26, 2010); Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, Inter-Am Ct. H.C.R. 309.12 (May 25, 
2010); Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001- IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 388.11.2 (2001); and Srebrenica Cases, IM 220.7-8. 
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This first way to conceive impunity is therefore focused into the obligation of the States 
making particular reference to the commitment of the authorities to protect the individuals through 
adequate justice measures.  
(ii) Human rights discourses have also addressed impunity as an unwelcome consequence of 
criminal conduct and, simultaneously, as motivation and cause of new or continuous violations. 
According to this, the fight against impunity does not only compromise States in accordance with 
their human rights obligations but also allows preventing new violations or further harms. In this 
line, “[a] causal link is made between ongoing human rights violations and the absence of 
prosecution for those of the past, and it is argued that by trial and punishment of individuals 
responsible for such crimes, individual and group rights will be better protected in the future.” 
(Schabas 1997: 215).  
Some human rights commentators consider that ending with impunity is the most efficient 
way of deterring new acts of violence (Defensor del Pueblo 1997; ILO 2011; Council of Europe 
2011). In this line, impunity is represented as a factor that fosters chronic recidivism (IA Court 
1998: 173; 2000: 211; 2001a: 186; 2001b: 123; 2002a: 101; 2005a: 96.20), not only because it 
enables  perpetrators to believe they will be sheltered from adverse consequences for their 
wrongdoing (Brussels Group for International Justice 2002; IACHR 2006: 144), but also because it 
perpetuates the social acceptance of crimes (i.e. before violence against women in IACHR 2007: 
124, 167). In line with this, combating impunity and strengthening accountability allows 
preventing new criminal actions. This connotation seems to rely on the compliance of the norms 
for the effective coercion created by the legal system.   
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Hence, impunity is represented as an encouraging factor for the repetition of criminal 
conduct, therefore affecting human rights: “States are to combat impunity […] as a deterrent with 
respect to future human rights violations” (Council of Europe 2011). Consequently, impunity may 
trigger new crimes and preserve the outcomes of previous or continuous violations allowing the 
perpetrators to think that they will be sheltered from adverse consequences for their actions203 
(Brussels Group for International Justice 2002; IA Court 2005a; IACHR 2006: 144). Impunity, 
then, takes the form of a strategy of concealment with the purpose of reinforcing the objectives of 
the criminal conduct (Colombia Nunca Más, n.d.)204.  
In line with this, for some, “human rights trials can play not only a retributive role but also an 
expressivist one, namely, to communicate the value of law and justice as social goods” (Freeman 
2009: 22)205. In this vein, a part of the literature claims that prosecutions for serious crimes “can be 
important for shoring up local confidence in the state’s ability and willingness to ensure the rule of 
law” (Freeman 2009: 22), while impunity would imply the opposite effect. Such understanding of 
punitive measures involves a human rights representation not simply as ‘negative’ mechanisms of 
                                       
203 An example of the link established between impunity and recidivism can be found in the Mapiripán 
Massacre v. Colombia case before the IA Court (2005a). The Court assessed that in Colombia the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (2001; 2005; 2004; 2003; 2002; 2000; 1998) has constantly referred to 
impunity of human rights violations committed by the paramilitary and to connivance between these groups 
and the security forces, “as a consequence of criminal proceedings and disciplinary investigations against 
them that do not lead to establishing liabilities or the respective punishment” (IA Court 2005a: 96.20).  
204 As we studied above, in the case of state criminality this is materialized through a set of institutions, 
discourses, ideas and behaviors enabled and enabling an opportunity structure favoring crime, a culture 
and context allowing repression, and particular political licences. 
205 Arendt (1971: 253) sustained an opposite view against what she called the higher-purpose theory. In her 
famous work Eichmann in Jerusalem, she asserted that “the purpose of a trial is to render justice, and nothing 
else; even the noblest of ulterior purposes [… as making an historical record of Nazis atrocities] can only 
detract from the law’s main business: to weigh the charges brought against the accused, to render judgment, 
and to [award…] due punishment”. In a way, she proposed that the Tribunal’s authority depends upon its 
limitations.  
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repression, but also as forms of obtaining a social improvements, capable of building up a human 
rights culture.  
Human rights discourses often warn about the potential of this problem becoming a broad 
feature affecting the overall social life, creating an atmosphere of systematic and endemic 
impunity. Expressions as ‘culture of impunity’ or ‘climate of impunity’ epitomize this concern206. 
These representations are pervasive in human rights literature, aiming at indicating cycles of 
chronic lack of accountability for human rights violations (Rekosh 1995; Del Ponte & Sudetic 
2011; Bongiorno 2001; Goldsmith & Lewis 2000; Nichols 2015; CEDAW 2006: 23).  
(iii) In connection to this last aspect, a third connotation that can be found in the literature 
understands impunity as a human rights violation. With this respect, impunity is understood as “a 
recipe for continued violence and instability” (Akhavan 2001: 30) presented not only as the 
undesirable cause or consequence of a situation of lack of accountability, but also as a violation 
itself. In this sense, according to different commentators (Ventura 2005; Bottinelli 2007; Le 
Clercq, Cháidez & Rodríguez 2016), impunity affects multiple human rights and has a 
‘multidimensional’ character that embeds legal, moral, social, political, psychological, economic 
and historical dimensions.  
Human rights literature frame impunity as an insidious condition of social unease, as a 
grave problem of the administration of justice and as a serious impediment to democratization 
(Roht‐Arriaza 2001; IACHR 2003). In line with different studies, impunity creates an impression 
                                       
206 An example of this generalization of impunity can be found in the Report submitted by Ms. Hina Jilani, 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights defenders on a Mission to Colombia, who 
asserted that in the country different factors produce a general climate of impunity (UN, 2002b). In the same 
vein, the Colombian state has declared before international bodies that impunity in the country “impacts in 
general the life of the nation and its culture" (IACHR 1999: note 6) and the IACHR (1999 par. 16) has 
asserted that “impunity in Colombia is structural and systemic”. 
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of ineffectiveness of the legal system and abandonment of the citizen before the phenomenon of 
crime (Tribunal Permanente de los pueblos 1989; Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 
2007), especially when the same type of crimes (with different victims or offenders) do get 
punished or normally receive some sort of normative response from the system.  
A major part of the human rights literature argues that impunity erodes the rule of law. These 
views understand that “the rule of law is mainly achieved by ensuring administration of justice that 
does not tolerate impunity” (IACHR 2003: 191). In this vein, the lack of legal redress is represented 
as a social problem decreasing confidence in the State as the legitimate forum to request for justice 
(UNHCHR 1998; Defensor del Pueblo 1997; La Rota, Montoya and Uprimny 2010). In line with 
this, combating impunity not only improves the rule of law but, ultimately, assures democracy 
(OHCHR 2011). 
In human rights literature, impunity is often understood as a phenomenon that has a great 
capacity to affect the general social life. The lack of legal intervention can shield a social configuration 
where exclusion and inequality prevail (Colombia Nunca Más, n.d.). Denying basic human values and 
debasing the ‘whole of humanity’ (Brussels Group for International Justice, 2002) 207 is often 
portrayed as a form of creating the impression on the public opinion that relationships based on force 
are more effective than appealing to the law (Cobián & Reátegui, 2009: 152). Thus, the problem of 
impunity is portrayed by different commentators as capable of transcending the individual crime and 
becoming a general situation that impacts the life of the nations and their culture, affecting not only 
victims but also society in general (IACHR 1999: 16; 2001: Chapter 3; Akhavan 2001).   
                                       
207 Discourses with this tone are not only contemporary, they can be found since the early nineteenth 
century: in an 1818’s writing on punishment of death in the case of forgery, Bowdler (1818: 21) asserts that 
“forgery would not be committed with impunity: justice would be done to the criminal, and to the public 
also”. 
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As such, the battle against impunity is comprehensive and should be fought on different 
social fronts (Groome 2011: 190): it “is not just a legal and political issue: its ethical dimension is 
all too often forgotten” (UN 1997). Human rights therefore offer a portrait of impunity as a social 
problem, capable of disturbing the administration of justice, the social safety, the rule of law and, 
ultimately, the human rights. In line with this view, some commentators conclude that impunity is 
a threat to democracy and public life208 (Ortega y Lara 2015: 5).  
This representation of impunity often integrates the rights of the victims as a concern, 
ground and justification for the fight: “States are to combat impunity as a matter of justice for the 
victims” (Council of Europe 2011). In accordance with impunity as a violation of the human rights 
of the victims, human rights tend to characterize impunity as a trouble against victims, preventing 
them from obtaining justice, therefore creating further vulnerability, suffering and victimization209. 
With this perspective, human rights understand that impunity often deteriorates victims’ feeling of 
belonging to the State and to the larger society, preventing them from gaining moral redress and 
proper legal attention (Justicia y Vida 2006; IA Court 1998: 173). Indeed, different human rights 
studies portray impunity as a violation that raises and aggravates the original harms suffered by the 
victims (IA Court 2005a). Moreover, these studies often claim that these effects may expand to the 
social networks of direct victims, particularly to their next of kin who, when undertaking all 
                                       
208 In this sense, Bentham (1843: 530) asserted that “[f]rom pardon-power unrestricted, comes impunity to 
delinquency in all shapes: from impunity to delinquency in all shapes, impunity to maleficence in all shapes: 
from impunity to maleficence in all shapes, dissolution of government:  from dissolution of government, 
dissolution of political society”. 
209 The Inter-American System has acknowledged that in the cases of human rights violations victims 
often feel anger, frustration and even fear of retaliation due to their search for justice (IA Court 2009) 
With this regard, the IA Court (2002) has established a presumption according to which violations of 
human rights and a situation of impunity regarding those violations cause grief, anguish and sadness, both 
to the victims and to their next of kin (IA Court 2002: 50). 
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pertinent actions to clarify the events, suffer an additional victimization from the indifference of 
society, the lack of operation of the legal system and the violence coming from the criminal justice 
(Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 2007).  
Human rights studies have assumed that impunity is a form of hardship to the victims and 
harm to the larger society (Justicia y Vida 2006; Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 
2007; La Rota, Montoya and Uprimny 2010). Victim-oriented human rights literature has, in sum, 
a tendency to focus on preventing victimization, controlling victimization and healing social 
troubles as a goal and motivation of the fight against impunity (inspired in Van Wijk 2013: 160).  
Anti-impunity discourses emphasizing on victims’ rights may also enable a counter-discourse 
against criminals. With this respect, representations of criminals as enemies of society (hostes 
humani generis) rather frequent in political discourses and in the media may also be found in human 
rights. An example of the representation of offenders as enemies of humanity in relation to the 
subject of impunity we can be find the Brussels Principles against Impunity. Adopted by a group of 
doctrinaires called the Brussels Group for International Justice, these principles assert: “the scope of 
serious crimes extends beyond the limits of the territories where they are committed. They constitute 
a challenge for the public conscience and result in their authors being considered as enemies of 
humanity (hostes humani generis). Within this context, the fight against impunity forms part of the 
fight for international justice and constitutes a responsibility for the entire international community” 
(principle 1.2). This excerpt is interesting to show the sense in which human rights defense from 
impunity may produce the exclusion of particular persons from the humani generis. 
To this point, we have characterized different connotations of the fight against impunity 
according to human rights. However, in order to elaborate conceptual elucidations we need to 
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explore other human rights normative mechanisms and conceptual work. The next section will 
address different human rights norms focusing on exploring the most authoritative international 
law conceptualization of impunity: the UN Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity. The analysis of this document may help us 
furthering our observations on the scope and objective of human rights when combating impunity. 
This is framed into our search for a socio-legal conceptualization taking into consideration the 
problems, issues and elements referring to how has impunity been observed until now.   
5.2.2 The UN Impunity Principles: human rights conceptualizations of impunity  
In the last section, we considered different connotations that the combat against impunity 
raises for human rights. Apart from different senses of meaning, we have not yet determined 
particular conceptual developments on this issue. One of the paradigmatic human rights documents 
enabling an exploration of this subject is the United Nations Set of Impunity Principles. Ironically 
perhaps, this study has its origins in a report on amnesty. 
In 1985, UN Special Rapporteur on amnesty Louis Joinet presented a preliminary report to 
the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in the 
subject of amnesty laws. The Sub-commission had requested this study “having become aware of 
the importance that the promulgation of amnesty laws could have for the safeguard and promotion 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (UN Commission on Human Rights 1985: 3).  
In his study, Joinet explored amnesty as an outgrowth of individual pardon. Beginning by 
the ancient republics, the study shows a transformation of the understanding of amnesties. Indeed, 
these were gradually perceived – or appropriated- as a prerogative of the States, rather than as a 
private issue. Public pardons were sometimes collective, embodying not only clemency but also “a 
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concern to remedy the imperfections of criminal law” (UN Commission on Human Rights 1985: 
5). In the sixteenth century, there was an increased impetus of amnesty as a means of assuring 
social and political peace. According to Joinet, this objective reached modern times when many 
countries resourced to amnesties employing different legal frameworks. In this context, “[t]he 
power of amnesty and its corollary, amnesty as a human right (the right of oblivion), are embodied 
in municipal law, but only indirectly reflected in international law” (UN Commission on Human 
Rights 1985: 5). According to this, Joinet assessed that peace might be gained by obviating 
disorder and sedition.  
Considering this conclusion, Joinet drew a distinction between amnesty as means for peace 
and amnesty as means for impunity. In Joinet’s study, the former refers to amnesties granted with the 
objective of enabling political transitions, facilitating, if necessary, peace agreements. In these cases, 
the effect of amnesties is often the release of political prisoners, the return of political exiles, the 
cessation of proceedings or dismissal of charges, the restoration of civil and political rights, the 
reinstatement of the persons deprived of their positions and the reparations to the victims. However, 
Joinet shows that in international law amnesties are not only granted for political transgressions, but 
have also been admitted for ordinary criminality210. In the terms of the study, amnesty for ordinary 
crimes is granted as “an expression of the relatively broad power of civil society to grant every 
citizen the right of oblivion” (UN Commission on Human Rights 1985: 23). These mechanisms are 
                                       
210 “In recent years, a growing number of countries have resorted to amnesties and pardons to relieve prison 
overcrowding in Africa, South America, Europe and Asia. For example in early 2013 the President of Sri 
Lanka granted amnesties to 1,200 prisoners on the country’s 65th Independence Day. Those released were 
serving minor sentences and some were those who had not been able to pay their fines. The prison 
population in Georgia more than halved from 24,000 to 11,000 in early February 2013, mainly due to a 
broad amnesty in which 7,985 prisoners were released. While providing short-term relief, amnesties and 
other forms of pardons have been shown not to provide a sustainable solution to overcrowding and can 
erode public confidence” (Allen 2015: 34). 
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employed with the objective of contributing to the reduction of social tension and addressing the 
overcrowding of prisons, as well as other humanitarian purposes, particularly favoring children, 
women, the elderly and the sick (UN Commission on Human Rights 1985: 8).  
In contrast, according to the study, amnesty as means for impunity occurs when regimes use 
amnesties aiming to evade the democratic rule of law; for instance, when State or para-state 
officials responsible of grave violations are exonerated from their wrongdoing (UN Commission 
on Human Rights 1985: 16)211. Thus, however the described (wide) applicability of amnesties, the 
study sets certain international law boundaries to that possibility by underscoring that amnesties 
are not applicable in any circumstance. For instance, the study affirms that amnesties should not be 
applied to international crimes or to crimes against humanity -in such cases “the right of oblivion 
may become a right to impunity” (UN Commission on Human Rights 1985: 19).  
Joinet’s study makes clear that international law admits amnesties as they may constitute 
appropriate tools for peace, allowing political transitions and social harmony. However, the study 
also recognized a form of amnesty that was a fraud because of its aim (evading the rule of law) or 
due to the relevance of the wrongdoing: “[s]ome amnesties are given to correct past injustices (e.g., 
Morocco 1994) and others to entrench impunity (e.g., Chile 1978)” (Freeman 2009).  
In short, the negative connotation of the notion of amnesty developed in this document was 
drawn upon two conditions. The first is when amnesty involves the lack of legal response to 
international crimes against humanity. The second is when amnesty is granted by governments with 
the visible intention to evade the rule of law (as opposed to a need to restore lasting peace and 
                                       
211 An example of this situation may be the amnesty promised by Rodrigo Duterte, President of the 
Philippines, to the any member of the police condemned for the state anti-drug campaign in which a large 
number of suspected traffickers or drug users have been killed, “de facto rendering the judicial system 
inoperative” (La Presse 2017). 
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democracy). In the latter case, regardless the quality of the wrongdoing, amnesties could not be 
considered as legitimate. 
The negative connotation of amnesty (amnesty to entrench impunity) was thereafter 
emphasized, denounced and expanded by the human rights movements, to the point that amnesties 
have become relegated when not explicitly rejected by human rights: there is an emergence of an anti-
amnesty norm equating it with impunity (Pensky 2008). The notion of “impunity”, therefore, grows to 
the point that it fully invalidates the institution on amnesty. In this vein, the movements have largely 
favored a standardized form of reacting to crime through the criminal justice, governed by ideas of 
retribution, deterrence and denunciation implemented through punishment as a form of inflicting pain. 
Indeed, since the 1990’s, international NGOs, activists, academics, and institutions such as the United 
Nations or the Inter-American System of Human Rights have adopted an anti-impunity position in 
accordance to which amnesties are undervalued in their possibility of bringing justice to social harm 
(Freeman & Pensky 2012). This position will be critically assessed in the next section.  
For the moment we would like to refer to the possible antinomy between amnesty and 
impunity. In a context in which the combat against impunity is a condition for the championing of 
human rights, is there a contradiction between the authorization of amnesties and the proscription 
of impunity? To this question, Joinet’s study replies that the consideration of granting amnesty for 
political crimes and crimes of opinion does not imply an acceptance of impunity. In this sense, 
Joinet asserts that amnesties, although admissible with the aim of achieving peace or political 
transition, may involve a form of fraud when they are granted with the mere aim of impunity. For 
instance, amnesties allowing authoritarian regimes to escape from democratic rule of law by 
depriving the victims of reparation, do not intend to obtain reconciliation as much as impunity.   
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Let us draw some conceptual considerations in this respect further from Joinet’s work. 
Indeed, amnesties and impunity may entail a degree of correspondence regarding their practical 
consequences, as they might involve the lack of a criminal law redress. In this sense, international 
organizations such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights tend to equate amnesties 
with impunity, as they prevent prosecution and punishment (Seibert-Fohr, A. 2009). However, 
these are two different phenomena.  
Among different existing definitions, amnesty may be addressed as “an extraordinary legal 
measure whose primary function is to remove the prospect and consequences of criminal liability 
for designated individuals or classes of persons in respect of designated types of offenses 
irrespective of whether the persons concerned have been tried for such offenses in a court of law” 
(Freeman 2009). In this line, amnesty laws imply a legal recognition of a wrongdoing to be 
exonerated from which do not preclude all forms of reparation to the victims. As such, the conduct 
acknowledged as a form of wrongdoing becomes selectable for exemption from legal redress. 
Since the only way to exonerate someone from a consequence is to recognize that a wrongdoing 
(the cause) was committed, amnesties involve an acknowledgement of the offenses: the criminal 
law consequence vanishes (but not necessarily other civil law consequences) while the wrongdoing 
is recognized by the legal and political systems. 
In this sense, amnesty is not only the refrain from criminal repression but, perhaps more 
importantly, may constitute a form of bringing certain wrongdoing and their actors to the surface -
followed by the decision of not prosecuting or sanctioning from the criminal law system (at least, 
not with the usual rules of sentencing in the ordinary legislative program of the criminal law 
system). For this reason, the conception of amnesty as oblivion or amnesia is increasingly outdated 
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(Gavron 2002; Mallinder 2008; Freeman 2009)212 and transitional processes employ it as forms of 
bringing light to the violations and delimiting the responsibility of different actors.  
Drawing a contrast between impunity and amnesty is useful for raising a provisionary 
element for a conceptualization of impunity. With respect to amnesties, the fact that the criminal 
law system is obstructed from dealing with the problematic conduct derives from a legitimate goal 
that involves the acknowledgement of the problematic situation. In contrast, impunity appears to 
involve a lack of acknowledgement of the problematic situation that involves a containment of the 
legal system. From this construction a particular element needs to be retained for our 
conceptualization of impunity: that the criminal justice system is prevented from acting against a 
particular wrongdoing without the acknowledgement of the problematic situation.  
The contrast between impunity and amnesty was present in Joinet’s work, to the extent that 
his original study on amnesty progressively evolved into addressing the problem of impunity. In 
line with this, Joinet’s final report entitled “Study on amnesty laws and their role in the safeguard 
and promotion of human rights” (1985), not only involved advances on international law studies on 
the subject of amnesty but entailed significant interconnections with the discussions of the subject 
of impunity – that ultimately led to that leaded to the identification between “impunity” and 
amnesty. As a result, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities (hereinafter, Sub-Commission) asked El Hadji Guissé and Louis Joinet to draft a 
working paper on the guidelines that a study of impunity should adhere to (Decision 1991/110). 
Following the submission of a working paper, in August 1992, the Sub-Commission 
decided at its forty-fourth session to request the co-authors to draft a study on the impunity of 
                                       
212 Amnesties, as in the case of South Africa, are currently understood, designed and used for facilitating 
the truth and the historical memory (Gavron 2002). 
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perpetrators of violations of human rights (Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1993/43)213. 
On August 1994, after the submission of the study, the Sub-Commission expressed its concern for 
the increasing impunity for perpetrators of human rights violations which qualified as a 
fundamental obstacle to the observance of human rights (UN Commission on Human Rights 
1993). Accordingly, the Sub-Commission decided to continue with the study of impunity dividing 
it in two parts, entrusting Joinet with a report on impunity for civil and political rights and El Hadji 
Guissé with a study on economic, social and cultural rights (Resolution 1994/34).  
According to Joinet, the concern of the international community over impunity 
experimented four stages. The first stage took place during the 1970s, when non-governmental 
organizations, human rights advocates and the democratic opposition mobilized to argue for an 
amnesty for political prisoners. “This was typical in Latin American countries then under 
dictatorial regimes. […] Amnesty, as a symbol of freedom, would prove to be a topic that could 
mobilize large sectors of public opinion” (UN Commission on Human Rights, 1997, par. 2), as 
well as helped to amalgamate resistance against dictatorial regimes.  
From the understanding of amnesty as a symbol of freedom and resistance, there was a 
change in the 1980s. In this second stage amnesties were “more and more seen as a kind of 
‘insurance on impunity’ with the emergence, then proliferation, of ‘self-amnesty’ laws proclaimed 
by declining military dictatorships anxious to arrange their own impunity while there was still 
time” (UN Commission on Human Rights, 1997, par. 3). Different groupings of victims created a 
                                       
213 A preliminary report was presented in August 1993 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/6) at the Sub-Commission’s 
forty-fifth session. Upon presentation of the preliminary report, the Sub-Commission requested the co-
authors to extend their study to serious violations of economic, social and cultural rights. 
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number of organizations under the view that amnesties were employed as a form of dismissal and 
absolute refusal to acknowledge the problematic-situations.  
The end of the Cold War implied the democratization of different countries along with the 
proliferation of peace agreements putting an end to internal armed conflicts. In the context of 
several peace negotiations, there was a manifest clash between “former oppressors' desire for 
everything to be forgotten and the victims' quest for justice” (UN Commission on Human Rights, 
1997, par. 4). After several years of intense confrontation and polarization, at a third stage, 
international law proscribed amnesties for grave human rights violations.  
In this line, the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (1993) recommended that 
“States should abrogate legislation leading to impunity for those responsible for grave violations of 
human rights such as torture and prosecute such violations, thereby providing a firm basis for the 
rule of law” (UN 1993, par. 60). Concurrently, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued a 
landmark case in which this transformation was crystallized. In the Barrios Altos case against Peru, 
the IA Court (2001c: Par. 40) concluded that amnesty laws and measures eliminating responsibility 
are inadmissible with regard to gross human rights breaches because they violate non-derogable 
rights recognized by international human rights law214. In the same vein, “the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights215, the organs of the United Nations216 other regional organizations 
                                       
214 This line was reiterated in the cases: Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile (IA Court 2006a: par. 105 to 
114), La Cantuta v. Peru (IA Court 2006b: par. 152 and 168), Gomes Lund et al. (Guerrilha do Araguaia) v. 
Brazil (IA Court 2010e: par. 147), Gelman v. Uruguay (IA Court 2011: par. 195), and El Mozote and nearby 
places v. El Salvador (IA Court 2012a: par. 283).  
215 Cf. IACHR. Report No. 28/92, Cases 10,147; 10,181; 10,240; 10,262; 10,309 and 10,311. Argentina, of 
October 2, 1992, par. 40 and 41; IACHR. Report No. 34/96, Cases 11,228; 11,229; 11,231, and 11,282. Chile, 
of October 15, 1996, par. 70; IACHR. Report No. 36/96. Chile, of October 15, 1996, par. 71; IACHR. Report 
No. 1/99, Case of 10,480. El Salvador, of January 27, 1999, par. 107 and 121; IACHR. Report No. 8/00, Case 
11,378. Haiti, of February 24, 2000, par. 35-36; IACHR. Report No. 20/99, Case 11,317. Peru, of February 23, 
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for the protection of human rights217 and other courts of international criminal law218 have ruled on 
the incompatibility of amnesty laws in relation to grave human rights violations with international 
law and the international obligations of States” (IA Court 2012a: 283).   
                                                                                                                           
1999, par. 159-160; IACHR. Report No. 55/99, Cases 10,815; 10,905; 10,981; 10,995; 11,042 and 11,136. 
Peru, of April 13, 1999, par. 140; IACHR. Report No. 44/00, Case 10,820. Peru, of April 13, 2000, par. 68; 
IACHR. Report No. 47/00, Case 10,908. Peru, April 13, 2000, par. 76, and Report No. 29/92. Cases 10,029, 
10,036 and 10,145. Uruguay, of October 2, 1992, par. 50-51. 
216 In this regard, see revised final report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of the impunity of 
perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and political), prepared by Louis Joinet pursuant to decision 
1996/116 of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev1, of 2 October 1997, par. 32, and Report of the UN Working Group on Enforced 
or Involuntary Disappearances. General comment on article 18 of the Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Report presented during the sixty-second session of the Commission 
on Human Rights. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/56, of 27 December 2005, paragraph 2, subparagraphs a), c), and 
d) of the general comments, 23 of the introduction and 599 of the conclusions and recommendations. 
Similarly, cf. UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. Report to the Human Rights 
Council, fourth session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/41, of 25 January 2007, par. 500. Also, in the universal domain, 
the treaty bodies for the protection of human rights have sustained the same criteria on the prohibition of 
amnesties that prevent the investigation and punishment of those who commit grave human rights violations. 
Cf. Human Rights Committee. General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligations imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, of 26 May 2004, par. 18. This general 
comment expanded the content of General Comment No. 20 which only referred to acts of torture, and cruel 
treatment or punishment. In this regard, also, cf. Human Rights Committee. General Comment 20: Replaces 
general comment 7 concerning prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment (Art. 7), U.N. Doc. 
A/47/40(SUPP), Annex VI, A, of 10 March 1992, par. 15; Human Rights Committee, Case of Hugo 
Rodríguez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 322/1988, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, Decision of 9 
August 1994, par. 12.3 and 12.4; Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by States 
parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations with regard to Peru, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.67, of 25 July 1996, par. 9; Yemen, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.51, of 3 October 1995, 
section 4, par. 3 (255); Paraguay, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.48, of 3 October 1995, section C, par. 5 (9), and 
Haiti, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.49, of 3 October 1995, section 4, par. 2; Committee against Torture, 
General comment 2: implementation of article 2 (prevention of acts of torture) by States parties. U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/GC/2, of 24 January 2008, par. 5, and Committee against Torture, Consideration of reports submitted 
by States parties under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and recommendations with regard to Benin, 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/BEN/CO/2, of 19 February 2008, par. 9, and of the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/MKD/CO/2, of 21 May 2008, par. 5. 
217 Cf. ECHR. Case of Abdülsamet Yaman v. Turkey, No. 32446/96, par. 552, 2 November 2004, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, 
Communications Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97-196/97 and 210/98, decision of 11 May 2000, par. 83, and 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Right. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, 
Communication No. 245/02, decision of 26 May 2006, par. 211 and 215. 
218 Cf. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Furundžija. Judgment of 10 
December, 1998. Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, par. 155; S.C.S.L., Prosecutor v. Gbao, Decision No. SCSL-04-15-
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As Joinet contemplated in his study, during the 1970s and the 1980s there was a 
transformation on the human rights position towards amnesties. Initially, amnesties were perceived 
as a pressing need for political prisoners. Different abuses were being committed by the use of the 
criminal law system, especially in Latin America different dictatorships and authoritarian regimes 
conducted atrocious campaigns of political persecution with the excuse of crime control. These 
campaigns instigated harassment, extermination and suppression of political opponents and human 
rights activists. Protestors, journalists, students, human rights defenders, unionized workers were 
main targets. Those who for some reason were not killed or disappeared were submitted to 
imprisonment. The criminal law system (and especially the military tribunals) were part of the 
strategy of persecution. Detentions offered spaces for torture and other ill-treatment.  
When some of these regimes collapsed, amnesties were employed for escaping prosecution 
under the democratic rule of law. The human rights movements reacted against this 
‘autoimmunization’, calling for punishment for the grave violations committed by these regimes. 
According to Joinet, this was the birth of the fight against impunity. This change implied a 
transformation within human rights organizations, especially in Latin America. From a position of 
                                                                                                                           
PT-141, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Preliminary Motion on the Invalidity of the Agreement between the 
UN and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of the Special Court, 25 May 2004, par. 10; 
S.C.S.L., Case of Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment of the Trial 
Chamber, 25 February 2009, par. 54, and Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, 
Trial Chamber, Sentencing Judgment, 8 April 2009, par. 253. In this regard, see also: Agreement between the 
Lebanese Republic and the UN regarding the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon, signed on 
January 23 and February 6, 2007, respectively, Article 16 and the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
approved by resolution 1757 of the Security Council of the UN. U.N Doc.S/RES/1757, of 30 May 2007, 
Article 6; State of the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leona, of 16 January 2002, Article 10; Agreement between 
the UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian law of crimes 
committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, of 6 March 2003, Article 11, and Law on the 
Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes 
Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on 
October 27, 2004 (NS/RKM,1004/006), new Article 40. 
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distrust of the criminal law system, these movements accepted and embraced the traditional 
legislative program of the criminal law as an adequate mechanism for protecting human rights. 
With this regard we will draw some critical considerations in the next section.   
For the moment we will consider Joinet’s conceptual elucidations. Joinet’s study was 
conducted on the basis that “impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to 
investigate violations, to take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the 
area of justice, by ensuring that they are prosecuted, tried and duly punished, to provide victims with 
effective remedies and reparation for the injuries suffered, and to take steps to prevent any recurrence 
of such violations” (UN 1997: 22). With respect to this concern, between 1996 and 1997, Joinet 
prepared and submitted three different drafts of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (in June, 20th 1996; June, 26th 1997; and, October, 2nd 
1997). This work was the basis of the final text of the Set of Principles completed in 2005. 
Table No. 12 Definitions of ‘impunity’ drafted by Joinet  
Draft First Draft Second Draft Third Draft 
Date June, 20th 1996 June, 26th 1997 October, 2nd 1997 
Definition 
Impunity means the 
impossibility, de jure or 
de facto, of bringing the 
perpetrators of human 
rights violations to 
account - whether in 
criminal, civil, 
administrative or 
disciplinary proceedings 
- since they are not 
subject to any inquiry 
that might lead to them 
being accused, arrested, 
tried and, if found guilty, 
convicted (UN 1996).  
Impunity means the 
impossibility, de jure or de 
facto, of bringing the 
perpetrators of human 
rights violations to account 
- whether in criminal, civil, 
administrative or 
disciplinary proceedings - 
since they are not subject 
to any inquiry that might 
lead to them being accused, 
arrested, tried and, if found 
guilty, convicted, and to 
reparations being made to 
their victims (UN 1997a). 
Impunity means the 
impossibility, de jure or de 
facto, of bringing the 
perpetrators of human rights 
violations to account - 
whether in criminal, civil, 
administrative or 
disciplinary proceedings - 
since they are not subject to 
any inquiry that might lead 
to them being accused, 
arrested, tried and, if found 
guilty, sentenced to 
appropriate penalties, and to 
making reparations to their 
victims (UN 1997). 
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The drafts proposed by Joinet introduced three formulations of the notion of impunity 
based on a same basic conceptualization: the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the 
perpetrators of human rights violations to account - whether in criminal, civil, administrative or 
disciplinary proceedings - since they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to them being 
accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, convicted. As can be noticed in table 5, the different 
drafts are cumulative rather than contradictory or genuinely different. Between the first and the 
second draft (submitted one year after), Joinet added both the obligation to make reparations and 
(four months later) the duty of appropriate penalties against those who violate human rights - this 
element expresses an adherence to the traditional end and the legislative program of the criminal 
law system since it refers to accusation, arrest and trial.  
The final Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through 
Action to Combat Impunity, adopted by the then Commission on Human Rights and endorsed by 
the United Nations General Assembly219, replicated the last concept of Joinet’s drafts. According 
to that document, impunity is the impossibility, de jure or de facto220, of bringing the perpetrators 
of violations to account - whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings -
since they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, 
if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to their victims (UN 
                                       
219 In 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights (succeeded by the Human Rights Council in 2006) 
adopted the Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to 
combat impunity (UN Commission on Human Rights 2005). In that year, the UN General Assembly 
endorsed the principles (Van Boven 2010). 
220 Human rights doctrine has differentiated between impunity de jure and impunity de facto (ICJ 2008). The 
former refers to legal provisions or law institutions granting the exoneration of crimes or the immunity of 
perpetrators. The latter refers to situations where there is a lack of serious investigations, suitable 
prosecution and effective accountability. 
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2005). Let us review five main elements that this definition involves and the possible problems that 
they may raise for a sociological reconstruction of the concept: 
(i) The “impossibility”: the English version of the Principles asserts that impunity means an 
“impossibility” of bringing the perpetrators of human rights violations to account. However, if 
impunity implies an impossibility, it is neither negative nor positive, but a state of affairs. In that 
sense, this conceptualization would involve that nothing could be done against it beyond 
recognizing the situation. How to sustain that impunity is a failure by States to meet with their 
obligations when it is understood as an invincible state of affairs? How can human rights 
countervail impunity if, as an impossibility, nothing can be done against it? This problem is only 
present in the English version of the document because the original in French and the Spanish 
version refer to the “absence” or “lack” of actions bringing the perpetrators of human rights 
violations to account.221 - these two last expressions are also ambiguous since they are governed by 
extremely broad reasons, we will come back to this later on. 
(ii) The violation of human rights: the principles operate the distinction 
impunity/accountability for human rights violations. The fact that the concept focuses on human 
rights violations as the form of wrongdoing from which impunity may emerge, widens the 
applicability of the phenomenon beyond criminal infractions. Human rights movements have 
advocated for a sort of correspondence between human rights violations and criminality – without 
proper reflection around its implications.  However, these are different phenomena, the latter as a 
                                       
221 “L'impunité se définit par l'absence, en droit ou en fait, de la mise en cause de la responsabilité pénale 
des auteurs de violations des droits de l'homme, ainsi que de leur responsabilité civile, administrative ou 
disciplinaire […]” (UN 1997b) “La impunidad se define por la ausencia, de iure o de facto , de la 
imputación de la responsabilidad penal de los autores de violaciones de los derechos humanos, así como de 
su responsabilidad civil, administrativa o disciplinaria[…]” UN (1997c) 
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conduct transgressing the criminal law and the former as a behavior against human rights norms 
and principles. Although eventually overlapping –e.g. when the violation to the right to life 
amounts to the crime of murder, they may also differ.  
When a domestic criminal or civil law lacuna affects or impedes the regulation and redress of 
the violations, this may be understood as a human rights problem. However, the divergence between 
criminal law and human rights may be acceptable or, all the more so, appropriate or advantageous for 
the functioning of the system. Indeed, there are different human rights violations regarding which the 
role that the criminal law may be theoretically questionable. When a particular human right is 
incompatible with the culture of a specific society, should we refer to these human rights breaches as 
criminal conducts? When there is no cultural inconsistency, is it desirable to criminalize any breach 
of human rights? Is the criminal law the only way that the law has to offer for addressing human 
rights problems? In respect to social and cultural rights, can we validly claim that the fact of not 
guaranteeing the right, regrettable as it is, should amount to a crime? 
 (iii) Impunity/measures of legal redress: The mentioned concept focuses on bringing 
perpetrators to account, regardless of the circumstances, whether in criminal, civil, administrative 
or disciplinary proceedings. If the observer understands this conceptualization as an obligation of 
cumulating sanctions, all possible forms of legal reaction should be in place in order to avoid 
impunity. Human rights violations often concern different jurisdictions. The implementation of all 
the different forms of legal control is rather remote222; indeed, it is extremely improbable that 
                                       
222 This problem was avoided in the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law according to which in cases of gross violations of international human 
rights law and serious violations of IHL constituting crimes under international law, there is impunity when 
States have disregarded the duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to 
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human rights violations (or the most ordinary criminal law violations) are processed through all 
possible jurisdictions. In sum, this form of constructing the concept expands the notion to the point 
that it takes us back to impunity as a state of affairs connatural to the wrongdoing223.   
In contrast, if we understand that the concept of impunity is only applicable when no form 
of sanction (either civil, administrative or criminal) is applied, the observer accepts that the 
implementation of any of these forms of redress would make impertinent the label “impunity” to 
describe the situation. In our view, however, there is a nuance of meaning behind such 
understanding in the sense that the Principles privilege criminal justice proceedings as the only 
inquiries that may lead human rights violators to be accused, arrested, judged and convicted- when 
a human rights violation does not amount to a crime to what extent and through which elements 
may we detect the phenomenon?224 
In this line, there is evidence that criminal punishment has become the “preferred and often 
unquestioned method” to the intended end of human rights violations (Engle, Miller and Davis 2016: 
                                                                                                                           
prosecution the person allegedly responsible for the violations and, if found guilty, the duty to punish her or 
him (Point III.4). 
223 This imposes serious difficulties for the research on impunity. Different researches use the concept of the 
Principles while at the same time delimit their scope on a particular indicator because of the difficulty for 
analyzing all possible jurisdictions and mechanisms as the Principle’s concept asks. For an example of this 
kind of de-limitation, there is a report on impunity regarding violence against Colombian Trade Union 
members authored by DeJusticia asserting that they used the Principle’s definition as “appropriate for 
identifying the factors of impunity in the country, not only because it is a widely accepted conceptualization 
both internationally and nationally, but because it encompasses the various dimensions of the phenomenon. 
[…] However we adopt a broad concept of impunity as defined by Joinet and Orentlicher, this does not 
mean that this research we will deal with all these elements. The analysis developed in this study excludes 
several of the aspects outlined concept of impunity […]The reason for this exclusion is not because we do 
not consider important these other forms of satisfaction of the rights of victims, whose importance is 
obvious. It was simply [because of a division of work] and a methodological decision to focus the study on 
one aspect of impunity that could be adequately studied within the time constraints of this research” (La 
Rota, Montoya, Páramo & Uprimny 2010 p. 7-8). 
224 For instance, when a child does not have access to primary education or when the workday exceeds the 
maximum legal ordinary working hours, there is a human rights’ violation but not necessarily a crime. 
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1). Thus, the very notion of justice has become identified with one chief possibility: the infliction of 
suffering by the criminal justice (Pires 1998: 10). In this sense, the system is endowed with the 
authority and obligation to react against criminal conduct holding a maximalist expectation. As 
Kaminski (2009) puts it, the criminal system is currently presented as apt and required for dealing 
with all sorts of social problematic situations (a Swiss Army Knife imagery)225.  
(iv) Impunity/reparations: the Set of Principles assesses that any human rights violation 
gives rise to a right to reparation, “implying a duty on the part of the State to make reparation and 
the possibility for the victim to seek redress from the perpetrator” (Principle 31). In this line, the 
notion of the Principles observe the lack of reparations to be made to the victims as part of the 
observation of the phenomenon: “[s]atisfying one of their obligations, such as the duty to ensure 
prosecution of those responsible for serious crimes under international law, does not relieve States 
of their independent obligations, including those bearing on reparations, the right to know and, 
more generally, non-recurrence of violations” (UN 2005: 7).  
The right to reparation entails different economic, social and symbolic measures intended 
to provide material, psychosocial and moral redress (UN 1997).  With this respect, Joinet assessed 
that the interpretation of the Principles should be guided by the UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to Reparation, in accordance with which this right should embrace a wide 
range of measures of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction. These measures 
seek to restore victims to their previous state (restitution); to address those damages causing 
physical or emotional injuries, including the lost opportunities, physical damage, defamation and 
legal aid costs (compensation); to offer adequate attention, treatment, medical care, including 
                                       
225 However, the fact that penal measures are represented as the mandatory reaction through the wide 
universe of misconducts, often creates the perception that the criminal system is actually useless. 
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psychological and psychiatric attention, enabling victims to continue with their life 
(rehabilitation); and, to provide moral reparation, through the recognition of the wrongdoing, the 
restoration of victims' reputation, the conduction of commemorative ceremonies or the 
preservation of historical memory of the violations, inter alia (satisfaction).  
With regard to the extent of these rights, according to Cherif Bassiouni – UN rapporteur for 
the reparation principles, the elements of reparation have appeared in a large number of 
international law documents with so many different connotations and, when studied cumulatively 
they “carry the potential to produce a multiplicity of standards, principles, interpretations and 
terms” (UN Commission on Human Rights 1999: par. 6). In this sense, to what extent, in the 
presence of full satisfaction of one or some of the ingredients of reparations is this acceptable 
according to international law? To what extent does this impact the concept of impunity? The 
reparations to be made to the victims certainly entail to some degree conceptual vagueness: it is not 
evident and perhaps not observable to what extent the lack of compensation constitutes ‘impunity’. 
(v) Impunity/adequate punishment: the distinction impunity/accountability for human rights 
violations, is further developed by the Principles into a distinction impunity/adequate punishment, 
according to which “inadequate” punishment entails impunity. The obligation to punish through 
appropriate sentences endorses the idea that there is only one kind of punishment that fits the crime 
(Hart 2008: 161) and that the criteria for assessing its “adequacy” is only quantitative. For example, 
not only a non-carceral punishment will tend to be observed as ‘inadequate’ but also an 
imprisonment of few years may be seen as ‘inappropriate’ because it is not causing “enough 
suffering” a propos a criminal infraction. Thus, the correspondence between wrongdoing and 
adequate legal redress is susceptible of different interpretations and is intrinsically related to a 
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“culture of imprisonment” in the contemporary criminal law system. Concerning the notion of 
impunity, this involves that punishment that is not understood as appropriate amounts to “impunity”. 
With this respect, a difficulty for assessing a non-impunity scenario arises.   
In accordance with human rights, criminal prosecutions in the usual legislative program are 
increasingly considered as a conditio sine qua non in order to preserve the rule of law, 
institutionalize democracy and improve human rights226. Human rights jurisdictions have gradually 
accepted the prosecution of those responsible for violations as a human rights rule: regional courts 
have urged for domestic criminal procedures as an adequate human rights redress227. However, 
there is no such consensus coming from human rights in regard to the extent and quality of 
punishment or to the existence of a duty-right to punish -understood as a form of pain infliction 
and temporal exclusion of those responsible for the violations.  
Nevertheless, when reviewing current human rights jurisprudence, a propensity to increase 
the pressures favoring punishment in accordance with the ordinary penal thought seems to 
emerge228. Additionally to the practice of international human rights courts, indicators of the 
obligation to punish are present in the human rights normative framework. This obligation can be 
                                       
226 “[P]rosecutions are considered to be an unalloyed good: they deter future abuses, promote the rule of 
law, restore the confidence of citizens in government, guarantee respect for human rights, and ensure justice 
for victims of atrocious crimes. Even those who criticize the traditional criminal justice model or the 
practice of international criminal law suggest that the problems lie chiefly inefficiency and enforcement 
rather than in conceptualization” (Engle, Miller and Davis 2016: 1). 
227 Alexandra Huneeus (2013) refers to this phenomenon as the quasi-criminal jurisdiction by human 
rights courts, observing that human rights bodies have developed a ‘new’ identity ordering, monitoring, 
and guiding national prosecutions. According to Huneeus (2013) this situation is problematic because it 
represents an illegitimate expansion of human rights jurisdictional mandates to criminal law issues. 
Further, this expansion involves the intervention of human rights bodies in criminal law issues, acting 
without the actual capacity or expertizes to supervise criminal procedures. 
228 “Troubled by massive breaches of human rights, and the failure or outright refusal of governments to 
prosecute offenders, attention [of human rights movements] has turned to a perceived need for 
repression” (Schabas 1997: 215). 
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traced back to the international human rights conventions and their interpretative bodies in at least 
two main forms: the introduction of an express obligation to punish and the composition of 
parameters for punishing. While the former is rather explicit, the latter is less manifest because it 
involves a form of regulation, enforcement and acceptability of punishment under certain limits. 
In regard to the first form of the human rights obligation to punish, several international 
conventions explicitly require appropriate or adequate penalties as an obligation that States should 
meet. In this respect, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment229, the International230 and Inter-American231 Conventions on Forced 
Disappearance, the ILO Forced Labor Convention232, the Principles on the Effective Prevention and 
Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions233, endorse the criminalization of 
their breaches and require legal redress through “appropriate punishment” – this expression remains 
vague and suggest the idea of strict severity in the forms of sanctioning. Other instruments, as the 
                                       
229 Article 4. 1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. The 
same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or 
participation in torture. 2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties 
which take into account their grave nature. 
230 Article 7.1. Each State Party shall make the offence of enforced disappearance punishable by appropriate 
penalties which take into account its extreme seriousness. 
231 Article III. The States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional procedures, the 
legislative measures that may be needed to define the forced disappearance of persons as an offense and to 
impose an appropriate punishment commensurate with its extreme gravity. This offense shall be deemed 
continuous or permanent as long as the fate or whereabouts of the victim has not been determined. 
The States Parties may establish mitigating circumstances for persons who have participated in acts 
constituting forced disappearance when they help to cause the victim to reappear alive or provide 
information that sheds light on the forced disappearance of a person. 
232 Article 25. The illegal exaction of forced or compulsory labor shall be punishable as a penal offence, and 
it shall be an obligation on any Member ratifying this Convention to ensure that the penalties imposed by 
law are really adequate and are strictly enforced. 
233 1. Governments shall prohibit by law all extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions and shall ensure 
that any such executions are recognized as offences under their criminal laws, and are punishable by 
appropriate penalties which take into account the seriousness of such offences. 
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Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide234 and the IHL Geneva 
Conventions235, enunciate this obligation using the expression “effective criminal penalties” –this 
expression focuses on the materialization of the sanctions without suggesting ‘strict severity’ in the 
same way. Other dispositions use drastic and explicit formulations as the obligation of “severe 
penalties”, stated by the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture236 –this 
expression directly obliges and invites to harsh sanctions. When analyzing these mechanisms one 
should note the absence of reference to the idea of “rehabilitation” or “restorative justice” models, in 
spite of the fact that currently these forms of justice tend to be framed as an important part of the 
human rights discourses.   
Besides the explicit formulation of the human rights obligation to punish, a second form can 
be depicted through the ideas and discourses aimed at offering different parameters for punishing: 
borders entail the reaffirmation of the territory within. Human rights parameters involve the 
administration of “decent conditions”237 in punishment, conditions capable of endorsing the rights to 
                                       
234 Article V. The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, 
the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to 
provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III. 
235 The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal 
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present 
Convention defined in the following Article (article 49, Convention I; article 50, Convention II; article 129, 
Convention III; article 146, Convention IV). 
236 Article 6. In accordance with the terms of Article 1, the States Parties shall take effective measures to 
prevent and punish torture within their jurisdiction. The States Parties shall ensure that all acts of torture and 
attempts to commit torture are offenses under their criminal law and shall make such acts punishable by severe 
penalties that take into account their serious nature. The States Parties likewise shall take effective measures to 
prevent and punish other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment within their jurisdiction. 
237 The mobilization for decent living conditions for prisoners is traditionally ambivalent: while it provides 
arguments for campaigning in favor of decent and humane conditions for prisoners, it does not seriously 
confront the cause of imprisonment nor question the underlying nature of the measures restricting the liberty of 
those convicted for their wrongdoing. Paraphrasing Garland, it is like if pain was sufficiently sanitized by 
procedural rules becoming invisible, when not openly accepted and tolerated, for the society that inflicts pain 
while at the same time intends to disavow violence (Garland 1990). The critiques of imprisonment focused on 
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life, dignity and integrity of inmates regardless of their wrongdoing (IA Court 2004: 102; 2004b: 150; 
2004c: 152; 2003: 126). With this regard, human rights propose restraints to severe physical distress in 
the form of ius cogens prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment238, the proscription of corporal punishment -including excessive chastisement for a crime 
or as an educative or disciplinary measure (UN Human Rights Committee 1994: p. 5), as well as 
outlawing prolonged incommunicado detention or solitary confinement239, and incarceration in totally 
inhospitable places or isolated locations which make difficult for the prisoner to receive visits from her 
family (UN Human Rights Committee 1994a, 1994b, 2002; IA Court 2003b: 87; 2000b: 150; 2000c: 
83; 2005: 221; 2004: 104). Human rights also prohibit collective punishments, recognizing the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility by the IHL240 and other human rights conventions as the 
                                                                                                                           
the administrative issues of internment are incapable of reflecting on the existence of prisons as a problem. 
Focusing on the administration of prisons, the corruption and lack of independence of the judiciary or the 
interference of the executive in procedures (e.g. Human Rights Watch 2016), human rights have progressively 
left aside the critiques on the central ideas and discourses around the system program of action. 
238 Inter alia, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 7); Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; American Convention on Human Rights 
(Article 5); and Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. 
239 The UN Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment (2011: 9) defined “solitary confinement as the physical and social 
isolation of individuals who are confined to their cells for 22 to 24 hours a day. Of particular concern to the 
Special Rapporteur is prolonged solitary confinement, which he defines as any period of solitary 
confinement in excess of 15 days. He is aware of the arbitrary nature of the effort to establish a moment in 
time which an already harmful regime becomes prolonged and therefore unacceptably painful. He concludes 
that 15 days is the limit between “solitary confinement” and “prolonged solitary confinement” because at 
that point, according to the literature surveyed, some of the harmful psychological effects of isolation can 
become irreversible” 
240 Principle recognized in the IHL, in the Lieber Code (Articles 44 and 47), First Geneva Convention 
(Article 49), Second Geneva Convention (Article 50), Third Geneva Convention (Article 129), Fourth 
Geneva Convention (Article 146), Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property (Article 28), 
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property (Article 15), Additional 
Protocol I (Article 85), Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Article 
14), Ottawa Convention (Article 9), Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Article 4). 
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American Convention on Human Rights (Article 5.3), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (Article 7.2), and the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (Article 19.c).  
The existence, adoption and adaptation of a series of human rights rules and principles to 
the idea of ‘adequate punishment’ do not contradict punishment but sets parameters for its 
implementation. This involves an observation of punishment as operative to human rights, 
reaffirming the territory within formed by the ideas, discourses and practices concerning 
punishment. “[A] major source of criminalization [sic] at national and international levels draws on 
the rhetoric of human rights” (Cohen 1992: 100). 
After taking into account these five conceptual elements but also the general connotations 
that human rights discourses attribute to impunity as well as the ordinary social discourses in this 
matter, in the next part we will draw some critical considerations about the elements and arguments 
exposed in the last sections. 
5.3. Critical considerations on the discourses and conceptualizations of impunity  
In accordance with the human rights conceptualization of impunity as well as the 
characterization of the phenomenon in social discourses, we have detected some preliminary 
problems for a sociological construction of the concept. These problems are the ambiguity, lack of 
contours and limits of (the fight against) impunity, as well as the expansion of the concept and the 
repressive logics that the slogan of combating against impunity embeds. This section will furnish two 
critical accounts of such problems. With this purpose, we will start our reflections outlining two 
possible functions of the current discourses on ‘impunity’: (i) regret and social denunciation, and (ii) 
reproduction of the criminal law traditional structures centered in punishment as a form of pain 
infliction.  
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5.3.1. Impunity as a discourse of regret and social denunciation  
If someone asks on the streets what love is, this question may raise rather positive answers241. 
The same may probably happen if someone asks for a concept of hope, beauty or nature. These 
terms, although certainly ambiguous raise a positive perception, a rather optimistic sense of meaning. 
In our days, this is not the case for ‘impunity’. As we studied in the last sections, although 
polysemous, impunity involves a negative connotation of regret and social denunciation: impunity is 
generally perceived as a social problem that can be “solved” by severe punishment; after all, in 
contemporary Western societies who would proclaim impunity as a valid social aspiration? Who can 
legitimately disagree with the fight against impunity?  
As a communicative mechanism of social regret, a wide variety of social wrongdoing can 
be mobilized through the topic of ‘impunity’. On the one hand, this discourse is simultaneously 
source and expression of moral indignation and social unease, and on the other hand it is often 
referred to as the cause and consequence of wrongdoing in society (a causal analysis). In sum, 
these connotations bring into being an overall discourse of impunity consisting of ‘a whole set of 
assessing, diagnostic, prognostic, normative judgments’242.  
When impunity adopts the form of a discourse of regret, the scope of the notion is 
broadened as a label capable of colonizing extremely varied social problems. This form of social 
regret is employed by both the left and the right as a communicative mechanism of social 
denunciation and mobilization of their political demands. In line with these discourses, the State is 
                                       
241 “For the majority, especially since Luther, genuine love is to the right of each of these divisions: self-
giving, truth-seeking, submissive, unconditional, enduring. While lesser love (if one can call it love at all) is 
to the left. By contrast, a small band of rebels insists that all genuine love, especially love with an erotic 
content, is ineluctably self-interested, possessive and mercurial.” (May 2011 : 235) 
242 Inspired in Foucault’s (1975: 19) words for the penal judgment. 
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the main actor towards which denunciation and regret are mobilized. In addition to regret for the 
lack of redress for criminal problematic situations, in the course of the present research different 
interviewees brought light to the use of impunity for referring to other social actors.   
In the PJ case, Hector Beltrán (father) drew a distinction between social/legal impunity, 
assessing that ‘social impunity’ is graver than ‘legal impunity’, because it creates a social 
authorization for the crime and oblivion on the atrocities that they suffered (Beltrán 2014: 94-95). His 
account closely parallels the one provided by a text written by the next of kin of Luz Mary Portela 
(disappeared), where they asked society “not to ignore us, not to discriminate us because we are not 
the only people suffering this problem, this could also happen to you” (Romero 2015: 112).  
This can be encapsulated into the concept of moral or social impunity (Bottinelli 2007) 
according to which the absence or lack of social sanction can be depicted as a form of impunity.   
The notions of moral or social impunity sustained by Botinelli and other commentators assume that 
impunity hampers the emotional recovery of the victims As we reviewed when examining human 
rights discourses on this topic, the adversity that victims bear in situations of impunity is a 
pervasive observation in human rights studies (Justicia y Vida 2006; Instituto Interamericano de 
Derechos Humanos 2007; La Rota, Montoya and Uprimny 2010).  
However, some studies cast doubt on the universality on the presumption that impunity 
creates emotional harm to the victims and that “criminal punishment” is its remedy. With this 
regard, it is particularly interesting to examine a study of the Basque Institute of Criminology 
(Varona and De la Cuesta 2014). This research concludes that the next of kin of people killed by 
terrorist groups in the Basque Country since 1960, do not always recognize criminal law measures 
as significant for their psychosocial recovery. In fact, in cases where there is a criminal conviction, 
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only 36.6% of the victims consulted by the study suggested that this helped them in their moral 
recovery, while 46.3% of the respondents argued that this did not help them at all, and to 13.4% of 
the victims this was simply indifferent. The extent of the moral and psychological impacts that 
convictions bring about to victims exceed the scope of the present research. However, we can 
assert that the criminal law conviction of those responsible of criminal conducts, represented as a 
desired outcome and an aim of the fight against impunity, cannot be universally validated as an 
effective remedy for the recovery of the victims and their families.  
The notion of social or moral impunity is ambiguous, imprecise and fluctuating depending 
on rather emotional factors, which can hardly offer stable elements for the observation. Indeed, for 
an observer using these conceptualizations it is impracticable to delimit a stable notion of impunity 
related to moral or social sanctioning. What means social sanctioning? How can we observe the 
absence or lack of “social sanction” in a given society?  
The slogan of the fight against impunity, ranging from legal to ethical questions, from 
psychosocial to political dimensions, from a cause to a symptom, from diagnose to a prognosis of 
social problems, communicates and enables different forms of constituting, organizing and 
interpreting social life243. The discourses of denunciation and regret concerning entail different 
implications. Let us consider these implications more closely: 
i) The constitutive connotation of discourses of regret and denunciation emerges when 
impunity is employed as an argument for creating, coordinating and bringing together institutional, 
                                       
243  Prosecutions are considered to be an unalloyed good: they deter future abuses, promote the rule of law, 
restore the confi dence of citizens in government, guarantee respect for human rights, and ensure justice for 
victims of atrocious crimes. Even those who criticize the traditional criminal justice model or the practice of 
international criminal law suggest that the problems lie chiefl y in effi ciency and enforcement rather than in 
conceptualization. 
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discursive or ideological initiatives in order to combat it. Anti-impunity campaigns both constitute 
and are developed through an institutional framework embodying a normative regret (Pensky 
2008). Legal instruments, policies and administrative programs, human rights institutions, either at 
the domestic or international level, are among the mechanisms implemented.  
This fight intends to undertake a series of mechanisms countervailing the social problems 
that are traditionally raised when referring to the absence or lack of punishment. As its source, 
raison d’être, goal and motivation, the action against impunity has served at creating a number of 
institutions engaged with combating impunity244. This is intended to express the message that there 
is an obligation of punishing (i.e. inflicting suffering) upon people who commit crimes. This seems 
to be the sense of the mantra “impunity will not be tolerated”.  
In this context, the slogan of the combat against impunity creates legitimate grounds for the 
creation or justification of a specialized institutional framework oriented to address the problem 
through the program of action of punishing the criminals. New legislation, social procedures for 
legal intervention, technologies of control and repression, and the reform or creation of a series of 
institutional mechanisms with this purpose.  
ii) The slogan of the fight against impunity implies also a sort of “Weltanschauung” (world 
view) that may be found in the arguments, ideas, discourses or practices enabling a particular 
observation or understanding of a certain social problems represented to be related to human rights. 
                                       
244 Roht-Arriaza (2001) and Pensky (2008) describe four main transnational contemporary institutions. 
These institutions supplement the domestic efforts of implementation of the combat against impunity: a) the 
creation of international or hybrid international domestic ad hoc tribunals, b) the intervention of foreign 
courts acting as third party states through extradition, c) universal jurisdiction or civil law mechanisms 
investigating and prosecuting non-nationals outside of their home countries, and d) the creation of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court with the purpose of ending impunity for the most serious crimes. 
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When a situation of impunity is observed, it becomes an argument for delimiting the role, extent 
and aims of social institutions in relation to social problems related with the problematic situation.  
In this context, discourses about impunity appear as reasons for developing the 
conventional program of action of the criminal law system, without any critical concern for the 
philosophy of intervention. This implies a normal social reproduction of legal institutions and ideas 
around punishment, influencing the hermeneutics of legal mechanisms as the statutes of limitation 
and the victims’ rights245.  
iii) The slogan of the fight against impunity serves also as a program of action for social 
mobilization. These discourses often use (the motto of the campaign against) impunity as an 
injunction aimed at orientating the actions of individuals and social movements. These discourses 
may involve moral, political and ethic arguments with the purpose of individuals embracing ‘the 
fight’. Either as a general campaign or as the support in favour of the reaction against a particular 
problematic situation, the creation of advertising campaigns, educational programs and other 
strategies, aims at socializing the reproach. Often, these strategies focus in transmitting the idea 
that prosecutions and criminal punishment against perpetrators is the ‘gold standard’ that the fight 
impunity must support (Pensky 2008).   
According to this, impunity as a discourse of regret and social denunciation creates 
opportunities for mobilizing the social consciousness against wrongdoing and its consequences. 
                                       
245 An example of this can be found in a case brought to the European Court of Human Rights where the 
applicant, a Bulgarian national who belonged to the Roma minority, being sentenced under charges of fraud 
to three years of imprisonment, was refused the suspension of the sentence on the grounds that there was “an 
impression of impunity, especially among members of minority groups”, considering that “a suspended 
sentence is not a sentence” (European Court of Human Rights 2010). In this context, the understanding of 
the deprivation of liberty is interpreted adverse to the offender using a discourse of impunity which served at 
regretting certain conditions of a particular human group. 
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This discourse around impunity may enable society to detect, name, recognize and address the 
social problems that the phenomenon entails. The awareness of the crimes, the visibility of the 
victims, the consciousness against the wrongdoing and the necessity of holding accountable those 
responsible for problematic situations are eventual valuable effects of this discourse.  
The portrait of the fight against impunity as a struggle against the absence or lack of 
punishment often demands a shift towards more punitive forms of social control. Benefiting from 
social dissatisfaction, this may constitute an opportunity for a law and order rhetoric which amounts 
to penal populism. Repressive discourses and practices, false promises of judicial effectiveness or 
actual policies of respect and support to the judiciary, administrative and technical support to the 
action of the system of justice, are some of the traditional expressions of these discourses246.  
These discourses often portray victims’ needs through an automatized claim for retribution. 
In this context, “victims and victim movements […] often are embraced by politicians that make 
Law and Order their central issue, as described by several authors (e.g. Fattah 1986, 1997; 
Kirchhoff 1991; Sherman and Strang 2007)” (Christi 2010: 117). The victims, deprived of voice, 
are employed as a standard justification of greater punitiveness – penal measures are allegedly 
implemented by the system for the wellbeing of actual or potential victims. In this context, the 
                                       
246 “Les transformations de l‘activité pénale de l‘État au cours des dernières décennies vont recevoir 
plusieurs dénominations différentes dépendamment de l‘aspect que l‘on veut  mettre  en  relief.  Ainsi,  
ces  transformations  peuvent  être  identifiées  comme  la montée de l’État pénal (Wacquant), comme 
une nouvelle culture de contrôle (Garland) ou comme une nouvelle pénologie (Feeley et Simon). Quel 
que soit le nom qu‘on utilise pour identifier ces transformations, elles semblent bien être associées à 
une nouvelle vague d‘intolérance, de demandes de peines plus sévères et de renforcement de l‘usage 
de  la  prison,  toujours  critiquée.  La  place  pour  les  connaissances  scientifiques  ou juridiques plus 
approfondies et innovatrices semble grandement réduite sur le plan politique. Même l‘ancienne idée du 
contrôle du crime par l‘amélioration des conditions sociales et par la réhabilitation du coupable semble 
être un discours dévalorisé. Aujourd‘hui,  les  politiciens  trouvent  plus  facile  et  moins  cher  (même  
si  cela  est discutable) de tenter de séduire leur électorat par la proposition de peines plus sévères, par 
une posture « tough on crime » ” (Xavier 2012: 12). 
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victims are simultaneously brought to light and silenced: “[t]he victim plays an ambivalent role in 
the anti-impunity imagination. The promotion of prosecutions often takes place in the name of the 
victims, even as their voices might be suppressed, limited, or distorted at trial.   […] The victim is 
thus both central and marginal, featured and featureless, a necessary representative of a horrific 
past and a feared brake on future transformation” (Engle, Miller and Davis 2016: 10-11).  
In the context of these communications, it is not surprising when “victims of certain types 
of crimes get organized as lobbies that tend to push the legislator into punitive responses that may 
jeopardize or pervert the ultima ratio principle. These lobbies rarely call for abolitionism and de-
criminalization, for alternatives to criminalization or for approaches that take into account the 
successful re-integration of the offender” (Bengoetxea 2013: 119).   People or movements with a 
strong demand for justice and peace may find themselves trapped in the paradox of supporting 
measures that entail different forms of injustice and vengeance.  
In the particular case against the Argentinian dictator Jorge Videla, it is interesting to 
explore the clash of values that the slogan of the fight against impunity based on regret and 
denunciation may involve. Videla was a military General who became one of the most cruel and 
ruthless dictators in the history of the continent. On March 24, 1976, the Argentine armed forces 
initiated a coup d’état that lasted until December 10, 1983. Videla launched the so-called “National 
Reorganization Process” and an “Anti-subversive campaign” consisting in the systematic 
suppression of the people who were against the ‘Western and Christian Civilization’. This regime 
spread terror, repression and death through the practice of arbitrary detentions, mass torture, 
abduction of minors, extrajudicial killings and forced disappearance of thousands of people who 
opposed the military doctrines. 
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After his removal from power, he benefitted from different amnesties and presidential 
pardons issued to favor the military. These pardons were annulled and on December 22, 2010, the 
Federal Tribunal of Cordoba sentenced Videla to life imprisonment. Videla died in his cell in 2013. 
In respect to this, the then executive director of Amnesty International for Argentina, Mariela 
Belski declared: “the important thing here is that justice was done, that Videla was sentenced and 
that he died in prison” (Valente 2013). In the same vein, the then Vice-President of the republic, 
Amado Boudou stated: “it's good that he died in prison and with a sentence from the justice and the 
democracy in Argentina”. Correspondingly, the Secretary of Human Rights of Argentina, Martín 
Fresneda, said that although “the Argentine government cannot celebrate the death of anyone”, he 
was “satisfied” that there was “justice and not revenge” against Videla and that it was “important 
that he died of natural causes and in a common jail”.   
These assertions communicate a sense of disquiet around the difficulty of putting on trial 
powerful actors. This concern triggers in the case a sense of triumph and relief in relation to the 
death of the perpetrator. Such understanding reveals the constitution of a paradox of sacrifice 
(Pires, 2012) according to which human rights aim at protecting human life through criminal law 
by sacrificing the (biological or social) life of the person against who the criminal law intervenes. 
This could also be seen as a trap of values according to which value Y is reaffirmed, essentially, by 
sacrificing value Y. Ultimately, this can be an indicator of a paradoxical relation between criminal 
law and human rights (on this subject, Cartuyvels 2007). With this regard, the combat against 
impunity when understood as a campaign for (criminal law) repression may entail a form of 
reproduction of social structures that will be studied in the following section. 
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5.3.2. Impunity: a mechanism for the reproduction of criminal law structures of pain 
infliction 
In this part we will study how human rights discourses, ideas and practices around the fight 
against impunity may entail the reproduction of a particularly repressive way of thinking the 
criminal justice program of action, creating different obstacles for the innovation. Particularly, we 
will argue that such understanding may identify the fight against impunity with the reproduction of 
criminal law punishment as a form of intended pain infliction.  
The automatized and one of the most frequent notions of impunity refers to the absence of 
punishment. The oldest document that we were able to trace referring to this notion of impunity 
dates back a document dated 1624: “one outrage unpunished provokes many more, through hope 
of the like impunity” (East India Company 1624: 2). This formulation, probably used by former 
communications, has spread throughout contemporary discourses, especially within human rights: 
in accordance with our study, the phenomenon of impunity is ordinarily identified as a social 
problem taking place when crimes (and other wrongdoing) go unpunished (e.g. Plataforma 
Argentina contra la Impunidad 1998; Justicia y Vida 2006; Bottinelli 2007: 196; IACHR 2007; La 
Rota, Montoya and Uprimny 2010; CCJ 2008, 2012247; Comisión Asesora Política Criminal n.d. in 
CNMH 2013: 197248; CPJ 2013). In this environment of ideas, the fight against impunity may 
                                       
247 An example of this is also found in a research on the violence against unionists by the Colombian 
Commission of Jurists (CCJ 2012), which studied the problem of impunity in these cases with reference to 
the convictions of the perpetrators. In this sense, a history of impunity was drawn comparing the number of 
cases of violence officially registered by the Prosecutor General’s office and the number of convictions 
between 1986 and 2011.  For instance, in this period there was a register of 225 unionist victims of enforced 
disappearance compared to a number of sentences in reference to only five victims. The research concluded 
that impunity amounts to 98%. 
248 “La Comisión Asesora de Política Criminal, al analizar la eficacia del sistema penal frente a delitos 
graves como el homicidio, concluyó que las condenas por los homicidios ocurridos en distintos años fueron 
equivalentes al 5,9% de las entradas por dicho delito en el 2005, al 3,8% en el 2006, 3,3% en el 2007 y 2,7% 
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constitute a mechanism for the reproduction of criminal law structures of pain infliction from at 
least two perspectives: the lack of innovative proposals and the formulation of a program of action 
centered on punishment as a form of intended pain infliction.  
On the one hand, traditional anti-impunity discourses (focusing on punishing as a 
mechanism of pain infliction) do not support as possible responses to impunity means other than 
penal measures intended at inflicting suffering. As we studied with regard to human rights 
discourses and norms, possible innovation coming from restorative justice ideas249, practices 
developed around the “transitional justice” (with the goal of allowing their presence in the ordinary 
legal framework), and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, are absent from the program of 
action of the traditional way of representing the combat against impunity. These absences already 
illustrate, at least partially, one of the ways in which the mentioned discourse may reproduce the 
conventional structures of the criminal law system.  
According to a notion of impunity constructed around the theories of punishment, the fight 
against impunity involves advocating for swift, certain, and harsh penalties, rejecting parsimony in 
punishment250. “If [this] is the starting position, then flexible punishment logically runs the risk of 
                                                                                                                           
en el 2008, lo cual equivale a tasas de impunidad cercanas al 95% para un crimen tan grave (Comisión 
Asesora Política Criminal, párrafo 89)” 
249 From 1960 to 1970 a theory of rehabilitation emerged allowing a degree of non-intervention in regard to 
certain (non-grave) criminal conduct as well as creating some alternative penalties (that often do not represent 
an alternative to punishment). Alternative conflict resolution has also presented some degree of innovation 
creating reconciliation programs and compensatory schemas as valid forms of administration of justice. 
Ultimately, restorative justice has allowed the creation of an idea of justice as a means attending the necessities 
emerging from the social problematic situation. In line with these ideas, restoration of social relations disrupted 
by the conflict is offered as the ‘new’ end and identity of the system, rather than punishment (Tonche and 
Umaña 2016). 
250 “The parsimony concept derives from the writings of Jeremy Bentham who argued that the goal of the 
State should be to maximize happiness or satisfaction and, accordingly, that whatever policy would do that 
should be adopted. […] Inflicting pain or unhappiness on anyone, including offenders, is a bad thing and 
can only be justified when some larger good is achieved. The offender's happiness is no more or less 
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becoming simply the latest incarnation of impunity” (Roht-Arriaza 2015: 382). When excluding 
from its field of action, less repressive interests, goals and mechanisms, the ‘traditional’ fight 
against impunity may uphold a rather repressive penal rationality and, therefore, the structures of 
the system. However, the reproduction not only resides on the lack of alternative answers but also, 
and importantly enough, on the criminal law measures that such fight endorses. 
For developing this issue, we will briefly present a theory concerning the characterization 
of the criminal law system that is at the same time concerned with the obstacles it confronts for 
possible innovation. The Modern Penal Rationality Theory (hereinafter, MPR) authored by Alvaro 
Pires (2008; 2014) and others (see Dubé, García and Rocha 2013), takes as a basis the 
characterization on the criminal system that authors as Foucault251 had advanced, using different 
tools from the systems theory to structure and develop its observations.  
According to this, the criminal law is currently presented as a self-sufficient, differentiated 
and self-contained legal sub-system. As such, this system absorbs the social function of operating 
                                                                                                                           
important than anyone else's and must be taken into account. The “principle of parsimony”, a concept 
revived in the writing of Norval Morris (1974), prescribes that the least painful or burdensome punishment 
that will achieve valid social purposes should be imposed. This is not an unfamiliar concept. Modern 
lawyers, and the American Bar Association's (1994) standards for sentencing, call for use of the “least 
restrictive alternative.” […] Applied to policies governing intermediate sanctions, the principle of parsimony 
would require imposition of the least painful, burdensome, or intrusive punishment that achieves the 
purposes being sought”. (Tonry 1998: 206-207). 
251 Based on Foucault (1974), Pires (1998) observed four paradigmatic transformations on the control of 
crime creating the possibility of the criminal law becoming autonomized as a legal system. These are: i) the 
invention of the prosecutor in the twelfth century as a representative of the king, replacing little by little the 
role of the victim; ii) the emergence of the ‘infraction’ as the form for referring to the crime, abandoning the 
concept of harm against someone and replacing it by the notion of a mere offense against the king; iii) the 
ex-officio authority which involved the obligation to prosecute, on the basis of the irrelevance of 
compensatory agreements between the victim and the aggressor; and, iv) the compensation not as a form of 
reparation in favor of the injured party, but as a form of tribute in favor of the sovereign. These 
transformations involved an important shift of the criminal thought. The criminal justice became 
progressively autonomized as a legal system and the criminal sanction was identified as punishment.  
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the code crime/non-crime252 (Pires and Acosta 1994: 10; Alvaro Pires 2008, 2014). Operating this 
code not only involves the definition of certain conducts as criminal but establishes as well a range 
of sanctions against the breaches of the criminal law253.  
With this regard, according to the MPR, the identity and horizons of the criminal justice 
system have been shaped around the premise of communicating an alleged correlation between 
crime and (the obligation of) punishment (in the sense of intended pain infliction). In line with the 
MPR, in the Western world has reproduced an identity of the criminal justice system around a 
program of action centered in punishment as its main end, aim and character. In this context, 
punishment is a medium which particular selections of meaning are driven by the modern theories 
of punishment (Pires 2015).  This system of ideas that can be denominated a penal rationality finds 
its rational, philosophical and practical grounds on the theories of punishment254.  
These theories entail an identitary discourse as they provide a rationale, a content and, 
further, an end to the criminal law. Also, the theories offer a course of action for the system 
constituting a frame of reference around which decisions are made (adapting the words of Hogarth 
1971: 69 in García 2013: 43). Using the expression coined by Durkheim, these theories furnish the 
                                       
252 The system operates the distinction crime/non-crime through a set of criminal law norms. For 
establishing the frontiers and content of what may be considered criminal in society, the system mobilizes a 
series of norms (coming i.a. from the constitutional law, the criminal law, the human rights, police and 
administrative regulations), and for delimiting the conducts able for the system selection uses a series of 
principles (necessity, equality, proportionality, obligation to punish). 
253 In this respect, the MPR adopts Hart’s (2012) distinction between norms of conduct and norms of 
sanction, according to which criminal law requires a duty from the people that if disobeyed implies that the 
person has broken the law. 
254 With this respect, Tulkens (2013: 10) explains that the MPR argues that “modern theories of 
punishment [retribution, deterrence, denunciation and even rehabilitation in prison] involve a major 
epistemological obstacle to the construction of an authentic criminal law for citizens and a new penal 
rationality, all at once, more human, more respectful for the freedom of all, more creative and better fitted 
to address the complexity of society”. 
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system with a program of action255 that supplies, supports and orientates the arguments, practices 
and objectives of the criminal justice system.  
For long time, the practical theories of punishment256 have been established around a 
paradigm contrasting utilitarianism257 (or consequentialist theories) to retributivism258 (or non-
consequentialist theories). This understanding differentiate the first as a set of ideas that understand 
punishment as an obligation to deter other crimes or to obtain other public gains259, from the latter 
as a theory obliging to punish as a form of correcting the wrong and reaffirming social order260.  
On the contrary, the MPR draw attention to the fact that these two groups of theories have 
shared the same basic assumptions and that, therefore, their opposition is only secondary with 
regards to the rational structures of the system: “a distinction without difference” (Pires 2001: 77). 
While the mentioned theories are traditionally represented as disputing philosophical grounds for 
                                       
255 A program of action is not phenomenological in the sense that their role is not to describe or explain 
what happens or has happened in the social world; in other words, a ‘program of action’ does not propose a 
causal understanding of social phenomena (García 2013). Rather a (criminal law) program of action aims at 
orientating the action of the (criminal justice) system in a forward-looking perspective. Durkheim’s concept 
is related to the notion of practical theories that “have, as their object, not to express the nature of things as 
given, but to direct action. They are not actions, but are closely related to actions which is their function to 
orient” (Durkheim 1956: 313). 
256 These ideas are practical since they do not only express an identitary credential but also govern the 
possibilities of action of the criminal law. 
257 Divided into classical positivists as Lombroso, Ferri and Garofalo and modern utilitarianists as Beccaria, 
Bentham, Blakstone, Filangieri, Feuerbach, Carmignani, Howard, Fry, Livingston, Lucas, Ducpétiaux, 
Julius, Beaumond, Tocqueville, among others. 
258 Western philosophy has built more than a version of theories known as “retributivist”. In this sense, the 
term “retributivist theory” refers to a particular group of theories. This theory has a religious origin (Hélie, 
1856, Berman, 1983). The first “retributivist” theory dates back to the eleventh century and refers to divine 
justice (Anselm, 1098). Some of the most influential representatives of this current are Kant, Hegel, Binding, 
Rossi, among others. 
259 As Betham asserted (1811: 12): “Ainsi la prévention des délits se divise en deux branches : prévention 
particulière, qui s'applique au délinquant individuel ; et préventiongé- nérale, qui s'appliqne à tous les membres 
de la communauté sans exception”. 
260 As Hegel famously assessed: “the criminal act is a negation, and punishment is the negation of a negation” 
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punishment (and partially because of that), they have managed to hide their common 
characteristics (Van de Kerchove 1981: 291 in Pires 1998). 
The three basic shared assumptions of these theories are: (i) a substantialized definition of 
punishment requiring an explicit and direct aim to inflict suffering through the operation of the 
system; (ii) the imposition of punishment (as a form of intended infliction of suffering) as an 
obligation; and (iii) an devalorization of any other form of conflict resolution beyond the obligation 
to inflict suffering. Let us review this more closely in relation to impunity. 
 (i) A substantialized definition of punishment as a form of intended pain infliction involves 
the valorization of afflictive or exclusionary measures as the consequence to crime. “[I]mposing 
punishment within the institution of law means the inflicting of pain, intended as pain. This is an 
activity which often comes in dissonance to esteemed values such as kindness and forgiveness” 
(Christie 1981: Preface). According to this, other forms of conflict resolution that are not 
characterized by communicating suffering (e.g. forgiveness) or measures that do not to inflict 
‘enough’ pain (e.g. lenient penalties) are identified with ‘impunity’261. 
The definition of punishment, initially forged by religious communications through the 
theory of retributive divine justice, was subsequently adopted by secular theories about punishment 
(Pires 2015)262. These theories were formed in reference to the religious concept of penance as a 
form of torment which at the time the ecclesiastical authorities imposed upon sinners “so that 
                                       
261 With this respect, Bentham (1811: 2) asserts: “Punir, dans le sens le plus général, c'est infiger un mal à 
un individu, avec une intention directe par rapport à ce mal, à raison de quelque acte qui paroît avoir 
étéfait ou omis” “Le mal que vous m'infligez […] S'agit-il d'une somme d'argent qu'on exige de vous, 
comme un équivalent pour une perte que vous avez causée à un tiers ? c'est un acte de satisfaction 
pécuniaire, non de punition” (Bentham 1811:4). 
262 The coupling between the religious notion of divine justice and the secular penal ideas can be 
characterized as non-coordinated uses of similar representations making possible to preserve the availability 
of a similar sense (Luhmann 2010 274-275 in Pires 2015). 
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through ‘sorrowful groans’ and a contrite heart they might be admonished, instructed and prepared 
for the future” (Shoemaker 2011: 20). According to this, sacrifice, penitence and suffering became 
identified as the consequence that the criminal justice is supposed to award to criminal 
wrongdoing. In this context, punishment is identified with an experience of ‘infamy’, a ‘legitimate 
pain’ suffered by those who behave against the authority of the law.  
The aim of pain infliction was originally communicated through corporal punishment, 
which ought to be the causation of physical pain. However, this practice particularly transformed 
especially in the eighteenth century (Shoemaker 2001: 15)263 into the form of temporization of 
punishment (Pires & García 2007; Pires 2014; Umaña and Pires 2016) from the second half of the 
eighteenth century264. This form was constructed in opposition to the corporal infliction of pain 
under a representation that only inhumane punishment could derive from corporal pain – e.g. 
prison time is more humane than to be whipped in a plaza.  
Hence, the constitution of an obligation of punishing evolved into the deprivation of liberty, 
administered in conformity with a temporization of suffering or temporization of the punishment 
(Pires and García 2007; Pires 2014; Umaña and Pires 2016). Temporization, using the neologism 
                                       
263 “Within a relatively short period of years, beginning roughly in the latter portion of the eighteenth century, 
a wide range of corporal punishments employed throughout Western Europe and the American colonies gave 
way to less bloody penal methods. By the early nineteenth century, […] no longer did punishment focus upon 
the dramaturgy of a condemned undergoing intense physical pain; now punishment operated without 
bloodletting, with minimized physical suffering, and almost exclusively within the walls of a penitentiary” 
(Shoemaker 2001: 15).   
264 This position is particularly noticeable in Beccaria (1764: 11) who asserted that every criminal cause 
should be judged syllogistically where “[t]he major should be the general law; the minor the conformity of 
the action, or its opposition to the laws; the conclusion, liberty or punishment”. According to this, the right 
to liberty is constructed in opposition to penal sanctions. 
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derived from the study of Norbert Elias (1998)265, is a synthesis of the correlation drawn between 
two different sequences: the gravity of the crime and the amount of time of sentence, 
simultaneously used as the measuring scale of each other. To the phenomenon of crime, a scale 
was designed relating the seriousness of the conduct with a timescale - deprivation of liberty 
formulated in terms of days, months and years. Temporal punishment uses a form of political 
economy of repression on the body: the horizon of punishment and its declared function is 
expressed on time (temporization of suffering). However different from a system of corporal 
punishment aiming at the bloody chastisement of the body, the temporization of suffering involves 
as well a physical restriction on the person submitted to the deprivation of liberty266.  
In this rational environment, prisons emerged as a standard social institution (Foucault, 
1983), identified as the essential penal measure267 and the identity of the modern criminal law 
system (García 2013: 63; UN Office on Drugs and Crime 2007:3268). Moreover, in modern times, 
                                       
265 In his studies on time, Elias (1998) noted that time has been used as a reference scale for measuring 
different phenomena. This correlation may be established between phenomena that have rather divergent 
characteristics –as may be time and criminal conduct. 
266 As Foucault (1975) asserted: “even if they do not make use of violent or bloody punishment, even 
when they use ‘lenient’ methods involving confinement or correction, it is always the body that is at issue 
- the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their submission”. 
267 Nonetheless, recently, ideas on transitional justice, restorative justice and rehabilitation theories have 
raised other possible schemas of thought with the aim of finding a more integral answer to the phenomenon 
of crime and, therefore, alternatives to punishment. It is still debatable and specific to every context, 
circumstance and crime, to what extent alternatives to punishment can be used, specifically in contexts of 
armed conflicts, war, massive human rights violations, and other grave situations. 
268 “Prisons are found in every country of the world. Policy-makers and administrators may therefore simply 
come to regard them as a given and not try actively to find alternatives to them. Yet imprisonment should not 
be taken for granted as the natural form of punishment. In many countries the use of imprisonment as a form of 
punishment is relatively recent. It may be alien to local cultural traditions that for millennia have relied on 
alternative ways of dealing with crime. Further, imprisonment has been shown to be counterproductive in the 
rehabilitation and reintegration of those charged with minor crimes, as well as for certain vulnerable 
populations. Yet, in practice, the overall use of imprisonment is rising throughout the world, while there is little 
evidence that its increasing use is improving public safety. There are now more than nine million prisoners 
worldwide and that number is growing” 
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the prison is the dispositive that absorbs public reprobation (Feinberg 1981: 31 in García 2013: 60; 
Duff and Garland, n.d. 34). In this vein, the modern penal theories agree on the mechanism of 
operationalization of criminal law reproach, expressed in terms of time and represented as the 
length of the custodial sentence269 (García 2013: 53). The overestimation of the forms of 
deprivation of the liberty that characterizes modern discourses of impunity focuses the attention of 
the system on finding an ‘adequate’ severity rather than finding an alternative to severity270.  
In this context, anti-impunity discourses entail a mechanism for the reproduction of the 
criminal law structures while the role of the criminal law to the fight against impunity becomes 
centered on a single mission: adopting (severe) penal measures implemented through a measure of 
exclusion and suffering that must correspond to a proportion of the wrong caused by the offense. In 
this vein, the operation of the system could not aim at more or better forms of social inclusion of the 
individual responsible for the wrongdoing -at least not done instantly the moment the sanction takes 
place, and pardon and amnesty are undervalued when not prohibited as a form of operation of the 
system271.  
                                       
269 While authors such as Drumbl (2007) observe that data on the criminal sanctions at the national and 
local levels show a certain diversification on the types of sanctions available -including community 
service, incarceration, lustration and compensation, we should notice that this diversification presents 
different formal and material obstacles. The graver the offense, the more difficult it is to find alternatives 
to imprisonment –apart from (increasingly rare) positions in favor of death penalty. 
270 “Although in many countries, the philosophy of imprisonment is increasingly thought of in terms of the 
concept of ‘corrections’, for those deemed to pose particular risks there appears to be a greater emphasis on 
security. Examples include notorious ‘Super-max’ facilities where the purpose of the regime is to prevent all 
physical contact between a detainee and others, and to minimise social interaction between inmates and 
staff” (Allen 2015: 25). 
271 According to some, “domestic amnesties are not violations of international law according to the emergent 
anti-amnesty norm. It is not a crime not to punish a crime. But the non-performance of punishment now at 
least in principle triggers the legal scrutiny of the international community” (Pensky 2008). Other 
commentators as Lessa and Payne (2012), in return, accept that besides trials, amnesties are not only 
permitted in international law but also could contribute to political transition. 
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The criminal law system has therefore become a social system in charge of responding to 
criminal conduct through negative or hostile measures. Negative since these theories refer to 
positive actions as impertinent or insufficient for addressing the criminal conduct (e.g. apologies or 
reparations instead of punishment) suggesting that only the concrete and immediate evil caused to 
the deviant (classical notion of punishment) can reaffirm the value that the norm upholds and the 
well-being of the social group to which it belongs (Pires 2001a: 184). The adverse character of 
punishment is, therefore, the conditio sine qua non for materializing the regret to crime272. 
According to this rationality, positive actions of integration or social assistance would be in 
principle inadequate for addressing the criminal conduct –in the exceptional cases when they exist 
they are often elusive and difficult to adopt and hard to implement. Furthermore, actions 
expressing reproach by allowing the offender to engage with performing positive actions for 
addressing the necessities that emerge in the criminal problematic situation would be perceived, at 
best, as insufficient and inadequate.  
The atomistic character of such reaction implies that the preservation of the social links 
between the offender and the society is indifferent to the action of the criminal law system: while 
the action of the offender may sometimes express a rupture with the society, the action of the 
criminal law system is programmed for expressing, at all times, a rupture between the offender and 
society. Even if the offender commits a crime without any particular representation of detachment 
from society (i.e. when the actor have a strong sense of belonging to social values), the criminal 
law system creates a rupture between the wrongdoer and her context.  
                                       
272 With this respect, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (2001: 106; 2004: 101) asserts that 
criminal law penalties “imply impairment, deprivation or alternation of the rights of an individual, as a result 
of an unlawful conduct” 
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This rupture is often physical in the form of the ‘ordinary’ measure of the deprivation of 
liberty but is, at the same time, abstract because it implies addressing a concrete problematic 
situation with a measure of pain infliction that is not concretely and primarily concerned with 
addressing the problems and restoring the necessities that the conflict raises: primarily it is 
committed with producing a sufferance and only secondarily it is concerned with producing a 
good273. In this rational context, the temporization emerges as an abstract form of measurement of 
the system’s reproach towards the crime without a concrete link to the criminal conduct initiating 
the reaction of the system: a uniform formula of penal temporization addresses very diverse 
problematic situations. 
(ii) This understanding involves the representation of punishment as an obligation (to 
inflict suffering). According to MPR, the imposition of punishment (as a form of intended 
infliction of suffering) constitutes an (either moral, pragmatic or legal274) obligation to be 
attributed against those responsible for criminal conduct, opposed to a simple authorization to 
intervene or even a form of sanctioning without directly seeking the infliction of suffering. In this 
context, impunity is constructed in contrast to the breach of the obligation to punish crime as a 
phenomenon that replicates and reproduces the social wrong derived from crime.  
With respect to impunity and referring to the mentioned traditional paradigm of the penal 
thought, on the one hand, in the case of retributivism impunity would amount to a breach of the 
                                       
273 In the Words of Bentham (1811: 10): “La peine produit un mal du premier ordre, et un bien du second 
ordre : elle inflige une souffrance à un individu qui l'a encourue volontairement ; et dans ses effets 
secondaires, elle se change toute en bien, elle intimide les hommes dangereux, elle rassure les innocents, 
elle est l'unique sauvegarde de la société”.  
274 At the begining of the nineteenth century we can find three main reasons governing the idea of 
punishing without a rest: a practical reson (Beccaria, Bentham), a moral obligation (Kant, Hegel) and a 
legal or logical obligation (Feuerbach) (Pires 2001: 82) 
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categorical imperative275 or of the moral or juridical duty to reaffirm the validity of norms. On the 
other hand, in the case of utilitarists276, the notion of impunity would refer to the breach of an 
obligation of punishing crime affecting deterrence and therefore creating recidivism or a general 
implicit authorization to commit crime277. In sum, these schools characterize impunity as the 
opposite to the obligation of punishing; in doing so, these theories propose no substantial 
difference from the point of view of the means to address impunity. 
The notion of punishment based on pain infliction (iii) under-values alternative 
punishments and, especially, alternatives to punishment (as a measure of pain infliction). Pires 
                                       
275 For the Kantian school, morality is governed by a moral imperative that has to be observed in all 
circumstances not as a means but as an end in itself. “The categorical imperative would be that one which 
represented an action as objectively necessary for itself, without any reference to another end. […] Now if 
the action were good merely as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is 
represented as good in itself, hence necessary, as the principle of the will, in a will that in itself accords with 
reason, then it is categorical” (Kant 2002: 31). This moral imperative is structured according to principles of 
justice that are derivable from reason. In this respect, Kant (2002: 23-24) writes: “[f]rom what we have 
adduced it is clear that all moral concepts have their seat and origin fully a priori in reason […]”. Kant 
described moral principles as ideas shared in society but adopted individually. Under this perspective, 
Kantians assert that punishment is an obligation that allows reaffirming the categorical imperative. 
According to this, impunity would be the breach of an obligation of punishing crime that goes against the 
law but also against the ethical principle of the categorical imperative. 
276 Utilitarianism is often identified with two of its most influential contributors: Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) 
and John Stuart Mill (1806 –1873) (Hudson 2003). Nonetheless, in 1725 the Irish philosopher Francis 
Hutcheson was the first to publish an utilitarist systematization of ideas. In (1729) he wrote on the utility 
principle, identifying the best action as that which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers. 
This proposition was received, reinterpreted and reformedby his contemporaries Pietro Verri’s (1763) and 
Cesare Beccaria (1769), at the time assembled in the Accadèmia dei Pugni. Later, Jeremy Bentham formulated 
his principle of utility, closer to what Hutcheson had formulated: “[...] it is the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong” (Bentham 1776: 3). Adapting it to the criminal system, 
Bentham (1830: 1-2) asserted that “punishment, whatever shape it may assume, is an evil” that it is “a physical 
evil; [involving] either a pain or a loss of pleasure”. However Utilitarism presents different variations its 
philosophical framework privileges the utility as the determinant criteria of ideas’ moral worth. In this vein, to 
some, the utility comes from deterrence. According to Hart (2008) the instrumental sacrifice of a person with 
the purpose of deterrence is limited to the extent that the person broke the law voluntarily and that the system 
should not procure more punishment than the necessary to deter. 
277 According to Bentham (1823: 287), “total or partial impunity of delinquents [favors] the occurrence of other 
similar offences”. In the words of Beccaria (1769): “It is doubtless of importance that no crime should remain 
unpunished […]. A crime already committed, and for which there can be no remedy, can only be punished by a 
political society, with an intention that no hopes of impunity should induce others to commit the same”. 
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(2013) employs the notion of epistemological obstacle by Gaston Bachelard (1938), assessing that 
the criminal justice system presents a cognitive obstacle while professional practices or ideas that a 
social system understands as appropriate, good or interesting, prevent the adoption, generalization 
and long-term stabilization of new habits and better ideas, structures and practices for the system. 
In this context, the fight against impunity lacking of aptitude for proposing innovative ideas 
contributes at such blockage.  
The mentioned cumulative elements constructed around punishment have shaped a rigid 
identity of the criminal law system stabilizing an epistemological obstacle to innovation and 
degrading alternatives to punishment; moreover (and perhaps fundamentally), it has obstaculized 
an alternative definition of punishment, which does not deliberately seeks to inflict suffering – ”il 
est possible de dire que le système de pensée du système de droit criminel est un « système qui se 
pense pensé» (Gauchet) : il ne voit pas qu’il a le pouvoir de modifier les idées qui le composent et 
de changer ses valeurs actuelles pour des valeurs (ou des formes) moins guerrières et plus 
garantistes sur le plan de la conception des normes de sanction” (García 2013: 68).  
“La sanction afflictive – celle qui est porteuse d’un message de souffrance – deviendra alors 
non seulement très valorisée, mais sera aussi étroitement attachée à l’image que le système 
construit et projette de lui-même. […] Il observe comme menaçantes les tentatives pour 
définir autrement la punition ou pour remplacer ces théories de la peine” (Pires 2015: 12).  
In sum, if we study the discourses of impunity with the tools of the MPR we find the 
construction of different philosophical arguments enabling a program of action of the criminal law 
system that consists on the obligation to punish, meaning by punishment the reaction to crime 
trough abstract, negative, and atomistic measures (Pires, Cellard and Pelletier 2001: 198).  In line 
with this description, punishment is understood as a pain delivery mechanism involving different 
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measures of restriction of rights epitomized in the deprivation of liberty - “[n]ous sommes chaque 
fois plus en presence d’un concept de punition énergiquement substantialisé” (Pires 2015: 31).  
This is especially visible in the practice of human rights organizations: a number of ideas and 
arguments that human rights movements used in the past when campaigning for the amnesty of 
political dissidents or impoverished criminals, has largely transformed into demands for criminal law 
protecting human rights. The understanding of the criminal justice system as a field of possible 
repression and abuse of power to be confronted, has predominantly transformed into particular 
(rather administrative) examinations, or has been limited to certain conditions of detention, or to the 
implementation of imprisonment in particular circumstances, or to specific ‘criminal’ populations, 
rather than a critique of the subjacent punitive system of ideas. In this line, it may be argued that it is 
rather difficult to find human rights comprehensive critiques of the definition of punishment that the 
system employs and expresses. This may constitute evidence of the weakening of antagonistic 
relations and the emphasis on collaborative interaction between human rights and criminal law.  
The discourse of impunity focused on punishment in our view contributes to the reproduction 
of dominant social structures of the criminal justice system. According to a traditional definition of 
impunity, the fight against it remains committed to the traditional ideas of the criminal law around 
punishment. When impunity takes the form of the exemption from exclusionary, afflictive, 
negative, hostile, atomistic and mandatory consequences to crime (punishment according to 
modern criminal law structures), fighting against it may involve a problem of reproduction and an 
obstacle for the innovation of the criminal justice system. Involving tacit and explicit forms of 
cooperation between human rights and the reproduction of criminal law traditional structures, the 
combat against impunity has become a major factor of the reproduction of criminal law social 
 294 
 
 
structures. This problem is especially relevant for a sociological construction of the concept of 
impunity. Before taking that step, let us consider different elements for the construction of the 
concept that our case study may bring about to this purpose. 
5.4. Experiences of the PJ case and the conceptualization of impunity: in the search for a 
sociological construction 
This part of the research will study the experiences, ideas and discourses of the actors of the 
case study regarding the notion of impunity through an analysis of a series of in-depth interviews, 
as well as a literature and a media review about the case. The objective of this part is to observe 
and analyze the elements and factors that the interviewees provided when asked about impunity, so 
that we can understand how these actors construct the notion and characterize the phenomenon. 
Bearing this objective in mind we will take into consideration the views of (i) the victims, (ii) 
justice operators and (iii) writings and interviews of retired Col. Plazas (convicted and acquitted 
afterwards) and his wife, Thania Vega.  
How do victims and justice operators construct the notion of impunity? During the semi-
structured interviews conducted in the present research, the interviewees were asked if they observed 
impunity in the case. A common assumption is that victims tend to find impunity in their cases 
(particularly when serious offenses take place). This is often attributed to a sense of regret against the 
lack of severity from the criminal justice measures. According to our data, this assumption and its 
possible explanation may be contested. For the moment, we may assess that victims offered very 
varied views on the notion of impunity. Their perspectives raised different elements of reflection for 
reviewing and characterizing the phenomenon. The observations of this group of people, who have 
been fighting against impunity for thirty years, are then pertinent and useful to this research.  
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While the victims and justice operators tend to observe impunity in the case, when asked 
about the elements that they employ for this characterization they raised a wide variety of features. 
Despite the variable connotations among the actors of the case, impunity is rather a constant 
appraisal. If everyone refers to different elements when observing impunity, would the observation 
of impunity be actually constant? This part will depict different elements for the socio-legal 
conceptualization of impunity that this work aims. 
5.4.1. Impunity/punishment: constructions from the point of view of justice operators  
The ordinary definition of impunity as an absence of criminal law punishment (i.e. a 
measure of intended pain infliction), was taken into consideration when preparing the fieldwork for 
this research. For this reason, we prepared a set of questions on the subjects of the criminal justice 
system, punishment, the declaration of guilt through a judgment and the practice of sentencing. 
This part will develop and analyze some of these responses and findings from the perspective of 
the justice operators who worked in the PJ case. 
On June 9, 2010, Judge María Jara acting as the Third Criminal Court of the Special Circuit 
of Bogota, found retired Col. Plazas guilty as indirect co-author of the aggravated disappearance of 
eleven people, sentencing him to thirty years of imprisonment. This judgment was upheld by the 
appeal court but, subsequently, was annulled by the Supreme Court.  
In 2008, Judge Jara was appointed as the Third Specialized Judge in Bogota where the PJ 
process had been assigned. According to her, her first reaction was to say: “what did I get myself 
into?” However, afterwards, she thought, “this is just another professional challenge. I can make 
it”. Later on, as expressed in the interview, she regrets that decision because it caused her different 
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burdens to her security and personal integrity. “From this case I concluded that it is more 
dangerous to judge powerful state agents than anything else. Why? Because if I am threatened by a 
drug trafficker, for instance, I immediately receive security measures from the State. On the 
contrary, if I am threatened because of a process where a military is judged and there is a political 
power behind it, the State stops protecting me”. The fact that the judge understood the procedures 
as a challenge uttered the difficulty of the process from the legal perspective but specifically with 
regard to the risks that the case entailed: “the process confronted an extremely powerful structure. 
In these situations, one’s hope as a judge is to make a really good job. Now, after the process, I feel 
many burdens, I fear so much for myself and my family”.  
In our encounters and different public appearances, Justice Jara presented a reflexive 
character about the ends of the judicial system and the obstacles it confronts. However, when we 
asked about her own activity in the process, she focused on presenting it as a legal duty. In line 
with her perspective, “to do a good job” is to follow the law, to judge and to pass a sentence on the 
person found guilty. The argument of legality was the rationale that judge Jara mobilized for 
explaining her activity and specifically the sentence of thirty years: “It is the consequence. That is 
what the law says”.  
The judge represented the sentence as the application of the law in a sort of mechanical 
exercise. In a sense, legality is an argument that obstructed further elaborations or an auto-reflexive 
attitude around her own activity. Her representation about the process of decision-making about the 
case excluded questioning punishment and was limited to more operative issues as the conduction 
of the proceedings, assessing the evidence and deciding whether there was a crime or not in the 
case. In this answer, Judge Jara did not provide arguments or further reflections around the activity 
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of punishing: “I think that he has to face that consequence. Nor more nor less punishment could be 
granted due to the principles of legality and favorability”. 
In this response, Judge Jara focused on the duty to punish and the proportionality between the 
evil committed and the suffering to be inflicted (punishment as an obligation). The existence of strict 
legal boundaries to decide the sentence contributes to observing punishment as the mechanic 
application of the duty of the State. With this respect, Lorenza del Castillo (judicial assistant) 
provided convergent but more elaborated arguments on how they “calculated” Plazas’s sentence. 
Mrs. Del Castillo explained to us the process of sentencing using as example a case of murder. First, 
she explained, the legal maximums and minimums for the crime under study must be considered: 
“homicide has a minimum and a maximum, thirteen to twenty-five years - clearly it is 
already difficult to know what these limits are in a country with such a legislative inflation278 
like ours [!]. Then, before the lapse of thirteen to twenty-five years, one should divide that 
into four quarters […]. Then, if there are generic aggravating circumstances the sentence 
should focus in the maximum quarters… What I mean is that these parameters are objective. 
Only when the judicial operator moves away from the minimum, he or she needs to justify 
why he or she did so”. 
In her answer, Mrs. Del Castillo portrayed the exercise of sentencing as an ‘objective’ 
arithmetical calculation according to the legal parameters: “You need to be objective; that is, to see 
things with impartiality”. This form of imposing the criminal law consequences expresses a sort of 
mechanical practice that is the result of the objective implementation of a legal disposition in 
accordance with the duty to punish criminal behavior: “That is what the law requires”.  
The argument of legality seems to immobilize not only the alternatives to criminal law 
redress – “It is the consequence. That is what the law says”, but also the rational process of 
applying and reflecting on the legal consequences of the justice system. In this context, severe 
                                       
278 By “legislative inflation” she referred to the persistent and substantial increase in the amount of legal 
norms and the extent of the penalties. 
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sentences awarded as a matter of law may become galvanized as a matter of legality that the justice 
system must implement and cannot renounce. 
Even though the judicial assistant portrays the operation of punishment as an arithmetical 
exercise, she represented this process as an activity that may entail challenging situations: “there 
are difficult cases, there are easy cases, as we learned at the law faculty, you know what I’m 
talking about… but there are cases that are not black or white, rather they are gray, almost 
imperceptible to the human eye, then there is a great responsibility”. This answer, referring to the 
degree of difficulty of the case, reframed her original perspective about sentencing as a mechanical 
legal operation into a matter of responsibility. 
When portrayed as a ‘responsibility’, Mrs. Del Castillo referred to the difficulty of cases 
taking into consideration the restriction of rights that the criminal law intervention entails: 
“Regardless of the passion or inclinations that you may have, for or against a certain position 
involved in the conflict, you should not forget that you are about to quash a person’s freedom”. 
When considering the rights of the person accused the sentence was not anymore depicted as a 
mere legal operation but as a form of affecting a person’s rights: “even the worst criminals deserve 
rights and guarantees. This is the least that one expects from a democratic state”.  
Reframing punishment as a responsibility with the capacity of affecting the freedom of 
people convicted in the context of a democratic State, rather than as an obligation materialized 
through arithmetic and legalistic operations, enables visualizing not only the legal parameters but 
being aware of the person who is  being punished. When deciding on the responsibility of the 
person accused for a wrongdoing, the justice system is also deciding on her life. Even when 
criminal law punishment is represented as established according to ‘objective’ legal boundaries, it 
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is important to understand that these boundaries are influenced by the conventional theories of 
punishment and that its practice involves (to some degree) variable judicial arbitrum.  
Other considerations and possible ruptures to a merely legalistic view emerged during the 
interviews. Judge Jara’s judicial assistant, Lorenza del Castillo, understood the attribution of guilt 
by the tribunal as a possibility to confer the victims relief and recognition. Moreover, in doing so, 
she did not stress nor even include the idea of a particular form of punishment as a condition to 
express this sort of acknowledgement: 
 “I imagine that the victims feel some relief [with the conviction], because it is a sort of 
ratification, of saying that their pain is the pain of the country, that we care about their pain. I 
think it's a way of saying that what happened was also against us, against our laws. On the 
other hand, this has happened for so long, it’s so intimate and individual, that I should not 
dare to guess what they are actually feeling”.  
In Mrs. Del Castillo’s view, the judgment in itself (without reference to the idea of 
inflicting suffering) was a way of expressing solidarity and assessing that what happened is 
important for society; ultimately, it was a way of saying: ‘the law is with you’. However, in her 
sayings she recognized the possible limitations of the judgment for bringing a feeling of relief to 
the victims, particularly because of the gravity of what had happened and because of the delayed 
response from the justice system. Indeed, people are not homogenous with respect to their way of 
perceiving the world and it is rather speculative to have expectations of uniformity around their 
feelings or observations of the social life. For instance, as lawyer Alejandra Vicente (representative 
of the victims in the Inter-American procedures) underscored, “impunity” takes place when the 
conviction is delayed or is too late. In this discourse, the notion of impunity is attached to a 
temporal dimension rather than to other material or social outcomes: 
“There have been judgments, but those judgments have come late. For this reason, there is 
already a violation of the right to justice for the families. Even if the rulings were final, that does 
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not mean that justice has been served. Many years have passed. Virtually until 2001 there was 
no serious investigation on the events, and prosecutions were only initiated at the request of the 
families”. 
Judge Jara, after sentencing retired Col. Plazas to thirty years of imprisonment, affirmed: “I 
think there is [impunity in the case], because justice comes so many years later, twenty-eight years: 
that’s impunity or looks like impunity or pseudo-impunity”. In her answer, Judge Jara did not 
consider the declaration of guilt nor the amount of the sentence for observing the phenomenon of 
impunity in the case, but the passage of time between the prosecutions and the application of an 
effective penalty. The passage of time was observed as attached to the lack of effectiveness of the 
judgment in a way that she was no longer capable of giving a particular significance to the prison 
sentence. Indeed, between the events and the time of the interview (November 1985 - September 
2013) the sentence had been suspended until a decision on the cassation appeal was reached.  
The former answers somehow move beyond a construction of impunity in opposition to 
punishment, because they do not focus on the term that the person is sentenced to serve, but on the 
time that prosecutions start and last. In line with this, the longer the time lapse between the facts 
and the investigations, the more impunity is present. The particularities of the crime of enforced 
disappearance contribute to this form of observing the problem. Enforced disappearance implies an 
act of abduction followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment 
of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person. The lack of information may be aggravated 
by the dearth of reaction from the State and, particularly, by the lack of adequate and effective 
investigations from the criminal justice. The time that passes between the disappearance and the 
start of the investigation may be decisive to find the victim or at least knowing her whereabouts. 
In the PJ case, six days after the events, on November 13, 1985, the National Government 
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created a Special Tribunal for investigating the crimes committed during the PJ (Decree 
3300/1985). The decision to open an investigation on the taking of the Palace, focused on the 
military confrontation rather on finding the people who disappeared or the bodies of those who 
were killed.   
“Belisario Betancur [then President] makes me angry because that gentleman does not 
disclose what actually happened. If he had done an investigation immediately we would not 
be where we are and we would not have had to go through all these horrible things that they 
made us go through” (Ana María Bidegain, wife) 
In the context of the litigation before the IA Court (2014: 432) the representatives of the 
Colombian State acknowledged “the prolonged delay in the investigations”. In this case, most of 
the further procedures remained or were deferred to a preliminary phase of inquiry during decades. 
Indeed, only twenty years after the events, criminal inquiries turned into official investigations for 
enforced disappearance and five years later there was a first-instance ruling - which was partially 
confirmed in 2012 by an appeal court and was overruled by a cassation appeal in 2015.  
The absence of a serious investigation into disappearances can be observed as a factor of 
impunity in the sense of the obfuscation of the truth. Indeed, this delay has an impact on the quality 
of the investigation affecting the possibilities of obtaining any form of clarification of the 
wrongdoing and condemnation of the responsible actors. In the PJ case, the prosecutor of the case 
Ángela Buitrago assessed that when she was assigned to the case, after twenty-three years of the 
events, “it was a difficult to advance on the criminal investigation”. With this respect, she 
particularly regretted the missing of material elements, which prevented the prosecution from 
establishing the fate of the disappeared. In this respect, former Prosecutor Ángela Buitrago 
affirmed: “It is difficult to go beyond where we did when trying to conduct a prosecution of this 
complexity after 23 years [of the events], relying on tight terms of instruction, especially when 
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there is someone under arrest”.  
However, the vice-Prosecutor General Jorge Perdomo assessed in an interview to the media 
(El Espectador 2014b) that the passing of time actually facilitated the investigations at least from 
the point of view of the technical advances around the production of evidences. According to 
Perdomo, new advances in forensic technology allowed, for instance, a better exploration of mass 
graves where the bodies  were possibly buried: “In this mass grave [in Southern Bogota] they 
buried not only bodies found in the PJ but those coming from a hospital adjacent to the area. 
Additionally, after the tragedy of Armero279 the same mass grave was used to bury the bodies. 
Benefiting from the current technology advances to identify these remains is easier now than 29 
years ago” (El Espectador 2014b). In this assertion, the vice-prosecutor general focused his 
observation on the advantages of the passing of time for the possibility to find remains, not on 
finding the people alive. Indeed, time is an impediment for finding alive people who were 
abducted: the more the time goes, the more it seems difficult to find the people alive.  
 The form in which justice operators portray their activity reaffirms the distinction between 
impunity and punishment. In this context, the justice operators observe their own activity limited to 
the ‘objective implementation of legal parameters’. Somehow, this focus reduces their awareness of 
the problematic situation (e.g. when the vice-prosecutor stops observing the importance of finding 
the people alive) and limits the capacity to respond to the situation differently than fixating a 
punishment (e.g. when the system urges the operator to move forward in the investigations with the 
objective of declaring someone responsible to the detriment of continue the inquiries into the fate of 
                                       
279 “On Wednesday, Nov. 13, 1985, the Nevado Del Ruiz Volcano in Colombia, located in the Andes 
Mountains of South America, erupted sending a destructive mudflow down its slopes. Flooding claimed the 
lives of over 25,000 people in the town of Armero” (AccuWeather 2016). 
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the disappeared). With this respect, punishment is represented as a creation of the legislator who, 
despite the fact of not knowing the individual who is prosecuted or the concrete problematic situation 
at hand, determines the activity of the judge who has no role other than imposing the penalty. Thus, 
when the justice implements a measure for reacting to crime focuses on punishment and when it does 
so the judicial system becomes the operator of a political decision previously adopted by the 
legislative and not and not the operator of a complex legal decision (inspired from Pires 2001).   
5.4.2. Impunity/non-impunity: constructions and deconstructions from the point of view of 
the victims  
As we were able to establish in the previous sections, the notion of impunity automatized in 
social discourses refers to an exemption from criminal law punishment (impunity/punishment). 
Considering this (prevalent) distinction, when conducting our interviews we expected that 
punishment would constitute a predominant representation of the victims when addressing the 
issue of impunity. However, their responses allowed us to observe other elements when referring 
to impunity meaning that its contra-term is not necessarily limited to punishment.   
Some of the victims awarded a centrality to the issue of punishment in their responses. For 
some of these victims, punishment was expressed as a desire that represented their expectation 
around the criminal legal redress.  
Enrique Rodríguez (father), when asked by the media about the possibility of punishing those 
responsible for the disappearance of his son, replied: “This could give me a little hope, but I 
don’t think [is going to happen]” (Revista Semana 2006).  
Given the MPR system of ideas has currently expanded among various communications - 
particularly influencing the social movements and the victims’ movements, we expected that at 
least some people would refer to punishment as a claim of pain infliction to be implemented via 
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imprisonment. However, in the case of retired Col. Plazas the factors enabling the observation of 
the infliction of suffering are complex. On the one hand, he was sentenced to a long-term 
imprisonment (30 years). But, on the other hand, he was sent to live in a military facility where he 
continues to be treated and observed by his soldiers as an authority, even as a war hero280. Where 
will victims lead their attention to? In the temporal dimension of the sentence or in the highly 
privileged treatment that the convicted will receive?  
“The sentences of the case applicable are derisory: Mr. Plazas is in a military garrison 
surrounded by all the comforts; I mean: what suffering is he experiencing?” (Victim) 
 
Hector Beltrán (father) asserted in his book that “for the victims of state crime it would be 
repairing that the Colombian justice operates with impartiality and promptness against those 
violating human rights in our country, sentencing them to severe punishments” (Beltrán 
2014: 139).  
When Judge Jara found retired Col. Plazas guilty as indirect co-author of aggravated 
disappearance, sentencing him to thirty years of imprisonment, some of the victims agreed on 
qualifying the decision as historical. In the same vein of the judge of the case, this qualification 
was not only due to the importance of the case in the Colombian context, but also because of the 
great obstacles that the prosecution faced before powerful actors, which they assumed would never 
stand trial. The fact that this decision was perceived as historical related the matter of impunity to 
the importance of someone being held accountable for the wrongdoing.  
“Sentences are very important because someone was held responsible for what happened” 
(Pilar Navarrete, wife). In this respect, Cecilia Cabrera (wife) asserted that the sentence was 
only a step that needed to continue against the other responsible agents (Revista Semana 
2010: 1’21”-1’50”). 
 
“At last! In 2005 an investigation began. Twenty years after the PJ events, finally someone 
investigated something and found a number of elements that were already there since 1985 and 
                                       
280 In 2011, the then Commander of the military General Navas declared that it was necessary to limit 
ordinary jurisdiction in respect to the military and affirmed that Plazas was innocent but also a national hero.  
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allowed to establish some responsibilities and to advance in the middle of complex and very 
difficult proceedings, reaching certain results […] This conviction is historical, is very 
important” (Cesar Rodríguez, brother).  
Some of the victims perceived the sentence as an act of satisfaction. This relevance was 
elaborated by some of the victims from the point of view of the life and death of family members. 
This is vividly captured in the fact that some of the family members, especially within the 
generation of the parents, have perished in their search: 
“As soon as the sentence was issued, the person that first came to my mind was my 
grandfather. He was the one who fought for this for a long time. I was sad because he could 
not be there enjoying that achievement. For me, that was very hard. After that, obviously, I 
felt a lot of satisfaction because finally we had managed to show that justice is possible and 
we demonstrated that the responsible were those who we had said they were” (Alejandra 
Rodríguez, daughter). 
 “And so it is. Many of the family members have died: Mr. Rodríguez, Mr. Guarín, and Mrs. 
María. She left behind her life, her husband, her other children and completely focused on 
finding her son. If she had to be at two in the morning at the Palace of Justice protesting, she 
was there” (Pilar Navarrete –wife, in Romero 2015: 61).  
The feeling of despair for dying is coupled with the feeling of (in)satisfaction for the (lack) 
of action from the justice system placing accountability for what happened.  
 “[…] We are dying, and we die without justice nor reparations granted to us, without 
knowing the truth nor witnessing the perpetrators paying for their crimes” (Hector Beltrán 
2014: 90 – father). 
In this assessment, Hector Beltrán frames their fight raising different elements: the truth, 
the justice (perpetrators paying for their crimes) and the reparations. Implicitly, his saying might 
also entail the claim for severe punishment expressed beforehand.  
Concerning the case of retired Col. Plazas (detainee at a facility where he was regarded as 
military authority), when the implementation of the sentence of imprisonment was in place, 
different victims commented that the initial satisfaction around holding someone accountable 
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transformed into deception and regret when the sentence was not properly materialized. Pilar 
Navarrete (wife) expressed (before the Supreme Court acquittal): “the sentence is very important 
[…] but I feel disquiet about the fact that Plazas is not interned in a prison”. In this line, Hector 
Beltrán (father) asserted: “I do not understand why those people that commit murders, violations 
and different grave crimes […] act with the conviction that the State will reward them for doing so, 
the clearest example of this to me is the so called operation to retake the PJ” (Beltrán 2014: 94-95). 
When punishment is converted into a form of honorary privilege, victims that focused their 
claims around conviction, rejected the declaration of guilt as it subsequently could imply a 
cancellation of the declaration due to the imprisonment conditions: a State institution may de facto 
nullify the conviction produced by the criminal law system. We will come back to this issue later on.  
The data gathered in our field-work allows us to observe other possible aspects of this 
problem. The idea that only punishment as conceived by the criminal law is capable of offering 
peace of mind to the victims, however, was not present in all of the interviews. When the victims 
evaluated the judgment, they raised a variety of purposes and ends of the fights against impunity in 
the case, apart from the penal measures intended at the mere infliction of pain. Other symbols, 
values and beliefs emerged when victims analyzed the value of the criminal law system with 
regard to their situation. One of the values found in the interviews is the victims’ relief and the 
social recognition of the offenses. This was especially visible when reviewing the saying of the PJ 
victims who are not part of the group of disappeared.  
This group of people appreciated the fact of holding the perpetrators accountable with a 
very particular connotation: some people of this external group experienced the sentence as an 
“indirect form of doing justice” in their cases. With this respect, Alexandra Sandoval (Justice 
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Sandoval’s daughter) noted “even though Plazas was not convicted for what happened to my dad 
[the death of Justice Sandoval was not part of this enquiry], to me, his sentence was an indirect 
way of doing justice. I used to say he is not sentenced in my case but at least he was sentenced for 
the disappeared. This was for me an indirect sentence that in a sense was also doing justice to us”.  
The declaration of guilt in this saying is observed as a general acknowledgment of the 
reproachable action of the military in this event. The condemnation of an individual who holds an 
important social status and position of authority in the army acquires a value that goes beyond a 
case-by-case observation and somehow compromises the organization on whose behalf he acted. 
Moreover, from some of the victims’ point of view, accountability is an important issue. 
Despite it does not directly address their personal case, it involves a possibility of holding the 
perpetrators accountable and, furthermore, as a possibility of social scrutiny and speaking out-loud 
the suffering around an event that affected a collectivity. In line with this assessment, some victims 
who identify a problem of impunity in regard to their own case, are also able to include themselves 
in a larger group receiving some sort of social recognition around a collective experience based on 
a shared criminal problematic situation.  
In this sense, ‘ending impunity’ can be perceived by the victims as ‘ending a global 
institutional inertia’ characterized as general silence and the absence of recognition of 
responsibility in relation to the criminal situation. When the victims focused on the idea of holding 
someone accountable, we found a rupture with the automatized understanding of impunity because 
the significance of the conviction does not imply an express reference to punishment as pain 
infliction. Indeed, when the victims of the case developed their views about accountability they did 
not focus on the amount of time (thirty years of imprisonment). Even more, certain victims 
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undervalued the sentence of thirty years of imprisonment taking a further step with respect to the 
traditional response of the criminal justice:  
“I don’t know, it doesn’t mean anything to me [the thirty-year sentence against Plazas]. I 
don’t see the difference [comparing the moment before and after the sentence]. I don’t even 
know if prisons make sense. I don’t know, I’ve heard the lawyers talking about that. I guess 
that is something acceptable, but it doesn’t mean anything to me […] I don’t even know why 
prisons exist, why is that a way to punish those who have done something wrong? I don’t 
know, it’s something very strange to me, to claim ‘because it is the law’… no, other aspects 
are more important, [such as] the shame of these people” (victim, personal interview).  
According to the discourse of this victim, the quantification of imprisonment involves a 
concern that refers more to the logic and the framework of the legal system and its operators than 
to her own way of thinking. In this sense, such issue is rather a secondary problem: whether the 
convicted is to be at a prison one day or thirty years, the perception of the victim does not vary.  
In this answer, there was a clear rupture between the ideas of accountability and declaration 
of guilt of a person followed by a punishment taking the form of imprisonment and, particularly, of 
a severe amount of time in prison. Victims may take a critical distance from the justice operators as 
representatives of the legal system, which is immersed in the idea of punishing through the 
institution of prison. In this vein, Alexandra Sandoval (daughter of Justice) asserted: 
“To me, what is important, more than imprisonment itself, was to know that he was deprived 
of liberty, although that deprivation of liberty is quite relative [as it is being implemented]. 
What matters to me, more than the trial, is the final judgment telling the world that what we 
are saying is true […] Many people use the criminal law as a way of leaving people to rot in 
jail, so they don’t see the sunlight ever again; however, at home my parents had a speech 
about the fact that penalties were not directed against the individual but against the behavior 
and that these penalties should reintegrate the people into society. Then, it is very difficult to 
think: ‘let them rot in jail’. No matter how much I dislike Plazas, I could not use this 
discourse”.   
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Mrs. Sandoval has retained for herself other observations that appear as “immunized” to the 
system of ideas of modern penal rationality. However, with this respect, she sees herself as 
thinking against the mainstream:  
“I have a deformation in my views because at home my parents were criminal lawyers and 
criminologists. Particularly, my dad detested the deprivation of freedom, so there I have a 
problem in my head. I do not need him [talking about Plazas] to be imprisoned but a 
conviction more than anything else, a court judgment”.  
The fact that Mrs. Sandoval understands her views as ‘deformed’, involves recognizing her 
perceptions as outsider with respect to the traditional framework which she finds problematic. The 
difficulty here is not merely the fact of thinking against the mainstream of a philosophy of severe 
penalties; but, fundamentally, the difficulty lies on not being able to embrace a human rights position 
and, at the same time, avoiding to endorse a traditional repressive criminal law framework. In this 
sense, her answer epitomizes a rupture of the identification of holding someone accountable with 
imprisonment – debating a common assumption of victimological studies.  
As we can see, the general framework of these discourses rather confronts the traditional 
approach of expressing responsibility through the infliction of severe suffering on people. 
Furthermore, through the image of the need for a ‘court judgment’ and for the ‘perpetrators to be 
ashamed for what they did’, the general framework of these discourses involve a degree of openness 
to possibilities of other criminal sanctions and of redress beyond the criminal law system.  
In the discourse held by the victims it is possible to see two other important aspects that 
separate their position from the system of ideas of modern penal rationality. The first aspect 
dissociates this discourse from the retributivist philosophy that understands (severe) punishment as 
necessary to “correct the evil committed in the past”. The second aspect is perhaps more decisive, 
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as it shows that to the victims to “know the truth” and its recognition are more important than the 
infliction of suffering on the culprits. 
Indeed, the satisfaction expressed by the victims with regard to the enunciation of guilt of 
the perpetrators is represented as unsatisfactory by the victims because of the impossibility of 
restituting their past. Some of the victims perceived the declaration of guilt as trivial for changing 
what happened. With this respect, they expressed that the judgments are simply unable to bring 
them peace of mind: “what troubles us is to think on the atrocities that they did to my sister” 
(Socorro Franco, sister). In this regard, considering the study of the Basque Institute of 
Criminology (Varona and De la Cuesta 2014) mentioned before and the qualitative findings of the 
present research we may draw as a preliminary conclusion that sentences do not consistently and 
generally bring peace of mind nor a sense of recovery to the victims and their families. In line with 
this, the assertion of satisfaction and relief that judgments bring to the victims is disputed – 
debating an assumption present in some victim studies. 
Concerning the second aspect, the enunciation of the guilt of the perpetrators is represented 
by some victims as unsatisfactory because of the lack of truth around what happened. More than 
expressing a replacement (truth in exchange of guilt), the victims distinguish between more 
important (the truth) and less important (severe punishment) outcomes. With respect to the 
judgments Alejandra Rodríguez (daughter) suggested great unease: “I think is very nice to have some 
justice, it is great to have a judgment assessing: he is guilty; but this does not necessarily lead to the 
truth or to proper reparations. Not only in the economic sense, but also in disclosing what happened 
with our family members”. With this regard, Jorge Molano (representative of some victims) 
considers the victims feel disquiet with the judgments because it is still uncertain what happened to 
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the disappeared. To the victims, these cases are not only about prosecuting an individual but also 
about the whereabouts of the person abducted: to the victims, criminal prosecutions ultimately 
involve the possibility of disclosing the whereabouts of their loved ones. 
“SEMANA.COM: Don’t you think it is an achievement that the Prosecutor General’s Office 
has finally opened an investigation? 
ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ [father]: No. My son will not return. What the prosecution is 
saying 21 years later is: ‘Sir, you were right.’ But it does so when it's too late and when we 
can’t do anything” (Revista Semana 2006).  
When referring to the trajectory of time in the case, Enrique Rodríguez (father) gave 
preeminence to the fact that the victims could find their loved ones over the possibility of 
convicting someone. This is important because in a sense the distinction impunity/non-impunity is 
focused on the possibility of the system acting against the perpetrator; however, when the victims 
refer to their own problems they discard the distinction as being non-satisfactory and irrelevant. In 
the case of enforced disappearances the dismissal of the distinction is manifest when the victims 
claim for a prompt and effective judicial remedy in order to unveil the fate of the person abducted. 
In the interviews, the victims frequently raised the matter of finding their loved ones. Information 
on the fate of the victims and the recognition of what happened is, for the victims, a way of 
“finding the loved ones” even if they are no longer alive. 
In this respect, it is important to examine more closely the meaning given by a large 
number of victims to the problem of the “lack of investigation” in relation to impunity. For them, 
this is not, at least primarily, a direct positive appraisal of police enquiries or the legal procedures 
per se. Something more complex and far more important is behind this claim: this is the only way 
in which they understand it is possible to know the truth. How could we talk about justice if the 
legal system is incapable of elucidating the whereabouts of their family members?  
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“In a case of enforced disappearance, justice without remains or justice without truth is a 
very lame justice. I think the case could have eventually be left as it was, with the 
investigation closed. I feel as if the State harmed us more by opening the case than by 
leaving it still, and why? This caused more harm to us because it created an expectation of 
justice that ultimately is not justice. This is because of what I am telling you: justice showed 
progress, but it is no justice because there is not a single element for recovering the remains 
nor finding the truth […]” (Rene Guarín, brother) 
The implementation of criminal prosecutions and penal sentences do not endorse the 
essential meaning of the word “justice” to the victims. These problems will be addressed in the 
section 5.4.4. For the moment let us focus on the subject of the truth.  
Let us turn now to the question of knowing and recognizing the truth. Juan Anzola (son) 
asserted that for him, the most important was nothing else than “to know what happened to my 
mother, to know she rests in peace”. The weight given to the truth was also present in several other 
interviews. Alexandra Sandoval (Justice Sandoval’s daughter) insisted on the importance of the 
criminal jurisdiction with this purpose. Helena Urán (Justice Urán’s daughter) asserted that she 
expected from the trials that “they tell us and the country what they did and why they did it”. The 
sense given to the judicial truth was thus, not only directed to the self and to the other victims but 
to society as a whole. In line with this, some actors asserted that this case was important as a means 
of doing historical memory and enabling social recognition for what had happened. “To establish 
the historical truth and to close a chapter of the national history”, in the words of Alejandra 
Vicente (representative of the victims in the Inter-American case).  
Knowing the truth is not only expressed as something that belongs to the victims. The truth 
was portrayed as a matter of the society as a whole. According to Alexandra Sandoval (Justice 
Sandoval’s daughter), the conviction means an acknowledgement of their truth: “to tell the world 
that what they [the victims] have been saying is true”. In the same vein, Juan Anzola (son) asserted 
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that the version of the judgment is not only for him but for the society: “if there is no judgment, if 
there is no recognition from the State, it is like saying that nothing happened, it means to close 
your eyes before such a heinous crime”. The fact that an observer refers to the trial or the judgment 
does not mean that what matters to them is the process itself or the judgment as such, but the 
discovery of the truth and its official recognition. 
In this line, for instance, for some victims “public recognition” is more important than the 
imprisonment of those involved in the crimes: “I think it is important that Colombian society is 
aware of what the armed forces can do and what it means for society. To me that would be more 
important than to see them in jail” (Mairee Urán, Justice Urán’s daughter). In this assertion, Mairee 
distinguished between imprisonment and the possibility of establishing the truth for them and for 
society as a whole. In this sense, there is a clear preeminence with regard to the truth.  
‘Telling the truth to the world’ was referred to by the victims as a form of recognition of their 
history of suffering. With this regard, Sandra Beltrán (sister) assessed the necessity of the books of 
history telling the truth so the new generations manage to know what happened and for cleaning the 
reputation of their loved ones who were accused of being terrorists. In this sense, also, Ana María 
Bidegain (Justice Urán’s wife) asserted her expectation for the life and work of her husband to be 
exposed in a national museum to tell society what happened. To Alexandra Sandoval (Justice 
Sandoval’s daughter), the conviction “is very useful to let people know that what you were saying 
was true”. To the victims, the concrete result or sentence may become secondary when the rulings 
declare a truth that does not acknowledge what happened, especially in express opposition to the 
truth from the defendant’s position, who during the process claimed that he was always right.  
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Judicial truth was relevant for the interviewees not only as a matter of speaking aloud their 
versions, but also to name the violations and to produce some sort of awareness within society.  
The 4th of February 2012 the national TV station Caracol launched a national survey asking its 
audience: Do you think that the military should apologize for the PJ events? Out of 61,707 
respondents, 81.58% responded negatively and only 18.42% agreed with the military should 
apologize (Revista Semana 2012b). 
Anahi Urán (Justice Urán’s daughter) asserted: “I do not think: ‘let those bastards rot in jail’”. 
Instead, one of the main objectives of the proceedings for her was to “let people know what those 
people do with their power”. In this sense, Alexandra Sandoval told us that the most difficult aspect of 
Plazas being acquitted by the Supreme Court in the cassation appeal, was not that he was not in prison 
but that he now has a court decision stating that he is innocent. If the convictions are understood as an 
opportunity for reaffirming the version and dignity of the victims, in that context “the dignity of 
victims risks suffering when (an alleged) guilty party is judged innocent at the end of a fair trial, a risk 
that is always present” (Freeman 2009: 23). After all, the rulings refer to an institutional capacity of 
declaring acts right or wrong according to law (paraphrasing Rodenhäuser 2014: 916)281. 
The sense of recognition was also raised by the victims with respect to the 
acknowledgement from the perpetrators of the suffering caused. With this regard, Rosa Cárdenas 
(daughter) observed that the sentence against Plazas and the time that they have been looking for 
                                       
281 In that sense, in a research on the violence against unionists in which I participated with the Colombian 
Commission of Jurists (CCJ 2012), it was concluded that one aspect to take into consideration when 
referring to impunity should be the degree of clarification of the events that the rulings provided. This was 
particularly relevant before cases of convictions in which the versions of the perpetrators on the crimes were 
not controverted by the judges. In the few cases of conviction on violence against unionists in Colombia, it 
was noticeable that the justifications of the crimes formulated by the perpetrators were part of the rulings 
without any consideration of the actual labor and social role of the victim. Hence, the fact that the 
perpetrators were sentenced was awarded a minor importance by the victims that realized that the 
perpetrator had justified the crime, for instance, as committed against a ‘delinquent’ or because the person 
was a ‘guerrilla’. A similar finding is present in DeJusticia’s research on the prosecution of crimes against 
unionized workers (La Rota, Montoya, Uprimny 2010) in which it was asserted that in the convictions for 
crimes against unionists a low level of descriptive detail about the victims was found.  
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her mother matched (thirty years). This coincidence, she affirmed, does not mean anything if 
Plazas does not reflect on what he did and tells them the truth. In this line, she assessed that she 
would exchange the years of imprisonment awarded to Plazas for just one day of him standing in 
their shoes: “if only he had to experience that despair. If only he had to borrow money for a bus 
ticket trying to find his disappeared son, daughter or wife. I think with a single day, I would feel he 
served his sentence”.  
We interpreted the idea of Plazas standing in her shoes as a matter of raising the awareness 
from the part of the responsible person for what he did. This discourse is not aimed at causing 
suffering on the perpetrator, but expresses a quest for the recognition of her suffering. In this line, 
Jorge Franco (brother) asserted: “someday, I suppose that I will not see it, I hope someone with 
remorse, someone unable of keeping up with that burden of conscience, tells the truth, I hope it can 
be soon before I die, I'm afraid this will not happen”. Different victims asserted that remorse 
should be one of the main objectives of the proceedings because that could create the opportunity 
of repentance and the possibility of the convicted revealing the whereabouts of their loved ones.  
From this part, we can conclude that victims present deep elaborations around the problem 
of impunity. The truth, the reparations, the justice and the education of society are some of the 
most relevant elements that victims raised when observing impunity in the case and constructing 
the non-impunity scenario. While the justice operators tend to focus their attention in the legal 
operation of the system, the victims tend to give to this a rather instrumental or secondary value for 
addressing their situation and for being able of finding their loved ones.   
5.4.3. Where are the disappeared and who disappeared them?  
Referring to the aspects that the victims raised when addressing the subject of impunity and 
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deconstructing the automatized notion of impunity in opposition to punishment, we found that a 
central claim to the fight against impunity in the case was to find the disappeared or at least 
information on their whereabouts. Due to the centrality that the victims gave to this claim when 
assessing impunity, it is relevant to present some considerations with respect to this.  
Until 2017, none of the PJ disappeared has appeared alive. There has been no news on the 
whereabouts of the cafeteria group, except on four of them: the identification of Ana Rosa 
Castiblanco’s remains in 2000282 and those of Lucy Amparo Oviedo283, Cristina Guarín and Luz 
Mary Portela Leon in 2015284. Eight of them have not been found and their fate remains unknown.  
Beyond the group of the disappeared from the PJ cafeteria, in June 2016 Auxiliary Justice Emiro 
Sandoval’s his family was told that the remains did not match with their DNA285. Justice Sandoval 
                                       
282 Ana Rosa Castiblanco was 31 years old when went missing. She was a worker of the cafeteria and was 
seven months pregnant. The whereabouts of Ms. Castiblanco were unknown for sixteen years. In 1998, a 
number of remains were exhumed in a mass grave located in Bogota’s Southern Cemetery. In June 2001, 
fifteen years after the events, her remains were identified. However, her family members are still uncertain 
on the fate of the baby she was expecting. In this case, an expert psychosocial appraisal presented to the 
Inter-American Court (2014: 534) established that “the way in which the restoration of the mortal remains 
was made and the absence of an official response to what happened to her and the baby she was expecting 
have created doubts and concerns among the family, both in their mourning process and with regard to the 
credibility of the State”. The IA Court (2014) concluded that due to the carbonized condition of the body, 
she had probably died as a result of the fire inside the building and not as a result of forced disappearance. 
The State acknowledged the delay in the identification of her mortal remains, in respect to what the IA 
Court (2014: 217) concluded the State had failed to comply with its obligation to ensure the rights to life and 
to physical integrity to the detriment of Ana Rosa Castiblanco, due to the failure to establish her 
whereabouts for sixteen years. 
283 On October 2015. Lucy Oviedo's remains were found in Bogota’s Southern Cemetery during the 
exhumation in 1998; however, they were only identified 17 years later. 
284 In 2015, the remains of Cristina Guarín and Luz Mary Portela were identified. They had been buried in 
graves of people who also died during the taking and retaking of the PJ. In the case of Cristina Guarín, her 
remains were found in the grave of Marina Isabel Ferrer whose daughter, Sofia, was unexpectedly informed 
that her mother was, then, missing. Before this situation, she declared to the press: “I'm desperate, I do not 
know where to find her, do not know where to search for her, I feel like if this [the Holocaust Palace of 
Justice] had just happened” (El Tiempo 2015a). 
285 The remains were exumed in 2015 because of a suspicion on their identification: the autopsy said that 
Sandoval’s remains actually corresponded to “at least two adult corpses”. Although there were two 
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was then disappeared and his fate was unknown286. With this respect, Alexandra Sandoval (Justice 
Sandoval’s daughter) observed at the time that the case of her father was in an “absolute impunity. 
[...] in my dad’s case we don’t even know, after thirty years, if we have his body or not” and when 
asked what should happen to avoid this situation she replied “our interest is currently focused on 
finding my dad’s remains. Rather than asking for criminal responsibility, the events of the recent 
years have led us to focus on finding the remains”. In this sense, she added: “well-run criminal 
proceedings I believe could be very useful”. Mrs. Sandoval’s construction of a good operation of 
the criminal system is then focused on shedding light on what happened.  
Thus, declaring someone guilty in this context becomes instrumental to the urgent need of 
finding the remains: what is central to the victims of enforced disappearance is to find their loved 
ones, dead or alive. This becomes the main claim around the fight against impunity. Although 
some victims constructed the notion of impunity in contrast to punishment, the question of where 
are the disappeared? somehow implied a rupture with this definition: the actors of the case 
considered that there would be impunity as long as they could not find their family members.  
“I sometimes feel that it would have been better to leave the case as it was before the trial 
because I feel like the State harmed us more through the process than leaving it as it was. It 
created on us an expectation that wasn’t satisfied because we didn’t recover the remains and 
we could not find the truth of what happened” “It does not satisfy me that those who killed 
my sister, either Pedro, Juan or José have a sentence of 30 or 40 years of imprisonment, what 
do I do with that? But if I could know the truth and have the remains and I can make a 
funeral…” (Rene Guarín, brother)  
“There is a sense of unease because we obtained a sentence without knowing what actually 
happened with the disappeared. We have a verdict on a crime that continues to be executed 
as we speak. What kind of justice is that? Families need to be able to grieve” (Lawyer Jorge 
Molano, representative of the victims).  
                                                                                                                           
bodies, the remains were buried as if they were of one person and the family was warned by state officials 
that the coffin could not be opened. 
286 However, at the start of 2017, his remains were found in a different grave. 
 318 
 
 
To the prosecutor of the case Ángela Buitrago, not having found the disappeared is one of 
her greatest “frustrations” in the case. Furthermore, in a personal interview she affirmed that it was 
not only a matter of finding the remains, she assessed that it was still possible the victims were 
alive: “a lot of people say that after twenty years they are simply dead but I say: wait a minute, 
there were very young people as Norma Constanza or Cristina del Pilar, very young people”.  
In 2009, René Guarín (brother) wrote a document for the Truth Commission entitled: 
“Cristina, a phalanx will suffice”. Mr. Guarín told us that in this writing he wanted to express that 
he would sacrifice some of the truth and the justice in exchange for finding Cristina’s mortal 
remains: “I would do this sacrifice if only I could mourn and give to this suffering a proper 
closure”. In the interview he explained that not being able to mourn is “too harsh”, that he is tired 
of that burden he has carried around for thirty years287. In this sense, when accepting this as a 
sacrifice he portrayed that although justice was an important claim for him, he was ready to give it 
away for the sake of finding her sister, considered as entailing a higher or more pressing claim.  
In 2012 and 2016, we conducted two other in-depth interviews with Mr. Guarín. In 2012, 
he replied to us that the justice in the case was “limp” [as incomplete] and that the impunity in the 
case was due to not having found the remains nor having clarified what happened to his sister. 
Months after this conversation, the remains of Mr. Guarín’s sister were recovered. After a prudent 
amount of time, we conducted a second interview concerning the impunity in the case. In this 
                                       
287 The families have an imprescriptible right to be informed about the fate of the disappeared. 
Additionally, in the event of decease, the body must be returned to the family as soon as it has been 
identified, regardless to whether those involved in the crimes have been identified or prosecuted. In this 
respect, the IA Court has established the importance of the right of the next of kin to know the 
whereabouts of their loved ones in addition to the right to know the truth, recognizing the importance for 
the families to receive the bodies of those who died, as well as to be able to bury them in line with their 
beliefs, and thus closing the mourning process (IA Court 2014: 326; 2009: 245; 2012: 115).   
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interview Mr. Guarín assessed that finding the remains was insufficient for affirming that in the 
case there was no impunity. With this regard, I asked him to help me interpret his own views in 
2012, when he emphasized on recovering the remains and the truth as essential measures for 
overcoming impunity. In this respect he said: “Camilo, I haven’t changed my mind since 2012 
when we spoke about this: I still think there is impunity, as when the remains had not been found, 
because now, four years later, we have some remains, but what about the truth? What about 
justice?” Although he recognized that the most valuable achievement after thirty years of struggle 
was finding his sister’s remains, impunity to him remained intact due to the lack of clarification on 
the events and the lack of justice in the case.  
In spite of having found the mortal remains, the lack of truth around the events and the 
whereabouts of the disappeared created the impression among the victims that the case had not 
overcome impunity: to the victims, who did it and under what circumstances are crucial issues that 
need to be solved for surmounting impunity. With this regard, Pilar Navarrete affirmed that they 
claimed for a “satisfactory truth”, involving not only the recognition and acknowledgement from 
the perpetrators of their responsibility but also finding the remains and knowing what happened to 
their family members. Thus, she regretted the fact that some rests have been retrieved without 
knowing what had truly happened to the victims.  
In the case of Cristina Guarín this is particularly relevant. Indeed, the forensic institution 
after almost thirty years found Cristina’s remains and a piece of her skirt. “It is a piece that is not 
burned, that is in good conditions, somehow dirty but is there” assessed Mr. Guarín - how can a 
piece of cloth coming from such destructive circumstances be preserved in good conditions? 
Additionally, these remains were found in the grave of María Torres de Velasquez: “when I talked 
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to the relatives of María Isabel, they said to me: when we buried her, they only gave us a 
carbonized piece and a shoe”. The fact that originally there were no other rests as they now 
appeared in the form of a skirt and bones of her sister, he asserted, “raises many questions”. These 
doubts have led to new question marks around the circumstances of the death. Mr. Guarín’s 
account closely parallels the one provided by Rosa Cárdenas (daughter). Mrs. Cárdenas recognized 
that while finding the remains of her mother is a great step, the remaining question is: “what is the 
truth? Why are the remains incinerated? Who made this happen?”   
Hence, the question of where are the disappeared reveals not only a search for a physical 
object (the body, the remains), but also constitutes a search for a trajectory the object, a historicized 
account of the events. The truth emerges as an issue intrinsically related to the finding. According 
to Mr. Guarín, truth does not mean an exhaustive account of what happened:   
“I would not like to know all the specifics of what happened, if she died from mechanical 
asphyxia or if they killed her with three gunshots in the head or if they put her in sulfuric acid as 
Ricardo Gámez [former intelligence military] told me in Belgium, but I would like to know 
what was the chain of command in these state criminal actions, who decided to murder and 
afterwards put to death Cristina Guarín. That’s what I mean when I say that the prosecution 
owes to me this part of justice [the truth] as well as the restoration of the mortal remains”.  
When Mr. Guarín referred to the truth as a matter beyond the little details of the wrongdoing, 
he framed this issue as a problem of information around those responsible for the disappearance and 
killing of his sister. When the reflection focuses on disclosing the actions of the perpetrators there is 
an understanding of the relevance of knowing the circumstances of the wrongdoing in order to the 
give a sense of truth and restoration to the finding of the mortal remains. According to some of the 
views gathered among the victims, the truth constitutes an amount of information necessary to solve 
the questions around what happened (instead of multiplying them). 
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In this respect, it is important to refer to the work of the Truth Commission on the PJ events 
and the relevance that the actors award to its work. Although there was not a set of questions directed 
to the work of the Commission, during the interviews, allusions to the Commission were only 
fragmentary when elaborating on the subject of impunity. However, we were able to gather some 
reflections around this. Some valued the Commission’s existence. In this line, Hector Beltrán (father) 
qualified the investigation as exhaustive and profound and the Deputy Attorney General asserted it 
was an important historical account of what happened (El Espectador 2014a). Others were more 
critical in respect to the Commission’s work. In this vein, Alejandra Romero (niece of judicial 
assistant Rosalba Romero Lopez) criticized the report asserting that it had changed her aunt’s name 
(for Rosalia) and her position (from judicial assistant to secretary):  
“The mistake of the Final Report of the Truth Commission, whether intentional or 
accidental, not only has an impact in the historical or biographical discourses, but also has 
implications for my affections. The pain and anger that this created on me led me to 
investigate the issue and ask why my family had done nothing, or even, what had we done so 
we let the name of my aunt went wrong, and it is here where I consider important to stop: 
memory is a claim, is a key for mourning, healing wounds, rebuilding subjectivities, in short, 
it is a political action” (Romero 2015: 13) 
Further from these appreciations, the fact that the Truth Commission referred to contextual 
and historical factors without referring to the responsibility of anyone weakened the perception 
around the relevance of the Commission among the respondents. The work of the Commission was 
valued as a historical account of the events that, among other important aspects, manifestly ratified 
that the disappearances took place – although this was stated in a point of history when the 
perpetration of this crime was much less controversial it was still debated specially around the 
judicial processes. Nonetheless, although this report endorsed the versions of the victims around 
the disappearances, it did not referred to the political or legal responsibility of the civil authorities, 
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of the military, of the police, and other official  and private agents for what happened. A version of 
a crime without perpetrator. 
In relation to this problem, Jorge Franco (brother) assessed that Plazas’s acquittal by the 
Supreme Court of Justice revealed that no one was going to be held accountable for the 
wrongdoing: “Who did it? Was it the Holy Spirit and not a flesh-and-blood person? According to 
the tribunals it seems that it actually was the Holy Spirit” (Jorge Franco, brother). Indeed, the fact 
that the crimes are recognized but the justice system is unable to clarify the circumstances of the 
events – i.a. how did they died or who did abducted them, creates a constant impression of lack of 
information on the whereabouts of the victims.  
With this respect, the victims did not express an expectation on a highly-detailed account of 
the episode - “when you know all kinds of details you can go crazy” (Xiomara Urán -Justice 
Urán’s daughter, referring to the autopsy practiced on the remains of her father). Their claim 
involves finding the remains, knowing what happened and who did it. In this sense, ultimately, 
when referring to impunity victims seek to establish the fate of their loved ones. This is not 
necessarily expressed as a measure of pain infliction through a criminal law measure. In short, 
determining a perpetrator is related with the search of the family members, after all they need 
someone they can ask: where are the disappeared and what happened to them?  
As the interviewees developed their views on the fight against impunity in the case and as 
they focused around finding the disappeared, the centrality of punishment vanished. This issue may 
emerge as a possible rupture with discourses constructing impunity in opposition to punishment. In 
this respect, when referring to Plazas’s imprisonment, one of the victims asserted that although she 
could not say she was unhappy with the fact that the perpetrator suffered some pain, the purpose of 
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their struggle was to find the truth. In this context, the question of where are the disappeared 
involves knowing the truth, the authorship of the wrongdoing and the whys and wherefores of the 
events. In cases of enforced disappearance, the truth and the finding of the bodies are crucial to the 
way they portray their struggle against impunity. This form of obtaining truth and redress is 
meaningful to the victims when they are unable to find their loved ones. However, in their 
discourses some victims and the justice operators also referred to a notion of adequate punishment 
as the objective of the fight against impunity. Let us review this form of the concept of impunity in 
the following section.  
5.4.4. Impunity as inadequate punishment  
When the victims and justice operators addressed the subject of impunity through different 
contrasts with punishment, there remains an open question: under what criteria do these actors 
observe that a criminal sanction results in an adequate form of punishment? The expression 
adequate punishment designates a penalty that is perceived as sufficient so that impunity becomes 
impertinent in a certain situation. In order to develop this part, we will integrate the views of the 
actors who, in spite of their different positions (victims, justice operators, lawyers), referred that in 
the case there was no adequate punishment when were asked about impunity. How do the different 
actors of the case study characterize an adequate punishment? 
When observing impunity as inadequate punishment, the actors mentioned themes such as 
the term of imprisonment and the conditions of imprisonment. When the actors were asked to develop 
these factors used for evaluating what adequate punishment is (in contrast to impunity), they 
employed ideas of proportionality (measuring the seriousness of punishment according to the gravity 
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of the crime), equality vis-à-vis the suffering of the victims (‘they should suffer as much as we did’) 
and equality towards other criminals (‘they should be sentenced in equal conditions as other 
criminals are’). However, their discourses also revealed a form of neutralization of the criminal 
sanction that was not focused on the conditions or the time but on the possibility for implementing 
the sanction (neutralization). Let us review these elements with further detail in three subsections:  
a. Time of imprisonment 
On June 9, 2010, Plazas was found guilty of the enforced disappearance of eleven people and 
was sentenced to thirty years of imprisonment. On January 30, 2012, the Superior Court of Bogota 
(Tribunal Superior de Bogota 2012) partially annulled this ruling declaring Plazas’s responsibility for 
the disappearance of only two people. Finally, retired Col. Plazas was acquitted in 2015 by the 
Supreme Court.  
The actors of the case evaluated the adequacy of the sentence drawing a parallel between 
the time (temporization of the sanction) and the adequacy of the penalty. Thus, the concept of 
impunity was constructed in reference to too-low sentences, in contrast to sufficiently prolonged 
ones that would not entail impunity. In broad terms, criminal law measures are framed into a 
traditional understanding of the functioning of the criminal law system as a pain delivery operation 
against someone (MPR). 
One of the rationales mobilized in this form of observing the problem was proportionality. 
Alejandra Vicente (lawyer representative of the victims before the Inter-American procedures) 
expressed that an adequate punishment must be proportional to the violation: “serious human rights 
violations must meet proportionate punishment”. Although found clear the dependency of adequate 
punishment on proportionality, when we asked her to elaborate on how to observe proportionality, 
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she explained that this was variable, contingent to the judge of each case and to the domestic legal 
framework; in other words, the allusion to proportionality was clear but its content, extent and 
definition was blurred:  
“It depends on each judge, then it is a very subjective issue. There is agreement that the 
penalties must be proportional but there is no agreement on what that means, what is the term 
of the sentences. It varies greatly depending on the judge that processes the case, the 
jurisdiction and the domestic regulations”.  
Despite the lack of parameters to evaluate the adequacy of proportionality with respect to a 
measure of restriction, lawyer Vicente maintained her observation of proportionality as a 
fundamental factor for an ‘adequate’ legal reaction against criminal problematic situations.  
In this line, when observing the term in prison a recurrent use of proportionality relates to 
the conventional juridical discourse of proportion drawn between the length of the sentence and the 
gravity of the violations. In this sense Gloria Gómez, family member of a victim of enforced 
disappearance and director of ASFADDES (association for the victims of disappearance) assessed 
in a personal interview: “we have always demanded that if a person forcefully disappears, those 
responsible for such atrocity should be given the highest possible penalty. We do believe that the 
penalty should be the highest because the damage done to us is too grave”. The elaboration on the 
seriousness of the crime brings about the necessity of a response in proportion to the gravity of the 
harm which could not be anything other than severe.  
When individuals enter the system of ideas of the modern penal rationality and, therefore, 
privilege the theories of punishment that are indifferent to the social inclusion of people 
responsible for criminal conduct, they have some difficulty in indicating a precise and adequate 
threshold for the length of the sentence. With this respect, for instance, lawyer Alejandra Vicente 
was asked what could be an appropriate penalty in the PJ case:  
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“What should the sentence against Plazas be? Should it be 20, 25, 30, 15 years [of 
imprisonment]? I think that limit is a little more abstract, but if he is acquitted by the 
Supreme Court or if it sentences him for a two-year term, the families will have a sense that 
there has been impunity, that although there was a process the case remained in impunity. It 
is more difficult to determine what the maximum penalty should be, but I think it is easier to 
determine if there is a very low penalty that makes family members, or the victims who have 
taken their case to the courts, think there is impunity”.  
Based on the principle of proportionality, lawyer Vicente delimited an appropriate penalty in 
the PJ case as an area formed by two possible limits. When observing these limits, she found more 
difficult to establish what would be an inadequate high sentence, in contrast to inadequate low 
sentences which she found more easily recognizable as inappropriate. This answer allows us to 
observe how the distinction impunity/adequate (ergo proportional) punishment, results fragile (when 
not irrelevant) regarding high sentences: in this vein, the fight against impunity may entail a claim for 
high sentencing. According to this use, an inadequate punishment (in relation to impunity) is opposed 
to ‘too low punishment’: impunity as a measure of leniency, in the words of the IA Court288.   
The described expression of adequate punishment encapsulates our description on the 
traditional discourses of criminal law by which low sentences tend to be observed as inadequate and 
high sentences as adequate. This is particularly visible in our research because the offenses of the 
case involve serious attacks against the life and safety of people. As Gloria Gómez (Asfaddes) has 
put forward: “We do believe that the penalty should be the highest because the damage done to us is 
too grave”.  
                                       
288 A similar finding is present in a study on the perceptions of a significant number of victims, next of kin 
of people killed by ‘terrorist groups’ in the Basque Country since 1960 (Varona and De la Cuesta 2014). 
This study enquired into what those victims thought about the convictions in their cases. 144 people were 
interviewed, and 64.6% of the respondents said that there has been a conviction in their case. Out of the 
82 people who knew the content of the ruling (53.24% of respondents), 57.3% found the sentence lax or 
too lax, 36.6% found it proportional and no one responded that it was harsh or too harsh. The lack of 
responses finding that punishment is harsh correspond to our findings: the themes of proportionality and 
adequate punishment emerge as inapt for questioning, or even recognizing, severe sentences. 
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b. Conditions of imprisonment  
When Plazas was convicted, the conditions of imprisonment became the center of attention of 
different actors when identifying the ‘adequate’ implementation of the sentence. The situation of 
retired Col. Plazas presented different particularities as we can see in Table No. 13: 
Table No. 13. Place of detention of retired Col. Plazas 
Picture No. 13 Plan of the place of 
detention. Retrieved from googlemaps 
 Picture No. 14 and 15 Plazas at his 
place of detention. Retrieved from La 
Cariñosa (2010) and El Espectador 
(2015a) 
Location: the Cantón Norte Military Facility is in Bogotá. 
Approximate area: 180.000 m2.  
What is it? The Cantón Norte is a military facility wherein 
function a number of military educational institutions, a 
battalion, the National school of the army infantry, the 
military cathedral, restaurants, officials’ housing complex, 
and a sports and amusement complex.  
The cell/room: As reported by the Director of the Army 
School of Infantry, Plazas was interned in one of the 
bedrooms of the Officials’ Casino, which consists of a bed, a 
nightstand, a desk, a chair, furniture for a library, a TV, a 
radio and a bathroom (Oficio 4235, November 25th, 2010).  
Chronology of the internment: in 2007 a court ordered retired 
Col. Plazas’s preventive detention289. In accordance with it, 
the Ministry of Defense conducted him to the military 
facilities of the Cantón Norte. On August 5, 2009, the Third 
Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit of Bogotá (Oficio 
No. J3-1528) ordered the INPEC to transfer Plazas from the 
Army Infantry School to the La Picota prison –more 
specifically, to a pavilion providing special security to former 
members of the Armed Forces. On August 26, 2009, the 
INPEC transferred Plazas to the Military Hospital because he 
was feeling ill. On June 9, 2010, the Criminal Court sentenced 
Plazas and the INPEC transferred Plazas to the National 
School of Army Infantry (at the Cantón Norte). In this place 
he served his sentence until December 17, 2015 when Plazas 
was released after his acquittal by the Supreme Court. 
                                       
289 The 13th July 2007, the Prosecutor of the case ordered his preventive detention. The 16th July 2007 
Plazas, gave himself up at the 
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Given these conditions, in 2013, Hector Jaime Beltrán (father), Cecilia Guerra Cabrera 
(wife), Cesar Rodríguez (brother), René Guarín (brother) and Pilar Navarrete (wife) filed an acción 
de Tutela (a legal action to protect fundamental constitutional rights) asking for Plazas to be 
transferred to a prison facility, based on their rights to justice and to an effective remedy.  In 
accordance with this group of victims, those rights were allegedly violated when the Army School 
of Infantry was designated as Plazas’s place of detention.  
With this respect, the plaintiffs argued in the tutela that their right to justice was breached 
because of the scarce restriction of movement of the detainee, the conditions he enjoyed (similar to 
active officials290), the presence of particularly luxurious conditions in the place of detention (e.g. 
having service staff), and Plazas’s activity as a professor. Thus, the plaintiffs portrayed the problem 
of ‘justice’ in this case not only as the detention in a military facility (wherein he held hierarchic 
authority), but as the lack of imprisonment (as a precarious and inflicting pain sanction). In short, the 
actioners constructed a relation between imprisonment and their right to justice. 
Although, according to our research, the victims take into account a diversity of elements 
when observing the subject of impunity, the element of imprisonment was raised as the key 
ingredient for drawing their legal arguments. This was possibly created by the intervention of the 
lawyers translating the complexity of the victims’ claims or their own constructions into the legal 
framework, as well as the use of impunity by the victims as a discourse of regret and denunciation 
that can be reduced without difficulty to a claim of imprisonment. This use of the fight against 
impunity reduces the complexity of the different interests, needs, doubts and reflections that victims 
uphold when asked about impunity, reducing it to the claims for sanctions that inflict pain through a 
                                       
290 According to a testimony gathered by the IA Court (2014: 458), retired Colonel Plazas lived in the 
Infantry School like a regular officer. 
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temporal-corporal dimension. This form of the fight against impunity may involve that the victims 
sacrifice the possibility of translating to the justice system their own intricate aspirations.  
The plea was contested by Plazas’s defense arguing that the special place of confinement 
was intended to safeguard his right to life and that the only difference with other inmates in 
Colombia was that he was not suffering the overpopulation and corruption of prisons. Concluding 
that the defendant was following all due limitations of movement, Plazas’s lawyers not only used 
the same categories as victims (equality and restriction), furthermore, as contradictory as this may 
sound, the defense argued that the convicted was suffering an adequate punishment that “must be 
retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent, reasonable, necessary and proportionate”. Hence, the defense 
lawyer, instead of supporting good conditions as a form of legal redress, tried to persuade the 
justice system of enforcing the special imprisonment conditions describing them as sufficiently 
negative and exclusionary and, for that reason, admissible.  
The Constitutional Court (2013) decided to remain Plazas’s place of detention unaltered, 
under the argument of protecting his right to life from potential risks of security - the Court protected 
the rights to life in reference to the conditions of imprisonment without referring to the term of the 
sentence. Furthermore, in this case the Court assessed that punishment was adequate because it was 
fulfilling a simultaneous objective of deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation291. Although, 
                                       
291 “In respect to the ends of punishment, this Court has stressed that in our legal system punishing has a 
deterrent aim, which is basically met at the time of the legislative enactment of the sanction, which is 
presented as a threat of an evil rising from the violation of the prohibitions; a retributive end, manifested 
at the time of the sentencing, and a rehabilitating end guiding its implementation in accordance with 
humanitarian principles and norms of international law. It has also been considered that the only penalties 
compatible with human rights are those aiming at the resocialization of the offender, meaning that the 
society incorporates the individual as someone that enriches it, which also contributes to a general 
prevention and a safe coexistence, all of which exclude the possibility of imposing the death penalty” 
(Corte Constitucional 2013). 
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according to the Court, the rights of victims are not confined to financial compensation –including a 
wide scope of rights as to the truth, the justice and full reparation for the damage, the Court 
concluded that there is not an entitlement of having the perpetrator in a particular place of detention. 
In line with the discussions presented at the acción de tutela, some of the actors understood 
that for countervailing impunity a serious condition of restriction should take place against the 
person found guilty. Adequate punishment, therefore, should result in conditions of imprisonment 
that meet “serious” restrictions against the offender: 
“The State has some discretion through its institutions with respect to the enforcement of the 
sentences and in this case, it decided that the detention place was going to be the Military 
Cavalry School for security reasons. This is questionable, because Col. Plazas could be 
interned in a different place with a secure area, where he could even be alone with security 
purposes and not serving his sentence in a military facility. Also, the fact that he enjoys 
different privileges can result on a perception of impunity, which are for example the permit 
to attend the wedding of one of his sons or the fact that he continues giving lectures at the 
university. Also, there is the fact that he is a military authority, and as such in the military 
facility he is at he will continue to hold authority. All these conditions create the perception 
that Plazas is not actually serving a prison penalty. This is again related to the subjective 
topic of proportionality that we always link to the theme of impunity and what is perceived 
as impunity when there is no serious enforcement of sentences” (Lawyer Alejandra Vicente, 
representative of the victims in the IA procedures) 
According to this, the notion of impunity as the lack of adequate punishment is not 
restricted by certain actors to evaluate the term of the sentence but should consider also lenient 
conditions of imprisonment. With this respect, lawyer Vicente identified as indicators creating a 
perception of impunity: the special benefits offered to the inmate (e.g. permits for going to parties 
or giving classes at the Military University), the place of detention (i.e. the military facilities) and 
the preservation of the military status of the person convicted (i.e. the relevant hierarchic position 
that the person holds in the structure of power functioning at the place of detention). Let us 
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consider these three elements (benefits, place of detention and status) to analyze the notion of 
impunity in contrast to adequate and proportional punishment.  
The word benefit is used to designate an advantage or profit gained from something. In this 
context, the term benefit refers to special conditions favorable to the inmate. During the interviews, 
other actors used the word privilege rather than the word benefit when referring to this circumstance. 
We will retain the formulation of privilege which closely parallels to benefits but portrays better the 
special advantage granted to a person, which is more accurate to this case. Let us, thus, reframe our 
question: considering that some actors regard privileged conditions of imprisonment as impunity, 
how do actors observe the subject of privilege in regard to prison conditions?  
When detecting the refinements of living that are all but necessary (privileges), the observer 
needs to make an assessment about what he or she considers as the standard reference. In line with 
this reference, certain actors elaborated the subject of privilege in reference to ordinary living 
conditions. In this sense, some of the victims expressed regret about the difference between the 
normal living of people and the conditions created by the intervention of the criminal justice. 
According to Rosa Cárdenas (daughter) “the sentence is derisory: Mr. Plazas is in a military garrison 
living with all imaginable comforts. I mean, where is the suffering? Suffering is what I have to go 
through every day to put food on my table with a minimum wage”. In her assertion, Mrs. Cárdenas 
compared her life and the difficulties that she faces as a humble worker with the comfort and 
favorable conditions that retired Col. Plazas had, even though he was convicted for enforced 
disappearance.  
Besides the comparison with ordinary living conditions, different victims characterized 
Plazas’s prison conditions as luxurious referring to a notion of ‘normal’ conditions of imprisonment. 
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These ideas were connected to the restriction of rights. The interview with Cesar Rodríguez (brother) 
allowed us to consider certain elements for analyzing how victims observe a proper restriction of 
rights:  
“The sentences issued until now are a mockery. Why? Because of the places of detention, 
because the convicted officers are living in the same conditions as active officers as if they 
hadn’t committed any crime. They have a good apartment in a military garrison, very big, 
with a lot of freedom movement. They have a good food service, laundry, constant visits; not 
even visits, their families live with them. These are not prison conditions... Well, 
undoubtedly, they have some restrictions on their freedom of movement. Something that is at 
least a principle of justice, and in any case, there is a sort of social condemnation, and at least 
the guy is convicted and detained. Although the conditions are not entirely adequate, 
undoubtedly there has been something. However, it is a mockery considering that a criminal 
who has been convicted for arbitrary detention, torture and murder should not for any reason 
be under such conditions”. 
Mr. Rodríguez affirmed that he found Plazas’s confinement was a ‘mockery’ because of the 
conditions of imprisonment. Although in his answer he recognized that the detention brings about 
some sort of justice, he regretted the lack of a proper restriction of rights during the time of 
detention. How to observe such restriction? In this respect, Mr. Rodríguez highlighted different 
elements as the visiting regime, the food supplies and the laundry services. Among these elements, 
he observed as the core condition the restriction of movement. In the same vein, several victims 
criticized the vast area where the inmate can move: “Is it acceptable that Mr. Plazas “limits” his 
mobility to 180,000 m2, whereas no detainee in Colombia has that same space?” (Acción de tutela 
filed by the victims). This was verified by lawyer Molano, who also regretted the fact that retired 
Col. Plazas had waiters at his service, that he could move freely within the military facilities and 
that he had access to cell phones and other communication devices - “They are living like kings”, 
assessed Ana María Bidegain, Justice Urán’s wife. 
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The observations of regret we have described can be interpreted as the rejection of conditions 
aiming at preserving or reinforcing the social status of the inmate and, therefore, diluting the sense of 
the criminal law reproach.  However, these responses may also correspond to a representation of 
acceptance and desirability of imprisonment as the standard response of the criminal law system and 
of precariousness as its ideal content and form of implementation - impunity takes place in situations 
where the measure implemented exceeds the precariousness of conditions. 
“[Sandra Beltrán (sister) said:] as a regular detainee convicted by ordinary courts he should 
be at La Picota or La Modelo [regular civil prisons], he should be eating in a can-pot, getting 
out to a courtyard according to a timetable, sleeping on the floor, because he is a convict. 
There are thousands of prisoners under those conditions, and just for stealing a bottle of 
milk! [Pilar (wife) interrupted:] Exactly! He, who has committed those kinds of errors, must 
be in the same conditions. He should not have privileges”. 
In this answer, Mrs. Beltrán assessed that eating, sleeping and moving must be seriously 
restricted for a measure to be characterized as adequate punishment. The evaluation of the 
conditions of imprisonment through the subject of impunity is often oriented in the direction of 
criticizing lenient conditions. The perspective of certain actors regarding imprisonment as 
characteristically precarious and restrictive, involves that some of the victims understand that 
conditions different from those aimed at inflicting pain may contribute to impunity: 
“If he is suffering, then I am glad. I am glad he is having a bad time. And he can make all the 
faces he wants, he can say it does not affect him at all but, even in a military facility, he has 
to be moved somehow.” (Victim B) 
“Yes, he cannot leave the place, but he is not suffering. Every morning they cook eggs for 
the man; he goes out and gives classes. He is not suffering! It is not punishment! Morally, it 
is, but nothing else. Also, when all this passes he is going to be a hero, I assure you, Camilo 
Umaña, that when Plazas is released, he will file a sue for his supposed undue detention 
against the State and we are all going to have to pay reparations in his favor.” (Victim A) 
In these answers, the adequateness of imprisonment is identified with the extent to which 
suffering is experienced by the convicted. While both of these victims accept that the mere fact of 
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being sent to prison may cause suffering, they affirmed that imprisonment should suppose a form 
of cumulative pain according to which the detention should be followed by additional suffering 
experienced through the conditions of imprisonment.  
From the point of view of the convict, Thania Vega (Plazas’s wife) described that the 
internment of retired Col. Plazas caused them great suffering and humiliation: “only those who have 
experienced it can possibly know how the life of a family changes in a situation as such” (Vega 2011: 
46). She asserted they felt an enormous humiliation by the simple fact of being taken pictures (Vega 
2011: 44). During the detention, Thania Vega perceived her husband’s “cheerful, smiling and caring 
personality” had transformed into “a constant state of irritation, irascibility, aggressiveness and 
mistrustfulness” (Vega 2011: 44). He suffered a “deep moral pain, a terrible inner agony and a 
sensation of defeat” (Vega 2011: 44).  
According to the idea of pain accumulation, some of the victims found in this suffering not 
only an adequate consequence but also a sense of comfort as asserted the victim B. In this context, 
the claim for equality means a claim for equally poor conditions for all those people submitted to a 
criminal law penalty. Answers such as the ones we have presented, referring to unequal conditions 
of imprisonment as a factor of impunity, could not be understood as a position in favor of 
improved conditions. On the contrary, this form of constructing the fight against impunity 
constitutes an argument for demanding for more restrictive conditions (against retired Col. Plazas). 
The representation of the accumulation of pain by means of criminal punishment expressed 
by some victims reminds us Foucault’s remark (1975: 16) when referring to the nineteenth century 
criticism to imprisonment according to which punishment was not sufficient when prisoners were 
less hungry, less cold, less deprived in general than poor people or ordinary workers. This involves a 
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pressure on the criminal law system so that “a condemned man should suffer physically more than 
other men” (Foucault 1975: 16). However, in the answers of the victims we were also able to depict 
certain elements beyond a mere valorization of punishment as a form of cumulative pain infliction.  
With regard to Plazas’s detention, another victim said: “I guess this has been very hard for 
him, I am very happy about this but I don’t think it's enough because what we needed was the 
truth”. According to this answer, the discourse on suffering was somehow instrumental, 
representing the infliction of pain as a means to the truth. In line with this representation, 
conditions of imprisonment causing suffering are perceived as possibly apt for compelling those 
involved in the criminal actions to tell the truth.  
“Perhaps with more rigor he [Plazas] would have been persuaded to tell the truth, so that we 
could know where they are [their loved ones] and what happened that day” (Pilar Navarrete, 
wife).  
 In this answer, imprisonment is not only instrumental but actually becomes irrelevant 
when the truth is perceived as ‘unreachable’. This is especially relevant in cases of enforced 
disappearance in which the whereabouts of a person are concealed. After Supreme Court acquitted 
retired Col. Plazas, this observation was clearer to some of the victims. With this respect, Pilar 
Navarrete asserted that, at the end, the fact that Plazas was imprisoned for eight years did not 
change anything, “as happens to all of those soldiers who are ‘detained’ in resorts or military 
garrisons where they are not treated with the full rigor of the law”, she assessed. In this answer, 
rigorous conditions of imprisonment are understood as pertinent, opportune and necessary, 
especially before rogue offenders, with the purpose of obtaining the truth.  
Other victims evaluated the lack of restriction as a form of preserving the living conditions 
of the person found guilty. This situation was identified as impunity not because of the degree of 
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suffering that the measure inflicts upon the person but because of the expression of a sort of 
protection annulling the reproach derived from the criminal law reaction. In this sense, some 
victims reject those conditions improving or preserving inmates’ conditions compared to when 
they were free from a conviction. Let us review this dimension in the next section.  
c. Neutralization of the criminal law system operation  
With respect to Plazas’s detention, the IA Court (2014) asserted that the internment in a 
military institution would only violate the IA Convention when it is contrary to legal provisions or 
to Court orders and when the special conditions are not justified by valid reasons -such as the 
protection of the life and integrity of the person confined. On the contrary, special conditions 
would constitute an arbitrary privilege that could nullify the execution of the punishment in the 
form of “illusory measures that only appear to meet the formal requirements of justice” (IA Court 
2014: 459; 2008 para. 203; 2010, footnote 225). According to these elements, the Court asserted 
that there was no violation of judicial guarantees and the right to an effective remedy of the victims 
in the case292 (IA Court 2014: 459-469).  
The elements that the Court raised to evaluate the appropriateness of the conditions of 
imprisonment allow us to observe a distinction between conditions of imprisonment and conditions 
of inequality or neutralization of the criminal sanction that are revealed or implemented through 
the mise en scene of a certain form of (containment of the) legal reaction. When observing this 
                                       
292 “Based on the foregoing considerations and the evidence it possesses at this time, the Court does not find 
that the incarceration conditions of the two individuals who have been convicted constitute a violation of 
judicial guarantees and the right to an effective remedy of the victims. If the sentences are confirmed, the 
Court considers that the domestic authorities must take into account the considerations of the Superior Court 
of Bogota inasmuch as it “urge[d] the national Government that the execution of the punishment imposed 
[on the Commander of the Cavalry School] be implemented in a way that it is not an offense to the pain of 
the victims and their communities.” (IA-Court 2014: 470) 
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situation the actors drew two sorts of comparisons. The first is a comparison to the active army 
officers who have committed no crime, given retired Col. Plazas lived in the same place and under 
the same conditions as other officials293. The second is a comparison to the inmate’s living 
conditions before the moment of the detention: the fact that Plazas’s residence conditions remained 
unchanged was characterized by the victims as a privilege that distanced the criminal law action 
from reproach, as we mentioned in the last section.  
This construction of impunity was sometimes constructed employing the notion of equality. 
Some of the interviewees contrasted Plazas conditions to those of other inmates in Colombia: unequal 
treatment is inadmissible as it entails privilege and, therefore, impunity. With this regard, Hector 
Beltrán (father) assessed in his book he found outrageous that someone who steals something little 
from a store would be sent to prison while “those who plunder the country obtain rewards, trophies 
and home detention”. In this assertion, impunity becomes detectable when the observer can draw a 
comparison between the social status of the actor and the legal reaction against his wrongdoing 
(social inequality). Impunity thus appears as an obstruction of the justice privileging individuals 
according to their place in society. This form of constructing impunity frames this issue within the 
social conditions of the transgressor of the norm.  
“I think the next of kin feel upset because of the privilege or unequal conditions of them 
[referring to the retired Col. Plazas and General Arias] compared with those people who 
commit common crimes” (Lawyer Jorge Molano, representative of the victims)  
“As a high ranked military, Col. Plazas should not be given any positive discrimination vis-
à-vis other people convicted in Colombia, especially those who are accused of serious 
crimes” (Lawyer Alejandra Vicente, representative of the victims in the IA procedures).  
                                       
293 “Is it acceptable that Mr. Plazas, convicted for crimes against humanity, has a bedroom in the same 
conditions as the Colonels on active duty and can stay in the Casino, like an officer on active duty and not 
as a convicted?” (Acción de Tutela presented by the victims) 
 338 
 
 
In the PJ case, these lawyers implicitly perceived that the military status produced the 
differentiation of treatment and not the issue of security or protection in detention. In the interview 
with the prosecutor of the case, Ángela Buitrago referred to the subject of privilege affirming: “there 
cannot be social classes between those who commit crimes and even less to give particular 
preference to this type of crimes. […] [P]rivileges of this nature should not be accepted”. In her 
assertion, prosecutor Buitrago differentiated between special detention, which she found admissible 
for any person that might need to be protected (in the case of the military because of security 
reasons), and privileged treatment, which she found inadmissible because it creates an arbitrary 
difference among criminals (neutralization of the sanction). In this context, privileges are viewed as 
guarantees of a certain social status and as mechanisms depriving the law from its general message 
and practical enforcement: “privilege is the name for that through which the laws are deprived of their 
general applicability” (Steinberg 2013: 92). In the PJ case, the described conditions were perceived 
by some of the victims as a form of dissolving any restriction294. 
 “The privileges enjoyed by Mr. Plazas on his site of detention are an insult and a great 
humiliation to us, the next of kin of the victims of the holocaust of the Palace of Justice. This is 
also the case for the Colombian Justice, disobeyed and ignored through this regime of 
privileges, which constitutes a contempt of the judicial decisions, as it is expressed in the fact 
that those military involved in crimes against humanity never pay any conviction making a 
mockery of our demands for justice and punishment” (Acción de Tutela). 
The expressions of unease and indignation that the victims communicate about the 
conditions granted to retired Col. Plazas were portrayed as a form of contempt of Court. In other 
                                       
294 “[A]ccording to expert witness Mario Madrid Malo, “it is a well-known fact that, in the Infantry School,” 
the retired Colonel lives “like a regular officer” of that unit; his movements within the School are 
unrestricted and “he has been the beneficiary of exceptional privileges that are not in keeping with the 
penitentiary and prison laws in force.” Meanwhile, the former Commander of the 13th Brigade has also 
been detained in the Infantry School since October 10, 2008, and, according to this expert witness, he enjoys 
“the same privileged situation.” ”(IA-Court 2014: 458) 
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words, it was not presented by the victims as a matter of infliction of suffering but as a matter of 
neutralization of the criminal law system. The representation of disregard of the authority of the 
courts of law was not restricted to the lack of precariousness and restriction of the sanction, but 
heavily relied upon the aptitude of the sanction for effectively changing the life conditions of the 
person convicted of a crime. In the present case, this specific feature must be interpreted together 
with the fact that retired Col. Plazas was detained in the military unit that he once commanded. The 
status that retired Col. Plazas hold in his place of detention was observed by some of the actors as a 
form of protection rather than a reproach for the wrongdoing. This was to be found not only 
through the mentioned material conditions but also through different symbolic elements:  
“We should not lie to ourselves, the military treats Plazas as if he was an active colonel, they 
say: 'My Colonel Plazas’. I do not mean that they should treat him inhumanely. He also has his 
dignity and should be treated as a person, but it is very different the treatment given to him in 
the military facilities than the treatment given to a person in a prison, where he would have 
more restrictions. Here, indeed, there is impunity from the practical point of view”.  
In this answer, Jorge Franco (brother) explained how Plazas was treated during his detention 
following the forms of the chain of command. This he considered inappropriate for a measure of 
restriction of rights. In this response, the regret of the privilege is not expressed as an expectation of 
inhuman conditions of imprisonment - contrary to the dignity of people as Jorge Franco assessed; it 
rather is a claim of conditions not aimed at protecting the social status of the inmate.  
 
Picture No. 16 “The officers that share 
with him show their admiration and 
respect to Plazas” (El Espectador 2015a) 
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Retired Col. Plazas referred to these conditions as normal: “I have a room, I live as an ordinary 
officer, I have my room here, a decent place where I live... here I have my books, I have my things” 
(Plazas in El Tiempo 2010). This perception founded upon his ranking in the military structure:  
Question: “Are you confined to a room?” 
Plazas: “No, I have certain movements in the School because I have the permission that the law 
gives me to move to the church, to move to the medical dispensary and to move to the gym, so I 
do have that freedom but most of the time I stay here at the Casino of officers and in my room”. 
Question: “Could someone assert that is a privilege?” 
Plazas: “No, that is the rule of law and the constitutional block that respects my military rank.” 
(Caracol TV 2011) 
In different interviews to the media, retired Col. Plazas acknowledged that his detention 
preserved his status and assessed that it was legal. He identified this as a ‘right’ that he was entitled 
to (a matter of law), because of his military rank.  
“There is a legal provision stipulating that the Infantry School is a place of detention for 
officers with a certain ranking, therefore my General Arias Cabrales, Uscátegui [and myself] 
are here detained”. (Plazas in El Tiempo 2010) 
The idea of status in Plazas’s case is not only constructed around his condition as a military 
but around his authority and ranking within the institution, comparable with that of the Army 
Generals. Indeed, other actors of the case similarly perceived that Plazas’s special conditions were 
due to his status. In this respect, Justice Jara assessed:  
“I took the determination to order his transfer [referring to Plazas] to the Picota [prison] 
because I said: he cannot do whatever he wants. The process was affected because the 
defendant just wanted to do as he pleased. No! Justice deserves respect. Its authority must be 
respected. I decided to transfer him to the Picota […] I also had information that Plazas did 
not fulfill the orders that were given by the command of the Infantry School, it was a total 
lack of discipline, an absolute rebellion”.   
In her answer, Justice Jara perceived that the defendant used his status as an excuse to 
obtain and maintain special conditions of imprisonment. Furthermore, Judge Jara asserted that the 
place of detention served as a measure of the lack of compliance of the court’s orders. In her view 
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this was ‘unjust’ and for this reason, when she was the judge of the case, she ordered the change of 
Plazas’s place of detention.  
In this case, not only the victims but also the defendant and the justice operators agreed on 
their perception that social status impacted the determination of the detainee’s prison conditions. 
While Plazas assessed that it was a right, Judge Jara observed that it was an irregularity based on 
his power, aimed at excluding him from the rule of the law. In this sense, she claimed her decision 
to transfer retired Col. Plazas to a prison was intended to place him under the rule of law.  
While actors of the case can characterize privileged detention conditions as a form of 
containment of the legal system placing someone over the rule of law (either as a manifestation of a 
legal entitlement or as illegitimate dispositive blocking the justice system), the underlying problem is 
the idea of reproach: impunity emerges as a lack of regret or reproach from the legal system and as a 
problem of interference with the functioning of the justice system. Thus, if the conviction results in a 
measure of protection of the status of those who were convicted, wrongdoing is not perceived as 
reproved or blamed. This situation was not only drawn by the victims in respect to the place of 
detention but also to other concessions as the fact that retired Col. Plazas was giving classes at the 
Military University to officers in courses of promotion (El Tiempo 2010).  
To Plazas, the classes and other special conditions derived from his status as a high ranked 
military (El Tiempo 2010). The fact that Plazas gave classes to officers in the promotion courses 
implied a symbolic support placing him as an intellectual reference to the military institution, as an 
example and authority for younger officials who want to get promoted in the institution. In this 
context, the status of the person declared guilty is not only preserved but also elicited and 
amplified through the implementation of the criminal law measure. Thus, the measure of reproach 
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becomes a measure of prestige invalidating the sanction. This situation, according to some, not 
only benefited Plazas but also victimized them: “we continue to be victimized because we are 
watching how this person who disappeared our loved ones gets rewarded, even though for thirty 
years he has been hiding the truth” (Rosa Cárdenas, daughter). 
In the former sections, we have reviewed different constructions of impunity found in the 
fieldwork. During the interviews, the actors constructed the subject of impunity in accordance with 
themes as the declaration of guilt, the lack of effectiveness of the conviction, the preservation of 
the status of those accused for the wrongdoing, the conditions of imprisonment, the lack of truth 
and social reproach.  However different and distinguishable, these themes allowed us to observe a 
possible form of characterizing impunity as a problem of blockage and interference with the 
criminal justice when prosecuting criminal conducts. In the next section we will propose a possible 
reconstruction of the concept of impunity considering the different connotations and significances 
found in our case study but also in the social discourses.  
5.5. On the sociological concept of impunity  
In the last sections we attempted to elucidate the uses and notions of impunity in social 
discourses. When reviewing the different elements raised in the course of our research, impunity 
emerges as a polysemous and ambiguous term. This notion can be portrayed as a ‘medium’. A 
medium is a means that adopts a specific form, giving a determinate sense to the propositions where 
it intervenes. Mediums have no essence, there is no single form capable of definitively eliminating 
other possible forms – “les possibilités d’un medium ne peuvent jamais être saisies à partir d’une 
seule forme” (Luhmann, 2013: 165 in Pires 2015). However, the medium is always expressed 
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through a certain selection of sense: “J’ai besoin du médium pour construire des formes et de 
formes (propositions) pour employer le medium” (Pires 2015: 5).  
The forms that the medium adopts are to be understood not as immanent properties but 
selections of significance. These selections have the potential of suspending other selections, 
according to their presence and authority before the communications of a social system. 
Nonetheless, the capacity of suspending other selections does not imply a necessary elimination of 
other possible forms (Pires 2015: 6)295.  
Considering the different possible forms that impunity may adopt, the present section aims 
at drawing a socio-legal conceptualization apt for addressing the conceptual problems raised in the 
present work. Although some commentators assert that probably no definition of impunity is 
exempted from major conceptual problems (Bonet & Fernández 2009; Penrose 2000; Alvarez 
2012), this observation should not be used as a pretext to induce the sociologist to renounce to a 
reconceptualization. The endeavor of this section is to construct a sociological concept allowing to 
deal with some of the problems reviewed in the last sections.  
With regard to the problems we found in social discourses, we depicted different issues when 
impunity adopts the connotation of a general discourse of regret and denunciation. Such use, we 
argued, involves a form of vagueness and ambiguity that ultimately hinders the distinction between 
impunity situations and non-impunity. However normative expectations are relevant, a sociological 
definition allowing stable observations of the phenomenon entail a construction beyond the 
                                       
295 “[L]es mots du vocabulaire, les adages, etc., fonctionnent comme médium (véhicule, moyen) à partir 
desquels nous construisons des formes et nous pouvons donner un sens aux propositions (Luhmann, 2013a : 
165). La forme renvoie à la sélection et à l’actualisation de propositions avec un sens spécifique (ibidem). 
Par example, le mot ‘égalité’ est un médium et la proposition ‘tous les individus sont égaux devant la loi’, 
signifiant que ‘le droit doit être le même pour toutes les strates de la société’, est une forme.” (Pires 2015 : 
4) 
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variability of social expectations that criminal accountability may raise. How to construct a 
sociological notion of impunity without limiting the observation to social emotional expectations?  
For a sociological conceptualization it is also valuable to detach from the use of impunity 
as a mechanism reproducing the traditional structures of the penal rationality identified through 
negative, abstract and hostile forms of reacting against criminal conduct. On the one hand, this use 
of (the fight against) impunity may contribute to the lack of innovation of the criminal law system 
observable, for instance, when combating against impunity is used as an argument favoring long-
term imprisonment and other radical measures of legal redress. On the other hand, when impunity 
is characterized as the counter-phase of punishment (understood as a legal human suffering 
materialized through measures of temporal exclusion from society), the notion becomes unrealistic 
(perhaps naïve) because in contemporary societies most of criminal behavior goes unpunished. 
This state of affairs should not be equated to the problem of impunity. We will come back to this 
later on. For the moment we should ask: how to construct a concept of impunity avoiding the 
reproduction of the traditional structures of the modern penal rationality? 
For the reconstruction of the concept, we will use both, a strategy of exclusion removing 
those elements that a general concept of impunity should not include -ultimately elucidating what 
is not impunity, and a strategy of inclusion referring to the conceptual elements that a notion of 
impunity should comprise. The strategy of exclusion attempts to elucidate different aspects that 
should be excluded from a general sociological conceptualization of impunity while the strategy of 
inclusion will depict different elements through the study of state criminality as a privileged point 
of reflection for the study of impunity. In this regard, explorations using other criminal phenomena 
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can be part of upcoming studies; until then, we may use our considerations in the subject in order 
to address the concept of impunity regarding the operations of the criminal justice.  
When assessing the concept of impunity, we must distinguish this phenomenon from other 
phenomena affecting the operation of the criminal justice system – strategy of exclusion. One of 
the most frequent issues with which the notion of impunity is associated is the selection of eligible 
events by the criminal justice. However, the phenomenon of the selection with regard to the 
operations of the criminal law system must not be confused with the phenomenon of impunity. 
Sociology currently understands that organized social systems operate through selection: events 
available for the internalization of social systems are submitted to selection. For instance, in order 
to operate, the health system selects what is going to be treated as a health issue (not every 
individual or condition are dealt with by the health system or “exhaustively examined” every time). 
If the health system were to treat (exhaustively) every single case, it would not operate. Another 
example can be the mass media. The mass media select and construct from all the information 
available what they esteem pertinent for diffusion considering the concrete vested interests, 
positioning and constraints. No one can seriously consider that it would be possible to inform about 
everything that is to be known.   
These observations are also valid for the criminal law system. Selection is a constraint of 
the system that constitutes a condition for the operation of the system itself. Moreover, the process 
of selection should be understood as the condition for the functioning of the criminal law system. 
All social systems, including the criminal law system, operate through selection – in the case of the 
criminal justice selection is contingent upon a great number of circumstances as the pertinence and 
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accuracy of the complaint, the collection of evidence, the time and resources for the investigations, 
the due diligence on the part of the prosecution, the capacity of defense, inter alia.  
The normal functioning of the criminal law system is characterized by the impossibility of 
processing all crimes. This could not be otherwise: what would happen to society if the criminal 
law system managed to process every problematic situation susceptible of being criminalized? 
Thus, the statement that the system ‘selects’ does not constitute a critique; it rather is a description 
of the state of affairs of the system operation. Furthermore, this may also be understood as a 
desirable outcome: firstly, the universe of problematic situations is virtually too large and most of 
it is obfuscated for different reasons296. Secondly, the criminal law is not the only legitimate 
normative system pertinent for or capable of dealing with events that can be criminalized. And, 
lastly, the system needs to select in order to operate: “too much law, too many offences and too 
many cases […] threaten the whole criminal justice system with collapse”, as stated by the Law 
Commission of Canada (1976). 
If we acknowledge that, at least from a sociological point of view, selection is a necessary 
condition for the functioning of the criminal law system, when assessing impunity we need to draw 
a distinction between this phenomenon and the process of selection of criminal events by the 
criminal justice. Thus, the relevant question to pose is: what is impunity if it is not a criminal event 
that is not criminalized or selected by the criminal law system? 
The distinction selection/non-selection is neither theoretically decisive nor empirically 
crucial to define and detect impunity. The selection process of a possible criminal event is caught in 
                                       
296 In the sixties we already find the assessment that “[i]t is a well-known fact that relatively few offenders 
are caught, and most of those arrested and released. But society makes a fetish of wreking “punishment”, as 
it is called, on an occasional captures and convicted one” (Menninger 1968: viii). 
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a double bind. In the first instance, an event must be defined by an observer as criminal and must be 
communicated as such to the criminal law system – the discrepancy between criminal behavior and 
a crime reported to the system is traditionally referred to as the “dark figure”. In the second instance, 
the event shall be accepted and internalized in the organized operation of the criminal law system. 
These two binds have been traditionally linked as part of the problem of impunity. However, 
while impunity indicates a bad sign of operation of the system, the lack of report of a criminal event 
or the decision not to internalize a criminal event into the operation of the criminal justice, cannot be 
automatically considered as a sign of a bad operation of the system. In different cases, avoiding the 
criminal justice may involve an appropriate and rational selection as a sign of good operation. For 
instance, when a minor crime is not reported to the system or when a police officer dealing with a 
problematic situation susceptible of being criminalized legitimately decides to choose mechanisms 
other than the criminal justice system to address the situation. If the officer decides not to internalize 
a criminal event, one cannot automatically consider this an inappropriate decision.  There are many 
alternatives to the criminal law system that can be observed as appropriate from different 
perspectives. “For all acts, including those seen as unwanted, there are dozens of possible 
alternatives to their understanding [and redress]” (Christie 2004: 10), without necessarily implying 
impunity, we may add.  
Characteristically, the criminal law system presents a significant disproportion between the 
number of situations over which the system is authorized by law to intervene and the number of 
situations where it effectively does so (Menninger 1968; Hulsman 1986: 65, 70297; Baratta 1989: 340-
                                       
297 “Those who are officially recorded as ‘criminal’ constitute only a small part of those involved in events 
that legally are considered to require criminalization” (Hulsman 1986: 65).  
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341298; Duff and Garland 1994: 9299; Pavarini 2009). ‘Impunity’ would be an inappropriate label for 
this form of selection. As early as the 19th century, Karl Biding coined the expression “fragmentary 
character of the criminal law”, asserting that this was a “serious deficiency of criminal law” (quoted 
by Jareborg 2004: 526); however, the current sociological knowledge allows us to understand the 
‘fragmentation’ as a condition of operation of the criminal law system300. 
Selection, as an operational condition of the criminal law system, is not only due to a problem 
of practicability, appropriateness or pertinence but is also founded through different rational 
criteria301. Considering the need to clearly distinguish between the notion of impunity and the usual 
and necessary operations for the selection of the criminal law system, the features of the phenomenon 
of impunity must not be confused with the criteria used by the legal system to operate selection. In 
this context, the phenomenon of impunity must be distinguished from institutional regulations such 
as the laws of “immunity” from jurisdiction or principles of selection as the ultima ratio.  
                                                                                                                           
“Anyway, there is no doubt that actual criminalisation of criminalisable events - even in the field of 
traditional crime - is a very rare event indeed. In a country like Holland, far less than one percent of those 
criminalisable events is actually criminalised in the courts. Non-criminalisation is the rule, criminalisation a 
rare exception” (Hulsman 1986: 70). 
298 “El modo como el sistema de la justicia criminal interviene sobre este limitado sector de la violencia 
"construido" con el concepto de criminalidad, es estructuralmente selectivo. Esta es una característica de 
todos los sistemas penales. Existe una enorme discrepancia entre el número de situaciones sobre las cuales 
el sistema es llamado a intervenir y aquel sobre el cual puede intervenir y efectivamente interviene. El 
sistema de la justicia penal está completamente y constantemente dedicado a administrar un reducidísimo 
porcentaje, seguramente es muy inferior al 10%, de infracciónes. Esta selectividad depende de la estructura 
misma del sistema, es decir de la discrepancia de los programas de acción previstos por las leyes penales y 
las posibilidades reales de intervención del sistema” (Baratta 1989: 340-341). 
299 “The penal system deals with only a small proportion of the total population of offenders, and generally 
does so only for short and intermittent periods” (Duff and Garland n.d.: 9). 
300 Jurists often encapsulate this idea in the observation that “not all interests that are worthy of protection 
are, or could practicably be, protected by the criminal law” (Jareborg 2004: 526). 
301 When referring to this operation as rational we do not understand it as right, accurate or good, we refer 
rather to it as methodical and governed by a set of norms aiming at giving a pretension of correction to the 
resort (or not) to the criminal justice system and the implementation (or not) of the criminal law in 
accordance with such framework. 
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The laws of immunity refer to a legal entitlement that can adopt three basic forms: 
functional immunity, which refers to those rules that shield “all (former) state officials from the 
jurisdiction of foreign national courts with regard to the limited class of official acts performed on 
behalf of the state”; personal immunity, which “provides comprehensive protection from foreign 
jurisdiction to certain categories of foreign state officials during their term of office”; and, state 
immunity, which “precludes the exercise of jurisdiction over the acta jure imperii of foreign 
states” (Van Alebeek 2008: 2)302.  
Impunity does not differ from immunity just in one letter. The first difference between both 
notions is that the latter is a legal entitlement governed and authorized according to the rule of law 
- while impunity is not a legitimate ratio for the lack of operation of the criminal justice system. 
The second difference is that the laws of immunity recognize the transgression of a primary rule 
(the rule prohibiting the conduct) and simply formulate a protection from jurisdiction. Immunity 
therefore “regulates the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of particular conduct and is thus entirely 
distinct from the substantive law which determines whether that conduct is lawful or unlawful” 
(ICJ 2012: 4)303. “Accordingly, the person enjoying immunity is in principle not exonerated from 
                                       
302 These forms of immunity have a strong relation to the concept of state criminality since they are related 
to actions performed by states (agents) on behalf of the state or as functionaries. “Since human rights 
violations often occur under the veil of state authority national courts asked to adjudicate upon the human 
rights violations allegedly committed by foreign states and their officials have stumbled upon the traditional 
international law rules on jurisdictional immunity” (Van Alebeek 2008: 418). As a ratio governed by 
international law, there is an expanding assessment on the restriction of immunities specifically when 
human rights norms are violated. A human rights exception gains space vis-à-vis the rule of immunity, 
understanding that people cannot be sheltered from jurisdiction when committing especially grave 
violations. 
303 In this respect, the International Court of Justice assessed that “the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by 
incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they 
might have committed […]. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain 
offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility” (ICJ 2002: 60). 
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criminal responsibility [or other kind of responsibility]; it is simply that it is more difficult to invoke 
such responsibility” (ILC 2008: 175)304.  
Besides the laws of immunity, one of the most pervasive substantive arguments to be found in 
the literature related to the selection of the criminal law is the ultima ratio principle. It is an internal 
criterion of the legal system employed to select the problematic situations that it will internalize. 
Although this principle emerged as a form of restraint with respect to the use of the criminal law, at 
least from the XVI century a connotation of justification of the functioning of the system was 
introduced to this principle (Mereu 2012; Pires 2001, 2012).  
When the principle is used to justify the action of the system it is authorized and represented 
as a selection criterion of last resort. According to Mereu (2012), Pires (2012) and Xavier (2012), 
this use has allowed repressive practices: when the criminal law is pertinent as a last resort measure 
its operation must be, accordingly, compelling and its outcome (the sentence) must be particularly 
severe. On the other hand, when the ultima ratio principle results in a criterion of selection by which 
the criminal law system rejects processing a criminal conduct, this might imply that a certain crime 
goes unpunished.  
With this in mind, some authors have drawn a link between ultima ratio with a problem of 
impunity (e.g. Bengoetxea, Jung and Nuotio 2013)305. In this vein, ultima ratio, when implying the 
lack of prosecution of different criminal behaviors, may be considered as part of the phenomenon of 
impunity. However, impunity is different from ultima ratio. Impunity implies a discrepancy between 
                                       
304 E.g. the doctrine of diplomatic immunity shelter diplomats against prosecution for violations of the laws 
of their hosting state, while they are still subject to the laws of their hosting state.  
305 “[…] There is therefore a legitimate concern that the principle of Ultima Ratio should not be abused in 
our European context and legal environment. But what would it mean for the principle to be abused and put 
at risk? […] Risks also lurk in cases of impunity, when seriously harmful acts are allowed, for different 
reasons, to go unpunished” (Bengoetxea, Jung, Nuotio 2013: 4). 
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the possibility of operation of the criminal justice system and the criminal law program of action; 
meanwhile, ultima ratio is a criterion of operation that does not involve a dysfunction of the system 
but a principled form of selection of the system – that has implied in contemporary uses a rather 
justificatory agenda for repression306 (Xavier 2012). Impunity is not in any case an acceptance of the 
operation of the criminal law system, it rather is a blockage of that operation preventing the criminal 
law from acting (neutralization).  
The notion of impunity, as we will elaborate here, implies a reference to a structure of 
blockage that is in place, affecting the usual operation of the criminal justice system, in contrast to 
a criterion of the system for its operation adopting (appropriate or inappropriate) concrete 
decisions. Moreover, impunity should not be constructed as a passe-partout, incorporating the 
universe of problems of the criminal justice system as part of the concept. Let us review some 
relevant distinctions with this regard. 
So far we have referred to the concept of selection as a necessary condition of operation 
that can explain the general problem of the disproportion between the action of the system and the 
operational mandate of the criminal law (the ‘dark figure’). The criminological and legal literature, 
however, have referred to the problem of selectivity as a form of selection that has a negative or 
pejorative connotation. This issue refers to a differential selection and treatment of the criminal law 
operation derived from social bias on grounds of race, gender, or social class. With this respect, 
authors as Baratta (1987) and Zaffaroni (1998; 2011) assert that most of the activity of the system 
                                       
306 Some liberal jurists refer to the concept of ultima ratio for limiting the scope of intervention of the 
criminal justice. So far, we have to acknowledge that, sociologically speaking, these expectations are not 
confirmed. Perhaps, with the framework of a new penal rationality, this principle may effectively come to 
play a role of limitation. Even in this case, this principle should not be confused with the notion of 
impunity that we propose in this work. 
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(either in the form of inaction or action) is due to a structural selectivity characterized by the 
designation of the more marginalized members of society as the system’s ‘clientele’, excluding the 
most privileged from its attention307.  
“[T]he sociology of penal law as well as the everyday experience shows that the criminal law 
system directs its action primarily against those violations of the weakest and most marginal 
parts of the population; that powerful groups in society are able to impose an almost total 
impunity to the system for their criminal actions” (Baratta 1989: 341). 
This problem has become a well-known fact in all occidental jurisdictions, easily recognizable 
by the operators of the system308. This is verified by the fact that, at least since the birth of prisons 
in the beginning of the nineteenth century, the former has been the predominant socio-economical 
group of people in worldwide prisons309. 
Since impunity and selectivity may imply forms of subtraction from the operations of the 
criminal justice (based on social bias)310, it is understandable that some observers refer to these two 
phenomena as undistinguishable (e.g. Genelhú 2015: 64). However, while selectivity refers to the 
inclusion or exclusion of a person from the operation of the criminal law system based on social 
                                       
307 Selectivity is eventually justified, mainly in political discourses, as a form of neutralizing populations labeled 
as particularly problematic in accordance with a function of prevention and control of crime. However, authors 
such as Pavarini (2009: 160) or Duff and Garland (1994: 26) have criticized this managerial logic as a 
justificatory rhetoric that tends to obfuscate its discriminatory aim and its role in the reproduction of violence. 
308 According to Perez Perdomo (1991) criminal justice in Latin America and particularly in Colombia 
presents high degrees of selectivity in consonance with the social status of people, which is often 
determined by the economic resources. Thus, upper social classes often evade justice while the 
underprivileged are repressed. 
309 In the case of the US, Loury (2013) asserted: “America’s prisoners are mainly minorities, particularly 
African Americans, who come from the most disadvantaged corners of our unequal society, cannot be 
ignored. In 2006, one in nine black men between the ages of twenty and thirty-four was serving time. The 
role of race in this drama is subtle and important, and the racial breakdown is not incidental: prisons both 
reflect and exacerbate existing racial and class inequalities”. 
310 Indeed, the blockage of the possibility for implementing the criminal law program of action (impunity) 
can be related to a problem of social bias by which certain people are shielded from accountability 
because of their social standing. Relations of power are established around social characteristics that can 
establish a biased selection of the criminal law system (selectivity). 
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bias, the problem of impunity only involves a form of exclusion. Moreover, in cases of 
exclusionary selectivity, theses phenomena are not to the same. Impunity is not necessarily based 
on a form of social inequality. As studied in the last section, this can be due to different constraints, 
interferences and pressures from the environment of the criminal justice system acting from the 
exterior and within the system – e.g. individuals who do not belong to a dominant social status may 
be included in the phenomenon of impunity.  
In our work, impunity is characterized as a form of neutralization or blockage of the 
possibility for implementing the criminal law program of action based on a variety of factors 
(including social bias). This delimitation of the concept does not involve an emphasis on the result 
that the system is expected to produce: impunity should not be equated to the ineffectiveness of the 
criminal justice311. The effectiveness of the system should be evaluated in reference to the 
materialization of a certain result. In order to draw the distinction ineffectiveness/effectiveness the 
observer focuses on the practical enforcement of the rule of law producing a reaction vis-à-vis a 
criminal event. Such result is often represented on the basis of a material outcome312. Some 
                                       
311 Conceptual and practical research problems are manifest when delimiting impunity in accordance with 
the system’s outcomes. These problems can be noticed when studies compare the aggregate of the 
criminal phenomenon (number of crimes) with the convictions produced by the system (e.g. IACHR 
2007; La Rota, Montoya and Uprimny 2010; CCJ 2012; CPJ 2013; Comisión Asesora Política Criminal 
n.d. in CNMH 2013: 197). Generally, this form of measuring impunity results into high numbers, 
showing a state of affairs of the system but at the same time normalizing and broadening impunity. Thus, 
impunity becomes a state of affairs rather than a problem that can be solved. 
312 However, even when working under the traditional framework, the operation of the criminal justice may 
involve results other than imprisonment. In this respect, different commentators (Foucault 1975; Froment 
1996; Shoemaker 2001; van de Kerchove 2005; among others) have affirmed that the enunciation of the 
guilt through a judgment and the sentence became progressively differentiated at both levels, factual and 
juridical. This created a distinction between the results around the operation of the system and the results 
around the traditional outcome. Further from (variable) economic, psychological, emotional and social 
burdens on those convicted and their family members (King 2003: 167), concrete non-material legal 
consequences take place through the mere declaration of responsibility– e.g. the incapacitation for 
exercising certain civil rights (Van de Kerchove 2005: 159). In sum, an assessment on the effectiveness of 
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observers will center their evaluation on the perception of what should be an adequate sanction – 
often evaluated within the box of the modern penal rationality.  
The assessment of the effectiveness of the system is often based on the assumption that 
imprisonment is the appropriate result. This presupposition constitutes an obstacle to innovations 
or alternatives. However, ineffectiveness assessed in reference to the lack of deprivation of liberty 
does not necessarily entail a problem of impunity. This situation may suppose an adequate and 
expected implementation of the criminal law program of action, for instance, when minor offenses 
are tolerated by the system or when a problematic behavior is processed through rather conciliatory 
measures. In short, in the absence of a particular result, we cannot automatically assess that there is 
impunity: how about when an alleged criminal dies in the course of prosecution? How to evaluate 
authentic amnesties or legitimate pardons? In these cases despite the lack of a particular result of 
the criminal law system (ineffectiveness), such system is able to operate autonomously before a 
criminal problematic situation.  
The problem of impunity should not be attached to the evaluation of a certain result.  
Assessing impunity implies evaluating a structural distortion of the system’s operation, consisting 
in a form of containment or suspension of an autonomous proceeding of the criminal law program 
of action. In line with this, an incidental problem in the operation of the system that does not entail a 
neutralization as the one described will not be observed here as a case of impunity.  
Any lack of implementation of the criminal law does not entail a problem of impunity, 
neither any form of implementation removes the problem: the presence of criminal law procedures 
does not create per se a non-impunity scenario. The system itself may operate fraudulent or 
                                                                                                                           
the system with a traditional perspective should evaluate different material and non-material results other 
than imprisonment as possible effects and outcomes of the criminal justice proceedings. 
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surreptitious procedures with the direct purpose of avoiding legal recognition and proper redress of 
the problematic situation. For this reason, different international law mechanisms have recognized 
that the principle of non bis in ídem may be exempted when a person is tried in a manner inconsistent 
with an intent to bring that person to justice, with the purpose of shielding him/her from further 
criminal responsibility (Rome Statute of the ICC Art. 20.3; Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal of Rwanda Art. 9.2; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia Art. 10.2). 
The problem of impunity can be described as the creation of empirical or situational 
sanctuaries blocking the possibility of an autonomous operation of the criminal justice program of 
action. Thus, when observing impunity, the observer should take into consideration the obstacles 
that the criminal law system confronts concerning such possibility. Creating or maintaining 
conditions preventing the criminal law system from implementing its program of action may be 
characterized as a form of dependency on its environment. This type of dependency may emerge 
from the action of other social systems as when segments of the political system are able to impose 
a blockage against the intervention of the criminal law system313.  
Exploring the idea of the sanctuaries, on September 2015, I conducted a series of semi-
structured interviews on the women’s prison El Buen Pastor located in Bogota, Colombia. In this 
fieldwork I explored the representations of the interns of impunity and whether they found it to be 
a problem or not. In this respect one of the interns commented: “Of course impunity is an 
                                       
313 In Colombia, an example of this kind of interference may be the public declaration of the political leader 
Francisco Santos regarding the eventual prosecution against former President Alvaro Uribe because of 
different grave crimes. On behalf of Uribe’s supporters, Mr. Santos stated “If they [the justice system] put a 
finger on Uribe, the country sets on fire. And it burns down on the hands of the president; because we all 
know that the responsibility for this lays on Juan Manuel Santos” (El Tiempo 2014a). 
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important problem! So many bad things happen here, but nothing happens [afterwards]”. In her 
answer, she was referring to an official state of apathy before different violent acts that some of the 
guardians and the other interns inflicted on each other; in other words, she was describing the 
presence of a form of indoor impunity, inside the institution of prison itself. In this situation, a 
paradox emerges: the prison that is designed to punish people can be a place where structures of 
impunity are created parallel to (and eventually to support) punishment.  
The fact that impunity may be detected as a problem within the framework of traditional 
punishment (imprisonment) is eloquent. As we can see in our example, the sentence of 
imprisonment is not conflicting with the phenomenon of impunity and, for this reason, it is not by 
itself a direct and infallible solution to the problem. The fact that impunity can be found inside the 
framework of imprisonment -the modern criminal law sanction par excellence, makes it 
particularly visible that impunity is different from the issue of imprisonment. This problem should 
be rather understood related to the possibility of action of the criminal justice system towards 
criminal problematic situations. With this respect, the observation of impunity should only be 
based on the lack of implementation of the criminal law system? How about when other legal sub-
systems address the problematic situation developing different forms of legal intervention?  
As we have affirmed, the conceptualization of the present work is built with respect to 
problematic situations susceptible of criminalization. For this reason, the phenomenon is 
constructed in reference to the program of action of the criminal law. Identifying the criminal law 
as the point of reference for the conceptualization does not mean that in order to put an end to 
impunity we need to criminalize every crime-related situation. Neither does it mean that the 
operation of other law sub-systems or jurisdictions is irrelevant for the observation of impunity.  
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A valid indicator of the possibility of the criminal law system operating without a problem 
of neutralization may be the reaction of other jurisdictions314. In this sense, the lack of legal 
intervention from other legal subsystems may be an empirical factor of the obstruction of the 
criminal law program of action. For instance, in the PJ case, we can observe the presence of social 
mechanisms of impunity due to various obstacles put in place to prevent the autonomous operation 
of the criminal justice system, but also to avoid any other form of social recognition and legal 
redress of the problematic situation as a whole.  
As described in the last part of the research, the obstruction that the operation of the system 
suffers in cases of state criminality may refer to a relational obstacle. In this sense, the 
neutralization involves an environmental element obstructing the possibility of operation of its 
program of action. This form of the phenomenon is particularly present in cases of state crime, 
involving the action of a social system capable of creating a neutralization on the possibility for 
implementing the criminal law system. 
Consequently, according to our conceptualization, impunity is related to environmental 
burdens against the criminal law system.  In this sense and in accordance with the findings of the 
present research, state criminality may be depicted through indicators of undue pressure against the 
criminal law system such as improper influence, inducement, threat or interference, and attacks 
against the independence, competence or impartiality of the criminal law system. In sum, the 
phenomenon of impunity may be empirically observed and constructed in reference to those undue 
pressures acting against the criminal justice system affecting the possibility for implementing its 
                                       
314 In this sense, we should not discard non-criminal legal systems as scenarios for observing the 
phenomenon of impunity for the crimes, even though the issue of impunity should be studied in reference to 
the criminal justice system. 
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program of action. The proposed conceptualization of impunity (like any other concept) gives rise 
to questions on the empirical factors allowing to observe the phenomenon in social life.  
These explorations, in our perspective, should not be focused on evaluating the existence or 
extent of punishment. In different situations, the absence of a legal consequence does not involve the 
presence of a mechanism of impunity315. Hence, as asserted before, impunity is different from 
effectiveness, because it does not depend on the presence of certain results (prison, poor conditions 
of internment, suffering of the perpetrators, among others) but on the possibility for implementing the 
criminal law program of action.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
315 As studied before, for instance, impunity is different from amnesty. While the latter consists on 
legitimate political measures waiving certain wrongdoing as a form of political recognition of the wrong 
which expressly declines the legal consequences arising from the violation, impunity undermines the 
acknowledgement of the wrongdoing through its obfuscation, denial or total invisibilization. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
In social discourses, impunity is a pervasive term and ambiguous notion. The slogan of the 
fight against impunity has gained political and legal unanimity, even though its content, extent and 
significance remain unclear. However equivocal, contemporary societies understand this 
phenomenon as a social problem that needs to be addressed. Discourses embracing impunity, 
mainly present before the nineteenth century, currently seem demoted, outdated and impertinent as 
a legitimate claim.  
Considering the multiple meanings that impunity bears in social discourses, this research 
referred to it as a medium capable of mobilizing a variety of significances, connotations and social 
claims. Indeed, in addition to the chaos of meaning found in ordinary social communications, the 
specialized literature on the field does not offer significant clarifications. In this research, we found 
a great number of works that denounce the existence of impunity and demand for counter-action, 
without further characterizations of the problem; others seek to measure the phenomenon, with 
blatant problems of delimitation of the object to be quantified; and some attempt at assessing its 
causes and consequences, without introducing a problematized account of the phenomenon. In 
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short, it is rare to find a conceptual problematization, characterization and elucidation of what is 
being measured, assessed or denounced: ultimately, what is impunity? 
Moreover, most of these works employ a conventional notion of impunity, which refers to 
the absence of adequate punishment. This understanding either overlooks, ignores or evades any 
critical consideration of the manner traditional structures of criminal law have constructed its form 
of responding to crime. Thus, besides a problem of conceptual vagueness, this research argues that 
the fight against impunity has fostered the reproduction of the traditional penal rationality centered 
in the temporized infliction of pain implemented through the standard institution of prison.  
In order to characterize the traditional penal thought, we have resorted to the theory of the 
modern penal rationality. This theory shows that the criminal law has constituted a delimited 
subsystem of law, equipped and endowed with the goal, mission and identity of punishment as a 
measure of intended pain infliction. This identity has been justified and developed through a series 
of theories of punishment which coexist and generally agree on identifying punishment as the 
obligation of the State arising from criminal behavior, as well as a right of the society and the 
highest expression of the victims’ rights. This system of ideas has provided the criminal law with 
copious philosophical grounds, reproducing and justifying the social function of pain infliction 
through the justice system. 
In line with this, the criminal law program of action has been endowed with the obligation 
to react to crime through negative316, abstract317, atomistic318 and hostile measures against those 
                                       
316 An adverse reaction against the negativeness of the criminal conduct to affirm the positiveness of the 
social system. 
317 Despite the wide variety of conducts and social problems immersed in the criminal phenomenon, the 
system addresses concrete problematic situations through measures focused on the deprivation of liberty, 
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people found to be responsible for criminal conduct. In accordance with this idea, when the notion 
of impunity is limited to the exemption from punishment319, the lack of implementation of the 
deprivation of liberty is considered the focus of the problem of impunity. Imprisonment thus becomes 
its solution, hindering other possible forms of addressing the issue, its causes and consequences.  
With the aim of overcoming the conceptual ambiguity and the critical deficits of the notion 
of impunity and with the purpose of offering clear theoretical distinctions and enabling stable 
empirical observations, the present research offered an in-depth reflection on the conceptualization 
of impunity through the initial question: how can we observe, conceptualize and characterize 
impunity from a socio-legal perspective through the study of state crime? 
Although delimiting impunity seems to be complex and its conceptualization appears to be 
a difficult task, we studied it as a phenomenon in the sense that it presents concrete social 
manifestations. It is precisely because impunity does not constitute a mere artifice and introduces 
different social problems that we need to develop better analytical tools for its study, improving its 
understanding and offering eventual theoretical and practical contributions.  
With this purpose, one of the first obstacles of observation is the delimitation of the source on 
the problem of impunity. Although in academic works there can be found a variety of wrongs to 
which the concept of impunity is applied320, the etymological construction of impunity in contrast to 
                                                                                                                           
which are not particularly concerned with addressing the problems and restoring the necessities that the 
conflict raises. 
318 The preservation of the social links between the offender and the society is indifferent to the action of the 
criminal law system. 
319 “Impunity obviously refers specifically to punishment: it declares the absence or deprivation of 
deserved punishment of guilty perpetrators to be an injustice” (Pensky 2008). 
320 Anti-impunity campaigns often embrace extremely varied wrongdoing. Such a wide scope includes 
human rights violations, political deviance, moral misconduct and different kinds of harm. This form of 
framing impunity broadens its reach to the point that is viewed as pertinent to every social wrong and 
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punishment has drawn a visible relation of this phenomenon with the operation of the criminal law 
system. Thus, among the universe of (mis)conducts that the literature of impunity takes into 
consideration when employing this term, most works agree on taking the phenomenon of crime as a 
basis of observation. In this line, we limited the use of impunity to problematic situations that can be 
defined as crime through the materialization of a problematic behavior criminalized by the criminal 
law. 
Given the wide diversity of conducts that the phenomenon of crime comprises, we decided 
to select a particular form of criminality that could enable a rich account of the complexity of the 
phenomenon, yet leading to clear delimitations of the subject. The analysis of this research is 
developed through the study of state criminality. This type of criminality was thus selected as a 
privileged point of observation of the phenomenon of impunity, taking into account at least three 
factors: a theoretical aspect, an empirical characteristic and a personal experience. 
Regarding the theoretical factor, most of state crime literature referred to the problems of 
control of such actions by the legal system.  Either due to the implementation of strategies of 
denial, or to the interference or obstruction against the legal system, or as a result of the inability of 
the judiciary to process such behaviors, these problematic situations are presented by the literature 
as constantly excluded from the possibility of control from the criminal law program of action. 
Regarding the empirical aspect, we conducted a case study of an event of enforced 
disappearance that took place in Colombia. This event was initiated on November 6, 1985, when an 
armed unit of the M19 guerrilla took over the national Palace of Justice. The President ordered the 
                                                                                                                           
relevant for extremely different contexts, possibly becoming a cultural feature (‘a culture of impunity’). 
This form of constructing the problem, we argue, may be advantageous for raising regret about the 
problem but certainly sacrifices its conceptual distinction, its empirical observation and its repressive 
resonances in the criminal law system. 
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ceasefire but his command was not respected by the Armed Forces. After twenty-eight hours of 
combat, the Armed Forces regained control of the building. Due to the battle, one hundred people 
were killed, including eleven Justices from the Supreme Court and the Council of State. A number of 
hostages were also released. Some of them, however, were identified, interrogated, and listed as M19 
supporters. Eleven of those hostages, mostly workers of the cafeteria and visitors, were disappeared. 
After the siege, different legal procedures were undertaken. Focusing on the prosecution 
against the officer who was in charge of the PJ field operation, we were able to visualize and 
explore different strategies of containment of the legal scrutiny. After twenty years of paralysis, the 
criminal justice finally walked out from that state. Although there was a multiplicity of procedures 
in place partially recognizing the wrongdoing and presenting some forms of reparation and 
acknowledgement coming from the State, the legal action has not furnished information on the 
whereabouts of the majority of the disappeared, the criminal justice has been unable to reach a 
final conviction to determine the criminal responsibility of any person and what happened to the 
victims remains concealed to their families and the society.  
With reference to the experiential criterion, this type of criminality was selected based on 
an experience of victimization suffered by the author of this research. In 1998 my father, a 
committed human rights defender, was assassinated in Colombia. In a private audience, the 
Attorney General told my family: ‘There is nothing to be done, it is a state crime’. This expression, 
coming from the head of the criminal prosecutors, arouse my interest in researching on the link 
between the phenomenon of impunity and state crime.  
From a methodological point of view, this personal experience has a double interest. On the 
one hand, it shows that an observer who is a “victim” himself of this type of criminality can 
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develop a sociological research on a theme related to his experience sustaining a critical and 
humanist perspective vis-à-vis the traditional philosophy of intervention of the criminal law 
system. On the other hand, this experience allowed us to combine an observation from the interior 
of the problem with an external observation derived from the sociological knowledge. 
When we initiated our study on the subject of state criminality, we found different 
oppositions to the concept and a degree of opacity that needed to be addressed in order to advance 
into our inquiries. In this context, the first objective of the present research was to elucidate and 
characterize this form of criminality, not as a legal notion corresponding to an individualized 
criminal offense, but as a criminological category of observation that, from the point of view of the 
law, corresponds to different criminal offenses.  
Although relegated by the mainstream legal thought, state criminality has presented a long 
history of legal reflection. While the genealogy of the notion tends to locate the origins of this 
concept within sociology and criminology, the developments from the international law inaugurate 
different debates around this notion. As such, these discussions are valuable for a sociological 
evaluation of the characteristics and problems surrounding the notion.  
With this respect, the international law debate at the ILC allowed us visualizing the 
difficulties for the governments to acknowledge the existence of this form of criminality. Among 
the legal problems raised in the discussions, a constant concern was the difficulty to assess the 
legal consequences attributable to the wrongdoing and the competent forum for responsibility321.  
Through these debates we were capable to conclude that, on the one hand, the notion of (state) 
                                       
321 Indeed, the rejection of the notion of state crime in the ILC work was based on the impossibility of 
reaching a consensus on the legal consequences attributable to the phenomenon. With this respect, the work 
of the ILC represents the traditional legal reasoning around criminal phenomena emphasizing on its 
attributable legal consequences. 
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crime constructed in reference to its legal consequences (sanction) limits the sociological 
knowledge around criminal problematic situations to finding an ‘adequate’ legal response; and, on 
the other hand, this analysis contributed to show the lack of innovation of the self-portrait and 
objective of the criminal law system.  
Indeed, the conventional form of understanding the criminal law intervention emerging 
from the discussions remains limited to the responsibility of individuals under a traditional 
framework of criminal penalties (mainly focused in prison time), excluding the possibility for 
attributing criminal responsibility to the organizations that support, tolerate or instigate the 
wrongdoing, especially if they are States. This literature also fails to recognize or construct forms 
of conflict resolution beyond the traditional framework of the criminal law legislative program. 
This last consideration is a major problem for the construction of a notion of state 
criminality. This category of crime entails a form of organizational wrongdoing which relies on 
realizing and verbalizing the organizational character of the authorship. The observation of state 
crime involves realizing two coupled levels of participation and accountability: the collective or 
organizational and the individual. From our perspective, in the case of state criminality the State is 
not merely an abstract entity. As an organization, the State produces an institutional arrangement 
and is composed by a series of organizations, coordinated through a system of government that 
operates based on the work of public officials and other de iure and de facto agents.  
From a sociological perspective, the criminality of the State refers not only to the individual 
as the source of the criminal behavior, but also and fundamentally to the structural and 
organizational involvement of the State in the problematic situation. State criminality is not a mere 
act of individual deviance. For this reason, in order to characterize it, the observer should be able to 
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depict a criminal organizational goal. The existence of a common program of action providing a 
general direction for the criminal conduct is not always in place. State goals may be explicit -in the 
form of public policies, political discourses or war propaganda, as they may be secret or obfuscated 
– in these cases the presence of the organizational aim may only be detectable through an inference 
concluding the lack of a different plausible explanation for the actions. 
These elements involve some difficulty for visualizing state criminality and, furthermore, 
involve a challenge for their legal scrutiny. As we said before, this type of criminality explicitly 
underscores the problem of impunity. State crime studies raise as a general concern the legal scrutiny 
of this type of wrongdoing. In this context, we observed that the subtraction of the criminal conduct 
from the organized operations of the criminal justice system involved a strategy of obstruction of the 
legal system which is not simply characterizable as the avoidance of the system reaction but as the 
creation of a space allegedly immune to its intervention. Indeed, the implementation and design of 
different strategies of containment of the legal control is eloquent in cases of state crime. In this 
context, we observed that the problem of impunity indicates that certain conducts or certain people 
are placed beyond the possibilities of intervention of the criminal law system.  
With this respect, the metaphor of the sanctuary was employed in this work to describe the 
constitution of zones of containment from legal redress, which are not legal entitlements but 
constitute empirical forms of suppression of the legal intervention. The creation and preservation of 
conditions that prevent the possibility for implementing the criminal law intervention may refer to the 
participation of different actors and social systems obstructing its possibility of action and creating 
different conditions of containment. Under these conditions, an assessment of impunity involves an 
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evaluation of the criminal justice system possibility of action or, conversely, the identification of 
constraints or obstacles that the system confronts for implementing its program of action. 
In the PJ case, through thirty-one in-depth interviews, the observation in situ of different 
commemorations and other official acts, in addition to literature and media reviews, we were able 
to inquire into the views of the victims and the judicial operators about these empirical obstacles in 
the case. While the justice operators represented punishment as a legal obligation and some of the 
victims perceived impunity as a matter of inflicting suffering, other values, ideas, claims and 
aspirations emerged from our field work.  
Under the traditional understanding of impunity, the victims’ rights are usually constructed 
around an archetypical need of retribution and voluntary infliction of suffering without any 
concern for the “social inclusion” of individuals. Indeed, a common assertion of anti-impunity 
discourses is that the victims construct their expectations focusing on the basis of a ‘retributive 
justice’ (that the victims ask for the imprisonment of the responsible actors of the violations). In 
other words, these discourses identify the victims with what the dominant penal philosophy of the 
system promises to achieve. In the case study, we found some assertions that reproduced this form 
of circularity: some victims understood (proportional) infliction of suffering as the adequate 
measure for countervailing impunity and accomplishing ‘justice’. These discourses reproduce the 
MPR ideas of infliction of suffering through prison time and also, eventually, through precarious 
conditions of imprisonment.   
However, in the case study, the victims also raised different views of justice giving 
relevance to the acknowledgement of the wrongdoing and to reparations. Indeed, some victims 
framed the combat against impunity as a matter of knowing the truth, finding the disappeared, 
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divulgating the violations, receiving an apology, achieving social awareness, or witnessing the 
acknowledgment of responsibility for the wrongdoing coming from the responsible agents or from 
State institutions such as the military - these discourses remain outside the Penal Modern 
Rationality system of thought.  
Among the different ingredients raised in the interviews we found that some of the victims 
argued that impunity was related to the preservation of the power and status of the criminal actors. 
In the case, the fact that retired Col. Plazas was imprisoned in the same space that he commanded 
when the taking of the Palace of Justice took place did not annul his position of power and did not 
acknowledge his wrongdoings; after all, he was placed under the shelter of the exact same 
organization that participated in the crimes. This form of implementation of the sentence awarded 
by the Courts (afterwards annulled by the Supreme Court), placed him physically and symbolically 
at the heart of the organization and structure of power that was engaged in the actions of state 
criminality. This form of deprivation of liberty was perceived by the victims and some justice 
operators as a form of privilege creating and maintaining a structure of immunization after the 
declaration of guilt. All the actors of the case, including the retired Colonel, perceived that these 
measures were a manner to protect his military ranking, which led to the neutralization of the 
reproach of the criminal law system.  
This empirical material was relevant for our reconstruction of the concept of impunity. 
Through the PJ case, we noticed that some of the ideas attached to the medium impunity were 
independent of the notion of punishment understood as a mechanism of voluntary pain infliction. 
Considering this, in our work we conceptualized impunity as a form of neutralization or constraint 
against the autonomous intervention criminal law program of action. Impunity understood as a 
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blockage of the possibility for implementing the program of action of the criminal law presents a 
form of dependence of the criminal law system with its environment. 
This conceptualization was valuable for the empirical observation of the case study and at 
the same time allowed us to address different concerns that we found when studying the social 
discourses about impunity. With respect to our concern regarding the reproduction of the structures 
of repression of the modern penal rationality, this conceptualization allowed us to replace the 
center of gravity for the conceptualization of impunity from the system of ideas of modern penal 
rationality -emphasizing in the (proportional) infliction of suffering, to the possibility for the 
implementation of the criminal law program of action. This construction suggest possible different 
ways to think the philosophy of intervention of the criminal law system, and gives space for 
alternatives to the criminal law system itself (provided that these alternatives include forms of 
recognizing the wrongdoing and guaranteeing reparations for the victims). 
In fact, as we saw, the ordinary functioning of the criminal law system is characterized by 
the impossibility of processing the universe of crime-related problems. Only a handful of conducts 
available for the internalization of the criminal justice (criminal behaviors) are selected by the 
system to fall into its operation. Selection is the condition for the system to operate. This is not 
only due to a problem of the possibilities of the system confronting the universe of criminal 
behavior (radically enlarged worldwide), but is also based on different legal and rational criteria 
that act as legal constraints for the identification of a situation as criminal or its prosecution by the 
criminal justice. Impunity should be constructed independently from this fact; in other words, it is 
not a state of affairs of the system, it rather is a problem for the functioning of the criminal justice. 
Otherwise, how are we supposed to combat it?  
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Concept of impunity 
Deconstruction Reconstruction 
Impunity is not the lack of criminal 
conviction for a violation of the criminal law. 
The concept of impunity refers to the 
neutralization of the possibility for the 
autonomous intervention of the 
criminal law. 
Impunity is not the lack of a criminal law 
punishment. 
Impunity does not mean the lack of a measure 
of intended pain infliction and the structures 
of the modern penal rationality. 
The concept of impunity differs from the 
assessment on the effectiveness or efficiency 
of the criminal justice. 
The concept of impunity differs from 
alternative ways of conceiving punishment or 
even from alternatives to punishment. 
The notion of impunity refers to the 
possibility of intervention of the 
criminal justice and it does not include 
the implementation of innovative 
measures of redress. The absence of 
any form of legal recognition and 
reaction through other legal 
mechanisms is an indicator of impunity. 
Impunity is not to be equated to transitional 
justice mechanisms and proper amnesties 
allowing the recognition of the wrongdoing 
and enabling other systems of redress. 
The concept of impunity differs from 
judgments based on the obligation to inflict 
suffering voluntarily on the person declared 
responsible for crime. 
The concept of impunity includes forms 
of nullifying the intervention of the 
legal system as when the sanction is 
neutralized by forms of rewards and 
privileges invalidating the reproach for 
the wrongs. 
The notion of impunity differs from the lack of 
precarious conditions in the implementation of 
the legal measures of redress. 
As the Law Commission of Canada (1976: 16) stated, the criminal law is a system of 
applied morality and justice that should serve to underline those values important to society. 
Understanding punishment as a mechanism of intended pain infliction and as a standard, required, 
mandatory and, further, ideal response to human suffering derived from crime, may hinder the 
visualization of the social needs that the criminal problematic situation raises and the observer may 
become unaware of responses other than the criminal law penalties – “[the n]aive belief that every 
 371 
 
 
problem can be solved by ‘having a law against it’ has proliferated statutes, regulations and 
offences” (Law Commission of Canada 1976: 17). This perception overlooks multiple claims and 
different values that victims may uphold towards a harmful conduct performed against them.  
Either beyond or with the slogan of the combat against impunity, the traditional fight 
against impunity relying in the structures of the traditional penal rationality should be replaced by a 
program of action oriented to visualize and countervail the structures obstructing the criminal 
justice and, particularly, should focus on constructive measure oriented to the recognition of the 
criminal conducts and the reparations for the victims. “The way in which we respond to various 
types of conduct is a reflection of the type of society that we want to live in. If we are to use one or 
many intervention strategies, then we ought to consider how they measure up against some of our 
key democratic values” (Law Commission of Canada 2003: 4).  
The possibility of innovating the system of ideas around the penal rationality and creating 
forms of accountability different from imprisonment – and particularly from severe forms of 
imprisonment, may be a plausible mean for the objective of humanizing legal responsibilities, 
preserving social relations, redressing the victims and addressing social problems around the 
phenomenon of criminality. In this context, perhaps, as Tulkens (2013: 10) asserts with respect to the 
MPR theory, we should reflect not on a new theory of punishment, but more fundamentally and 
radically on a new theory of legal intervention. This project can be nourished by a human rights 
agenda with a critical capacity vis-à-vis the current philosophy of intervention of the criminal law 
system but, fundamentally, creating a space for innovation before wrongdoing and its accountability.  
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